Mr. Mcllraith:

Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to thank hon. members of the committee for their co-operation when we were sitting in the whole house.

February 18, 1968

Mr. Chairman, I am sure the same spirit of co-operation will continue as we resume discussion of the defence estimates. At five o'clock I was indicating that because of the frantic haste generated by the slogan "60 days of decision", the changes that were taking place in the armed forces over the past seven or eight years reached such a speed that the difficulties already referred to by previous speakers were inevitable. I refer, of course, to problems of morale and problems of confusion.

It is difficult, both for hon. members and the press, to receive concrete information on the changes taking place in the department as a result of the stepped up program of integration and the secrecy that must prevail. As a consequence it is necessary for ordinary members to get the information, as it were, through the back door. One of the sources of information I find most useful and helpful with respect to this problem of morale, and the uncertainty and confusion in the armed forces, is to attend receptions. When the conversation becomes animated, when the inhibitions are lowered, then in talking to people who are closely associated with our defence forces we discover all is not as rosy as the picture painted by the minister in his speeches both here and across the country.

[DOT] (5:10 p.m.)

As I have pointed out, we in the Conservative party believe in orderly change. Certainly as a result of the confusion in the early 1950's a change was long overdue. However, if you are going to have orderly change it cannot take place overnight but should be done on the basis of long term planning. For instance, you might map out a five or ten year plan, particularly when there is going to be a comprehensive program of reorganization. From talking to people closely identified with Canada's forces I have the impression that there has been a slamming together-even a knocking of heads together-which has left some of the persons involved somewhat stunned.

I think the minister has given us a clue to this situation in that every statement he makes is full of optimism. There seem never to be any problems to be confronted or solved; everybody is moving smoothly toward the ultimate purposes the minister has in mind. In other words all is for the best in the best of possible worlds. When things move as smoothly as that we are reminded of the words of Shakespeare when he said; Me-thinks he doth protest too much. In no field

Supply-National Defence of human endeavour, particularly in public, political and military life is it possible to conceive of a situation where everything is ideal and no problems exist. The minister is like a salesman who talks beyond the sale. In attempting to make a sale he keeps on extolling the virtues of the product. I think because he is so importunate in this matter there is reason to be suspicious of what goes on behind the facade that has been erected.

Perhaps I may use another simile, Mr. Chairman, and go back in Greek mythology to Procrustes, who tried to make every traveller fit his magic bed, with the loss of course of a few limbs, heads and lives. The minister in attempting to make everybody fit into the pattern he has devised in reorganizing the armed forces has not lost any limbs, heads or lives, but obviously he has lost a considerable number of personnel. I suggest, as others have suggested, that this is indicative of problems of morale, confusion and frustration resulting from the 60 days of blazing decision atmosphere that has prevailed in the Department of National Defence.

Psychologists carry on tests with animals and have found that one sure way of creating disorientation is to subject these animals in experiments to constant and rapid change. I think that is the difficulty which prevails in the armed forces at the present time.

We are not sure even after the White Paper and the deliberations of the committee, on which I have not been privileged to serve in recent years, how far the minister intends to go in his reorganization; whether he is going beyond integration to unification. This is still a matter of debate, although I noticed in his statement yesterday that he did use this phrase, as it appears on page 1417 of Hansard, that the various services-

-would be integrated on a functional basis as a first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada.

We will be able to consider these matters later in the committee, but I question whether complete unification is in the best interests of Canada's armed forces. What is needed is unity of purpose and motivation. That must be a requisite to the maintenance of morale in the armed forces. If you try to press, by force, every branch of the armed forces into one common mould you are going to get monotony and frustration rather than strong morale and motivation.

We do not need similarity of colour and structure to meet Canada's defence requirements, we need flexibility. Flexibility is not

February 18, 1866

Supply-National Defence usually achieved by reconstructing ourselves into one organization as one unit with one system of operations, logistics and all the rest of the paraphernalia. We must have sufficient diversity of background and approach to provide the greatest number of solutions to meet our problems lest, to use a famous quotation, one good custom corrupts the whole world. This sort of regimentation toward solidarity and uniformity is bound to destroy the high morale and spirit of the armed forces. I think this is the major difficulty which is of concern to Canada's forces at the present time. I am not going to pursue that matter further, but I should like to mention one other point very briefly.

