June 17, 1952


Alfred Johnson Brooks

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Brooks:

Will this bill go to the special committee on veterans affairs?


Hugues Lapointe (Minister of Veterans Affairs)


Mr. Lapointe:

Yes, it is the intention to refer it as soon as second reading has taken place.


Motion agreed to, bill read the second time and referred to the special committee on veterans affairs.




Lester Bowles Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs)


Hon. L. B. Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs) moved:

Tnat It is expedient that the houses of parliament

He said: Mr. Speaker, as I reported to the house on May 27, representatives of the member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization signed on that day in Paris a protocol which extended to the newly formed European defence community the guarantees under article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty. It is this protocol which is of immediate concern to us today and for which I am to ask the approval of parliament. I submit that possibly no more important subject will be discussed by the house during this session than the one which we are considering today. The protocol has already appeared as an appendix to Hansard and I am sure all hon. members are familiar with it. Article I of the protocol reads as follows:

An armed attack (i) on the territory of any of the members of the European defence community in Europe or in the area described in article 6 Ii) of the North Atlantic treaty, or (ii) on the forces, vessels or aircraft of the European defence community when in the area described in article 6 (ii) of the said treaty, shall be considered an attack

against all the parties to the North Atlantic treaty, within the meaning of article 5 of the said treaty, and article 5 shall apply accordingly.

Article II of the protocol reads as follows:

The present protocol shall enter into force as soon as each of the parties has notified the government of the United States of America of its acceptance and the council of the European defence community has notified the North Atlantic council of the entry into force of the treaty setting up the European defence community . . .

At the beginning I should like to emphasize that whatever action is taken by the government in respect of ratification of this protocol, the protocol does not come into effect until it is ratified by all the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Therefore even if action were taken at an early date by the government of Canada the protocol itself would not be effective until it had been ratified by all the members and until the European defence community treaty was also in effect.

The reason that we are asking for consideration of this matter now at the end of this session is to make sure that, if the protocol commends itself to the house, we will not be in the position of holding up its coming into effect. I believe that if the protocol commends itself to parliament and if the government decides to ratify it, it might be desirable to postpone the deposit of our ratification for a time until we see how other governments, possibly even more immediately concerned than we are, act with regard to it.

It is true that the acceptance and the coming into effect of this protocol do extend the obligations which Canada has undertaken under the North Atlantic treaty to the Federal Republic of Germany. That of course is a very important development indeed. As hon. members know, the proposed European defence community includes only one member which is not already a signatory to the North Atlantic treaty, and that is the Federal Republic of Germany. But though the protocol does represent an extension of our obligations, I suggest that the extension is more theoretical than real because in the North Atlantic treaty there is an article, article 6, which provides that the guarantee of mutual assistance shall come into effect when an armed attack is made on the forces, the vessels or the aircraft of any of the parties when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the parties were stationed on the date when the treaty came into effect.

That means that we are already under obligation to come to the assistance of the NATO forces stationed in Western Germany. If this protocol comes into effect it will extend that obligation from an attack on forces of occupation in Germany to an attack on

Western Germany itself. It is a further step, and I think a valuable step, in the development and the reaffirmation of collective security and collective action which is the best preventive of war in the present circumstances. I think the hon. members of the house, in view of the importance of this matter, would wish me to set this protocol and its implications, especially its implications for Canada, in the wider framework of a statement which I shall keep as short as possible on the European situation with special reference to Germany.

It is, I am sure, clear to all of us that over the continent of Europe today hangs the threat of aggression the driving force of which is a compound of Russian imperialism and communist ideology. Even with that threat facing us, it is not easy to banish memories of the appalling results of German armed might in the service of a totalitarian regime. There are few European countries today in which the material and spiritual wounds of the second world war have had time to heal completely.

National economies, which with the help of the Marshall plan and other assistance have been gradually returning to something like normal conditions after the destruction of war, have had once more to shoulder the added burden of large-scale rearmament. It is heartening, therefore, Mr. Speaker, to see that in spite of these trials of the body and spirit men have been, found who realize that the battles of the past should not determine the policy of the future and who realize also the urgent necessity of uniting Europe- of uniting Europe for peace on the only basis on which this can be done.

I need hardly remind the house that in any scheme for European, integration the position of Germany is of central importance. This is abundantly evident from the efforts which have been made and are still being made by the western nations to secure the support- and by the Soviet bloc to secure the submission-of the Germans. Germany lies in the very heart of Europe and it is not surprising that western policy in general, and indeed United States policy in particular, regards German participation as essential to the effective defence of Europe. This I suggest should be the easier now that the long feud between France and Germany has lost much of its reality in a world where the important divisions are no longer inter-European-and the old-fashioned balance of power concepts are based on larger than national considerations.

So, the nations of Europe which are still free to choose-and they are not all free to 55704-209J

NATO-European Defence Community choose-are realizing, in spite of neutralist sentiment in certain countries and certain quarters, how important it is for their survival that they unite as Europeans in the face of this common menace and common danger. This process of European integration seems often painfully slow to those of us who watch it from across the Atlantic ocean. To the Europeans themselves I often suspect it must seem immoderately hasty.

It is not my purpose to recount all of the steps taken in recent years toward the unification of Europe. They are well known to all of us but it is perhaps not always realized that there have been so many. Because the urgent necessity of avoiding a third world war has filled the minds of free men, particularly in North America, we have underestimated the enormous strides which have been taken in the last few years towards the solution of complex European problems, many of which have persisted throughout generations.

This progress has been made in spite of deep-rooted, understandable nationalist feelings and traditions and serious political difficulties such as the legitimate desire of some nations to retain their economic and political association with countries outside Europe. It follows, I think, from these considerations that the integration of Europe will be a gradual process achieved through the creation of supranational authorities with limited but definite powers in certain specific fields-such as the coal and steel authority under the Schuman plan and the Benelux convention. This functional approach has proved to be more acceptable to the nations concerned than the theoretical approach of those who want to establish a formal federation at once. European unity then, I suggest, must grow and not be imposed. It must be a voluntary and constructive union-not anything like a shotgun marriage.

The European defence community treaty by associating the Federal Republic of Germany with the defence of Europe is one far-reaching step toward this more closely integrated Europe. The E.D.C. treaty, like the Schuman plan, is the result of a bold idea for the solution of a major European problem- the return of Germany to the community of free and democratic nations. It takes its place in a complex of agreements all of which show this same trend toward Europeans coming together.

As so often in the past, it was on this occasion the keen and imaginative political intelligence of the French leaders which gave birth to many of the ideas which have helped to create this more closely united Europe.


NATO-European Defence Community Nobody would deny that at the present time the necessities of defence and economic recovery are the most compelling incentives toward this unity; but beyond the community of interests in military and economic matters there are amongst these free European states a common culture and common traditions which cannot be overlooked by a group of nations for which individual and moral values are at least as important as material ones.

Germany then as I see it is the key to the solution of these European problems1. Because of her geographical location and the size and the industry of her population, Germany- even a divided Germany-is likely to be a vital factor for better or for worse in European politics for many years to come. The events of a few weeks ago in Paris and Bonn, and the repercussion of these events in points as far distant as Berlin and Tokyo, have outlined the importance which the communist world attaches to what is often referred to in the press and elsewhere as the struggle for Germany. Two blows in that struggle were struck for the west in Bonn and Paris on May 26 and May 27 last.

The first of these blows was the signing on May 26 in Bonn by the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States and France on the one hand, and by the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany on the other, of an agreement which comprised a convention on relations between the three powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, three related conventions and a number of accompanying instruments.

Hon. members will, I am sure, agree that it is not necessary for me to explain in detail all these various documents, some of which are highly technical and all of which have now been made public. But I would like to say a few things on the convention and the general rules which we know familiarly as the peace contract with the Federal Republic of Germany.

These contractual agreements which were freely negotiated and not imposed replace the occupation statute; they abolish the allied high commission, and they bring the Federal Republic of Germany into the family of free nations. They provide for the stationing of foreign forces in Germany to assist in the defence of the west and for the reservation by the former occupying powers of their rights in Berlin and over matters affecting Germany as a whole, in particular the problems of unification and the eventual peace treaty which of course are not solved by this peace contract. These restrictions on the complete freedom of the Federal Republic of Germany were made necessary by the peculiar nature of the problem of according to the federal

republic rights over its external and domestic affairs while preserving the means of conducting negotiations with the Soviet union on German unification and on the final peace settlement. Article 4, section 4, of the peace contract is important and I would like to read it and one or two of the other more important sections.

Article 4 reads:

The federal republic will participate in the European defence community in order to contribute to the common defence of the free world.

Article 5 provides for the proclamation by the three western powers of a state of emergency in the federal republic, should the federal republic and the European defence community be unable to deal with the situation which is created by an attack on the federal republic or Berlin, subversion of the liberal democratic basic order, a serious disturbance of public order or a grave threat of any of these events.

Article 7 is very important. Its first section states the agreement of the three powers and the federal republic that the essential aim of their common policy is a peace settlement for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies. It also defers all frontier questions to an eventual peace settlement. In the light of the recent Soviet notes on unification and a peace treaty, I need hardly underline the capital importance of these declarations. If the intention of this article, which I have just read, is that a unified Germany will have the rights and be bound by the obligations conferred on the federal republic by this agreement and by the European defence community treaty, then this article is in effect the expression of a hope that a unified Germany would continue to throw in its lot with the west.

I am aware that sceptics will point out that in the event of unification and peace treaty discussions, there will be a new partner to any agreement, namely the Soviet union, which would not necessarily-that I know is an understatement-subscribe to the present accords. Moreover, an all-German government would not be the same as the government of the federal republic at the present time and might, therefore, insist that the contractual agreements would have to be re-negotiated. This important possibility, which is very much in our minds, is perhaps foreshadowed by article 10 which provides for the review of the terms of the convention on relations and the related conventions:

(a) upon the request of any of (the signatory states), in the event of the unification of Germany or the creation of a European federation; or

(b) upon the occurrence of any other event which all of the signatory states recognize to be of a similarly fundamental character.

So much, Mr. Speaker, for the peace contract. The second important event, as I have already indicated, was the signing in Paris on May 27 of the treaty establishing a European defence community. By the provisions of this treaty the governments of France, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and the Federal Republic of Germany have agreed to set up a European army, purely defensive in character, which will be under the operational command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commander. Within the framework of the North Atlantic treaty, this new treaty seeks to ensure the security of the states which have signed it. I do not intend today to go into detail about the European defence community arrangements, because I know they will be familiar to most hon. members as they have already been made public.

The signing of these two sets of agreements is, I think, a tribute to the sense of political reality and the spirit of reasonable compromise shown by the statesmen and their expert advisers, who have brought the negotiations to a successful conclusion after many months of difficult and delicate discussions. It would, however, be rash to express any easy optimism on the final results, merely because these arrangements have been signed. Both the agreements I have mentioned will have to be ratified by the governments whose representatives signed them, and the road to ratification may not be a short or an easy one. There is as yet no European army except on paper, and there are stiff political struggles ahead both on the international plane and within the countries which are members of the European defence community, before these arrangements will be of any effect on the international plane. The activities of the Soviet union and its communist agents in other countries on the subject of Germany and the recent agreements bear witness by their scope and violence to the growing strength of western defence, and the impression this strength and unity has already made, as well as to the vital importance which the Soviet union attaches to the coming into effect of these arrangements.

