Mr. Maclnnis (Cape Breton South):

Answer it now.

Mr. Foy:

I would have to look up the records.

Mr. Maclnnis (Cape Breton South):

Mr. Chairman, further on the question of privilege-

The Deputy Chairman:

I do not think there is a question of privilege. Therefore, I think we should allow the hon. member for Lambton West to continue his speech.

[DOT] (8:50 p.m.)

Mr. Maclnnis (Cape Breton South):

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member has made an accusation against me and I rely on the privileges of this house in asking him to either back up that accusation or withdraw it. He has indicated that I insulted serving officers. When I asked him how many

National Defence Act Amendment serving officers were called as witnesses before that committee after I became a member of it, he said he would have to consult the record, because he does not know. If he does not know that answer, he should not make such a statement. He should now withdraw it, and will do so if he is any kind of man.

Mr. Foy:

Mr. Chairman, the hon. member is doing exactly what he was doing during committee meetings.

Mr. Maclnnis (Cape Breton South):

What you are talking about is a lot of lies. You are trying to put across lies. Stick that down your throat.

Mr. Foy:

The hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre took great delight in stirring things up. He does the same thing in this house. He often says terrible things and demands resignations. After really stirring things up he takes his seat and conceals his laughter. Mr. Chairman, very often the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre and others sit in their places grinning from ear to ear, after causing a great disturbance.

Mr. MacEwan:

Surely that is terrible.

Mr. Foy:

The hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre loves to play the game of party politics. He loves that kind of action. I suspect that the hon. member agrees with the principle of this bill. He cannot convince me that with his vast experience in parliament and in military matters he is against it.

Mr. MacEwan:

Would the hon. member throw away his notes and make a speech.

Who wrote it for you?

Mr. Foy:

Mr. Chairman, I hope the time being consumed by these ridiculous remarks is not considered as part of my allotted time. Whenever a member tries to make some reasonable comments this is the kind of thing we hear from hon. members such as the hon. member for Cape Breton South.

One of the most oft-repeated criticisms of the unification program is that the government is moving too hastily, or that it somehow plans to invoke instant unification. While I am sure that some of the critics who make this charge are sincere and I suppose well-intentioned, my membership on the standing committee on national defence has made me equally sure that they could not be more wrong in this regard.

During the course of the last few months, the hon. member for Northumberland has been travelling throughout the country making incorrect statements, one of which is to

14528 COMMONS

National Defence Act Amendment the effect that our servicemen will be transferred from ships to the air force, or to the infantry. This is a ridiculous statement. Perhaps, like Diogenes seeking an honest man, he is seeking the leadership of Her Majesty's loyal opposition. We all know he aspires to this position. If he is successful, by some fluke he could become prime minister of this country. That hon. member should take the time to learn the true facts about unification, before expounding on this subject about which he does not seem to know anything.

What this government is asking for is not permission to complete unification within a few days, a few months, or even a year. If anyone is labouring under the impression, he is mistaken and has not bothered to follow the evidence heard by the standing and special committees on defence. This would also obviously indicate that he has not followed the statements made by many serving senior officers and by the minister himself. I think we should examine some of the testimony given by these men.

Let me quote the vice-chief of the defence staff, Air Marshal Sharp, who gave this evidence before the committee on February 7 of this year:

Because this is a very complex job, very thorough and careful planning is required. The department has, on the one hand, been accused of acting too quickly, i.e., not doing sufficient planning, and on the other hand, accused of not deciding sooner the details of what is involved in unification. Since planning takes time and since the details cannot be decided and divulged until the planning has been completed, it is obvious that the department cannot satisfy both of these criticisms. To take time for adequate planning means that there will be some delay before the details of unification can be announced. To quickly announce the details implies inadequate planning. However, to postpone the decision to unify until all the details have been worked out is contrary to common sense. It is tantamount to saying that the decision to build the trans-Canada Highway should not have been made until all the details of construction had been completed.

Air Marshal Sharp is an intelligent and distinguished officer who has been deeply involved in this program since its beginning and he knows what he is talking about. I am sure that the air marshal does not believe we are going to instantly unify our forces. Obviously he does see the logic in obtaining permissive legislation so that he and his colleagues in the Canadian armed forces can get on with the job.

[Mr. Foy.J

DEBATES April 4, 1967

On February 23 the minister made the following statement before the standing committee regarding the timing of unification:

It is an continuing evolution that will not be completed until 1970-72, as has been stated by many serving officers, including the heads of training command, materiel command, the vicechief and myself.

There is no way you can bring about 'instant unification'. Nor is there any intention to do so. It will all be done in a step-by-step, carefully calculated manner, with full regard for our operational effectiveness and the best interests of our servicemen.

Why do official opposition members continually say here in Ottawa and elsewhere that unification is to be completed immediately? Because they do so I suggest there is a lot of partisan politics being played as there was at the meetings of the standing committee. This type of thing is continually practised by hon. members opposite. They know very well that instant unification is impossible.