By the program that is under way are we not tending to reduce the Canadian defence forces to the role of a glorified police force? I know the minister is aware of this danger because I recall reading an article which appeared in the armed forces magazine in 1964 regarding the minister's approach to greater efficiency and reorganization in the armed forces. At page 54 of that publication the minister is quoted as stating:

The surest way to lose our sovereignty is to have someone else do our fighting for us.

I understand from that statement that the minister is fully aware of Canada's unique position which established Canada historically and geographically as a nation. It is almost trite to say that we are a nation because of a freak of history, because of an accident of history and circumstance. As we look at the pattern that has unfolded in the past three years during the administration of the department by the present minister and the Liberal government we get the impression that even though he uttered that warning not to have someone else do our fighting for us, he is unwittingly falling into that very error.

[DOT] (5:20 p.m.)

It is obvious to everyone that there are strong American overtones within Canadian defence policy not only in terms of equipment, to which reference has been made by at least two previous speakers, but also on major policy matters. For example, Mr. Chairman, there has been kite flying recently about the possibility of organizing a marine corps along American lines in the Canadian forces. I think it would not be boasting on my part to indicate that the Canadian armed forces in world war I and world war II achieved fame and established a reputation that would be equal to if not beyond that

[Mr. Dinsdale.J

established by the famous United States marine corps. I could refer to many incidents in this regard from world war II, such as Dieppe and the various campaigns of that most recent conflict.

The minister when in opposition was aware of this problem because, as the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre pointed out in his remarks he criticized the Conservative government for its tendency to accept the obsolete hardware-that is the word the minister likes to use-of the American armed forces.

This is not the time to resurrect the famous nuclear arms question, but I have always regarded the essence of the nuclear arms controversy of 1963 as being whether Canada should maintain its important posture of sovereignty or knuckle under to the dictates of another nation, in this instance the United States government.

I believe that the stand the Conservative government took at that time was in the best interests of preserving Canada's sovereignty and national identity in the face of the pressures that are constantly pushing in on us from the south.

So, as we move toward armed forces solidarity, as we move forward to create this highly trained, mobile, air-portable striking force, I believe serious second thought should be given to whether Canada is not abandoning completely its role of defence forces and substituting rather a role of a glorified police force. It seems to me that while we must have a bit of both, the fact that morale in the armed forces has declined in recent years would suggest that the defence and fighting role is diminishing at the expense of the glorified police force role.

I should like to make just one more observation, Mr. Chairman, in reference to the air force. As a former member of that service I should like to point out to the minister that integration in the R.C.A.F. can only be achieved to a limited degree. Certainly you can have integration at the training level. This of course was demonstrated in the early reorganization which took place back in 1957, 1958 and 1959, I believe it was, when all military flying training was taken over by the R.C.A.F., even to the extent of removing the training of air observer pilots from the various Royal Canadian Flying Clubs which had done an excellent job up to that point. But beyond this level the problem becomes rather complicated.

February 18, 1966

With reference to the CF-5 discussion that is under way in the house and the country at the present time, the surest indication that this plane has deficiencies, which have been pointed out in press comments, is the fact that there is to be no simulator provided for training. The minister likes to use the phrase that weapons systems have become sophisticated and complex. One of the reasons for phasing out air force auxiliary training, for example, was that the planes, weapons systems and techniques had become so sophisticated and complex that it was no longer possible for we reserve types to maintain a level of operational efficiency.

Whatever might be the qualities of the CF-5 aircraft-and the minister, again, has gone into rhapsodies concerning the qualities of this airplane and has been so extravagant in his claim for its merits that I am persuaded to be somewhat suspicious-I have no doubt that some problems do exist in this regard. From my experience any new aircraft, even the old, unsophisticated aircraft of world war II, the introduction of any new aircraft-even a modification or a new mark of an existing aircraft-has always produced a whole new generation of gremlins.

