April 9, 1973

ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS

ANNOUNCEMENT OF SALE OF WHEAT AND BARLEY TO RUSSIA

LIB

Otto Emil Lang (Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada; Minister responsible for the Canadian Wheat Board)

Liberal

Hon. Otto E. Lang (Minister oi Justice):

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to announce to the House that the Canadian Wheat Board has signed contracts covering the sale of some $200 million worth of Canadian grains to the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics.

The wheat contract covers a total of 1.5 million metric tons, or some 58 million bushels. This will include a variety of grades of spring wheat and durums. The barley sale amounts to 500,000 metric tons, which is approximately 24 million bushels.

The grains will be shipped through east and west coast ports and for the first time, I am pleased to say, through our northern port of Churchill.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   ANNOUNCEMENT OF SALE OF WHEAT AND BARLEY TO RUSSIA
Permalink
?

Some hon. Members:

Hear, hear!

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   ANNOUNCEMENT OF SALE OF WHEAT AND BARLEY TO RUSSIA
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PC

Frank Fletcher Hamilton

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Frank Hamilton (Swift Current-Maple Creek):

Mr. Speaker, we are very pleased to hear the announcement by the minister in charge of the Canadian Wheat Board. However, what concerns western farmers is the eventual price they will receive. It is hard to know what the return will be. It is interesting to note that the latest report from Statistics Canada indicates that western farmers intend to plant some four million acres less than recommended by the government. There is great concern in western Canada about all the unknown factors.

I would like to hear the minister clarify as soon as possible some of the guidelines regarding who will be eligible to vote in the forthcoming vote on whether oilseeds should be sold through the Wheat Board, as well as clarify the whole feed grain situation in western Canada. The western feed grain growers are in a quandary. They do not know whether the eastern market will be protected. I hope the minister will clarify some of these matters soon.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   ANNOUNCEMENT OF SALE OF WHEAT AND BARLEY TO RUSSIA
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NDP

Alfred Pullen Gleave

New Democratic Party

Mr. A. P. Gleave (Saskatoon-Biggar):

Mr. Speaker, I was very pleased to hear the minister's announcement. The other day in the committee the Minister of Agriculture said he would like to have the job of looking after the Wheat Board, and I did not know how quickly the two ministers were going to make the switch. Apparently the minister in charge of the Wheat Board is still on the job and has negotiated another sale to the Soviet Union. I only

hope that we can produce enough grain to meet these and other commitments. I also hope that the weather will be favourable and that there will be enough moisture to produce the kind of crops we need on the acreages we have.

I think that transportation again needs maximum attention from the minister to enable us to develop a rail system that will move our grains effectively. I am very pleased that the government is planning to make greater use of the port of Churchill. This will help to make up for some of the traffic taken away when the job of supplying northern stations was moved from Churchill to Montreal.

If the minister has some influence, perhaps he could also restore this traffic and thus improve the over-all situation.

So far as planting is concerned, I think the farmers are reacting to the relatively dry conditions in western Canada. Hopefully, this situation will improve and result in much greater planting. With regard to price, perhaps the minister might develop the habit of telling parliament and the farmers the price at which he is selling our wheat. This might be helpful.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   ANNOUNCEMENT OF SALE OF WHEAT AND BARLEY TO RUSSIA
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SC

Joseph Adrien Henri Lambert

Social Credit

Mr. Adrien Lambert (Bellechasse):

Mr. Speaker, first I must thank the minister for sending us a French copy of the statement which he has just made. As I would rather congratulate than blame, I am pleased to discharge my responsibilities, especially since my point of order was rather strangely reported in newspapers last week. Therefore, I hope that they will report my comments today as being a compliment to a minister of the Crown.

This being so, I would like to make some brief remarks on the minister's statement that a rather considerable quantity of grain will be exported to Russia. This clearly shows that Canada is in a position, when wisely developing its natural wealth, especially its soil, to contribute to feed mankind.

I am very pleased with this sale which will contribute not only to feed part of mankind but also to expand further agriculture in Canada. However, I would like to point out to the government that if we want to keep on exporting so that we may help feed mankind we must not neglect our important and basic industry, namely the agricultural industry.

And, in conclusion, I would also like to point out to the Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Whelan) that Canada could find it beneficial to engage on a larger scale in stock-farming so as to use up our grain and put us in a rather favourable competing position, thus preventing us from having to import more meat when it is possible to increase such production at home.