There has been, as hon. members know, a lively exchange of diplomatic notes between the Soviet government and the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. In their first note on March 10 of this year, the Russians put forward a draft peace treaty which was obviously designed to appeal to all shades of opinion in Germany, and to delay the conclusion of the contractual

17. 1952 3311

NATO-European Defence Community agreements and the European defence community treaty. That latter design, of course, was not achieved. These Russian proposals concerned reunification, the withdrawal of occupying forces, the rehabilitation of ex-nazis -many of whom are now joining the Eastern German army-the abolition of all trade restrictions on Germany, the granting to Germany of national-not international- defence forces, and the granting to Germany of permission to produce armaments on a large scale. In other words, in these Russian proposals there was something for nearly every German. On the other hand, under the same proposals, the reunified Germany was not to be free to enter into alliances, and its territory was not to include the former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. Finally, a four-power conference was to meet at once to settle all these questions.

In their replies to these Soviet proposals the three western governments have taken what I think to be the sensible line, that while the door must not be shut on negotiations with the Soviet union on this matter, there can be no question of a four-power conference-of which the allies already have had some unhappy experiences-until the Soviet proposals have been subjected to searching inquiry and until their real meaning can be ascertained. With this in mind the three governments have concentrated, in dealing with this problem, on the basic question of free elections throughout Germany, and the consequent formation of an all-German government, free both before and after the peace treaty to enter into associations compatible with the principles and purposes of the United Nations. The insistence of the three western powers, in dealing with these, and subsequent Russian proposals, has been on unity with freedom and peace with security. I believe that is a sound attitude to adopt.

Nevertheless, no matter how insincere the Soviet proposals may seem to us, they have a dangerous appeal to German nationalism since they appear on the surface to offer a definite program of unification which cannot fail to attract Germans to whom unification, I suppose, stands above almost everything else at the present time. For this reason, I venture to express the hope that too much time will not elapse between the receipt of Soviet notes on Germany and the dispatch of the western replies. The longer the interval, the greater the chances which the Soviet proposals, however specious they are, will have to work on public opinion in Germany and elsewhere. I think it would be unwise-I am sure the house will agree with this statement-and indeed unnecessary to allow the Soviet union to win propaganda


NATO-European Defence Community victories in this field. I think the west should also be prepared to counter Soviet offers in a positive way and not spend too much effort on pointing out the hollowness and the insincerity of those offers.

To most Germans the desire for unification goes extremely deep, and it is a desire that is going to be achieved by one means or another. But I believe that more and more Germans will realize that a neutral Germany would be in grave danger of becoming an enlarged East Germany, and that their best hope for an eventual peaceful unification of their country lies in the integration of the federal republic and ultimately of all Germany with the western defence system. This grave step, however-and it is a grave step- may seem to many observers to involve risks and to involve also the protracted division of Germany. There is no doubt that in lining up behind this policy we are taking a calculated risk, to use that somewhat shopworn but still serviceable phrase.

What are the alternatives to it? Should we suspend any consideration of Germany's association with the west? Should we suspend such things as the European defence treaty and this peace contract until a scheme for unification and a peace treaty has been worked out with the Russians and their friends, on the basis they have put forward, which includes a national German army, the pardoning of all nazis, and German neutrality, with all foreign troops withdrawn-the Russian troops presumably to Poland and at least some of the western troops presumably across the Atlantic. Should we support that proposal as an alternative to the proposals which we have before us today? That alternative has commanded some support in circles which are certainly not allied with communism. Quite apart from the danger of a neutral Germany, with complete control of its own forces and rearming in its own way without restriction, and quite apart from the danger of that kind of Germany working with the east, if we followed that course it would also wreck the patient and intelligent work of the North Atlantic countries and the Adenauer government, and it would lay Germany open to uncertainty, confusion and, I suggest, danger.

The policy now proposed frees Germany but includes her in the European system. Her rearmament will be defensive and international; and I hope that both this defensive and this international character of German rearmament will be stressed. I hope also that our policy of rearmament within the European defence community will not be taken to mean that we are going to be inflexible in our approach to the larger and ultimate problem of a unified Germany with a peace treaty

to which the U.S.S.R. must subscribe, because inflexibility and negotiation in matters of this kind are incompatible. The western aim has been-and should, I suggest, continue to be-a slackening of world tension followed by a reasoned, calm and firm endeavour to end the cold war. Our hope remains, as it must, that eventually we may enter upon an era of peace for which men everywhere so ardently long; and they include millions of men in the Soviet union itself.

The agreements signed at Bonn and Paris and the western replies to the Soviet notes have shown the Soviet union that the period of fear is over and that the west now stands firm against the encroachments of the police state.

There will be difficulties ahead, especially during the period when ratification is being discussed. But it should not be beyond the capacity of western statesmen to overcome those difficulties. I believe that there is now a real prospect of'European integration not merely on a continental basis but within the developing North Atlantic community-a community which is not designed to be exclusive in character or to replace the United Nations but rather to ensure that the magnificent vision of the United Nations is not destroyed from within.

I am not blind-nor do I think any of us are-to the danger of a restored and a rearmed Germany, but I believe that within the European defence community this restoration and this rearmament can be brought to serve not the ends of totalitarian aggression-* which it has served in the past-but the ends of peace in Europe and in the world. It is in that hope, Mr. Speaker, that I submit for the approval of this house the North Atlantic treaty protocol which is before us.


Gordon Graydon

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Gordon Graydon (Peel):

Mr. Speaker, with what the minister said a few moments ago with respect to the vital importance of the debate in which we are now engaged I am in entire agreement. There have been few issues with which this parliament has had to deal which have required as much study and have given as much anxiety and concern as has this problem of our ratification of the present NATO protocol. It is proper that Canadians should give every possible consideration and study to this matter. In a sense we are at a turning point in history because these agreements, which are of such a complicated and multiple character, have an important bearing upon what happens not only in Europe but in other parts of the world in the days that lie ahead.

I must say that as I am speaking now I have a feeling of heavier responsibility with respect to the position taken in connection with this protocol than I have had on almost

any other occasion on which I have spoken in this House of Commons. This matter cannot be approached from the point of view that we are dealing with an unimportant subject matter. This parliament is the first to make its voice heard not only within the four corners of this chamber but across Canada and the world with respect to this new approach in connection with European peace and stability. Because we are the first to deal with this matter, it becomes of the utmost importance to approach it with the calmest kind of judgment and the best common sense that we can summon to our command. In our approach to the NATO protocol we must remember that within the confines of Germany herself Canadian troops are stationed at the present time. For that reason the situation is of vital interest to the people of Canada.

As you know, Mr. Speaker, I have always been one of those who have leaned very heavily toward the idea of Canada speaking with a united voice as far as possible where great international issues are concerned. On this occasion I hope that we shall be able to follow that kind of policy and to show the world that we are united on this very important matter.

Without any further delay I want to indicate in the first instance that the official opposition, the Progressive Conservative party, supports the government stand on the NATO protocol and will give it full support in the house. Having said that, I want to make what I hope will be some pointed observations respecting the situation which surrounds the ratification procedure and the substance of the proposals themselves.

Perhaps hon. members have received with the compliments of the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) a rather thick booklet of 328 pages-at least I have received one-issued as a message from the President of the United States. In this booklet is contained in compact form information that is available to any country, and for that reason Canada has taken proper advantage of the message itself. Within those 328 pages will be found the convention on the relations between the three powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Bonn, May 26, 1952, together with related documents which are of a highly technical nature.

I mention this to raise a matter that I have raised before in this house. We have in parliament a standing committee on external affairs. I am not attempting to be unduly critical of the fact that in this instance this

NATO-European Defence Community protocol and the related agreements, complicated as they are, are not to be sent to the external affairs committee for detailed consideration. I know it is getting toward t'ne end of a very busy session; I know that perhaps the atmosphere and the mood of the house generally may not be conducive to the kind of study that might normally be made of very complicated documents such as these. But I do think that our system of dealing with peace treaties and protocols of this kind is open to very serious criticism. If our external affairs committee is to function in its full sense then these are the subjects with which that committee should be dealing.

When the Japanese peace treaty was approved by parliament I brought the question before the house; I bring the question up again. I do it, not so much to seek this remedy at this time as to call upon the government to adopt a new, a more up to date and modernized approach to the procedure that parliament is to use when approving and ratifying international agreements and treaties in the future. Under a change of the rules, or under whatever may be necessary to effect it, it should be possible to see that when we have a resolution such as this, where there is no opportunity in committee of the whole to question the minister or to find out the facts, and where it is almost a question of "yes" or "no" and pro forma speeches made by those on this side of the house and by the minister, it is sent to the committee on external affairs. To deal with it otherwise is not good enough when it comes to educating and informing the Canadian people of just what these vast commitments mean to them in their everyday lives.

It seems to me that we cannot afford at any time to take any steps other than those which will give the fullest information to the people of Canada on- these agreements. It is not enough to say that the Canadian people should read Hansard and that this knowledge should be in their possession. Perhaps that is true, but we in parliament ought to be able to dissect, to analyse and to place that analysis before the Canadian people so that from the questions and answers that come out in committee they may be able to assess for themselves just exactly where this country stands with respect to the various commitments under these agreements.

These agreements commit Canada very heavily. We are not objecting to them, nor do the Canadian people object to them, but I can say now that having in mind the far future, perhaps even the immediate future, when it becomes a question of Canadian

NATO-European Defence Community public opinion being behind many of these things, we ought to take time by the forelock and make sure that as far as this parliament is concerned there is no jot or tittle of evidence with respect to these agreements that is not made abundantly clear to the Canadian people as a whole. I think that ought to commend itself as a policy to every member of the House of Commons.

In making that suggestion I believe we ought to remember the mistakes that we have made in the past, and we ought to benefit by those mistakes and go forward in the new era with a new procedure in these international matters. It has always occurred to me that in the house we give great attention to and focus great concern on many domestic matters, but on questions of international gatherings we do not show the same concern. Make no mistake about it, there are over 100 conferences to which Canadians go. There are many matters discussed in these conferences and decisions arrived at by the representatives of this country which hardly ever see the light of day except to those in the parliament of Canada who may be interested in these technical international topics.

I think the time has come when in view of the major part that Canada is taking in international affairs parliament and the people of Canada must be given a freer and fuller and more abundant opportunity of seeing exactly what we are doing in every phase of world activity today. That I think is something that we ought to consider at this time as being important.

I wish now, if I may, to deal with the protocol and its relevant circumstances. I was interested in the minister's approach to the problem and the issues which this protocol arouses. In the main I think I can say that we agree with most of the comments and observations which he made. In taking our position, or in assessing the position that Canada should take on the NATO protocol, I think we have to consider that there are some lessons that we may learn from similar events that have occurred in other parts of the globe.