I do not know whether the minister has heard of gremlins, but it would seem to me that the CF-5-and we will no doubt get some further information in the committee on this matter-must be an aircraft that is particularly infested with this mysterious creature.

Coming to the question of the simulator, Mr. Chairman, it is well established in flying training procedures, particularly with the complexities of modern aircraft, that you cannot carry on an adequate training program without some sort of ground simulated training. The very fact that Canada has decided to withdraw from the contract for this simulator would suggest that the Americans have decided that this aircraft is not suitable for operational purposes.

Just a short time ago the Associate Minister of National Defence suggested that many CF-5's had been sold to other countries. If there is such a demand for this aircraft it might still be possible, to proceed with a simulator. You will not achieve an adequate training program if you depend entirely on airborne training procedures. Not only is it expensive but it is highly inefficient, because only on the ground, in a ground trainer or a simulator can you get the controlled situation that is necessary to train aircrew in the first 23033-95a

Supply-National Defence instance and is then necessary to maintain operational efficiency.

Even in world war II, with relatively slow aircraft and relatively unsophisticated techniques, aircrew were not allowed to fly operationally until they had a minimum of one hour in the Link trainer before going on ops. I am referring to night fighter pilots, who had a particularly difficult problem to cope with in terms of instrument flying. But again, we have made such tremendous advances since world war II that I would suggest to the minister that if he persists in going through with the purchase of the CF-5 he should re-examine this question of the availability of a simulator.

To sum up-and I think my time has expired, Mr. Chairman-I should just like to repeat what I said in the opening part of my remarks. I would suggest to the minister that if he wants to overcome the obvious difficulties that prevail in the Department of National Defence at the present time he should give the command structures a chance to gel and work out the kinks before going any further, o (5:30 p.m.)

Let us lay down some five year plans; let us lay down guide lines. It is not good enough to reorganize armed force headquarters and then give the command to integrate. It is all fine and good to go through the motions of integrating, but you have to provide guide lines, otherwise you get a glorified situation of confusion. You are dealing with human beings who can only adjust at a certain rate of speed. We all know that perhaps the armed forces are a little more rigid in this respect than any other type of human being. You have to take into consideration the psychological factors in the field of human adjustment. I know, as a member of the opposition, that this is a difficulty that has bothered them, that is gnawing away at the members of the armed forces. This is what is destroying the morale of the armed forces at the present time.

The minister made reference yesterday to economy in the armed forces. Perhaps he might find greater success in achieving real economies if consideration were given to managerial systems in connection with budgeting, tendering and the other aspects of defence planning, which obviously have not been under control in years gone by. I need refer only to the Avro fiasco to point out the situation which has prevailed and which no doubt has prevailed up to the present time to

February 18, 1986

Supply-National Defence a substantial extent. If we are going to have efficient and effective armed forces, we must retain unit spirit; we must retain opportunity for promotion; we must retain opportunity for competition. Otherwise I am afraid the Canadian armed forces are going to decline in efficiency, to degenerate in effectiveness, rather than move forward along the lines that were first contemplated when Hon. George Pearkes set this machinery in operation.

Mr. Brand:

I have just a few remarks to make, Mr. Chairman, particularly with regard to the morale problem in the armed services. My comments are not made as a result of information I have received from various assistants. I am speaking now at the request of many members of the armed forces who have approached me personally and expressed their concern about the way things were going in the armed forces today. They themselves offered to me what I thought might be solutions to these problems. If I may be presumptuous, perhaps I could suggest to the minister what the solutions might be.

Primarily, I should like to refer to jet pilots in the Royal Canadian Air Force. I placed question No. 419 on the order paper, which read as follows:

What are the numbers of R.C.A.F. jet pilots under the age of 28. who have retired voluntarily from the R.C.A.F. in each of the following years-

The years mentioned were 1957 to 1965. I think the figures are most interesting. You will notice that in the year 1957, only 4 retired. In the following years there were 3, 1, 8, 7, 6 and 8. In the year 1964, there were 26 who retired. These are highly trained specialized members of the Royal Canadian Air Force who retired voluntarily. They are young men, still under the age of 28. In the year 1965 there were 27 who retired voluntarily. There must be a reason for this. The reason they retire under the age of 28 is that in order to get a job in civilian aviation in the United States, where most of them have gone, they have to be under the age of 28.