Anyway, I am most pleased by such a transaction and I am convinced that all Canadians will benefit from it.

April 9, 1973

Viet Nam

Again I congratulate the minister for his interest in this matter, though I maintain my position and suggest once more that the Canadian Wheat Board be put under the immediate responsibility of the Minister of Agriculture.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   ANNOUNCEMENT OF SALE OF WHEAT AND BARLEY TO RUSSIA
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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

LIB

Mitchell William Sharp (Secretary of State for External Affairs)

Liberal

Hon. Mitchell Sharp (Secretary ol State for External Affairs):

Mr. Speaker, it is my very sad duty officially to inform the House that Captain Charles Eugene Laviolette of the Canadian Armed Forces, on assignment to the Canadian delegation to the International Commission of Control and Supervision, was killed in the line of duty on Saturday, April 7, when the International Commission helicopter in which he was a passenger crashed near Lao Bao in Viet Nam with the loss of all nine persons on board. I know that all members of the House, and all Canadians, join with the government in extending sincere condolences to the wife and family of Captain Laviolette and share their deep sense of grief at this tragic event which has befallen them.

The sadness and grief caused by this incident do not affect Canadians only. One Indonesian officer and two Hungarian officers were also killed, as were two Americans and one Filippino, crew members on the helicopter, and two Viet Cong or PRG liaison officials accompanying the party. We are relieved, however, that the other two Canadians, Captain R. L. Parsons and Master Corporal J. M. R. Laplante, who were passengers in another helicopter on the same mission which went to the aid of the stricken aircraft, are now safe in good health.

The Canadian government deplores this tragic and unnecessary incident which, according to preliminary investigation and reports, was the result of a hostile act directed, either deliberately or by mistake, against helicopters which were clearly marked with ICCS insignia. One helicopter was struck by a missile fired from the ground, presumably by the party in whose area of occupation the incident occurred, while it was approaching Lao Bao on an ICCS mission. This happened despite the fact that all the safety procedures and precautions designed specifically to prevent such incidents had been carefully followed. The team had secured the Viet Cong's assurances of safe passage, as witnessed by the presence of two of their representatives on the stricken helicopter, and according to our information the helicopters did not stray from the designated flight corridor to which these assurances of safety specifically applied.

I wish to state as clearly and as forcefully as possible, Mr. Speaker, the conviction of the Canadian government that absolutely no circumstances should ever justify the firing upon personnel of the International Control Commission by any of the belligerents. Even if these helicopters had strayed off course, which all the evidence available to us denies, the penalty for losing one's way in the cause of peace should not be death at the hands of one of the signatories to the Paris Peace Agreement.

While we were under no illusions at the start of our participation in the ICCS concerning the dangers that, existed for Canadian personnel in Viet Nam, we have advocated and, we believed, had secured adequate safety and security measures in the field, based largely on trust in the assurances the ICCS is given by the parties involved in each particular case. However, the circumstances of this incident and the events which followed, particularly the hindrances encountered by the commission in its efforts to locate and bring aid to ICCS personnel on the missing aircraft, are such that they jeopardize this trust, even to the point of questioning the ability of the PRG representative in Saigon to speak for all of the military formations occupying the area in question. It cannot but have an effect on the future operations of the ICCS in the deployment of its teams and its investigatory capacities and, as a result, on the attitude of the Canadian government.

The International Commission is still attempting to carry out a detailed investigation of the incident and, until it is completed, not all details will be known. In the meantime, however, I wish to provide the House with the following information, as we have it to date, on events leading up to Saturday's tragedy, what we know of the incident itself, and what has passed since.

May I at this point apologize to the spokesmen for the other parties that I was not able to get this statement into their hands earlier. It was in the course of being revised right up to the last moment on the basis of the latest information.

Under article 4(d) of the protocol on international supervision, attached to the 1973 Paris Agreement, Lao Bao is a specifically designated team site of the ICCS. According to the agreement, the Lao Bao team was to have been in place and operational within at least 30 days after the agreement was signed. However, for a variety of reasons, it was not until March 17 that the first helicopter reconnaissance visit took place to Lao Bao, via Quang Tri and Gio Linh. For this visit the necessary assurances of safety were received from the Vietnamese parties involved and the Viet Cong provided liaison officials to accompany the ICCS team. A second reconnaissance visit was planned for April 5, to see if the Lao Bao facilities were ready for ICCS occupation, but it was abandoned when the Viet Cong liaison personnel were prevented by officials of the Republic of Viet Nam at Quang Tri from boarding the helicopter.

