January 1, 1962



The President and the Prime Minister met in Nassau from December 18 to December 21. They were accompanied by the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, and the under secretary of state, Mr. Ball, and by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, the Minister of Defence, Mr. Thorneycroft and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Colonies, Mr. Sandys. The President and the Prime Minister discussed a wide range of topics. They reviewed the state of east-west relations in the aftermath of the October crisis in Cuba, and joined in the hope that a satisfactory resolution of this crisis might open the way to the settlement of other problems outstanding between the west and the Soviet union. In particular, they reviewed the present state of the negotiations for a treaty ending nuclear tests, and reaffirmed their intent to seek agreement on this issue with the U.S.S.R., in the hope that this agreement would lead on to successful negotiations on wider issues of disarmament. As regards Berlin, they reaffirmed their interest in arriving at a solid and enduring settlement which would ensure that Berlin remains free and viable. The Chinese communist attack on India was discussed with special consideration being given to the way in which the two governments might assist the government of India to counter this aggression. Defence problems of the subcontinent were reviewed. The Prime Minister and the President are hopeful that the common interests of Pakistan and India in the security of the subcontinent would lead to a reconciliation of Indian-Pakistan differences. To this end, they expressed their gratification at the statesmanship shown by President Ayub and Prime Minister Nehru in agreeing to renew their efforts to resolve their differences at this crucial moment. The two leaders discussed the current state of affairs in the Congo, and agreed to continue their efforts for an equitable integration of this troubled country. They expressed support for Mr. Spaak's proposal for a fair division of revenues and noted with concern the dangers of further discord in the Congo. The Prime Minister informed the President of the present state of negotiations for U.K. membership in the common market. The President reaffirmed the interest of the United States in an early and successful outcome. The President and the Prime Minister also discussed in considerable detail policy on advanced nuclear weapons systems and considered a variety of approaches. The result of this discussion is set out in the attached statement. Statement on Nuclear Defence Systems December 21, 1962 (1) The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the development program for the Skybolt missile. The President explained that it was no longer expected that this very complex weapons system would be completed within the cost estimate or the time scale which were projected when the program was begun. (2) The President informed the Prime Minister that for this reason and because of the availability to the United States of alternative weapons systems, he had decided to cancel plans for the production of Skybolt for use by the United States. Nevertheless, recognizing the importance of the Skybolt program for the United Kingdom, and recalling that the purpose of the offer of Skybolt to the United Kingdom in 1960 had been to assist in improving and extending the effective life of the British V-bombers, the President expressed his readiness to continue the development of the missile as a joint enterprise between the United States and the United Kingdom, with each country bearing equal shares of the future cost of completing development, after which the United Kingdom would be able to place a production order to meet its requirements. (3) While recognizing the value of this offer, the Prime Minister decided, after full consideration, not to avail himself of it because of doubts that had been expressed about the prospects of success for this weapons system and because of uncertainty regarding date of completion and final cost of the program. (4) As a possible alternative the President suggested that the Royal Air Force might use the Hound Dog missile. The Prime Minister responded that in the light of the technical difficulties he was unable to accept this suggestion. (5) The Prime Minister then turned to the possibility of provision of the Polaris missile to the United Kingdom by the United States. After careful review, the President and the