I spoke to many of these pilots and asked them why they were leaving the Royal Canadian Air Force. The first thing they said was they liked the Royal Canadian Air Force; they enjoyed the life. However, they were concerned about the security of their tenure. Many pilots had been retired by the minister, at the minister's orders, as I understand. These pilots wondered whether they could get

a permanent commission in the force. They never received a positive answer. They did not know whether they were still going to be pilots when they were in their thirties.

If they were let out of the air force when they were in their thirties, what would happen? They would be out in civilian life with no job, and there would be no job for which they were qualified. They would be too old to go into the field of flying passengers for large air lines, unless they were exceptional. The average man is just too old for this work. He has had tremendous training which I understand costs, if I heard the minister correctly, between $200,000 and $250,000. If we lose to the United States 26 pilots, each of whom was trained at this cost, then we have lost $7J-million or more to the United States.

When I heard that they did not have training which they could use in civilian life, I asked these pilots what they felt should be done. They had what I thought was a very good solution. They suggested that perhaps their training could be tied to a university, which it most certainly is in the type of work they do in the aeronautical engineering field, and while they were training with the air force they could receive a degree from some affiliated university.

Then, if these men were retired at an early age from the R.C.A.F. they would have a degree with which they could approach prospective employers and obtain a job in this manner. There is a precedence for this in the armed forces colleges which grant degrees in engineering and so on. I feel the idea has some merit, Mr. Minister, and I should like the ministry to look into this matter, and particularly to discuss it with the men who are thinking of leaving. Perhaps these discussions would be most revealing.

When I heard the associate minister refer to the increased number of voluntary releases over the past few years from all the forces, and attribute this to increasing opportunities for employment in the country, I began to wonder if that was not more the type of statement a person would make on the hustings before an election campaign. It seems to me that directly tied with that statement is the opposite one that by virtue of their training they are unable to get employment in civilian life.

Today we heard the associate minister saj there are increased re-employment opportunities. I have talked to members of the Royal Canadian Navy and the Army and I have

February 18, 1966 COMMONS

asked them why they left the forces. Their reason was dissatisfaction with what is going on; they did not know what the future held for them. Believe you me, Mr. Minister, if this is not a morale problem I do not know what else you could call it. There is something very wrong indeed when there is this sort of increase in voluntary releases, as the associate minister pointed out.

[DOT] (5:40 p.m.)

There is one other point I should like to make. Both ministers have commented on the tremendous economies effected as a result of this integration of the armed forces. I am sure there are many areas in the armed forces which for many years have required integration. I certainly agree with this and the general tenor of what has been done.

However, when I look at the estimates at page 252, it seems to me, though I am not a chartered accountant and perhaps cannot understand this, that instead of a decrease in 1965-66 over 1964-65 there are increases all the way down. I see one decrease, and that is with respect to mutual aid.

I would ask, what about this efficiency we keep hearing about? I also see a decrease in pensions, due to efficiency I presume. But in every other item there is an increase, with perhaps one exception. The amount of money paid for the permanent personnel of the army has increased, and the navy is about the same. If I remember correctly, the amount to the air force has gone down, which is directly related, I presume, to the number who have left the air force as a result of voluntary release and other releases practised by the minister in his wisdom.

I would ask the minister whether he would consider looking very carefully once again at the loss of these highly trained personnel. I do not think the Canadian tax dollar should be used to provide men to fly aeroplanes in any other country than our own. This is something that I am sorry to say extends to other fields in our country as well as national defence; but surely it is something to which we should not turn a blind eye. I suggest we examine this problem as closely as possible to see what we can do to retain these highly trained people. Although the re-engagement bonus is a wonderful idea-and I agree with the hon. member for Victoria (B.C.) that it is not enough-this is surely closing the stable door after the horse is stolen.