This reconnaissance flight was rescheduled for April 7; on the morning of April 7, at Quang Tri, with clearances and safety guarantees for the flight received from both the South Vietnamese and Viet Cong authorities, the crew of ICCS helicopters Nos. 006 and 115 were carefully briefed by Captain Parent on the exact routing designated by the Viet Cong as being safe for travel to Lao Bao. The two helicopters left Quang Tri at nine o'clock in the morning on April 7 for Gio Linh, where two Viet Cong liaison personnel boarded helicopter 006 and a third boarded helicopter 115. The helicopters departed at 11.15 and proceeded along the route designated by the Viet Cong, from Gio Linh to Dong Ha, and from Dong Ha toward Lao Bao following highway nine at a pre-arranged altitude of 1,000 meters within the agreed corridor two kilometers either

April 9, 1973

side of highway nine. At ten minutes before noon, helicopter 115 reported that it was in its final approach to Lao Bao. Approximately three minutes later the ICCS team in Quang Tri received a transmission from the helicopter to the effect that one was receiving ground fire and that the other helicopter had been hit by a missile and was going down.

Canadian personnel aboard the surviving helicopter confirm that their helicopter was fired upon at this time. They report that it took evasive action and landed in a hamlet on highway nine, from where they walked to the crash site of the other helicopter, about two kilometers away. There is therefore no reason to believe that either helicopter was outside the flight corridor at the time of the incident, and the weather conditions were excellent. The helicopter which landed safely was fired upon with small arms after it was on the ground, where its ICCS markings could not have been mistaken.

The PRG authorities in Quang Tri have issued their own account of what they call "the accident". They claim that the two helicopters were at least 25 kilometers, that is, about 15 miles, away from the approved flight corridor when helicopter No. 006 was shot down. The statement maintains that they had been this far off course for 40 minutes.

Within minutes the commission's regional headquarters at Hue were informed of the radio distress report and were told that there had been subsequent loss of contact. Immediately, Canadian and other ICCS personnel began common efforts in Quang Tri and in Saigon to get information on what had happened, and most important, to launch a search and rescue mission.

All efforts were to no avail. At Quang Tri, about 40 miles away, Colonel McLeod, commander of the Canadian forces in ICCS region one, contacted representatives of the Viet Cong, which claims to be the party in control of the area of the incident, who were across the river from Quang Tri. During the course of the afternoon of April 7, he was three times refused permission to proceed by either land or air to Lao Bao. He was eventually informed early in the evening of April 7 that necessary arrangements for safe passage to Lao Bao could not be made. Later he was told that one helicopter had landed safely, but that the other had, and I quote, "met with an accident". The PRG or Viet Cong representative would give no information on casualties or on the condition of the personnel involved.

In Saigon, while General McAlpine and his three colleagues on the military committee of the ICCS left for Hue to conduct the inquiry personally, similar attempts were being made to secure information from the PRG or Viet Cong delegation to the two-party Joint Military Commission. These efforts, which involved a three-hour meeting between the PRG representatives and the Indonesian chairman acting on behalf of the commission, also faded. The Viet Cong would not permit a proffered American search and rescue operation to proceed from Thailand as the commission had requested, and they refused to provide liaison officers for any search organized by the ICCS, although helicopters were standing by. Nor would

Viet Nam

they give any information on the personnel involved. Almost 24 hours after the incident, the best that could be obtained from the Viet Cong was a letter to the commission confirming that one helicopter had "met with an accident", and that the PRG was organizing its own search and rescue operations.

By this time General McAlpine had proceeded from Hue to Quang Tri with other members of the ICCS military committee where, on the morning of April 8, he met with the same PRG representative who had refused Colonel McLeod permission the day before to go to Lao Bao. The Viet Cong representative reported, at last, that all those aboard one helicopter had been killed in the "accident", but he still either could not or would not say which helicopter was involved. General McAlpine was also told that the Viet Cong were bringing out the dead and survivors to Gio Linh that evening, and that he and his colleagues should proceed there to receive them. Early in the morning of April 9, which was yesterday afternoon by our time, General McAlpine received the Canadian survivors and we are able to positively identify, for the first time, which helicopter had been shot down. As I mentioned above, the survivors were examined medically and found to be in good condition.