I am satisfied that any evidence of hesitancy, any suggestion of delay, anything that looks as though this country or the free powers were taking a little more time in some of these deliberations than normally might be the case, always impresses those who are looking for chinks in our armour and a sense of indifference on the part of the free front. I have no doubt in my mind that we would not have had a crossing of the 38th parallel in Korea had those behind the iron and bamboo curtains been told in no uncertain

terms that if that crossing was made or if aggression of that kind occurred there would be a certain rallying of the free powers to see that it was stopped. But instead of that there was hesitancy, there was uncertainty, there was a somewhat chaotic approach to that particular section of the Orient. It was an invitation which was accepted by the Soviet and those who were under its direct or indirect control to take the step that they did.

I have always looked upon the Berlin blockade as being a test set up by the Soviet to find out whether we were united to the extent that we said we were. I have always felt that if we had not met that test as we did, if we had not called the bluff of the Soviet in Berlin, we would be faced with almost chaotic, if not dangerous, conditions in Europe far beyond the conditions which we now face, dangerous though they may be.

I think those are lessons that we in this parliament should consider because they will go a long way to educating us as to how we must deal with the people in the Kremlin who have control of Soviet policy. I have had a humble experience, but it has been broadening, in attending international conferences from time to time. I have formed the inevitable conclusion, which I think I must apply to the present protocol, that the Soviet is not really anxious for agreement, that it is not really anxious for the settlement of issues because any agreement and any settlement means that imperial communism cannot thrive or grow to best advantage. It thrives and has its most fertile ground in those conditions where people cannot reach agreement, where people are differing in their view, where there is uncertainty and chaos.

I have felt, and I think many of those who have attended international conferences have felt, that after all the Soviet is taking the position which perhaps it is expected it would, that if the people do not think that it pays them to settle, then it is pretty hard to get them into an agreement of any kind. The most difficult person with whom to form an agreement is the man who thinks it would not pay him to make an agreement. I think this is at the root of much of the western difficulty with the Soviet in the effort to settle international disputes generally.

If we are going to continue the discussions which started some years ago, when an attempt was made, and a very earnest attempt, by the western powers to arrive at a peace treaty for a unified Germany, I would remind the house that while the Soviet talks long and loud about the desirability of having another big four conference, those of us-I fancy this would include most members of the house-

who have read the history of those days just after the last war will realize that many insurmountable difficulties were encountered by the free powers at the time in trying to arrive at an agreement for unifying, and making peace with, Germany as a whole. We realize that they did not want a peace treaty. What they want now is another opportunity to come before the world with the deceptive idea that they are trying to find a settlement of world issues. They want a new and important forum from which they can pour forth their propaganda in an effort to divide and distract the opinions of the peoples in democracies generally.

I have no doubt that with those experiences before them the United States, Britain and France have hesitated, as they should hesitate, to give the Soviet another opportunity of spreading across the world that kind of talk and that kind of deception under the guise of wanting another German peace treaty. I think in this country we ought to be careful in taking any stand that would indicate that we have any hesitancy. That is one reason why we have been supporting so fully the government's position with respect to this NATO protocol.

I know it may be said that in a sense this country is putting the cart before the horse by dealing with this matter before the agreement between the occupying powers and Germany may have been concluded and before the European defence community agreement may have been ratified. That may be; but I believe that in view of the fact that parliament is about to prorogue shortly we ought not to be in the position of adding fuel to a fire that seems to have been kindled in certain parts of Europe and elsewhere by even those who perhaps mean well but whose position I think is wrongly taken at this time.

For that reason I think it would be a black eye to Canada to delay in any way our ratification, particularly in view of the fact that parliament may not meet for many months to come. I am quite sure that we would not want to come back to a special session to deal with this matter alone. I think perhaps in dealing with the question of the ratification of this NATO proposal we have to bear in mind one particular thing; that is the importance I think of our first of all having unity among the free powers and, secondly, indicating to that part of the world which is behind the iron curtain that we have that unity and that we have the strength necessary to carry out our defence of the peace at this time.

First of all it is important that we have unity. Second, it is important that our unity be supported by strength. Viscount Alexander

NATO-European Defence Community of Tunis, whom I regard as one of the great military men and statesmen of the free world today, a man who has the faculty of being able to put his points of view in simple, clear and understandable terms, has come about as close as possible to the position which I think the parliament of Canada should take with respect to the NATO protocol. In yesterday's newspapers a report appeared of what defence minister Earl Alexander of Britain had to say at Seoul in Korea. He dealt first with the question of whether or not he believed a third world war was in the offing. The report reads as follows:

Of the possibility of another major war Alexander said at a press conference: "No, no . . . We are

no nearer to it than a little while ago. There is only one way to prevent it. That's for the United Nations to get together and resist aggression and let the other side know that's what they're doing.''

From these few words I think this country might very well take its policy with respect to this and other matters having to do with the very important question of the peace of the world today. With regard to the situation in East and West Germany, it is very interesting indeed to hear the Soviets, with their honeyed words, attempting to attract the German people at this time, but in the Potsdam declaration, which was one of the basic documents in respect of proposals for peace and the unification of Germany, one finds certain words which I think go to the root of some of the difficulties with which NATO and the occupying forces in Europe are faced at this critical time. Among other things the Potsdam declaration contained the following:

So far as is practicable there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

In other words, pending a peace treaty to unify the country there was to be similarity and uniformity of treatment of all Germans. But that did not happen and because it did not happen the Soviets must bear a very heavy responsibility so far as the present situation is concerned. While the occupation troops of the three occupying powers were attempting to carry out the policy of the Potsdam declaration in West Germany the Soviets were at the same time re-arming East Germany. It is all very well to say that they were not arming in divisions or in ordinary troop formations but they were arming in a more subtle and deceptive way. They were arming under the guise of creating security police or constabulary in that part of the world.

In addition, not only were they doing that but they were also attempting to cement into East Germany the most insidious network of communism in all its political, social and economic forms. Was that treating Germany uniformly in accordance with the Potsdam


NATO-European Defence Community declaration? Of course not. The result is that the present situation has been aggravated by virtue of such action. I might also say with respect to East Germany, which is the Soviet area of occupation, that all through this period of jelling, if you like to call it that, when East and West Germany were becoming almost separate entities for the reasons I have just mentioned, it has been more difficult to bring about unification of the two countries. It seems to me that is a rather unfortunate situation but it perhaps was inevitable because of the line drawn between two worlds, so to speak, cutting through Germany itself. In that connection I was interested to see what the Soviets have now offered the German people. As the minister said a few minutes ago, a Soviet union note of March 10 called for a four-power conference to draft a German treaty. That in itself would seem enough to put us suspiciously on guard against falling into any new scheme for calling a four-power conference. The Soviets do not call for four-power conferences either for the purpose of helping us or to settle outstanding issues. They have another reason for suggesting four-power conferences, and I think that in itself should cause us to stop, look and listen.

They have called for an all-German government expressing the will of the German people, and they attach a draft treaty to their note. The minister mentioned the treaty a few moments ago and I shall not attempt to elaborate upon it at the moment because he has done so quite fully. However, it does appear on the face of it as though it is the last straw thrown out by the Soviets not only for the purpose of getting the Germans into their camp but to see if they cannot disturb the minds of people in Germany and elsewhere. Under their draft treaty Germany is to be a unified state. The occupying forces are to be withdrawn inside of one year from the date of signature of the treaty, but while they suggest that the occupation forces should be withdrawn nowhere is there any provision for the withdrawal of Soviet Russia's fifth column forces from any corner of East or West Germany.

It is all very well to talk about withdrawing occupation troops but, as the minister said, while our troops might withdraw across the Atlantic in some instances and the Soviet troops might withdraw into Poland, the troops of ideological communism will commence their offensive the minute the other troops have left. After all the dealings we have had with communist Russia in the past, if we are innocent enough to believe that Russia is going to leave Germany alone under the guise of a unified independent Germany, then I say that we are far more

gullible as a people, as a parliament and as a government than I thought we ever could be. That is the important factor that we cannot disregard at this time. One of the things that struck me about the eleven clauses of the Russian draft treaty is that they call of course for the rehabilitation of nazism in Germany. That is what it means because it not only gives the right to those nazi generals, colonels and others who took part in the nazi movement an opportunity now to militarily rehabilitate themselves; but after all the things that the Soviets have said up and down the highways and byways of the world about nazism and the resurgence of nazism, then in this kind of declaration and this kind of draft treaty they reverse themselves and seek the very thing which they have condemned all through these years. That indicates the hollowness of the ring that this kind of treaty really has.

May I say this when we are speaking about nazi resurgence? Do not forget that after the downfall of the Kaiser in 1918 there were something like 40,000 officers of the then German army still in Germany. As opposed to 40,000 there are now, I am reliably informed, 400,000 officers who formerly served with Hitler. Those are the things that should of course put us on guard.

It seems to me that the American approach, the American answer to the Russian note on the draft treaty was a fair one. They went back again to the position taken by the United Nations where the United Nations indicated that a commission under the United Nations should be set up to ascertain whether it is possible to have free elections in both East and West Germany. That seems to me to answer the question whether the matter should be proceeded with so far as an all-out unification of Germany is concerned. Up to the present time the stumbling block has been the Soviets. They have refused to allow an independent commission to make a survey in East Germany. Why? Because they know what will be found. They know ahead of time what is there. They know that there is a network of sovietism and communism saddled now upon East Germany. They are not taking any chance on somebody coming in and seeing what is being done there. They are going to see to it that they stick out for a unified Germany on another basis, and I am suspicious that the other basis means a unified Germany under a united Soviet empire.

That is the thing which disturbs me but still at the moment the words and phraseology have an appeal. Words, Mr. Speaker, are one thing, but the background of the people who have uttered them is another. We know

the background and for that reason I think our suspicions at this time are well founded.

Now I want to say that of course there is no use attempting to gainsay the fact that there are risks and dangers in connection with the course that is being taken; but on balance-balancing the risks on one side and the dangers on the other with the fact that we are now pushing up very close to the fringe of danger, the border of the Soviet empire itself, with all the implications that may have-I for one believe that it is better for us to have the dividing line at the Elbe if we cannot get it farther east and include East Germany at this time. The hope is that East Germany will some day become part of a unified Germany and be friendly with us, but at this stage it is better to have the dividing line between that part of the iron curtain and ourselves at the Elbe rather than at the Rhine or somewhere farther west.

That is a risk that must be taken but I am wondering, Mr. Speaker, whether the risk is as great as perhaps some people believe it to be. The Soviets have run a gigantic bluff since the end of the last war. They have not been so courageous when it came right down to a critical point. They have always been pretty good at having somebody friendly with them do the dirty work-whether it was Korea, Indo-China, or some other country. The Soviets themselves have been pretty careful not to get their fingers burnt in something that might be close to a hot war. I am satisfied that the dangers have been somewhat overestimated. I am one of those who believe, and I think the minister agrees with me because he said this not so long ago, that a very intensive cold war will foe waged. It may go on for three, four, five or six months but in the end it seems to me it will collapse and that we shall come out of this if we simply hold our heads and hew closely to the line that we have taken-and show these people behind the iron curtain that we mean business; that we do not mean war but that we mean that everybody in the world from now on is going to 'keep the peace or else'. I think we have got to take the position that after all peace is what we want and we are prepared to defend that peace to the last ditch.