DEBATES 1491

Supply-National Defence

I should like the minister to look into the reasons for this and perhaps come up with some conclusion which would be to the benefit of all armed forces in Canada today.

Mr. Herridge:

Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to speak at any length but I do want to express our point of view on one or two matters.

First of all, the minister's defence policy reflects our Canadian foreign policy, and he has to adjust his defence policy to our foreign policy. To that extent his hands are tied, and we know it. We give the minister full credit for any savings accomplished as the result of integration, changing circumstances in the world today, improvements in technology and customs, and so on.

However, from our point of view the formulation of defence policy for Canada is more difficult than it is for many countries. Our defence policy, as we see it, in some respects does not add to our national security.

I want to bring to the attention of the minister an article I read recently in the Globe Magazine written by Professor Eayrs, an economist at Toronto University. I suggest the minister would be well advised to read it, because there are some good suggestions in this article, some of them critical of the defence department's policies. I think there is a great deal of thought behind it.

I might say that in conversations I have had with people I have met who are interested in our foreign policy, our defence policy and so on, there has been growing criticism of the amount of our expenditures on defence at this time-the expenditure in our budget which has been going directly for military purposes and which is not being used in other directions.

This article is entitled "Canada's military establishment: a waste of money?" Then there is the subheading:

Politics, rather than strategy, has guided the nation's defence policies, says a political economist who suggests military spending could be cut by two thirds.

I should just like to quote two or three paragraphs from this article; I hope the minister will read the rest of it.

I began by stating that the formulation of national security policy is made more difficult for Canada than for most other countries by the fact that what we do in the name of our own security demonstrably does not contribute to our security. Our contribution to North American defence has been undertaken largely for political reasons, and has had less to do with Canadian-Soviet relations than with Canadian-American relations: moreover,

February 18, 1966

Supply-National Defence

our contribution has been marginal throughout most of the past and, citing McNamara's testimony, is likely to become less significant in future, as the threat of bomber attack recedes and as antiballistic missile defences are perfected. Our contribution to Western European defence is largely symbolic-

I have heard similar statements made by persons well acquainted with military affairs in Europe.

-and its rationale must be provided by a series of arguments which can hardly be tested and never be proven. The use to which we might put our military establishment in maintaining order along the peripheries is severely restricted both by our own internal inhibitions and by developments in the environment of interposition over which we have no control.

Then he goes on to say:

My own feeling is that we have been paying too much for it-much too much. I would think that a really ruthless Minister of National Defence could justify a military establishment for Canada costing no more than about one third of its present annual upkeep-about $500 million-without worrying that his countrymen would fall prey to aggressors as a result.

Then he goes on to develop his argument.

So that there is no misunderstanding as to what is our policy in this respect, I wish to quote what it is. The minister will understand that I am quoting the New Democratic party policy with respect to defence. I am going to refer to the program which was adopted at our August 4, 1961 convention, at the Regina convention in August 1963, and of course carried on to our last convention. This is what our program says:

NATO has played its part in the maintenance of west European security. However, it has concentrated on a military role and has failed to adapt its policies to the growing importance of the economic and social front in the present world struggle. The New Democratic party believes that we should seek a reappraisal and change of NATO's policies and objectives.

The New Democratic party believes that the extension of nuclear weapons to any further states and alliances threatens disaster to the world. It therefore opposes Canada's troops being supplied with such weapons at home or abroad. At present, except for those nations which have independently developed atomic capacity, neither NATO itself nor its members individually possess or control nuclear warheads. Should they do so, Canada, must make it clear that it cannot remain in the alliance. To relieve tensions, Canada should press for a demilitarized zone in central Europe and for the simultaneous disbandment of the Warsaw and NATO pacts.

That is the position of this party with respect to our continued support of NATO. I presume the minister will agree that NATO is a nuclear power or component part. I see the minister nods his head.

[Mr. Herridge.j

Mr. Hellyer:

It is a nuclear-armed alliance.