We have been informed by the Canadian representative on the military committee of the ICCS, Major General McAlpine, that when the so-called PRG officially handed over the bodies and survivors on the morning of April 9 at Gio Linh, it made an attempt to have the ICCS military committee sign a prepared statement claiming that the helicopters were off course and that the incident was an accident. The ICCS military committee quite rightly refused to meet such an outrageous demand.

From the reports which we have received, however, it is understood that before they were released, the surviving passengers and crew of the helicopter had been required to sign statements prepared by the PRG that they were off course, and that it was implied that if they refused they might not be returned to ICCS authorities. I understand that the survivors did sign the statements; I am sure that hon. members will make no mistake about the value of such statements signed under these circumstances.

In the meantime, the commission is proceeding on an investigation of this tragic incident. The PRG have agreed that the military committee will be escorted to the crash area where they will be permitted to conduct their own on-site inquiry.

Mr. Speaker, that is the extent of the information which is available to us now. I am bound to say that this incident is only the most tragic of a number of cases in which ICCS aircraft, all of which are clearly and prominently marked, have been fired upon. As hon. members will recall, the first such incidents occurred in late February. Since the incident of which I have just given an account, I have received a report that another ICCS helicopter has been fired upon within the past 24 hours. Two Canadians were among its passengers. On April 9, in the southernmost of the ICCS's seven regions, the ICCS helicopter was accompanying a helicopter of the Joint Military Commission near a team-site called Vi Thanh. The JMC helicopter was flying at an altitude of 500 feet, and the ICCS helicopter was following it at an altitude of 3,500 feet. Both

April 9, 1973

Viet Nam

were fired upon from the ground, and the JMC helicopter is reported to have been hit by a number of rounds. As a result, all ICCS helicopters in the region have been grounded pending consideration of the matter by the ICCS at its headquarters in Saigon.

I wish to assure all Canadians, and especially the families and friends of Canadians serving in Viet Nam, that the government is taking these incidents very seriously indeed. It is doing everything within its power to ensure that they do not recur. We are in touch with our representatives in Saigon to ensure that all possible measures are taken to that end. When we are satisfied that we have obtained all the relevant information, and after consultation with our partners in the ICCS, particularly those whose nationals have lost their lives, we will take appropriate action to hold accountable those responsible.

Such serious incidents will of course have a bearing upon the government's decision concerning Canada's continued participation in the ICCS. Hon. members will recall that in my statement to the House late last month, I said that the general situation in Viet Nam was highly unsatisfactory, and that Canada would terminate its participation at the end of June if the situation did not improve substantially. Since then, the general situation has not improved; in fact, it has deteriorated. If it does not improve very substantially, it will be clear that by continuing to serve in the ICCS we would be staying on to observe, not a peace, not a cease-fire, but a continuing war. We would be doing so, as this recent deplorable incident makes clear, at totally unjustified human risk. This we will not do. This House may be sure, and all Canadians may be sure, that we will not continue to risk Canadian lives in fulfilment of a task which is not worth doing. The parties are responsible for making the task worthwhile, by making it a task in support of peace in Viet Nam. We will expect them to fulfil that responsibility.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Sub-subtopic:   VIET NAM-KILLING OF MEMBER OF CANADIAN DELEGATION TO SUPERVISORY COMMISSION-STATEMENT ON GOVERNMENT POSITION
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PC

Claude Wagner

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Claude Wagner (Saint-Hyacinthe):

Mr. Speaker, a Quebecer, in the line of his peace keeping duties has just lost his life in Viet Nam. It makes us all feel very sad and on behalf of the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Stanfield) and of my party, I extend to Madame Laviolette and to her family our deepest sympathy.

In our opinion, this tragedy is not an isolated case which is to be accepted with submissiveness and fatalism. It is a tragedy which must be considered in the overall picture of a mission that is becoming more perilous and desperate each day, because this government to which we gave the benefit of the doubt when it renewed its commitment shows that it is incapable of securing the required guarantees for the safety of our observers.