I want to say this too. There is no reason why this country or any other country should be necessarily provocative. I think that if there is anything which would be a great sin for us now it would be if we were unduly provocative. People who are following a charted course towards peace have no need to provoke anybody. All we want to do in the free world is to mind our own business and to ask other people to mind theirs. In 55704-210J

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NATO-European Defence Community that spirit we hope there will grow up an era of better understanding between the east and the west.

In connection with a divided Germany from a German point of view their attitude is readily understood. They are Germans and they are proud of it. The nationalistic feeling in that country is of course one that we must take into consideration. Until East and West Germany come together again there will always be that pull or that desire to be together-and that is only natural. Nevertheless if we were to say to West Germany: Well, we are going to leave you now to work out your own solutions with East Germany as a unified nation, I have no doubt, Mr. Speaker, that would only mean throwing West Germany to the wolves. In view of the critical international position I do not think that this country or any other country would want to have anything of that kind done. If we do not do our best to bring West Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization I am satisfied that not only would it have a serious effect on the German people but there would be incalculable consequences for the other units of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe and elsewhere.

Do not let us mistake this. While great stress is laid upon the strength of other nations within the North Atlantic community, and there are very strong nations within that community, let us recall that West Germany with her population of nearly 50 million is now in the position of being almost the top nation in strength in that community. Her position with respect to industrialization, and her general economic position, of course are not always fully known. True, she has taken on a very heavy burden for defence under the North Atlantic protocol. We must remember that today West Germany's exports, according to the latest figures I have received, have increased no less than sixfold within the last three years. Her ecoriomy is now by way of being the healthiest in all Europe. Some economists have indicated that she is today on a par with or better than either Britain or France economically. In any event, she is in a preferred competitive position.

Three years of intense rebuilding have brought her a larger productive capacity industrially than she had before the war. I am told that she is 50 per cent above the pre-war level, and that has been achieved by an increase of 18 per cent in 1951 alone, which is to be followed by an estimated 15 per cent in the present year. All this indicates, I believe, that the position of West


NATO-European Defence Community Germany is one which must be assessed in relation to her great strength and her vital importance, if I may say so, to the success of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the defence of Europe. I only wanted to mention the West German situation as a further buttressing of the support that we intend to give to this protocol itself.

I should like to make one or two references, if I may, to our own situation with respect to the revival of West Germany. A few minutes ago I mentioned that she had undertaken, under the NATO obligation, a heavy burden with respect to financing defence. Nevertheless, it does give Germany the opportunity, as one British newspaper said, of rebuilding her army at bargain prices. It is likely that United States money will go into that, and only maintenance charges will be made against the Federal Republic of West Germany. The resurgence of West Germany economically, of course, will have repercussions in many parts of the world. It is a risk which Canada takes herself. West Germany is now selling goods to the extent of $4 billion annually. After having seen the devastation of Germany following the last war, one wonders at the skill, imagination and initiative of that great people in being able to come back as they have. Not very long ago the London Economist indicated that West Germany would shortly be making a bid for the position of the third greatest trading nation in the world, following the United States and Great Britain. This means increased competition for us all. The competition which Germany will be able to provide under the North Atlantic treaty set-up, and on her own, is something that we ought to carefully consider.

These remarks and observations are not being made to weaken in any way the support that Canada may give to the admission of Germany to this protocol, but for the simple reason of seeing to it that we in Canada learn the full facts while the matter is under consideration, rather than learning about them at a later date. I think it is important that when the minister makes his reply he give the house some information as to what Canadians may expect concerning bilateral trade agreements, for instance, that may now be in effect between the Federal German Republic and East Germany. Whatever may be the outcome of our arrangements, and the arrangements with other nations, to bring West Germany into the fold of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, we have to face one physical fact, and that is that you have a border between East and West Germany on both sides of which are German people; on both sides are people whose family

connections and business connections are well known. Perhaps on one side you have a balance of industry as against a balance of agriculture and rural communities on the other. We must remember that is not the ordinary kind of border; that is not the kind of border between two nations who have been traditionally opposed to each other. I believe, therefore, that we ought to be told by the government just what trade relationships exist between East and West Germany, and whether or not those are going to be continued if this ratification takes place.

Do not forget there is a very big market for German production in Russia, in the east and in China. For that reason I believe it is important that we know where the production of West Germany is going in the days that lie ahead. I believe it is also important, too, so to arrange our set-up in bringing West Germany in that we show them that they are on our side, that we aid them economically and that they do not have to depend on trading to the east for their sustenance and for carrying the burdens of NATO. Moreover, I think the government ought to indicate what safeguards there are. This is not meant as a reflection upon the West German people; far from it. But if that frontier between East and West Germany is to be a fluid kind of frontier, then of course the question of strategic materials coming from the free world to positions behind the iron curtain becomes a very important factor to this and other countries. I have no doubt that problem will be solved, and that it will not cause any grave complications in our relationships with West Germany or West Germany's relationships with NATO in general.

I think it is important, while we are dealing with these matters, that we have a clear conception of the practical implications of all these commitments that Canada undertakes. With the consent of parliament and with the consent of the Canadian people-let us not make any mistake about that-we are building up for Canada a huge area of commitments abroad. Frankly I may say that I do not know what else we can do if we are to try to see that peace is maintained and preserved in our time. It is a risk and it is a great burden financially; but it is a burden and a risk that were not imposed upon us by ourselves; we had no choice in the matter. We must bear that fact in mind. We have moved from one commitment internationally to another until we now have a network of obligations that is of a vast character; it is by far the most extensive and intensive network of obligations and commitments internationally that Canada has ever had, and much more than she ever dreamed of fifteen

years ago; but then we did not dream that we would have the kind of world to live in that we have today. Because of that fact these commitments of course have become necessary.

The last point I want to make in connection with these commitments and obligations is this. This government and we in this parliament will make a grievous error-the results of which will be reflected upon them and upon us and upon the Canadian people in general-if, while this vast network is being instituted and established, they and we do not tell the people of Canada exactly what we are doing, why we are doing it and what would be the alternative if we refused to do it. Those are the things that are bothering the public today. Those are the things about which the public may perhaps be less informed than we in parliament could make them. Therein, in my opinion, lie the germs of certain dangers in this country which may become greater as the period of intense activity is prolonged. We may as well face, frankly and openly, the fact that our resources of perseverance, resolution and determination are going to be called upon to an extent beyond anything the people of this country have ever experienced before, in order to carry on during this critical time of what we call the cold war.

I have said before, and I say it again, that it is difficult for democratic governments and parliaments when they are trying to superimpose, upon a normal basis of the peacetime economy, a vast defence preparedness program costing not millions but billions of dollars annually, to do it without that support which during war is known as wartime mass psychology. That is something which, thank God, we have not in Canada today. Having in mind those two important features, I think our present situation calls for a greater measure of taking into the complete confidence of the government and of parliament Canadians in every walk of life and calls for telling them in plain, unvarnished, understandable language exactly what is being done, why we are doing it, the cost to each one of them in the process, and the alternatives that we would face were a different policy to be pursued by this country in its quest and search for peace.

Mr. Speaker, I am convinced we have a heavy responsibility with respect to our international affairs. I think the situation has become more critical than ever of recent times. At this vital stage of the proceedings when we, and those powers associated with us, are trying with every bit of diplomatic skill which can be summoned to their aid to see whether the ship of peace cannot be

NATO-European Defence Community kept sailing in untroubled waters, I hope that we in this parliament, regardless of where we sit, will take our responsibilities seriously to the point where we will back up those who are with us, without too much carping criticism of those in other lands who are trying to carry the heavy burden and responsibility of saving the peace. So far as it is possible, let us try to march together, arm in arm, in measured tread, not towards war but towards a great adventure, that of saving the peace of the world in our time.


Major James William Coldwell

Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.)

Mr. M. J. Coldwell (Roselown-Biggar):

Mr. Speaker, I suppose that anyone who rises to discuss this protocol and the implications attached to it must be conscious of some responsibility. In introducing the resolution approving of the protocol this morning, the minister said that this was probably the most important matter which would come before the house at this session or at this time. I agree with him in that respect. I would say that I think it is the most gravely important matter that we have had before parliament this session or that we are likely to have before parliament for a considerable time.

I want to say at once that, in view of the world situation, defence agreements among the anti-totalitarian nations of the world are essential. I noted that the minister said- and in this I think he was expressing a word of caution-that the ratification of the protocol would not be followed immediately by its deposit with the United States government, as is required. In other words, to that extent Canada will follow a wait-and-see policy. Personally I think that procedure is wise. This protocol in effect extends our obligations under the North Atlantic treaty. It brings into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as it were, under the European defence plan, contingents of troops and other forces which will be raised in Western Germany. As the minister pointed out, the protocol states:

The present protocol shall remain in force for so long as the North Atlantic treaty and the treaty setting up the European defence community remain in force and the parties to the latter treaty continue to give, in respect of themselves and the European defence forces, guarantees to the parties to the North Atlantic treaty equivalent to the guarantees contained in the present protocol.

In other words, the defence forces which are mentioned as included in this protocol are, as the minister stated, in existence only on paper as yet. But it is an important consideration when we are discussing the protocol.

May I just remark in passing, Mr. Speaker, something that I have remarked before, namely that we are today considering what the minister says-and in this I agree with him-is probably the most important document that will come before this parliament


NATO-European Defence Community this session. And yet when we look around the house we see a slim attendance. At the moment there are 33 members occupying seats. When the spokesman for the official opposition began his speech there were not many more, and there were not many more when the minister himself was on his feet introducing the resolution and discussing what he himself says is one of the most important documents to come before this parliament.

As the hon. member for Peel (Mr. Clraydon) said, and as the minister himself said, this matter has arisen a short time after the appalling results of German armed might under nazi leadership had been understood and felt by the people of Europe and of the world. It was only seven years ago last month that the war ended in the surrender of Germany to the allied nations. I agree that seven years later the nazi militarists are still a danger both in Western Germany and in the eastern zone. In fact, one of the remarkable statements that have come out of the Soviet union was the statement that they were prepared to see a united Germany with a German army officered, indeed fashioned, by officers who officered the nazi army under Hitler. That I think is a very revealing statement that we of the western nations cannot overlook.

Any proposal for the rearmament of Germany does involve grave risks to the rest of the world, and we would be completely opposed to any suggested rearmament of Germany which might be considered to be in the nature of a separate or independent rearmament of Germany. The only manner in which German troops can possibly be integrated into the European defence community, as we see it, is as a part of the forces of the community and under the control of the western democratic countries through their general staff and through their high officers. I say that is the only manner in which we should as a country consent to any proposal for the rearmament of Germany. But having said that, we have to consider the proposed ratification of this protocol in Canada in the light of the political atmosphere in western Europe, and when that is viewed in its proper perspective one realizes that the proposal to ratify at the moment, before the situation in western Europe has been clarified, may be, in the words of the minister on another occasion, both premature and unwise.

Our people want peace. Indeed the people of all the nations want peace, and consequently we should ask ourselves whether the ratification of this protocol and the subsequent acceptance of the proposed peace treaty with Germany does really make for

peace in the world. Recently we have seen powerful political parties in western Europe *

and indeed within the last week the government of France, one of the countries occupying a very vital position in connection with European defence-urging that before ratification of this protocol and the acceptance of the peace treaty, a further attempt at a settlement of the German problem should be made in the hope that understanding may lead to removal of this fear of war which overhangs the people of Europe at the present time.