Prime Minister agreed that a decision on Polaris must be considered in the widest context both of the future defence of the Atlantic alliance and of the safety of the whole free world. They reached the conclusion that this issue created an opportunity for the development of new and closer arrangements for the organization and control of strategic western defence and that such arrangements in turn could make a major contribution to political cohesion among the nations of the alliance. (6) The Prime Minister suggested and the President agreed that for the immediate future a start could be made by subscribing to NATO some part of the forces already in existence. This could include allocations from United States strategic forces, from United Kingdom bomber command, and from tactical nuclear forces now held in Europe. Such forces would be assigned as part of a NATO nuclear force and targeted in accordance with NATO plans. (7) Returning to Polaris, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the purpose of their two governments with respect to the provision of the Polaris missiles must be the development of a multilateral NATO nuclear force in the closest consultation with other NATO allies. They will use their best endeavors to this end. (8) Accordingly, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the U.S. will make available on a continuing basis Polaris missiles (less warheads) for British submarines. The U.S. will also study the feasibility of making available certain support facilities for such submarines. The U.K. government will construct the submarines in which these weapons will be placed and they will also provide the nuclear warheads for the Polaris missiles. British forces developed under this plan will be assigned and targeted in the same way as the forces described in paragraph 6. These forces, and at least equal U.S. forces, would be made available for inclusion in a NATO multilateral nuclear force. The Prime Minister made it clear that except where H.M.G. may decide that supreme national interests are at stake, these British forces will be used for the purposes of international defence of the western alliance in all circumstances. (9) The President and the Prime Minister are convinced that this new plan will strengthen the nuclear defence of western alliance. In strategic terms this defence is indivisible, and it is their conviction that in all ordinary circumstances of crisis or danger, it is this very unity which is the best protection of the west. (10) The President and the Prime Minister agreed that in addition to having a nuclear shield it is important to have a non-nuclear sword. For this purpose they agreed on the importance of increasing the effectiveness of their conventional forces on a worldwide basis. Following is text of joint communique agreed by Mr. Diefenbaker and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Joint Communique Following on their joint meeting with President Kennedy, the Prime Ministers of Canada and the United Kingdom had discussions in Nassau from Dec. 21-22. The foreign secretary, Lord Home, took part in some of these. The two prime ministers discussed a wide range of topics which had been on the agenda for Prime Minister Macmillan's talks with President Kennedy. In particular, Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. Macmillan reviewed the state of east-west relations, including the problem of nuclear tests and disarmament, and expressed the hope that the present situation might offer opportunities for constructive moves in the problems outstanding in these fields. They also reviewed the situation in the Indian subcontinent and Prime Minister Diefenbaker expressed his strong support for the declaration by President Kennedy and Mr. Macmillan about the desirability of a reconciliation of Indian and Pakistan differences. The two prime ministers also discussed the situation in the Congo and agreed on the desirability of a peaceful solution which would promote the unity of that country and prevent further discord. The two prime ministers exchanged views about the current negotiations for British membership of the common market and affirmed the importance of close consultation in this regard. The two prime ministers expressed their strong conviction of the vital role which the commonwealth can play in the improvement of understanding between nations, in promoting the cause of freedom, and in the solution of world problems. They also stated their satisfaction at the unique opportunity which the commonwealth provides for close, friendly and continuing consultations. Such consultations are in themselves an expression of the vitality of the commonwealth and of its increasing usefulness in the service of mankind. Nassau, the Bahamas December 22, 1962



January 12, 1963.

The first meeting of the Canada-Japan ministerial committee was held at the ministry of foreign affairs, Tokyo, on January 11 and 12, 1963. Canada was represented at the meeting by Hon. Donald M. Fleming, Minister of Justice and Attorney General, Hon. J. Angus MacLean, Minister of Fisheries, Mr. David Sim, deputy minister of national revenue, Mr. N. A. Robertson, under secretary of state for external affairs, Mr. J. A. Roberts, deputy minister of trade and commerce and Mr. W. F. Bull, Canadian ambassador to Japan. Japan was represented by Hon. Masayoshi Ohira, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hon, Kakuei Tanaka, Minister of Finance, Hon. Seishi Shigemasa, Minister for Agriculture and Forestry, Hon. Hajime Fukuda, Minister for International Trade and Industry and Hon. Kiichi Miyazawa, Minister of State and Director-General of Economic Planning Agency, and Mr. Nobuhiko Ushiba, Japanese ambassador to Canada. The committee discussed the whole range of the trade and economic relations between Canada and Japan as well as their trade and economic relations with the rest of the world.

The Canadian ministers outlined the growth which has taken place in the Canadian economy. They explained that the rapidly growing labour force in Canada must largely find employment opportunities in secondary industry. The Japanese ministers reviewed the significant achievements in the development of the Japanese economy and stressed the importance to Japan of expanded foreign trade. The committee examined the balance of payments problems of both countries and noted the progress that was being made toward their solution. There was an exchange of views about the trade relations between the two countries. The ministers of the two countries reviewed the growth of trade between Canada and Japan. The committee agreed that there existed good opportunities for further expansion of trade between Canada and Japan. In the course of the discussion, the annual consultations for Japan's export restraints were reviewed at some length. The committee agreed on the desirability of concluding the consultations as quickly as possible. The committee did not enter into the details of the current consultations for 1963, but it had a full exchange of views on the fundamental principles governing such consultations. The committee believed that such frank exchange of views would make a significant contribution to increased understanding between the two countries of their mutual trade relations. The Japanese ministers reaffirmed the principle of orderly marketing of Japanese exports to Canada of products competitive with Canadian production in order to avoid injury to Canadian industries. At the same time they emphasized the Japanese desire to see gradual expansion of exports of commodities subject to voluntary restriction and removal of such restraints as soon as the Canadian situation permits. The committee reviewed recent progress made in the liberalization of imports into Japan. The Canadian ministers asked that as further progress became possible Japan should keep in mind Canada's interest in certain products. The Canadian ministers urged that quantitative restrictions should not be replaced by tariff increases or other restrictive devices. The committee took note of the assurances of the Canadian government that the Canadian temporary import surcharges would be eliminated as quickly as Canada's balance of payments position permits. The committee examined recent developments in international economic relations. The committee took special note of the joint initiative taken by the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States in calling for a meeting of ministers to set in train a broad program for the liberalization and expansion of trade. The committee welcomed the fact that this meeting would take place under the auspices of GATT in the early part of 1963. The committee stressed the importance of achieving the broadest participation in the tariff negotiations which would follow the meeting of ministers and emphasized that such negotiations must be based upon the unconditional most favoured nation principle. The committee recognized the need to make progress in all sectors of trade. The ministers reviewed the efforts being made by Canada and Japan to assist economic progress in the developing countries and noted that both countries were co-

