December 20, 1974

LIB

James Alexander Jerome (Speaker of the House of Commons)

Liberal

Mr. Speaker:

Is it the pleasure of the House to adopt the said motion?

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Sub-subtopic:   ANNOUNCEMENT OF CHRISTMAS RECESS
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?

Some hon. Members:

Agreed.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Sub-subtopic:   ANNOUNCEMENT OF CHRISTMAS RECESS
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Motion agreed to.


LIB

James Alexander Jerome (Speaker of the House of Commons)

Liberal

Mr. Speaker:

Now that the motion has carried, may I thank all hon. members who spoke on the motion for the complimentary and kind remarks which were directed to me. Personally, I can scarcely believe that three months have gone by since I was first dragged to this podium kicking and resisting. I can only say that whatever success may have been attributed to me, as it was this morning, it was only possible because of the reservoir of good will and mutual respect existing in this chamber. For I can only say that regardless of the vigour, strength and deep-seated differences of opinion of hon. members of this chamber, there exists among them a level of respect and an amount of good will that is impossible to beat down, regardless of circumstances; and although at times it may be strained almost to the breaking point, it always redounds to the profound respect for and reputation of this chamber.

As a token of my appreciation for that good will which has carried me along, may I extend an invitation to hon. members: I ask them to join me in room 16 at five o'clock and, as is customary, I ask the guardian angels in their lofty positions on high-as described by the hon. member for Peace River (Mr. Baldwin)-to join us so that we may have the opportunity to pay one another the compliments of the season. I have asked the very excellent choir from Sudbury, the Marion Singers, to grace the hall at noon and at five o'clock with suitable music. I hope that hon. members and others will be able to join us at that time.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Sub-subtopic:   ANNOUNCEMENT OF CHRISTMAS RECESS
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ANNOUNCEMENT OF SAFEGUARDS IN RESPECT OF EXPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, FACILITIES AND TECHNOLOGY

LIB

Donald Stovel Macdonald (Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources)

Liberal

Hon. Donald S. Macdonald (Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources):

Mr. Speaker, I am announcing today the decision of the government to require more stringent safeguards in respect of the sale abroad of Canadian nuclear technology, facilities and material. I will in this statement set forth some of the important elements of that decision including the safeguards that must be met by any country seeking to purchase a nuclear facility, technology, or material from Canada. Not only will these binding safeguards apply to all future sales, but the government has decided to negotiate additional safeguards in respect of uranium supply contracts already approved. Existing contracts and contracts pending will be allowed to proceed during the course of the next calendar year while new safeguards are being negotiated.

The events that led to the review by the government of nuclear safeguards are well known to hon. members.

Canada's commitment to nuclear power as a peaceful energy source extends back almost 30 years. As a result of

December 20, 1974

intensive research and development over that period, Canada is now in the fortunate position of possessing, in addition to a large uranium resource, one of the most successful of the world's nuclear reactor systems- CANDU.

The spread of international acceptance of CANDU has coincided lately with a radical alteration in the international energy situation. Reliance on imported oil to satisfy the bulk of their energy needs has become, for most countries, especially those of the developing world, a particularly onerous burden on their economies.

It has become demonstrably clear that additional energy sources are needed urgently; nuclear power is the single most important other new source that is now commercially feasible and many countries are making the decision to use it. Canada has already made a decision to rely for part of its energy requirements on nuclear power and a number of countries have turned to us to supply fuel, technology or equipment. With uranium resources in excess of our requirements and a competitive Canadian reactor, we are in the position to make an important contribution to the pressing energy needs of the world and are willing to make it.

At the same time, the government is more than ever conscious of its responsibility to ensure that Canadian nuclear resources do not contribute to nuclear proliferation. This requires that Canada should apply the maximum "safeguards" or restraints attainable to inhibit importing states from using nuclear supplies to further the production of nuclear explosive devices.

The export of certain nuclear equipment, including reactors, fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants, heavy water plants and their major components, and related technology, will require safeguards.

I would like now to outline the provisions that will be required in every safeguards arrangement. The provisions, to be administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency, or through appropriate alternative procedures meeting the requirements of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, will cover all nuclear facilities and equipment supplied by Canada for the life of those facilities and equipment. They will cover all nuclear facilities and equipment using Canadian-supplied technology. They will cover all nuclear material-uranium, thorium, plutonium, heavy water-supplied by Canada, and future generations of fissile material produced from or with these materials. They will cover all nuclear materials, whatever their origin, produced or processed in facilities supplied by Canada.