One of the questions we have to ask ourselves is, does the ratification of this protocol at the present time improve the possibilities of reaching such an understanding, or does it actually make understanding more difficult? Before we approve of this protocol in this house we must satisfy ourselves as to the answer to that question. The minister said that the road to ratification of the peace treaty will be difficult and it will be dangerous.

I think the Russians have won something of a propaganda victory in the last four or five months. Their proposals are obviously unacceptable to us in the democratic countries, but when these proposals were made did the western allies make counterproposals that were in any way likely to be equally acceptable to Western Germany, or was their reply somewhat inept? I am inclined to think that their reply was inept- and someone suggests that that is an understatement. We have the best cause in the world, and we have done the worst propaganda job in connection with it. We have always allowed the Russians to take the initiative, and indeed they are taking the initiative today in connection with germ warfare in another field when we might, when they made the charge, have taken the initiative and asked for a meeting by the security council of the United Nations where that question could have been examined. Now the Russians have proposed it, and again we lose the battle of propaganda, and I think we to some extent lost out in connection with proposals for the solution of the German problem.

What then is the situation in western Europe? Mr. Speaker, since it is one o'clock may I discuss that phase of what I am going to say when the house resumes after lunch.

At one o'clock the house took recess.

The house resumed at three o'clock.


Major James William Coldwell

Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.)

Mr. Coldwell:

Mr. Speaker, when I was speaking this morning I perhaps was a little

unfair to members of the house when I said that there were only 33 in their seats. That was the number present, but I was not aware that several important committees were sitting. Something like 60 per cent of the members of the house are on those committees. Consequently I should like to put the matter right because I do not like to be unfair to my colleagues.

At the conclusion of my remarks this morning I said that I thought we had to consider the state of public opinion in the NATO countries generally and particularly those in western Europe, as well as some of those which may not be included in the NATO organization. First, we have to pay some attention to the state of public opinion in Germany because if we ratify and deposit this protocol and it is followed by the signing or ratification of a peace treaty we want to be sure that we have achieved something of a permanent nature.

I have been following the reports emanating from Bonn and other places with a good deal of interest and also with some misgiving. For example, I notice that last week the treaty system that will rearm a sovereign West Germany within the framework of the Atlantic alliance has been challenged in the courts as to the right of the government to enter into such an agreement. We have been told that there is in Germany a steady increase in public support to induce the chancellor, Mr. Adenauer, in the words of his minister for all-German affairs, and I quote:

To demonstrate the government's willingness to take the responsibility for the reunification of Germany.

In other words, the feeling is growing in Germany, and I believe it is a majority opinion, that prior to anything else in the way of rearmament or otherwise being done, the reunification of Germany should be considered an essential factor. As a matter of fact the German chancellor is faced with something of a rebellion in his own party, as is indicated to some extent by the quotation I have just made.

The social democratic party, which is the strongest opposition in that country, is certainly opposed to these steps being taken until the unification of Germany has been discussed and indeed until free elections have been achieved.

Not only is there misgiving and grave opposition to what is being done in Germany; we find a somewhat similar situation in France. The French government is not a socialist government; it is a coalition government. We read in a dispatch from Paris in the New York Times of Thursday, June 12,

NATO-European Defence Community that the French cabinet instructed its foreign minister, Mr. Schuman, to urge an early conference between the Soviet union and the big three western powers. That was to be confined to two questions: first, the conditions of a free election in Germany, and the circumstances under which the unification of Germany would be effective. Although it has not been confirmed, it was assumed that the note from the British foreign secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, favoured a four-power conference in reply to the latest Soviet note. According to this news dispatch from Paris, Mr. Schuman was urged to support that view if Mr. Eden expressed it. As I say, the reference to Mr. Eden was not confirmed from London.

The same dispatch in the New York Times says that there is a strong feeling among officials in France that no government should risk appearing reluctant to negotiate with the Soviet union in view of the fear in Europe of greater tension as a result of the signature of the treaties linking West Germany with the western coalition. It goes on to say that even Mr. Schuman pointed out recently that there would be time to negotiate before the treaties were ratified and that there is a disposition in France to put off ratification to perhaps the end of the year and to press for negotiations with the Soviet union again this summer. It adds that ratification by the French parliament might well be vitally affected by the belief or lack of belief that the western powers had made a genuine effort to discuss the German problem with Moscow.

I think all this underlines something that the minister of external affairs said this morning. He said that if this house ratifies the protocol, at the conclusion of this debate the instrument will not be deposited with the United States but will be held until there has been a clarification of the general position in western Europe. I think that that is a wise provision. In fact, had the minister not said that this morning I would have been inclined -in fact I would have done it-to move an amendment to delete the last part of the resolution before us and to substitute words to that effect. In view of the statement made by the minister of external affairs I believe that the moving of such an amendment is unnecessary because the instrument will not be deposited until there has been a further clarification of the position overseas. So much for the French situation at the present time. The dispatch to which I have referred, and a similar one by Drew Middleton from Bonn appeared in the Sunday New York Times of June 15, indicate the same kind of French and German opinion.

Then we have had recent statements made in Great Britain. At the moment I am looking


NATO-European Defence Community at a most comprehensive statement issued by the British Labour party, which after all in the recent elections last October polled the largest popular vote and may within a measurable period of time once more become the government of the United Kingdom. The British Labour party issued a statement on April 30 which does not reject, as we do not reject, the possibility of conditional German rearmament, but in confirming its agreement on this point it lays down certain conditions which I should like to place on the record. They are four in number and may be summarized as follows:

(a) No effective German rearmament so long as the Atlantic forces in Europe are not well organized and equipped.

(b) Western nations other than Germany-in particular France-to be given priority for deliveries of American arms.

(c) The integration of German troops in an international army.

(d) No German rearmament so long as the Germans themselves do not wish to rearm.

I think the latter is a very important proviso because if we are going to have successful integration and support of German troops under an international army of defence then the German people must support what is being done or it will fail. More than a year ago Mr. Clement Attlee, who it will be remembered was at that time prime minister of Great Britain, had already referred to the first three of these conditions, and I understand that the fourth was recently attached after a long discussion at the national executive meeting of the Labour party of Britain.

I have a longer statement which I do not intend to read now because I may not have time but which underlines and elucidates the position taken, the four points that they made, and particularly their support for the demand of France for greater aid from the United States. The official statement of the social democratic party in Germany is also something of which I think we should take some cognizance. The party's policy was stated on the 27th of April by its vice-chairman, Erich Ollenhauer, and was reported as follows:

(a) Ollenhauer pleaded for priority to be given to the Soviet proposals for German reunion and a German peace treaty, and for all other questions to be postponed until a coherent effort had been made to reach four-power agreement on Germany.

(b) The first object of German foreign policy, he said, should be to test the sincerity of these Russian proposals.

As a matter of fact I think there is an obligation on all of us to test the sincerity of these proposals. In our hearts we may believe them to be insincere but we are engaged in a cold war, a war of words, a war of ideas, and we have to make it abundantly clear that we have tested the sincerity of all proposals emanating from the

other side before we reject them if we are to obtain support for our cause throughout the world. It goes on:

This could be done by proving whether or not there were genuine possibilities of free all-German elections. Should such possibilities not exist, every German must be satisfied that every possible effort had been made by the western powers and the Federal German Republic.

(c) The signing of the contractual agreements, and the integration of West Germany in the defence system would at least make German reunion more difficult and might prevent it altogether. German participation in a European army could scarcely be interpreted as a friendly gesture by the Soviet union. The whole present conception of European integration was, moreover, basically false.

(d) Instead, the western powers should give the Soviet union a "timetable" for negotiations on German unity. This would prevent deliberate attempts to protract four-power talks and so sabotage western plans. Such questions as the Oder-Neisse line should not be brought up for a moment; they would only prejudice chances of arranging all-German elections. No alternative western policy should be applied to Germany until it was clear that such elections could not be held.

Apparently that is the official position of the official opposition party in Germany which, with the increased support it has received in the country over the last number of months, may within the next thirteen or fourteen months when the federal elections are due become the government of Germany in any event, and if elections are held sooner might become the government much earlier.

I think we should also pay some attention to the Scandinavian countries which are not a part of NATO, though in association with it. The international secretary of the Swedish social democratic party, Kaj Bjorh, in an article which he has written, has this to say:

(a) The question of German rearmament should be postponed if possible until the question of German unity is solved. Otherwise an extremely dangerous explosive situation will develop in the centre of Europe. This recommendation is in line with the German social democrats' present policy even though that policy has partly a different motivation.

I would comment here that the Swedish foreign minister, Osten Unden, made a proposal in the United Nations that the four big powers should take up negotiations on the question of free elections throughout Germany and report back to the United Nations within one month. This proposal was made last winter during the interval between the Rome and Lisbon meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. One could continue to quote not only the social democrats but the other party which is associated with Adenauer. They are the free democrats who are in a coalition with the Christian democratic union party in Germany. Dr. Karl Pfleiderer of the free democrats has expressed his doubt as to the wisdom of implementing the treaties in a hurry. He actually assailed

Dr. Adenauer for having told the bundestag that the treaties must be ratified soon to suit the convenience of the United States. Here is a direct quote from Dr. Pfleiderer:

I do not know whether the West German government realizes that public opinion disagrees with it. We are indignant about this attempt to link one of the weightiest decisions on our future with the election campaign in a foreign state.

He was referring to the election in the United States. Many Europeans believe that the haste and pressure coming from the United States is to some extent due to the political situation in that country. I might add that I have seen several articles lately in which it has been indicated that the democratic parties of western Europe are quite alarmed at the choice of General MacArthur as keynoter at the Republican national convention. They fear the election of Mr. Taft on that account, perhaps unfairly, but nevertheless there have been some outspoken comments regarding that particular matter. Dr. Pfleiderer goes on to say that the Germans wanted every aspect of reunification explored thoroughly before the treaties were ratified. He added that "the Germans want reunification and peace, not war".

One could go on with a number of similar statements. I think our own position has been pretty well stated in the official statement which the C.C.F. national executive released to the press on May 25. I should like to put it on the record. It reads as follows:

The C.C.F. regrets that the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and Western Germany are persisting in their determination to sign the German peace pact at this time. The signing of this pact may well mean an end to all hopes for the unification of Germany and, therefore, enables the communists to exploit German nationalism for their own ends. Furthermore, the evidence is clear that large sections of the German people, probably the majority, are opposed to it and it is doubtful whether the pact will be ratified even by the present Bonn parliament.

The national executive of the C.C.F. fully supports the position taken by the national executive of the British Labour party and other socialist parties in Europe. We urge the governments concerned to reconsider even at this late date. An attempt must be made first at four-power negotiations for the unification of Germany and for free elections. To refuse even to attempt such negotiations is to bear the responsibility for the permanent division of Germany. Sooner or later this will almo:t certainly alienate the support of the people even in Western Germany and may well make'the whole scheme of west European integration a hollow shell. In any event, such a final act as a peace pact should not be pushed through against the will of the people of Western Germany. It should, therefore, wait until new elections have been held there, in which the German people may declare themselves on an issue which means so much to their future and to the future of peace.