Not only did we fail to get essential and necessary guarantees, but because of a stupid, incomprehensible and foolish act which we strongly condemn, NLF sharpshooters have killed several observers, including a Canadian, Captain Laviolette from Quebec. How far, Mr. Speaker, do we have to go to establish peace in Viet Nam?

We agree to hope beyond all hope, but we must not confuse daring and recklessness, or highmindedness and naivete. We shall continue to question the government on its ambivalent behaviour in this whole business. We trust

the government will give us answers that are as specific as our questions will be. We will continue to demand that complete light be shed on this subject in committee.

And if, after having performed a superhuman task, Ambassador Gauvin may be justified in having holidays, we wonder why he could not appear before the committee and do so with the same government permission he had to get for his visit to Tokyo, to enlighten the public and the Members of Parliament on the measures taken by the government in Viet Nam.

Mr. Speaker, there are some fundamental questions that must be asked about our operation in Viet Nam. They are questions Canadians have a right to see answered. If, as the minister said in his statement to the House when the government's decision to recommit was made known, our role is more in the area of providing an international presence than supervising the peace, why must our men be continually subjected to increasing danger? More directly, what action are we taking at the ICCS level to ensure that all ICCS personnel are subjected to as limited a degree of danger as possible? If, as Canadians have believed, we are there at the invitation of the combatants, why did we experience, if reports are correct, continued difficulty in gaining access to the crash site in order to make our own inquiry, either independently or as part of a special ICCS investigation?

We must ask whether those we are dealing with representing the combatants really do have control of their forces in the field. If we do obtain guarantees of safe passage from the Viet Cong, for example, can we be satisfied that such guarantees will be respected by Viet Cong regulars in the field? Are Canadian forces in the field, in conjunction with other ICCS members, being afforded basic co-operation-basic at least to the extent of safe passage? Are ICCS craft so viewed by the combatants that the slightest diversion from course causes them to be classified as hostile and open to attack?

Sir, these are questions to which every responsible member of this House and of the government should want answers. There were accidents in Cyprus, there were accidents in the Middle East and in the Congo. Nevertheless, there was a basic assumption of safety under international auspices throughout all those assignments. It is this assumption which Canadians are working under now and which was understood when most agreed that we should accept our responsibilities in Viet Nam. It is surely the basic assumption that we must demand from the combatants if we are to continue to maintain our commitment.

When the party to which I belong accepted the view advanced by the Secretary of State for External Affairs that we should continue our commitment in Viet Nam in the hope that our presence might ease peace into place, we asserted that the minister had the responsibility to continue and re-initiate efforts to gain formed acceptance of the essence of our basic conditions for participation. The tragic death of Captain Laviolette and those of his international colleagues underlines the need for those initiatives. I say to the government that all Canadians are now calling on the government to illustrate clearly and

April 9, 1973

forthrightly that we have done all we can, and are continuing to do all we can, in order that no more Canadians or other ICCS members should have to make this supreme sacrifice.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Sub-subtopic:   VIET NAM-KILLING OF MEMBER OF CANADIAN DELEGATION TO SUPERVISORY COMMISSION-STATEMENT ON GOVERNMENT POSITION
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NDP

David Lewis

New Democratic Party

Mr. David Lewis (York South):

Mr. Speaker, needless to say, every member of my party in the House, like every Canadian throughout the country, is saddened by the tragic death of those aboard the helicopter, saddened not only by the death of Captain Laviolette, although his death is closer to our hearts and to our thoughts, but saddened also by the death of the other people who were on that helicopter, some of them members of the ICCS and even Viet Cong people as well. I join the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the spokesman for the Conservative party in sending Madame Laviolette and her family our very deepest sympathy.

It is possible, of course, in a situation of this kind, to start making political accusations against the administration, either in Ottawa or in Viet Nam, accusing them of having failed to obtain sufficient guarantees or of not doing enough. I submit that this is not the issue. There is no evidence that Mr. Gauvin and his associates in Viet Nam have not worked their hardest to get all the assurances it was possible to obtain, and I am not prepared to try to make political capital out of this situation-

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Sub-subtopic:   VIET NAM-KILLING OF MEMBER OF CANADIAN DELEGATION TO SUPERVISORY COMMISSION-STATEMENT ON GOVERNMENT POSITION
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?

Some hon. Members:

Hear, hear!