Most importantly, all safeguards arrangements will contain binding assurance that Canadian-supplied nuclear material, equipment and technology will not be used to produce a nuclear explosives device, whether the development of such a device be stated to be for peaceful purposes or not.

All potential Canadian exporters of nuclear material, equipment or technology are advised that prior to making offers of supply, they must ascertain from the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce and the Atomic Energy Control Board that there are no safeguards impediments.

Nuclear Safeguards

Mr. Speaker, while adopting the safeguards I have outlined, Canada will of course continue to work with other exporting nations of strengthen the international safeguards structure.

Future exports of the CANDU reactor, along with the major programs of coristruction already underway and planned domestically, will bring significant benefits to employment in the high technology nuclear industry of Canada.

To ensure that Canadians enjoy the economic gains from sales abroad, the government will encourage the supply from Canada of major high technology components and services. In regard to domestic nuclear power programs, the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, in cooperation with my department and with Atomic Energy of Canada Limited will consult with the provinces to establish a cooperative approach of preference for Canadian material, equipment and services.

The Canadian nuclear equipment industry at present has the capacity to produce the components for the nuclear steam supply system for at least three nuclear reactors a year. Domestic requirements will average four units every year over the remainder of this decade, while exports could add at least one additional unit every year. Nearly $100 million in capital investment has already been committed or planned by the private sector of the industry to expand capacity. Future domestic and export demands will stimulate a further expansion involving perhaps another $100 million industrial investment.

The Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce will examine the advisability of providing selective assistance through its incentive programs to help the industry upgrade its capability.

Contingent on compliance with the new safeguard structures required for nuclear exports, the government has authorized Atomic Energy of Canada Limited to negotiate the following sales:

With Argentina, the supply of goods and services for the nuclear part of a second 600 megawatt CANDU nuclear power station. Subject to escalation, these goods and services are estimated at $90 million, and the heavy water at a further $60 million.

With Iran, the supply of goods and services for two 600 megawatt CANDU nuclear power units, and possibly two additional. .

With the Republic of Korea, the supply of goods and services for one complete nuclear reactor power unit.

Once again subject to full compliance with the safeguard requirements, and in so far as Canadian capacity permits, the government has further authorized AECL to negotiate the following:

With Denmark, the supply of goods and services for the nuclear part of a CANDU nuclear power station.

With Romania, agreements covering CANDU-PHW (Pressurizing Heavy Water) licensing, AECL consultancy, fuel design, development and manufacturing, heavy water production and plant construction, and a scientific and technical exchange.

December 20, 1974

Nuclear Safeguards

With the United Kingdom, agreements covering CAN-DU/SGHWR (PTHWR) technological exchange, and supply of heavy water. (SGHWR: Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor; PTHWR: Pressure Tube Heavy Water Reactor).

With the Italian company, Pregettazioni Meccaniche Nucleari, a licensing agreement to supply CANDU reactor units in Italy.

The government has reaffirmed the policy guidelines on uranium enrichment as announced on August I, 1973. Canadian involvement in uranium enrichment will be determined within those guidelines.

Canada has made the decisions on safeguards that I have just outlined in the spirit of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which is designed not only to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons but to ensure the benefits of lower cost energy are shared by all nations.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   ANNOUNCEMENT OF SAFEGUARDS IN RESPECT OF EXPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, FACILITIES AND TECHNOLOGY
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?

Some hon. Members:

Hear, hear!

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   ANNOUNCEMENT OF SAFEGUARDS IN RESPECT OF EXPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, FACILITIES AND TECHNOLOGY
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PC

James Balfour

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Jim Balfour (Regina East):

Mr. Speaker, we on this side of the House welcome any strengthening of the safeguards to restrict Canadian nuclear materials to peaceful applications. As a country with substantial reserves of uranium and the hard-earned technology to build nuclear reactors, Canada now finds itself on the horns of a moral dilemma. On the one hand, the third world is pressing for access to the nuclear energy already enjoyed by the more developed nations. Yet on the other hand, sales of uranium and nuclear reactors to an increasing number of previously non-nuclear nations significantly raise the danger and probability of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We are being asked to weigh the goal of achieving equity with regard to energy sources against the spectre of a nuclear holocaust. And let us make no mistake: as we have seen in India, with a supply of uranium and reprocessing technology that is widely available any country can construct a nuclear bomb with the plutonium from a CANDU reactor.