I think the note I would like to emphasize in that statement is the note that is struck

NATO-European Defence Community in statements from all the western European democratic parties-that we must beware lest the haste that has been shown plays directly into the hands of the communists in western Europe. If we try to force on western Europe policies that will not be supported by the vast majority of the people of western European countries, we are playing directly into the hands of Russia and the communist parties of both eastern and western Europe.

I repeat again that such rearmament or, shall I say, such co-operation in the defence of western Europe as may be desirable and must be achieved should be on the basis of the integration of such German forces as are necessary under the allied general staff divorced from a German general staff, and as far as possible under the leadership of the western, democratic nations. Unless that is done we shall be building up in Western Germany an armed force-and this I am certain is what France really feels-which one day may co-operate with the force that is being raised and has been raised in Eastern Germany; and once again France, Europe and the world generally will be faced with the accomplished fact of a strong German army threatening the peace of Europe and of the world.

We are on the horns of a dilemma, it is true, because we are threatened with aggression across the world from behind the iron curtain. I know they profess they are defending peace and are desirous of maintaining the peace of the world, but I wish I could see more evidence of their desire to co-operate with the peace-loving peoples of the world to bring about in the world conditions which will lay the foundations of permanent peace.

This morning, the hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon) in discussing German rearmament pointed out something which I know is in the minds of many people, and that is the tremendous improvement in the industrial and economic situation in that country. Indeed that is largely due to the fact that they have not had to dissipate their efforts in raising armies, building air forces and navies, and to provide armaments for the forces they raise. As long as that condition continues they are of course at an advantage and we are at a disadvantage. To some extent I think that the idea of allowing Germany to engage in the production of arms-indeed not only allowing her but pressing her to do so-may be motivated in some quarters from the point of view that it will relieve other industrial nations to some extent in that field and at the same time cause Germany to engage

NATO-European Defence Community in the production of armaments to the disadvantage of the industrial production which has proceeded apace in that country over the last few years.

I welcome the statement made by the minister this morning that the instrument of ratification will not be deposited until there has been some clarification in the European countries, and particularly in the countries associated with us in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I think it is vital that that should be the case. Indeed, I suppose the Secretary of State for External Affairs presses for the ratification of this protocol today, towards the end of the present session, because possibly parliament will not meet again until sometime after Christmas or if we meet before then it will be very late in the fall of the year. We do not anticipate that meeting but it would be some months away and consequently I suppose he desires the expression of ratification by this parliament in order that when other nations, and a sufficient number of them, are ready to deposit their instruments of ratification Canada will be in a position to deposit with them.

I do not think we should be the first to deposit. I do not think that we should be the first to deposit largely because we are a North American nation. I think in this respect we should let our European friends come to decisions and give a lead in the deposit of the instruments of ratification. As I understand it, what we are doing is ratifying a protocol, an instrument, which may or may not be deposited at Washington, and it will only be deposited when we feel that the conditions among the nations associated with us in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization permit us to do so without any reservation and indeed without taking the first step.

I think, Mr. Speaker, that I have said all I wanted to say on the matter. We hope this will promote confidence and peaceful negotiation in Europe. We approach the problem with some misgiving in that regard because we realize as other democratic people realize, particularly those in western Europe, that the proposals may deepen the gulf that separates the west from the east and may make it still more difficult to arrive at an international understanding and the foundations of world peace. I think no one questions the necessity, as long as the situation in Europe and indeed across the world remains as it is, of organizing our forces to resist totalitarianism-totalitarianism in any form-in order that we may preserve the freedoms that we value and protect the freely elected parliamentary institutions under which we live.


Solon Earl Low

Social Credit

Mr. Solon E. Low (Peace River):

Mr. Speaker, it is not my intention to take too much time this afternoon in the discussion of the protocol that is before us but I do feel that it is essential that I say something on behalf of the group which I lead in this house.

I have followed with great interest the statement that was made this morning by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) and the speeches that have been made by the hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon) and the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell). While I find myself in agreement with much that has been said I feel also that there are warnings that have to be uttered, and it is my intention to utter one or two of those warnings in the course of the few minutes that I shall speak this afternoon.

In making his statement this morning the minister stressed the importance of the protocol. I believe he said that it was, if not the most important, one of the most important matters to come before parliament at this session. He also stressed the gravity of the world situation. I can quite understand the anxiety any minister would feel about finding, if possible, a balance of power arrangement or treaty under which peace could best be assured, or at least under which we would have the very best chance to beat back any aggressor who might wish to take the chance of attacking us; that is understandable. When one does take a thorough look at the whole world situation, it is a situation that fills one with disquietude and anxiety, so every effort will have to be made to see to it that the western nations are made strong so that they can have some feeling of security. I am the last person in the world who would want to say or do anything that would jeopardize our chance of making the nations of the world strong or of jeopardizing the chances for peace, so I hope I will be able to be moderate in all that I say today, realizing as I do my responsibility as a member of this house.

In his opening statement the minister said that the protocol under discussion does indeed extend Canada's obligations under the North Atlantic treaty. If we ratify this protocol, then our guarantees given under the North Atlantic treaty are extended not only to the armies, the air force, the navy of Western Germany, but also to the territory of the Republic of Germany. In my judgment this makes the protocol one of extreme importance. I believe that today Germany occupies the most dangerous, and at the same time the most potentially explosive position in the world. For months past I think the world has realized that. While the focus of world attention has been on Korea and the Far

East, world students have consistently told us to keep an eye on western Europe, particularly Germany. That being so, Mr. Speaker, any decision which involves Canada in obligations or guarantees towards Germany is a decision which ought not to be made hastily, and certainly not without the fullest possible measure of inquiry into every detail of our undertaking as well as into all the implications of that undertaking.

I feel sure the minister must know that neither the timing of his resolution nor the form in which it is presented before us now permits of the thorough investigation and discussion by members of parliament which such a gravely important document requires. One is led to ask, of course, why the protocol was not referred to the external affairs committee. I realize that it has not been in existence very long, but I believe it has been in existence long enough to allow it to have been presented to that committee for thorough discussion and investigation. I believe that one could be excused for asking why, at the present time, there is no opportunity to consider the protocol in the committee of the whole, where by a process of question and answer the members of the house could ascertain just what we are doing and at the same time let the people of Canada know exactly the type of contract to which we are binding them.

The form of the resolution which places the protocol before the house today does not permit of that kind of discussion. I think it is a pity. I am asking in all seriousness why it was not introduced in a different form. Surely, that could have been done. We would at least have had the satisfaction, when we had completed the discussion, of feeling that we had found out all that there was to be found out in the course of our questions and answers. Only then would we be in possession of sufficient knowledge to enable us to make a choice as to whether or not we would commit Canada to the protocol.

The minister says that he believes, dangerous as the situation may be after we have committed ourselves to the protocol, that under the circumstances it is the best preventive of war. The minister, of course, is in possession of a lot more information than are the. members of the house. He has the advantage of advisers who doubtless are ready to advise him on that particular score, but we in the house are not in the possession of these things. It seems to me that before we do commit ourselves to such a proposition as the protocol we ought to know a great deal more about it.

Much has been said today, Mr. Speaker, about the rearmament of Germany. I want to say a word on that topic. To my mind

NATO-European Defence Community the rearmament of Germany is fraught with the gravest possible consequences to the whole world. Under the present circumstances it may be necessary to rearm the German people if we are to prevent war with the Soviet bloc. On the surface, it does appear to be so, but what will be the long-range result of rearming the German people? That is a question to which I think we ought to give the most careful consideration.

I have always felt that the defeat of German arms in world war II did not put an end to that country's ambitions, and consequently Germany will try it again. Of that I am sincerely convinced, and particularly if the western powers continue to insist upon terms in peace treaties which impose upon Germany such things as trade restrictions and the gold standards which are involved in the mostfavoured-nation trade clauses and in Bretton Woods. I think everyone who has read anything at all during the past few months must have come to the conclusion that Germany has made a most remarkable recovery since the end of the war. I know that when I travelled in Germany in 1948, even that soon after the close of the war, there was evidence everywhere of recovery. Labour was at peace. There where no strikes. The people had an inclination to get down to hard work without complaints. Everywhere there was determination to bring Germany back just as quickly as possible to a position of strength.

Down through the Ruhr valley, where a few months before those seas of smoke stacks had been without smoke, in 1948 they were belching smoke and the whole area was a hive of activity. In recent months there have been reports in various publications, notably a February issue of Life magazine, containing the whole story of the remarkable recovery of Germany. These publications have carried detailed stories about what has been happening in Germany. I want to say right here, Mr. Speaker, that these reports have tilled me with foreboding, because as soon as Germany brings herself back to a position of real strength in her industrial capacity, such as she had during the war, then the rest of the world has to begin to fear, particularly under the type of trading arrangements that we have been following in the past few decades. In one way I am glad to see Germany coming back and making the remarkable recovery that she is making. But, Mr. Speaker, it looks to me as though the recovery of Germany is going to complicate matters now. I say that with sincerity, and I believe the minister realizes that it is so.

It does seem insane for us to take a position of restriction in trade treaties and in such things as Bretton Woods, and to be imposing these things upon a conquered


NATO-European Defence Community country at a time like this when the world is in desperate need of goods of all kinds. Surely we should welcome the effort of any country to go all-out in order to produce goods and services for the people of the world. That is particularly so now when 1,200 million people in this world go to bed hungry almost every night of the year and when those 1,200 million people in what we call the underprivileged an underdeveloped areas of the world are looking to the west for assistance by way of the things that we can produce and send to them.

It looks to me as though we should welcome the efforts of countries like Germany to produce all-out and to make their production available to the world. If we are ever going to convince Germany and other countries of this world that their productive enterprise is welcome, that we must give encouragement everywhere to all-out production and to see that that production is distributed equitably throughout the world it is necessary for us to institute a new idea of decent treatment between peoples and nations. We cannot do it by imposing upon them restrictive trade treaties. I am just afraid, Mr. Speaker, that that is one of the things involved in this whole question of Germany.

We are today talking about the peace treaty, the unification of Germany and rearmament in relation to this protocol. I want to impress upon the members of this house that if the rearmament of Germany is to be accomplished without grave danger to the rest of the world, it will have to be done under a relationship that will bring home to the people of Germany the idea that the western powers are going to treat them decently, and that they will be given a decent opportunity to produce and to distribute the goods that they can produce so that the peoples of the world can have them. Unless that is done, we are just going to push such countries as Germany right back into the position in which they were prior to world war II when they felt that they simply had to break out and resort to arms in an effort to breathe.

I am just as satisfied as I am that I stand here of the fact that one of the reasons why Germany went to war in 1939 was that she felt she simply could not continue to operate under the restrictions in trade which were being imposed on her. I am not trying to excuse for one moment what Germany did. I have always been prepared to join with those who set out to put down aggression and any unwarranted armed conflict of any kind anywhere. I think we must learn to understand; and to understand, it is necessary for us to get at the root of

things. In my judgment, one of the things that are complicating the present European situation is the fear that Germany will once again dominate the whole of Europe in the matter of productive potential, particularly in industry.