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Sub-subtopic:   VIET NAM-KILLING OF MEMBER OF CANADIAN DELEGATION TO SUPERVISORY COMMISSION-STATEMENT ON GOVERNMENT POSITION
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NDP

David Lewis

New Democratic Party

Mr. Lewis:

-by accusing either the people in Ottawa or the people in Saigon or other parts of the Viet Nam of having failed in their duty.

What has obviously happened-and this is the saddest part of the situation-is that the assurances that had been obtained, particularly from the Viet Cong, particularly from the PRG, are assurances that have not been kept. The PRG would not have placed two liaison officers on the helicopter that was destroyed if arrangements for the flight had not been very carefully and fully made.

I say this to the minister, which seems to me to be important above anything else: the event which occurred on Friday was not an isolated incident. As he makes clear in his own statement, helicopters have been fired upon since February. The ICCS has not been given an opportunity to do its job. It was even refused the right and the opportunity to investigate the crash itself. It seems to me a pattern is developing which shows there are some parties who are not prepared to keep the Paris peace agreement. It may well be that those parties agreed to the presence of the ICCS only for the period when this was necessary in order to get the American troops and the American prisoners of war out of the area, and that now this has been accomplished certain parties in Viet Nam-not limited to the North Vietnamese or the PRG, since it would seem the South Viet Nam government is also playing this kind of game-are no longer concerned about having the ICCS there but are more concerned about having freedom to continue the war, as the minister indicated in his statement, than in taking action which would really stop the war. If this is the case, I suggest to the minister that the date of June 30 is not a sacrosanct date, even though it is the date we suggested, and I repeat the statement I made in Charlottetown during the weekend that we should now

Viet Nam

decide to withdraw before June 30. I do not think it is a sacred date.

It has already been shown that the work of the ICCS is being interfered with, that the lives of members of the ICCS are being endangered. I think the government ought to decide now that, if this danger continues over the next week or two, we will not wait until June 30 but take action to end the ICCS operation just as soon as it becomes evident that there is no reversal of the attitude of certain parties in Viet Nam. I urge the minister that we not wait that long, not only because of the danger to our personnel there but also because we ought not to participate in an operation that is clearly being frustrated by those people who are responsible for keeping the peace.

One other factor that has disappointed my colleagues and myself immensely about the work of the ICCS is that it has not been given any opportunity at all to look into the question of the political prisoners held by the South Vietnamese government. There are thousands of these prisoners. Their numbers have been debated by those who say they know, but there may well be 200,000 of these political prisoners who are being held by the South Vietnamese government. Their release is not only a humanitarian necessity but also a necessity if there is to be peace in Viet Nam, for they are the people who could build the bridges among the various sections of the Vietnamese people.

If the minister has not already done so, I think he ought to take the initiative in making sure that our arm of the ICCS is having intensive discussions with the representatives of the three other governments. I also suggest that we ought to initiate immediately very serious discussions with the joint military commission of the combatant parties to see whether we can find out if they really intend peace or the opposite.

I close by repeating our deep sadness at the death of Captain Laviolette and the others with him in the helicopter. I also reiterate my plea to the government that they not hold the date of June 30 as sacred but that we leave this dangerous area just as soon as the government becomes convinced that there is no chance of reversing the attitude of certain Vietnamese parties.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Sub-subtopic:   VIET NAM-KILLING OF MEMBER OF CANADIAN DELEGATION TO SUPERVISORY COMMISSION-STATEMENT ON GOVERNMENT POSITION
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SC

David Réal Caouette

Social Credit

Mr. Real Caouette (Temiscamingue):

Mr. Speaker, my colleagues and I join all other members in extending to Madame Laviolette and her family our most sincere sympathy on the very sad incident which took place on April 7, in Viet Nam.

I also endorse the views that the hon. member for York South (Mr. Lewis) has just expressed when he said that one should not use such an incident to play politics.

I heard earlier the hon. member for Saint-Hyacinthe (Mr. Wagner) make a lacrymose statement holding, so to speak, the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Sharp) responsible for what happened in Viet Nam.

Mr. Speaker, I can't help wondering what the Progressive Conservatives would have done in the place of those who now govern us. That, they forget to tell us. However, they are prepared to put the whole blame on this government, when we know very well that our participation in

April 9, 1973

Viet Nam

the International Commission of Control and Supervision leads necessarily to certain consequences. One cannot go there without running any risk, and by the way, the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) and the Secretary of State for External Affairs said it recently.