This is why the issue of safeguards on nuclear exports is so vital, and why several questions must be asked about the minister's statement. First, we take for granted from the minister's statement that the retroactive safeguards which he intends to negotiate will be at least as restrictive as those which he has said he intends to impose with respect to future sales of nuclear fuel and technology. Second, let us recognize that Canada maintains three distinct types of nuclear exports: nuclear material, primarily uranium; nuclear equipment, specifically CANDU reactors; and nuclear technology, the know-how to construct these reactors.

To date we have had some success in applying safeguards to the first two types of exports, but the challenge now is to control the uses to which our technology is put. The government's safeguards are not nearly strong enough to do this job effectively. Even though we will, under the new guidelines proposed today by the minister, inspect the CANDU plants we build ourselves in many developing countries, this does nothing to prevent these countries from copying our reactors exactly and their using the

plutonium produced in such reactors to construct an explosive device. For this reason it seems only reasonable that a further safeguard, before we export our reactors, is to require an agreement which provides for inspection of a nation's entire nuclear facilities, not just the plants we build, to ensure that they are devoted to peaceful uses.

We in this party are particularly concerned about this in view of the minister's reference to the large number of nuclear transactions under negotiation at this time with countries which have not ratified the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. I think particularly of Pakistan, Japan, India, Argentina, the Republic of Korea and Italy.

We should be putting all possible pressure on these nations to ratify that treaty and to submit to the International Atomic Energy Agency inspections for which it calls. Indeed, Mr. Speaker, our own ratification of the non-proliferation treaty suggests to me that we should not be shipping nuclear materials to several Euratom countries until they ratify and accept stronger safeguards of the NPT calibre.

The reference in the minister's statement today to the policy guidelines on uranium enrichment announced August 1, 1973 is totally inadequate to meet this situation. The minister's failure to detail specifically the safeguards to be applied to the export of enriched uranium leads to the conclusion that Canada should not involve itself in the export of enriched uranium until specific policies to meet the situation have been worked out and have received the approval of parliament. That, we submit, should be the government's position. But if it is not, and if the government is prepared to go ahead and export enriched uranium from the James Bay area to a country like France-and we have heard this discussed-then it is time the Canadian people were told far more about this project than they have to date.

As the minister knows, the more uranium is enriched, the more easily it is converted into nuclear explosive. Fully enriched uranium is as dangerous and fissile as plutonium itself, the key component of a nuclear bomb. Are we going to export such a substance to a country like France which has an active program of nuclear testing and has never signed the non-proliferation treaty? In 1965, the then Prime Minister, Mr. Pearson, specifically refused to export natural uranium to France. How much more important is it today not to export a far more dangerous form of enriched uranium to that country without absolutely stringent guarantees that it will in no way facilitate or free up their own resources for their military program?

We welcome the minister's assurance that Canada will demand safeguards and inspection rights as strong as those formulated by the IAEA, but as Canada's delegate to that body's eighteenth general conference himself affirmed, those standards are still not strong enough. In particular, as the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich (Mr. Munro) mentioned last week, we must demand a full accounting for all the plutonium produced from Canadian uranium or Canadian built reactors in other countries. In addition to that, to put some teeth into our nuclear contracts, Canada should be working to negotiate an agreement with all uranium producing and reactor selling countries to boycott any nation which acquires nuclear

December 20, 1974

material and then breaks a bilateral agreement on the subject.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, we would like to see more attention paid to the dangers associated with the transportation and disposal of nuclear materials. The dangers to the environment from plutonium, a substance which must be buried for 25,000 years before it is safe, cannot be exaggerated. It has been estimated that there are over 100,000 people in the world today with the expertise to build an atom bomb, which needs only 11 pounds of plutonium to construct one in the 20 kiloton range; and one must view the danger of a terrorist group getting their hands on a nuclear device as very real indeed. Canada has a responsibility also to develop safeguards against these eventualities.