If we followed the advice of stand pat reactionaries every time we sought to enact important legislation for the benefit of Canadians, we would never get anywhere. It is only by realizing problems and acting on solutions that we are ever going to progress; that we are going to develop this great nation's full potential.

During this session the government has set a record by passing more important and long overdue legislation than at any other time in history. Such vital appendages to our prosperity as a guaranteed annual income for old age pensioners, medicare, the Canada Assistance Plan, manpower programs, a new transportation program, Bank Act revisions and such things as a Science Council and a health resources fund cover the broad spectrum of human need in Canada. I suggest to hon. members that this is accomplished because we are willing to progress and not stagnate.

[DOT] (9:00 p.m.)

Clearly, any delay in obtaining parliamentary approval for the unification of our armed forces would have a most serious effect on the morale of our great servicemen. They are, I am sure, anxious to get going on this imaginative program, but uncertainty is their biggest enemy-uncertainty as to when they will be allowed, as General Allard has said, to get off the front pages of the press and back to the job of running the forces. In fact, the general in his brief to the committee on February 28 outlined very lucidly the rationale for obtaining approval from parliament to enact the legislation and, of course, he too

April 4, 1967

dispelled any fears we might have about instand unification. I should like to quote General Allard in this connection:

Finally, I would refer to the question regarding any suspension or delay in proceeding with the final stage of the reorganization, and that is unification. I sincerely believe a postponement or delay in starting-and I insist on this word-starting this final stage would have a most serious effect on all of us now serving and on our recruiting prospects. What the serviceman is saying to us today is, "Get on with it." And in my opinion any delay-one year, two years, five years, or even a few months -would seriously impair morale.

Then further on he concludes:

In summary, then, gentlemen, the situation is this: The idea of a single force, in a single, distinctively

Canadian uniform, working, living, training, and___

most important-thinking together as one entity is an exciting and challenging idea. After all it is designed to meet the problems of a modern world -a scientific world-which is growing away beyond ,e harriers of the past at a speed that cannot stand the slow pace of yesterday. For all this, you know that we do not intend to proceed in haste- I said it was a starting point-but rather in a carefully planned manner which will extend over a

"ff, oft yaars- A11 that is required now is the authority to do so.

I should like to follow up on this eloquent plea by Canada's top serving military officer by saying this: The integration-to-unification program for the Canadian armed forces has been exhaustively scrutinized and debated since the white paper was issued early in 1964. Evidence given to the committee and to parliament during interim supply alone amounts to more than 4,000 pages of standing committee minutes and Hansard. To put these figures into plainer terms, the number of pages represents about a dozen comprehensive text books of information. So far we have talked about defence matters more than 114 days and have heard from over 130 different committee witnesses, many of whom have appeared two or more times. Any attempt by hon. members of the house to defeat this bill by a talkathon could only be regarded by the men and women of the forces, and the public alike, to be a ridiculous procedure, wholly infringing on parliament's responsibility to act.

It is said by hon. members on the other side of the chamber that there has been an undue rush toward unification. I say this is not so, Mr. Chairman, not at all. Having exhausted everything that can be said about the unification legislation, it is now our responsibility to turn the program over to our servicemen, let them implement it, let them get on with the job, and let them confirm our conviction that

National Defence Act Amendment this is the right policy for our servicemen, for Canada and for our allies.

Mr. Smilh:

Mr. Chairman, the fact that the last speaker and some of those who preceded him have been so worried about the length of time this debate is going to take and have started to talk about closure, when we are not quite through the second day of discussion of the bill in committee, makes me wonder what they are trying to conceal. It seems a shame that so much of the debate and so many of the pages to which the hon. member who preceded me referred have been filled with ir-relevancies, in so far as the problem of unification is concerned. Indeed, the professional staff, Air Marshal Miller and others who gave evidence and helped fill up the record, confronted us with a great many irrelevancies. For example, in a list in one of the briefs submitted to the committee there was included as one of the benefits of integration and unification the acquisition of the fan jet Falcon, that nice little, executive jet that cabinet ministers are getting to whizz them around the country. That aircraft was listed as one of the pieces of equipment we were acquiring because of the savings from unification.

A great deal of the argument put forward in support of unification has had nothing at all to do with unification; it has dealt with integration and the benefits of integration. Indeed, most of the witnesses who appeared before us, and I think most of the committee members, realize that there is a great deal of good to come from the integration of command, of certain supply services, and so on. But that is irrelevant in so far as this bill is concerned.

My friend the hon. member for Greenwood, with whom I often find myself in agreement, has also introduced irrelevancies into this discussion. He talked about unification in the light of a new role for the Canadian forces. I should like to suggest that while it may be very desirable that we increase our intervention role and build up our mobile force, whether or not our forces are unified will not make that intervention force or peacekeeping force any more or less efficient. In so far as this bill is concerned, that is an irrelevant argument.