The United States and other countries of the world have been sending into Europe large sums of money and large gifts of equipment, material and food to help those countries to bring themselves back and to get into a position in which they can take care of their own needs. Now that the United States and the other "have" countries have at least partially accomplished their objective, they then turn right around, put up high tariffs and impose trade restrictions upon them so that they cannot get rid of their goods. What kind of a paradoxical situation is that, Mr. Speaker? It is that paradox which must be solved if we are ever to achieve peace in this world. Surely in a world of potential abundance it is unthinkable to allow want, frustration, deprivation and fear of the future to continue to exist amongst at least half the population of the world. I mention that matter because it is involved in this whole question of what to do about Germany in the future.

I agree with the hon. member for Rose-town-Biggar when he said that rearmament of Germany must be carried on under the strictest possible supervision. I do not know how long that supervision can last. That is one of the imponderables. At the present time it would be quite possible to see that what German troops are raised, armed and equipped should be officered by North Atlantic Treaty Organization officers; but that does not mean to say that they will be able to continue to officer them and to control them in the years ahead. We do not know for how long that will be possible. So, Mr. Speaker, what I said earlier I must emphasize once more, namely that we should not rush into the ratification of a protocol of this nature until we have given it much more study than we have been able to give it thus far. There are too many dangers involved.

In the course of his speech this morning, the minister laid some emphasis on the development of a united Europe. In the course of his statement he mentioned the functional integration of Europe; that is, he stressed the functional approach rather than the formal federation approach. I would be much more impressed by the minister's statement wherein he said European unity-that is, the full integration of Europe-should grow and not be imposed, if the facts of history did not definitely indicate that the integration is being forced and has actually been planned and forced for many years.

Anybody who has a knowledge of the facts of history must realize that the present sordid world situation did not just happen. It did not. These things do not just happen. These things that make up the present sordid world situation are the results of policies of men. That being so, for the life of me I cannot understand how anybody could possibly say that the integration of Europe is not being forced. It is being forced. War and the fear of war have been used for a long time to force that integration. I have some fairly strong feelings of suspicion about the whole matter. I have watched the moves ever since I was old enough to start to watch them. Back in 1917, Mr. Speaker, we did not worry too much about communism; but when we saw communism rise, we began to worry. And by the way, Mr. Speaker, it rose in Germany; it was cradled in Germany; it was nourished in Germany. The communist cells were developed in Germany and spread elsewhere. When, back in 1917 and 1918, we saw an opportunity of nipping communism in the bud and saw that it was deliberately bypassed, some of us began to wonder what was up. And when we saw it spread from Germany, by way of what I think was a deliberate conspiracy, into Russia, sponsored by German interests and German money, to make possible the revolution, and make possible communist control of Russia, and nothing was done to prevent it-in fact everything was done to enhance the move, Mr. Speaker-some of us were filled with foreboding. We have seen these things develop step by step toward the point where today some say that the only possible cure for it is the full federation of Europe.

I do not know whether that could possibly be a cure. I am quite prepared to admit that balance of power arrangement amongst all the free nations of the world is essential at this time. It may even be that integration of European economies under what the minister is pleased to call the functional approach is necessary. It may be, but, as I said to begin this part of my talk, I would be a whole lot more impressed by the minister's statement if the facts of history did not indicate quite definitely that the integration of Europe is being forced and has been forced and has been planned for a long time. It needs a lot of study and a lot more of consideration than we have been able to give it up to this time.

The minister informed us today that the road to ratification of the peace treaty with Germany and of this protocol itself is likely to be a difficult one. I understand that Canada is the first country to take action on the protocol. That may or may not be true.

NATO-European Defence Community


Lester Bowles Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs)


Mr. Pearson:

We have not taken any action yet.


Solon Earl Low

Social Credit

Mr. Low:

But we are in the process of taking some action now. It is before us for ratification. As I understand it, what we are doing here is putting the seal of approval of the people on it so that at any time it is deposited with the United States of America, and when the other contractees to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have done likewise, then it becomes a binding contract. Well, we are taking action.

It seems almost a chronic fault, in my judgment, of the Liberal government to want to rush headlong into international commitments, to be the first in the water without knowing how deep the water is or how treacherous the currents may be in the swimming pool. We have made terrible mistakes in the past through such unwise haste. I have often wondered how long this government will make Canada the guinea pig, or the cat's paw to snatch the first hot chestnut out of the fire. How long are they going to continue to make Canada the guinea pig or that cat's paw?

Like the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell), I say let us first see what some of these other nations are going to do. Give them the chance to act first. I recall quite well that when the Bretton Woods matter came up in the house in 1945 one of the things which we Social Crediters placed before the house was that Russia had continued to press for that thing with such undue and indecent haste that we were suspicious of it. We said: Let us just take a look and see what Russia is going to do about it before we plunge headlong into it. Let us take a look at what its implications are. You remember, Mr. Speaker, how some of us were called a bunch of fools because we attempted to get those facts before the people, to hold it up long enough to study the whole situation, all the implications of Bretton Woods. I just refresh your memory, Mr. Speaker, that after Russia had succeeded in getting the rest of the nations into it, they backed out and have never come into the scheme. We succeeded in putting a millstone around our necks right here in Canada and so did the other nations that allowed themselves to be imposed upon in the same manner. Therefore I say, let us be pretty careful about how we jump into these things. If the minister insists, of course, that this protocol must be ratified by us quickly and without ample opportunity to inquire into the full meaning and implications of it, then the only thing I can say to him is that he will have to take the dreadful responsibility alone, as without a full knowledge of the facts and


NATO-European Defence Community possibilities involved in it, I am not in conscience joining my group with him in committing Canada to the extended obligations to which this treaty binds us.

If he feels it is essential that the house put its seal of approval on the protocol now, then I warn him that before Canada deposits her ratification with the United States we must make mighty sure that we know every detail of the obligations the Canadian people will have to assume as a consequence of it; and furthermore, as the hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon) expressed himself this morning, the Canadian people ought to be made fully aware of just what they are getting into. With that warning, Mr. Speaker, I shall simply have to throw this responsibility right back on the minister's doorstep, as I do not feel that I can commit my group to the support of it at this time, knowing as little about it as we do.


George Randolph Pearkes

Progressive Conservative

Mr. G. R. Pearkes (Nanaimo):

I welcome this opportunity to take part briefly in this debate on the resolution which is before the house. In the resolution it is stated that one of the objects is to permit the closer association of the countries of western Europe. It was my privilege last December to attend the Council of Europe in Strasbourg where the whole question of a greater unity of the European countries was discussed at very considerable length.

I was pleased to hear the minister state that he considered the so-called functional approach was more acceptable at the present time. When I was speaking in the house on March 11 of this year in the throne speech debate I also mentioned that I considered the functional approach was the only practical approach to this problem at the present time. Briefly the functional approach is that of the setting up of specialized authorities to ensure European co-operation in certain definite and specific fields in which there is a very definite prospect of a solution being found to specific problems. Opposed to that idea is the rather more speedy solution advanced by certain statesmen in France and Italy for the federal approach. The congressmen from the United States who attended the consultative assembly last year seemed to be rather anxious that the federal approach should be adopted. But my impression, which apparently is the same as that of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, is that the functional approach is the only practical one at the present time, and that we must move slowly in this matter.

The countries of Europe have century-old traditions behind them. They are not all bad; it is not all a question of national

(Mr. Low.]

hatreds. There is much national pride in the development of their national cultures and so forth. It is upon those particular aspects of the gradual development in Europe that emphasis is laid. These countries are hesitant about abandoning all that their forefathers have created. They are proud of their national traditions, and they do not consider the work of their fathers as being that of fools and liars. There is an old quotation that when a land forgets its legends, when it sees fears in the past, it is a sign of its decay. Europe is not decaying at the present time.

The minister went on to refer to Germany as being the key to Europe at the present time. I could not agree more with any statement. I certainly do believe that Germany is the key to Europe at the present time. While I was there I heard many statesmen indicate the importance of German unification being brought about. Statesmen from West Germany repeatedly emphasized the goal of German unification. I heard it said that this was an imperative necessity. But those statesmen of West Germany were not prepared to sacrifice the West German republic to soviet Russia in order to bring about unification. They wanted unification brought about along democratic lines rather than along communist lines. The impression I got was that the statesmen of West Germany would rather wait for proper unification to be brought about through democratic processes than to have unification brought about by the communist approach. As the minister said, Russia could withdraw behind Poland and the occupational forces of the United States, France and Great Britain could be withdrawn behind the Rhine, but that would be paramount to handing over Germany to communism. It would create a vacuum in which communism certainly would flourish.

There is no question about the determination of the Germans to eventually have a unified Germany. I heard evidence that some 10 million or 12 million East Germans had been expelled from their country and sent into West Germany. I shall never forget what one statesman of the West German republic said. He told me that their places had been taken in East Germany by Poles and Mongols. You could feel the pent-up determination of that man to one day see those Poles and Mongols removed from the farms of East Germany and those expellees who were living in West Germany returned to the eastern provinces of their country. We must not be led away by the fact that at the present moment West Germany is anxious to work with the other countries of the North Atlantic treaty, with the western powers, and is prepared to forget

unification. They are anxious for unification, but they want the democratic approach to that unification.

Reference has been made to the growth of trade in West Germany. I saw evidence of the way in which new plants have sprung up all through the Ruhr valley from the rubble of factories which were destroyed. No one travelling in that country can help but be impressed by the resilience of the German people. Those people have to live by trade; they have to find markets in the world in which they can sell their manufactured goods.

Reference was made to the possibility of having free elections in Germany. In my opinion it will be difficult to bring about the unification of Germany until free elections can be held in all parts of Germany and in the various sections of Berlin. Evidence was given before a committee of the United Nations in Paris to the effect that at the present time free elections could not be held in East Germany. It was said that that could not be done until the Russian authorities were prepared to allow the leaders of parties other than the communist party to come into East Germany and announce their policies on the public platform. That cannot be done at the present time. Although there are small groups keeping alive democratic ideas in East Germany, the meetings of those groups must be held in secret or they must come into West Germany or western Berlin in order to discuss these matters.

There are two questions regarding this protocol which I should like to have answered. I notice in article I reference is made to the territory of any of the members of the European defence community in Europe. It then goes on to say that an attack on the territory of any member shall be considered an attack against all the parties to the North Atlantic treaty and require necessary action.

I am rather interested in knowing the position at the present time in respect to Turkey. Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but in the main she is an Asiatic power. Any threat to Turkish territory might well be through an Asiatic approach to that land which is most vulnerable in that direction. We know that for some five hundred years Turkey has exercised dominion over many Arabian countries. We know that there are communist satellite states on her eastern border. Would an attack on Turkey developing from Asia be considered as excluded from the provisions of this protocol, or are we to be committed to going to Turkey's assistance if an attack

NATO-European Defence Community should come through Asia? Are we concerned only with the European portion of Turkey? This article states definitely "in Europe". That is one point which I would ask the minister to clear up.

When the minister was referring to Western Germany and our responsibilities to Western Germany he made no reference to Berlin. Berlin of course is entirely separate from Western Germany. It is in a peculiar situation in that it is surrounded by Russian-occupied zones. I would ask the minister to advise the house what our obligations are with respect to the western sector of Berlin where we have very definite connections but quite different from those with regard to Western Germany. I think it is somewhat ambiguous to leave the situation as it is at the present moment.