And so I do not think it is altogether honest to try and make little of the government's action. If one wishes to avoid all risk, there is only one thing to do: stay at home. We undertake to carry out the mission, and then, when we are there, there is an accident and we are all upset. I thought the Leader of the Official Opposition (Mr. Stanfield) was sobbing just now. I thought the member for Saint-Hyacinthe was going to start saying his prayers; he was that serious.

Mr. Speaker, this is no way to treat an accident of this sort. For my part, I thought, and I still think, that we should have stayed at home, because the situation over there was not clear, and it is not any clearer now. The minister has just said that we will not be taking any more risks. It is high time we thought about that. I consider that we must help Viet Nam if Viet Nam wants to help itself. But if it does not, let us not impose ourselves. I am speaking now to all those concerned. To those who say that what is happening there is the Americans' fault, I answer that it is just as much the fault of the communists. If we blame one side, let us also blame the other. Let us tell them that the Vietnamese must be left to settle their own problems without intervention by the USSR, China, the United States or Canada. It is as simple as that. That is our position.

I am totally opposed, Mr. Speaker, to any attempt at making politics of this issue, and I am sorry that such attempts are being made. What is the government going to do? What is the government going to answer? The government might answer: I think Mr. Laviolette was killed. That is quite simple, and everyone knows it. We do not yet know all the causes of this incident. When we do, we will be able to form a clearer, sounder opinion. But meanwhile, let us hope that there will be no more such incidents in Viet Nam and that, as Canadian members of Parliament, we will do all we can to prevent them.

Mr. Speaker, those are all the remarks that I wished to make. In ending, I again present our sincerest condolences to all of Mr. Laviolette's family and I hope that this will not happen again in Viet Nam.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Sub-subtopic:   VIET NAM-KILLING OF MEMBER OF CANADIAN DELEGATION TO SUPERVISORY COMMISSION-STATEMENT ON GOVERNMENT POSITION
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LIB

Albert Béchard

Liberal

Mr. Albert Bechard (Bonaventure lies de la Madeleine):

Mr. Speaker, as Captain Laviolette comes from my riding where his parents and his wife's parents are still living, I wish to join the Secretary of State for External Affairs and members of all parties in this House in extending to Mrs. Laviolette, her nine-year old daughter and to all her relatives, my deepest and most sincere sympathy.

[Mr. Caouette (T6miscamingue).J

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Sub-subtopic:   VIET NAM-KILLING OF MEMBER OF CANADIAN DELEGATION TO SUPERVISORY COMMISSION-STATEMENT ON GOVERNMENT POSITION
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BANK OF CANADA

SC

René Matte

Social Credit

Mr. Rene Matte (Champlain):

Mr. Speaker, under Standing Order 43, I ask unanimous consent of the House to introduce a motion which is of urgent necessity.

In view of the failure of the Bank of Canada, because of its present structure and rules, to be really devoted to all Canadian citizens and of the inefficiency of the present banking system, I move, seconded by the hon. member for Rimouski (Mr. Allard):

That an order be given by this House to the effect that the Bank of Canada could finance all public projects on government rates, whether those projects are under the responsibility of federal or provincial governments.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   BANK OF CANADA
Sub-subtopic:   FINANCING OF PUBLIC PROJECTS-REQUEST FOR UNANIMOUS CONSENT TO MOVE MOTION
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NONE

Lucien Lamoureux (Speaker of the House of Commons)

No affiliation

Mr. Speaker:

The House has heard the motion. Under Standing Order 43, this motion requires unanimous consent of the House. Is there unanimous consent?

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   BANK OF CANADA
Sub-subtopic:   FINANCING OF PUBLIC PROJECTS-REQUEST FOR UNANIMOUS CONSENT TO MOVE MOTION
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?

Some hon. Members:

Agreed.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   BANK OF CANADA
Sub-subtopic:   FINANCING OF PUBLIC PROJECTS-REQUEST FOR UNANIMOUS CONSENT TO MOVE MOTION
Permalink
?

Some hon. Members:

No.

Topic:   ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS
Subtopic:   BANK OF CANADA
Sub-subtopic:   FINANCING OF PUBLIC PROJECTS-REQUEST FOR UNANIMOUS CONSENT TO MOVE MOTION
Permalink

April 9, 1973