However, I do agree with the hon. member for Greenwood that what we need is a new statement of defence policy, a statement indicating the priorities that we are attaching to our defence roles; because unless you know what you are doing or why you are doing it,

April 4, 1967

National Defence Act Amendment you cannot organize your forces to meet those commitments.

I do not propose to quote at great length any of the witnesses who appeared before the committee. I should like to read two or three passages from the evidence of Air Marshal Miller, and for a particular reason. The reason is that he is the serving officer who very strongly supported integration; he had more to do than anyone else with the initial planning of integration, and until just six months ago he was the chief of staff. His definitions of integration and unification impressed me very much.

[DOT] (9:10 p.m.)

I think it would not be a bad idea if we had them in the record in close proximity. His definition of integration appears at page 2290 of his evidence, as follows:

By that I mean the operating of the three services under a single-what I would call-management. A single defence staff, a single planning organization, an d single budgeting arrangement.

That I think, sir, is a fine definition of integration.

His definition of unification appears at page 2311 of the committee's proceedings, where he said the following:

Unification is the formation of a single force, single rank structure, single administrative chain, the wearing of a common uniform and calling trades and ranks by common names. In other words, a single force instead of three forces.

What does Air Chief Marshal Miller say about the advantages and disadvantages of unification, always bearing in mind that he is a very strong supporter of integration? At page 2291 he said:

The area of unification is a very sensitive one, as you well know. It strikes at the traditions and the feelings of a lot of people. I did not see, up until the time I left, that the return from pressing the unification sign was commensurate with the disruption and the great concern to the man in uniform that would result from it.

The following exchange appears at page 2297 of the proceedings:

Mr. Harkness:

Do you, yourself, see any financial advantage accruing from the proposed scheme of unification?

Air Marshal Miller: There are no significant financial advantages whatsoever as far as I can see.

Mr. Harkness:

Do you see any military advantages flowing from it?

Air Chief Marshal Miller: Again, there are no significant military advantages.

Mr. Harkness:

Do you see any military disadvantages coming out of it?

Air Chief Marshal Miller: The disruption is an unknown factor, and one which I have always rated rather highly. I did not want to have anything occur that would cause disruption in the services. I felt a lot of careful planning was necessary, and that probably time to educate people was required before the next step of unification was taken.

There is one more quotation of Air Chief Marshal Miller which I should like to read. It appears at page 2293. He was speaking about the loss of efficiency, and he said this:

I think it is a very bad thing for the forces. Many of the people who had left had a great deal to contribute to the forces organization in the future if they had stayed on. There were some key men who left.

Mr. Harkness:

Would you consider then that the loss of considerable numbers of highly trained personnel extending right down into N.C.O's and so on, and technical trades, has impaired the effectiveness of the forces?

Air Chief Marshal Miller: Yes. With the loss of skill and talent from our pool, the pool is bound to be poor thereby.

Now I would like to turn to General Allard's evidence. Lately General Allard has been making some speeches. I found that his statements to the committee were most unsatisfactory. They were unsatisfactory in many ways. They were tinged with political overtones, they were irrelevant and in some instances they were misleading. If lately he has brought a certain amount of political fire about his head, he has no one to thank for it but himself. When in the committee we pressed him for details on his planning, his attitude was: you are just a civilian; you would not understand; this is a professional matter. In looking through his statement one can find many instances where he seems to have taken that attitude.

Some of the people who were questioning him, myself included, are of course very ignorant in military matters and have not had much experience. However, I still think that we are entitled to better answers than those which General Allard gave us in his rather haughty and arrogant manner. It was the only time when Rear Admiral Landymore made the statement about a military commander taking over. I agreed with many people that Rear Admiral Landymore had gone too far, but some of General Allard's statements to the committee made me wonder whether Rear Admiral Landymore's fears did not have some basis.

Mr. Hellyer:

You should be ashamed of yourself.

Mr. Smith:

There is nothing to be ashamed of. Anyone can read the evidence. Let me

April 4, 1967

give examples of some of the misleading statements made by General Allard. For example, at page 1764 of the committee's proceedings he drags in the ill-fated Bobcat, which was a military weapon with the development of which governments struggled for some time. I do not know how he could relate that to the benefits of unification or integration, but he did. The same reference on the same page relates to the Arrow program. On the following page he speaks about the national survival system as being something that would not be carried out because of integration or unification, but really it seems to me that this is completely irrelevant.

At page 1821 he made the following statement:

Now, I have made a very careful study of the committee system, in which the army alone spent 50,000 hours-man hours-per year on co-ordination between the three services; this was the committee system.

Therefore, when I finished my study, I was convinced that we had to have an organization that would deal with this centrally.

Again this is a matter of integration, not unification, but he has confused the two. He said, 50,000 man hours. In those terms it sounds rather like a lot. On page 1824 he is questioned about this statement. I asked him:

General Allard, you mentioned in answer to Mr. Churchill a few minutes ago that 50,000 man hours were spent in the army on co-ordination. I have never been noted for my mathematics, but that would indicate to me some 25 or 30 men per year.