[DOT] (5:50 p.m.)

Mr. Herridge:

Yes, I think that is a better description. I understand his position in view of these changing developments.

Then we go on with the other questions relating to our policy. We are told that the New Democratic government will make a general and searching reappraisal of Canada's defence role. Much of the money which Canada now allocates to defence could better be spent on providing such conventional troops and civilian personnel as the United Nations may require, and on aiding underdeveloped countries.

We believe in maintaining efficient defence forces in Canada, to provide for the defence of this country. We also think that we can provide troops that should be utilized by the United Nations anywhere in the world, with the transport that should be necessary, and other materiel and equipment that might be required. We also would agree to our naval forces being used in patrol of the seas, off both our coasts.

Then we go on with the question of NORAD. I am quoting from the New Democratic party program, page 51 which reads as follows:

It is questionable whether NORAD ever made any significant contribution to the defence of Canada and in any case it has outlived its usefulness. Furthermore, there is every danger that the Bomarcs will be equipped with nuclear warheads. The NORAD agreements should therefore be terminated.

That is the attitude of the New Democratic party with respect to NORAD. I continue to quote:

The New Democratic party demands an immediate ban on nuclear tests, both to avoid the dangerous effects of fall-out and as a first step toward nuclear disarmament.

Then we go on to deal with it.

We believe that that should be our defence policy. I fully admit that the minister has to give effect to a defence policy which reflects foreign policy, because he knows that we stand for an independent foreign policy for Canada which is western oriented. We believe that we can make a worth-while contribution to the development of peace in the world by providing what we would term the police force necessary to police the world. I think my hon. friend from Brandon-Souris rather objected to the words "police force". We will be very happy if we can refer to the forces of the United Nations being used as police forces anywhere in the world, rather than as armies, navies, and air forces.

February 18, 1966

In addition, I understand that we ought to be able to save our present costs of maintaining our forces in NATO, which I understand amounts to $500 million a year. Is that correct, sir?

Mr. Hellyer:

I should not want to comment on the figure.

Mr. Herridge:

The minister does not want to comment.

Mr. Hellyer:

It depends how you apportion it.

Mr. Herridge:

I used the figures that I read. However, here we are denying to our old age pensioners an increase of $25 a month.

We are very concerned about the education of our young people. We, in the New Democratic party, suggest that we could use this approximate sum of $500 million a year for those purposes. In addition to that, other savings could be effected. These could be achieved by a change in the requirements for foreign forces and defence policy, to provide greater economic aid to those areas that require it throughout the world.

Mr. Churchill:

Would the hon. member permit a question? He used the phrase, that there would be a savings of $500 million a year. I suggest that no actual saving is to be effected anywhere. Did the hon. member not mean that the defence estimates might be reduced by that amount and be available for these other purposes?

Mr. Herridge:

Yes, possibly I did not use the correct words. The reduction of $500 million could be applied to the uses I have suggested. Of course there would be other savings brought about by reduced need for expensive equipment, such as landing ships, and so on, for which at present we have to pay. That would be reduced by a certain proportion.

Mr. Crouse:

Mr. Speaker, I wish to speak briefly on the minister's estimates presently before the house. In his opening remarks he used, in effect, these words: The fact that our progress toward a completely unified force is well in advance of what might be hoped for reflects the spirit of enthusiasm in our task which has been undertaken. It is evident, Mr. Chairman, that this spirit of enthusiasm is not shared by the enlisted personnel of our armed forces as evidenced by the manner in which they are presently forsaking the services. I would say to the minister that his

Supply-National Defence program has not been one of integration, but one of interruption or, as my colleague suggests, one of disintegration. We have had interruption of the planned program in the navy. We have had interruption of personnel enlistment. We have had interruption of the role of the Royal Canadian Air Force, as the supporter of Canada's mobile defence force. I believe that Canadians generally are beginning to wonder just what is happening in our defence department.