Some years ago Albert Einstein said: "The splitting of the atom has changed everything, except our modes of thinking, and therefore we drift toward unparallelled catastrophe". It is time we took a closer look at those modes of thinking. The safeguards the government has proposed should be viewed carefully in this light. If, in operation, they do not prove effective enough, Canada must not hesitate to suspend and reconsider its entire nuclear program.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   ANNOUNCEMENT OF SAFEGUARDS IN RESPECT OF EXPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, FACILITIES AND TECHNOLOGY
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NDP

Francis Andrew Brewin

New Democratic Party

Mr. Andrew Brewin (Greenwood):

Mr. Speaker, with a lot of the doubts expressed by the last speaker, I am entirely in agreement. The government was presented with an agonizing dilemma in connection with the export of nuclear technology, facilities and material, and has come out with a policy of procedure to negotiate for the sale of reactors wherever it can. The dilemma arises out of the fact that nuclear technology has two purposes-peaceful uses in providing energy, and non-peaceful uses, such as the manufacture of strategic nuclear weapons which threaten the world and humanity with the unspeakable horror of nuclear war.

There is every reason in the world why Canada should do its best to provide nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to countries which now lack the know how. But we must be aware that the most efficient power producing nuclear reactors will, as a by-product, convert natural or enriched uranium into plutonium. And the conversion of plutonium into nuclear weapons presents no great problem. The plain fact of the matter is that as civilian nuclear reactors proliferate, the ability to produce nuclear weapons will proliferate, treaty or no treaty, promises or no promises, and in spite of the so-called safeguards.

It is true that nuclear energy will become increasingly important to the development of the world, and the minister is perfectly right in saying that Canada's experience in regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy sources qualifies Canada to help other countries to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. There are also very good commercial reasons why Canada, having made a substantial investment in reactor systems, should seek to recover its investment. However, the problem still remains that the transfer of nuclear material held for peaceful purposes can easily be diverted into nuclear weapons. The effort has been made to overcome this difficulty through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This treaty provides for international safeguards applied through the Interna-

Nuclear Safeguards

tional Atomic Energy Agency with its system of inspection and accounting.

The least that Canada should require in exporting any nuclear material is to ensure that the countries who accept these nuclear materials adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and accept the inspection and accounting provided for by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

It has been noted that we will be negotiating, and according to the minister's statement negotiating is a continuing process in carrying out contracts, with Argentina and the Republic of South Korea, among others. The former country has not signed the non-proliferation agreement and the latter country, South Korea, although having signed the agreement has never ratified it. I am not sure what the position is in regard to Iran, but I believe it has not ratified the treaty either.

There remains a grave question as to whether agreements, either under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or bilateral, are enforceable and whether they are adequate. They seem to depend upon the reliability of the country giving the guarantee.

The life of a nuclear reactor is about 25 years. During 25 years the complexion of governments may change, and I hope it will in some countries. In this party we want more firm assurances than have been given by the minister in his statement that in fact the safeguard structures of which he speaks will be effective. We may not be able to obtain 100 per cent assurance in any sort of agreement or system of inspection, but we are entitled to question, and question closely the efficacy of these safeguards.

It is my suggestion that this question should be referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence before any agreements are entered into so that the adequacy of safeguards can be examined with the help of expert evidence. Many eminent scientists, as I think members of the House know, have questioned the effectiveness of the safeguards. As I have said, this is an agonizing decision. We wish to assist the world by the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, but even that fact and even the commercial advantages should not prevail if in fact what we are doing is proliferating nuclear weapon-making potentiality throughout the world. In that way lies disaster more deadly than it is possible for us to imagine.

For this reason we in this party cannot at the present time approve the government's policy as announced by the minister today.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   ANNOUNCEMENT OF SAFEGUARDS IN RESPECT OF EXPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, FACILITIES AND TECHNOLOGY
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SC

Gilbert F. Rondeau

Social Credit

Mr. Gilbert Rondeau (Shefford):

Mr. Speaker, first of all I want to thank the minister for having sent to us his statement in French before the House met today.

I would also like to tell him that he was right to make his statement on the use of our nuclear exports. This statement tends to establish that in future the government will be scrupulous towards the users of our nuclear exports. This control, Mr. Speaker, should have been carried out before. We would not have seen some of our nuclear exports used to such ends as recently in India, where they were used for nuclear explosions. Mr. Speaker,

December 20, 1974

Rail Line Abandonment

the businessmen which are a little experienced should have thought that our nuclear exports to India should be made under such conditions the minister wants to have now.

Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I consider that even if the decision has been made too late, it will still be valuable and will apply at least to future exports.

We know how the official energy crisis and petroleum products shortage have created an awareness in all nations of the world about the importance of energy now and in the years to come for the economic development of all countries. This is why the minister is acting cautiously, and rightly so, about such a dangerous and valuable energy product, both as concerns industrial development and the dangers involved if our exports were used in case of war, since Canada will become an important producer of nuclear energy on an international level.

First, as the minister indicated, atomic energy must be used for specific purposes and to meet our own needs. We must allow Canada itself to develop its own nuclear resources before thinking about other countries. We must show that atomic energy can help Canada progress. However, we should not do like the Arab countries which unfortunately export their resources and then export their dollars. Moreover, the population of Arab countries do not profit from the billions of dollars in natural resources which are exported throughout the world. Yet, the petroleum kings of Arab countries waste the money they have made with their countries' natural resources at roulette in Las Vegas. Mr. Speaker, this shocking example of Arab countries will not be followed by Canada because we shall first have to develop our country, and then we can export our surplus. We must sell our atomic products at a profit in order to reinforce the Canadian economy.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   ANNOUNCEMENT OF SAFEGUARDS IN RESPECT OF EXPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, FACILITIES AND TECHNOLOGY
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TEXTILE AND CLOTHING BOARD

LIB

Alastair William Gillespie (Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce)

Liberal

Hon. Alastair Gillespie (Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce):

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to Standing Order 41(2), I should like to table in both official languages copies of the Textile and Clothing Board Reports respecting men's and boys' shirts, acrylic yarns, cotton yarns, cotton terry towels and towelling, and nylon fabrics.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   TEXTILE AND CLOTHING BOARD
Sub-subtopic:   TABLING OF REPORTS ON SHIRTS, ACRYLIC AND COTTON YARNS AND NYLON FABRICS
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NDP

Lorne Edmund Nystrom (Whip of the N.D.P.)

New Democratic Party

Mr. Nystrom:

Mr. Speaker, before you leave motions, I want to raise a brief point of order, and I do so now instead of on the adjournment motion a few minutes ago. The Minister of Transport (Mr. Marchand) has said in the House several times he would make a statement about rail line abandonments, either last week or this week, before the House recesses. Because of the number of prairie communities that will be affected, we should inquire of the House leader or the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) whether someone will be making a statement today so that the people on the prairies will know where they stand before this parliament recesses for Christmas.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   TEXTILE AND CLOTHING BOARD
Sub-subtopic:   TABLING OF REPORTS ON SHIRTS, ACRYLIC AND COTTON YARNS AND NYLON FABRICS
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LIB

James Alexander Jerome (Speaker of the House of Commons)

Liberal

Mr. Speaker:

I do not know whether the hon. President of the Privy Council (Mr. Sharp) heard the point of order.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   TEXTILE AND CLOTHING BOARD
Sub-subtopic:   TABLING OF REPORTS ON SHIRTS, ACRYLIC AND COTTON YARNS AND NYLON FABRICS
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LIB

Otto Emil Lang (Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada; Minister responsible for the Canadian Wheat Board)

Liberal

Mr. Lang:

Mr. Speaker, as the hon. member knows, the Minister of Transport (Mr. Marchand) and I have been working closely together on this subject, and we are about ready to make an announcement in this connection.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   TEXTILE AND CLOTHING BOARD
Sub-subtopic:   TABLING OF REPORTS ON SHIRTS, ACRYLIC AND COTTON YARNS AND NYLON FABRICS
Permalink

STATISTICS ACT

PC

Flora Isabel MacDonald

Progressive Conservative

Miss Flora MacDonald (Kingston and the Islands) moved

for leave to introduce Bill C-371, to amend the

Statistics Act.

She said: Mr. Speaker, this is a bill amending the Statistics Act to remove the penalties against anyone who refuses to answer a Statistics Canada question, except only those connected with the decennial census. While I hope all Canadians would co-operate with Statistics Canada, I believe those who object on principle to answering personal questions should have the right to do so without being penalized.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   STATISTICS ACT
Sub-subtopic:   AMENDMENT TO REMOVE PENALTIES FOR REFUSAL TO ANSWER QUESTIONS
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Motion agreed to, bill read the first time and ordered to be printed.


ORAL QUESTION PERIOD

FOOD PRICES

December 20, 1974