There was one other remark in the minister's speech that I wanted to mention. He referred to the reorganization of the German army and the supplying of the German forces with armament which he said was defensive. While the intention may be that the armament should be used defensively I think it would be giving a false impression if the statement were let stand that the Germans were only being allowed to rearm with armament of a purely defensive nature. Otherwise one might consider that the sole armament with which the German forces would be equipped might be anti-aircraft artillery and that sort of thing. From published reports, however, we know that the German component of the European army will have such formations as panzer divisions; and while panzer divisions may be used entirely defensively nobody could possibly say that they are defensive armament. I wanted to raise that point.

I think we must also realize the fact that Germany has no army at the present time and has not had for a period of seven years. Armies cannot be created overnight even though there is a core of officers who saw active service seven years ago. It is going to take some time before a reorganized German army can be ready to take the field or can be effective in any way. Personally I feel that the immediate danger of the next two or three years so far as the possibility of a Russian advance through Europe is concerned outweighs for the time being at least the dangers which might be foreseen in the creation of a German army.

I do not think Germany has any thought of embarking upon another Franco-Pruscian war or of initiating operations against France or any other European country. At the present time her feelings are far more hostile toward Russia than toward any other European


NATO-European Defence Community country. Therefore I feel there is no reason for delay in approving this protocol because such delay might be misinterpreted to mean that Canada was not anxious to carry out all her commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or from the point of view of the general desire to maintain the peace of the world. If we have wise statesmanship over the years I think we can ward off the fear that in the far distant future Germany might have aggressive designs against other European countries.

If we always keep before us the objective of the resolution, namely the ensuring of closer association of the countries of western Europe, then we can avoid that danger. We need not cherish the suspicions that exist at the present time because if there is closer association between the countries of western Europe, which can be brought about by wise statesmanship, the danger of future wars will recede.


William Joseph Browne

Progressive Conservative

Mr. W. J. Browne (St. John's West):

Mr. Speaker, sitting here today as one who is not a member of the external affairs committee but as one who is deeply interested in the subject before the house, it seems to me that hon. members are showing great discretion in the discussion of this matter. I wish to support the hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon) and the hon. member for Nanaimo (Mr. Pearkes) in the attitude they have taken in favour of the resolution, though I think I can understand the. motives at the back of the minds of the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Cold-well) and the hon. member for Peace River (Mr. Low) in urging upon the minister that every precaution should be taken to see that we are not the first to deposit ratification. As the old saying goes, be not the last the old coat to take off nor yet the first the new one to put on. They do not want to see us rush to deposit ratification.

I listened to the hon. member for Peace River speak of the fears in his mind of the danger of a reorganized Germany. He was, I think, following somewhat in the footsteps of the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar, who spoke about the nazis. It seems to me that these hon. members are not cognizant of the great change that has taken place in Western Germany and in Europe generally since the war. Fascism was overthrown not so much by war as by the will of the people concerned. The people did not want fascism. They did not want a tyranny over them. The people in post-war Germany did not want a tyranny over them. We have in both Italy and Germany today Christian democratic governments with which the western nations can easily work in harmony. It is because of

the presence in Germany today of a Christian democratic government with a Christian prime minister that we are being asked to support the resolution.

I think we must recognize that Germany stands in the front line if there is1 any danger from Russia, and I am sure the hon. member for Peace River will recognize that the danger from Russia is greater than the danger from Germany at the present time. I do not think anybody can deny that. We know that the professed aim of the Russian government is world domination, as was the professed aim of Hitler and nazi Germany fifteen years ago. Russia came out of the war far greater and far stronger than Germany ever was. Russia gained far more territory than Hitler ever had in mind to gain. Therefore Russia is the real enemy, and it seems to me that the hon. member, looking at the reality of the situation and recognizing that however distasteful it may be to link up with a former enemy

not only link up but guarantee protection

will see this is the only thing we can do. We have to choose one way or the other. As the hon. member for Nanaimo (Mr. Pearkes) says, we cannot leave the centre of Europe a vacuum. If we do the power of Russia will spread into Germany; and if we permitted German intelligence, manpower and industrial power to be added to the present power of Russia, then Russia would be invincible. If the power of Japan could be added to the power of China and Russia you would have the same situation in the east.

It is fortunate for the western countries that these European countries have the common culture and common traditions about which the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) speaks. They have a common Christian culture. It is fortunate for us today, too, that we have both Japan and Germany on the side of the western democracies, adopting the principles that we advocate as the most suitable form of government. Some hon. members may remember that nearly three years ago I said that we should have both Japan and Germany on our side. It is a blessing from the Almighty for which we ought to be thankful that these two nations are on our side and not with the Russians. The nazi government was a pagan government; the Russian government is a pagan government, and therefore, directly opposed to our traditions, the cultural ideas in our western democracies, and to our form of government which comes from respect for the individual, something which does not exist in Russia.

Germany is, as I say, in the first line of defence. If there is to be an attack Germany must meet it. To do so she must

have forces. It is impossible for the Americans, the Canadians and other smaller countries to defend a great country like Germany from the powerful forces which we are told Russia could mobilize in a very short time. As the hon. member for Nanaimo (Mr. Pearkes) has said, there is no German army in existence today. There is really nothing for the hon. member for Peace River (Mr. Low) to fear. What we have to fear is what everybody is fearing; that the Russians may feel they are in a position to attack and conquer. Fortunately the organization that has taken place in the last year or two under the leadership of General Eisenhower and the United Nations seems to have put them off that idea. Let us hope this protocol will be speedily ratified by all the nations so Germany will be reorganized and become part of the common defence of Europe and the western democracies as soon as possible.

Germany has made a remarkable recovery, similar to the recovery made by Japan. It is really remarkable to notice how these two countries have come up from defeat and the results of the severe bombing attacks they received, which practically destroyed a high percentage of their industrial capacity. German industry is now in such a position that people who attended the international trade fair in Toronto the other day were full of admiration for the German exhibit which they said was the best at the show.

What we have to decide today is whether we are going to support Germany entering into the European defence community and joining us in a defence contract against possible communist imperialist aggression. That is the problem in a nutshell, and it seems to me it is very simple. There is only one decision we can make. The hon. member for Peace River and the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar do not wish us to make the decision right away. They say let us wait; let us see what the other countries are going to do. Well, it is either right or wrong, and it seems to me to be right so the sooner we do it the better. Let us who claim credit for having initiated the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and all the good things that have come from that organization, go ahead. Why should we hesitate to be the first to approve this protocol?


James MacKerras Macdonnell

Progressive Conservative

Mr. J. M. Macdonnell (Greenwood):

Mr. Speaker, I just want to add a brief word.

It seems to me this situation is terribly clear, terribly simple and terribly important. What is the situation? The situation as I see it is that we and other nations have banded ourselves together in the hope that we may still

17, 1952 3331

NATO-European Defence Community have time to become strong enough to deter the Russians from attacking us. Now we are asked to take an action the aim of which I suppose, if you analyse it accurately, is to do the best we can to get Germany on our side rather than the other side. I suppose that if Germany is attacked today we are bound to defend her. We have troops in Germany; our own brigade is there.

Now, let us not fool ourselves that the Germans have come to love us. Of course they have not come to love us. The question is whether West Germany will find it in her interests to be on our side rather than the other side. We know that they hate communism, or we believe that they hate communism; nevertheless those who had to make this decision

Acheson, Eden, and Schuman -did not find it easy, I am sure. They found it terribly difficult, and I think all the evidence shows that. Nevertheless, having calculated1 the risk these men-able men whom we trust-with all the information available decided to take the course which has been decided upon,

We are now asked to authorize our government to go ahead. We are not asking it to rush in tomorrow, but I deprecate more than I can say the idea that we should hang back and let the European countries go first. Where would we be if the United States had done that for the last year or two?

As I said, I do not think we should tell the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) that he should rush off and mail this protocol today or do whatever is necessary by way of depositing it, but it seems to me most unfortunate that anything should be said in this house which can be used to show there is hesitation. We are committed now, and the time for hesitation has long gone by as far as I can see. It would seem to me unfortunate beyond words if anything said in this country could be used, as it will be used in Russia, to show that our people are half-hearted, that they have been ready to talk but that when the issue comes they are not ready to act. That can be used in the German bundestag where this is being fought out at the moment.

I have, myself, the greatest admiration for Adenauer. I do not know whether he hates or loves us, but he is a stout fellow trying to get this thing through. He is not having an easy time. It seems to me that any word of hesitation in this house is going to be surely magnified and used by the opponents of this measure in the West German parliament. We are not acting in any spirit of chauvinism; we have had enough war, and we know what it is like. It is not a very thrilling


NATO-European Defence Community adventure, and it will be worse the next time; but we are doing our best, and for goodness sake do not let us face both ways.


Louis-René Beaudoin (Deputy Speaker and Chair of Committees of the Whole of the House of Commons)


Mr. Deputy Speaker:

Order. If the minister speaks now, he will close the debate.


Lester Bowles Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs)


Mr. Pearson:

Mr. Speaker, I think all hon. members will agree we have had a good discussion which is worthy of the importance of this matter. I have a few words to say in concluding the discussion because I think the house would expect me to try to deal with some of the points that have been raised.

In the first place, Mr. Speaker, I would like to refer to one or two specific points raised by the hon. member for Nanaimo (Mr. Pearkes). He wanted to know what the position of Turkey would be under these NATO guarantees and the European defence community guarantee. He was worried about the use of the word "Europe" in the article of the protocol referring to that guarantee. If he had read a little further in that article he would have seen that the guarantee extends to the territory of any of the members of the European defence community in Europe or an.y area described in article 6(1) of the North Atlantic treaty. That reciprocal guarantee is also in the European defence community treaty.

If he were then to turn to article 6(1) of the North Atlantic treaty, an article which was modified by the admission of Turkey and Greece, he would discover a guarantee in that treaty which now extends to the territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, to the Algerian departments of France and to the territory of Turkey. Those words were added when Turkey joined the North Atlantic pact, so it is quite clear the guarantee we extend to those countries extends to their whole metropolitan area. The reason the word "Europe" was used in the first place was to exclude from the guarantee the colonial territories of some of the signatory powers.

Then the hon. member wanted to know what the situation was in regard to Berlin, and that is a very important point. I do not think I mentioned this morning that Berlin is not included in the territory covered by the peace contract. There are references, however, to Berlin in the contract and in certain supplementary exchanges which will be found attached to the contract. The interest of the three western powers in Berlin was affirmed in September, 1950, in a tripartite security guarantee which they gave at that time. This guarantee was later reaffirmed at a North Atlantic council meeting, and again on the signature of the European defence

community treaty in Paris on May 27, in the following terms:


That is the three governments.

-therefore reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves.

I believe it is quite clear now that any attack on Berlin from any quarter would call into effect the guarantee so far as the three main guarantors are concerned; that is recognized in the exchanges that have recently taken place.


Solon Earl Low

Social Credit

Mr. Low:

Is the guarantee limited to the three?


Lester Bowles Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs)


Mr. Pearson:

We have accepted ours, of course, under the original treaty. The effect of an attack on the occupying powers in Germany, including Berlin, would be an attack on those powers, so we are included to that extent.


Gordon Graydon

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Graydon:

It is not affected by this legislation now?


June 17, 1952