For example, no keel has been laid for a service vessel since the minister introduced what is commonly called in Nova Scotia the "Hellyer plan". He has yet to produce one practical alternative for defence in mine warfare. He started a program to cut back personnel, which snowballed to the extent that our services are now suffering from manning problems. As a result we see him introducing a re-enlistment bonus program. I am pleased to note this, because I would point out to the minister that this was proposed by the Progressive Conservative party when we met at Moncton, prior to the election of 1965. We are happy to endorse this. I think it will be helpful. I am glad to see that the minister has adopted in one of his policies something previously advocated by Progressive Conservatives.

Under the economical guidance of the minister the department made a decision to buy 125 improved versions of the Northrop CF-5. This, I understand, will be the R.C.A.F.'s new multipurpose aircraft which will be acquired at a cost of $215 million to the Canadian taxpayers.

Just how good is this aircraft? In a recent exchange with the Associate Minister of National Defence in regard to this subject I learned that this aircraft is to be modified. Apparently there is need for a great many improvements. We are told that the United States defence department rejected this aircraft after carrying out extensive proving trials with a number of them. The faults listed were not all in keeping with Canada's international or intended role, for which purpose this aircraft is being bought.

The CF-5 is intended for deployment anywhere in the world in support of Canada's mobile defence forces. However, according to all reports it is difficult to refuel this aircraft in flight. Four of these aircraft made the trip from the United States to Iran, taking eight days in transit, with ten refuelling stops.

February 18, 1966

Supply-National Defence

The minister and the Associate Minister of National Defence have stated that this aircraft can take off from short clearings in fields. However, I am informed that because of its underslung bomb load, necessitating a perfect runway, it requires greater length of runway than an Air Canada DC-8 jet. Even operating from perfect airfields, which might be few and far between in brush-fire wars, the aircraft is limited, with a moderate bomb load, to a range of 180 miles.

The Minister of National Defence has been careful to deny that at the present time there is a problem respecting morale in his department. However, the numbers of men receiving discharge in the last 18 months, being some 13,142 who have retired from the defence forces prior to normal retirement age, would indicate that he has been singularly successful in producing rivalries long forgotten in the Canadian services. His policies have caused discontent among the troops. He has disrupted planned programs in the navy, setting construction back by at least five years, with no clear objective. He has generally made so many serious errors in judgment, such as the retirement of 500 pilots who now are required by the Royal Canadian Air Force, that there seems little reason, except the old school tie, for him to hold his post.

[DOT] (6:00 p.m.)

It is readily understandable that the navy, in the Atlantic provinces, and especially in Nova Scotia is our prime concern. However, what did the minister do? He cancelled the general purpose frigate program and then, many months later, he produced another, smaller construction program. But to date no action has been taken.

In his so-called wisdom he decided a minesweeping capability was not required by the R.C.N., so he mothballed every minesweeper in the fleet. I ask him this: What alternative is he going to introduce in place of these minesweepers? It is true that if he

keeps on at this present pace it may well be that Canada will not have any navy to protect against mines. But we do have a large and growing wooden and steel fishing fleet, and in time of war these ships would be entitled to some protection, if they are to be expected to continue producing food for the nation.

The minister stated today that our six squadrons in Germany will be fully operational in the non-nuclear attack role as well as in the nuclear strike role. However, I think he should give us a clear explanation of what is being done in support of our NATO requirements. Does this mean we have now gone full cycle and become a non-nuclear power? Will the Bomarcs in Canada be scrapped, or will this arrangement be expanded, with Canada becoming part of an anti-missile missile system?

There are many other questions I could put to the minister but I see it is six o'clock. I hope he will answer some of those I have been able to pose during the short period of time at my disposal.

Mr. Nowlan:

May I call it six o'clock?

Mr. Hellyer:

I understood there was some general feeling that we might finish tonight -that it had been discussed earlier.

Mr. Churchill:

Misinformed.

Progress reported.

Mr. Churchill:

I should like to ask the

Minister of National Defence about the business for Monday. I understand there will be a continuation of discussion of the estimates of the Department of National Defence followed then or later by the estimates of the Department of Justice. Is that correct?