February 1, 1916 (12th Parliament, 6th Session)


George Perry Graham



Possibly the Government does not know these men are being, canvassed. I say the Government should concentrate and bring together these funds,, and let the people know that the Government is supplying the necessities. Then the Patriotic Fund could be reserved for-oomforts, for looking after those who suffer-in disasters, or through the dozen and one-things that may happen to the families or . to the soldiers, which cannot be provided: against in any statute you may pass.
In regard to a few lessons from the-war, 1 think one of the first lessons we have learned is that the farmers-of Canada have succeeded by a super-

human effort in increasing their
production during the past year.
If you go into some of the homes in the province of Ontario-and I suppose this is true 'everywhere-you will find that the men there., at the request of the powers that be, work longer hours and harder than they have done for a long time in order that they may produce more. This is also applicable to the manufacturers of the Dominion who1 have shown that they can speed up and compete with any people in the world. I criticised the War Office a Sew moments ago, but I am not surprised that Great Britain thought we could not do anything in this country in the manufacturing line.
I remember not so very long ago reading a document which the Prime Minister placed upon the table of the House as coming from the First Lord of the Admiralty, to explain why we could not make ships in Canada. Two of the reasons given were: first, that it required very firm ground on which to have the shipyards established; and, second, that it needed cranes of 150 tons capacity to handle the ships. These were two reasons given by the Admiralty itself, and when the Government of Canada endorsed them, of course, the War Office thought that we could not make shells or anything of that kind. They would not bother with people who had not earth strong enough to hold up a ship and who were not able to build cranes of 150 tons' capacity. They took us at our word, and perhaps that is the reason why they said to Russia and France: Go to the
United States; Canada says she cannot do anything. I will not discuss that point any further, but I will just point out when a man starts on a wrong road where it is apt to lead him. The Government never thought, when they accepted these reasons for not being able To build ships in Canada, that so soon Canada herself, through her manufacturing establishments, would give them a direct denial and would show the people of the whole world that in Canada the artisans and mechanics and manufacturers could do anything that could be done with machinery anywhere.
Another thing that we have learned from the war is that the naval policy of this Government is of no use in time of stress. Had the policy of the right hon. gentleman who sits at my right (Sir Wilfrid Laurier) not been repudiated by the Government, the Minister of Agriculture

(Mr. Burrell) would not have been in such trouble as he was on the British Columbia coast. That brings me to the question of submarines. I am going to discuss it from another angle, because I am trying to discuss everything at some angle from which it has not been viewed previously. I am not going to argue that too much money was paid for the submarines, or that they were no good. I am going to take Sir Richard McBride at his word and follow his statement up with evidence from the Minister of Agriculture. First I will ask the question: were the submarines needed? Yes. Why were they needed? Because British Columbia, on its coast, was naked of the first vestige of defence. I think I agree with Sir Richard and the Minister of Agriculture on that point. Why was it naked?

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