operating together in this field in various international bodies. They recognized that the economic progress of the developing countries required not only financial assistance but also expanding export opportunities for their products. The committee noted that this would be a major objective of the forthcoming U.N. conference on trade and development. They agreed that Canada and Japan should work closely together in the preparatory committee in order to ensure the achievement of meaningful and constructive results. The Canadian delegation expressed the strong support of the Canadian government for increased participation by Japan in the organization for economic co-operation and development (OECD) and full Japanese membership therein. The committee discussed a number of fisheries matters. There was an exchange of information and views on the present conditions of the respective domestic fishing industries as well as on the international aspect of fisheries. The importance of fisheries for the economies of the two countries and the significance of international co-operation for the sound promotion of fisheries were emphasized. It was agreed that negotiations be initiated between the two governments for the conclusion of an agreement for the avoidance of double taxation in view of the need for further strengthening of economic relations between the two countries.

The ministers of the two countries were unanimously agreed that the Canada-Japan ministerial committee which was established by Prime Minister Ikeda and Prime Minister Diefenbaker in June 1961 was of great value for the development of better mutual understanding between the two countries. Accordingly this highly successful first meeting was of historic importance. The committee accepted the invitation of the Canadian government to hold its next meeting in Ottawa.



Following is the text of a letter dated December 19, 1962 from Chairman Khrushchov to President Kennedy. Dear Mr. President, In our recent correspondence related to the events in the Caribbean area we have touched on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Today I would like to come back again to that problem and to set forth my views concerning possible ways of its speediest solution which would be mutually acceptable to both our sides. It seems to me, Mr. President, that the time has come now to put an end once and for all to nuclear tests, to draw a line through such tests. The moment for this is very very appropriate. Left behind is a period of utmost acuteness and tension in the Caribbean. Now we have untied our hands to engage closely in other urgent international matters and, in particular, in such a problem which has been ripe for so long as the cessation of nuclear tests. A certain relaxation of international tension which has emerged now should in my view facilitate this. The U.S.S.R. does not need war. I think that war does not promise bright prospects for the U.S.A. either. If in the past after every war America used to increase its economic potential and to accumulate more and more wealth, now war with the use of modern rocket-nuclear weapons will stride across seas and oceans within minutes. Thermonuclear catastrophe will bring enormous losses and sufferings to the American people as well as to other peoples on earth. To prevent this we must on the basis of complete equality and with just regard for each other's interests develop between ourselves peaceful relations and solve all issues through negotiations and mutual concessions. One of such questions with which the governments of our countries have been dealing for many years is the question of concluding a treaty banning all tests of nuclear weapons. Both of us stand on the same position with regard to the fact that national means of detection are sufficient to control banning experimental nuclear explosions in outer space, in the atmosphere and under water. So far, however, we have not succeeded in finding a mutually acceptable solution to the problem, of the cessation of underground tests. The main obstacle to an agreement is the demand by the American side of international control and inspection on the territories of nuclear powers over cessation of underground nuclear tests. I would like to believe that you yourself understand the rightness of our arguments that now national means are sufficient to control also this kind of tests and be sure that agreement is observed by any side. But so far you do not want to recognize openly this actual state of things and to accept it as a basis for concluding without delay an agreement on the cessation of tests. Striving to find a mutually acceptable basis for agreement, the U.S.S.R. has made lately an important step toward the west and agreed to installing automatic seismic stations. This idea, as is known, was put forward not by us. It was introduced by British scientists during the recent meeting in London of the participants of the Pugwash movement. Moreover, it is well known to us that when this idea was proposed it was not alien to your scientists who were in London at that time. We proposed to instal such stations both near the borders of nuclear powers and directly on their territories. We stated our agreement that three such stations be installed on the territory of the U.S.S.R. in the zones most frequently subjected to earthquakes. There are three such zones in the U.S.S.R. where these stations can be installed: central Asian, Altaian and Far Eastern. In the opinion of soviet scientists, the most suitable places for locating automatic seismic stations in the U.S.S.R. are: the

area of the city of Kokchetav for the central Asian zone of the U.S.S.R.; the area of the city of Bodaibo for the Altaian zone; and the area

of the city



for the


January 1, 1962