April 3, 1952

PC

George Randolph Pearkes

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Pearkes:

I do not know; I am merely reporting what is in the paper. The very fact that the minister did not mention it is reason for justifiable concern whether these Orenda engines will be used solely for the CF-100 or whether they are to be used also for the F-86. That is another point on which we would like information. This same article goes on to say that reliable estimates indicate that engine production would run at about twenty a month.

If that is so, sheer mathematical process makes one wonder how we can get enough aircraft fitted with these engines, particularly if they are going to be fitted into the F-86, to look after our overseas commitments and our commitments in Canada as well.

Going on from that, we come to the position regarding the standardization of weapons. This was another point that was emphasized by the minister a year ago. I express some surprise that no mention was made of it today. In fact, the whole situation regarding standardization is somewhat bewildered because a year ago we were shipping British-type weapons to our European allies. We sent equipment for three divisions and at that time we were told that the British-type weapons would be replaced with United States equipment. The minister advised then that that would be done and said that an exceedingly good arrangement, to use his own words, had been reached. He intimated that substantial quantities of United States-type equipment were forthcoming, but United States-type equipment in any large quantities has not been forthcoming. We gave a warning a year ago about the hasty Americanization of the Canadian army, and I think that warning was well founded.

The 25th brigade in Korea is part of the commonwealth division and it uses British equipment, as do the other units of that division. The 27th brigade is operating with the British army on the Rhine and is serviced and maintained largely, if not entirely, through British channels. The standardization of our army along United States lines :seems to have misfired badly. Canada has sent British-type weapons to Europe-Belgium, The Netherlands and Italy each receiving the equipment for one division. Other equipment, including artillery, has been sent to Portugal, Denmark and Luxembourg, but the Canadian army has not been refitted.

I think the minister owes an explanation to the country as to what has happened in this respect and whether a premature decision was made to standardize along United States lines which seems to have been abandoned in midstream, leaving our army units in Canada short of equipment. We do not question the desirability or the advisability of sending equipment to Europe. As has been pointed out, the great reserve of manpower in Europe cannot be utilized because of the lack of equipment. What I am asking is what has happened to the replacement of the British-type equipment that we have sent out of this country.

Very large amounts are involved, including the sum of over $2,000 million, an increase of $400 million over last year's appropriation. It should be remembered also that the appropriations for civil defence this year are not included in these estimates, though they were in the national defence estimates last year.

I said we have not a great deal of information in the blue book as to how this amount is going to be spent. We shall have opportunities of going into that not only when this house is in committee of the whole but, if the suggestion made this afternoon by my leader is adopted and these estimates are referred to the committee on defence expenditures which was set up today, that committee will provide ample opportunity for careful examination not only of the expenditures made last year but of current expenditures as well. However, just a quick examination of such detail as is available indicates that over $213 million is to be spent on the acquisition of land and the construction of buildings in Canada. No particular details are given beyond the division of that amount as between the different branches of the department, $20 million to the navy, $81 million to the army and $114 million to the R.C.A.F. It would look as though we shall soon require a department of defence construction as well as a Department of Defence Production, because that is a large sum of money to be spending, and I hope the minister will give us details in regard to it.

This afternoon the minister referred to the number of men now in the service, both in uniform and as civilians. I noticed he said there are now 40,000 civilian employees in the services. If I remember correctly he estimated last year that the number might reach 30,000. It seems to have gone up in the interval. I wonder whether there is not a desire to increase that number perhaps out of all proportion to the actual service rendered. From my experience in the services a number of years ago I know there is a tendency to inflate establishments. There is only one man who can see that these civilians are used

economically and that establishments for home service do not become blown up; that is the minister. A great responsibility rests upon him, and I hope he is not going to be carried away by what might almost be described as an inordinate ambition or a lust for power, but that rather he will use his judgment to try to relieve the burden which rests upon the taxpayers by seeing that there are no unnecessary expenditures.

I am not convinced that we have reached the bedrock of economy in this department.

I believe if a thorough examination were instituted by the minister, perhaps in the form of a special travelling board or something of the kind, more unnecessary expenditures might be eliminated and these inflated establishments might be reduced. I know the tendency of all commanders to build up their headquarters as much as they can. I believe it was Gladstone who said something like this, that if you took the word of a doctor you believed there was no health in the country; if you listened to a parson you believed there was no purity; if you listened to a soldier you believed there was no security; and that the advice of these experts must be tempered with a generous portion of good common sense. I know there is a great tendency on the part of all senior officers to revel in the size of their commands. So I am not thrilled by the fact that there are 40,000 civilians serving at the present time instead of 30,000, though I realize perfectly well that many of them will be usefully employed.

No doubt many of the services mentioned in the blue book are very desirable and attractive, but I think of such things as some of these grants which are made to associations, which have been creeping up and up over the years. I think of such personnel as military attaches in many European countries. I suggest that their employment be reviewed now in the light of the fact that we have national representatives at SHAPE, because we do not want any duplication of the work there.

So I would wind up on this note: that while many of these services will seem attractive and desirable for the armed forces, the minister has to be extremely careful to see that only necessary expenditures are made at this time. It is only in the Department of National Defence that any real reduction may be made. Perhaps that cannot be done at the moment because of our commitments, but a grave responsibility rests upon the minister to see that in the expenditure of this enormous amount of money there is no waste or duplication or superfluous spending. It is not a question of how much the services would

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like spent on them; it is how much this country dares spend on the bare essentials of the services.

At six o'clock the house took recess.

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AFTER RECESS The house resumed at eight o'clock.


CCF

Major James William Coldwell

Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.)

Mr. M. J. Coldwell (Roseiown-Biggar):

Before the dinner recess, Mr. Speaker, we heard two very interesting speeches, one by the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Clax-ton) in which he gave the house quite a lot of information concerning the defence estimates, what has been done and to some extent what is expected to be accomplished during the current year. I do not propose tonight to speak at any great length, because either the suggestion made by the leader of the opposition will be followed, that is to say that the estimates will be referred to the committee which is to be established on defence expenditures, or we shall have an opportunity of going into the estimates item by item in this house.

I think it is almost staggering, indeed quite staggering, that seven years after the close of a great war we have before us the largest peacetime budget for defence in the history of our country, $2,106 million, out of a total budget for all purposes for Canada of $4,335 million. Approximately fifty per cent of our budget this year is to be devoted to some form of defence expenditures. As X have said, this sets a new peacetime record. When I looked over the estimates for last year. I found that the estimate now before us is twenty-three per cent higher than the estimated expenditure for last year, which was $1,723 million. It will be interesting to go into these great appropriations to find out how this increase has occurred. It may be that it is because we are carrying over from last year some of the projects that were included in the estimates of that year and remain unspent. It may be that some projects we are undertaking this year, and which were estimated to cost a certain amount, are, because of inflation, costing more than was expected.

Last year this house appropriated $5 billion to be spent on various projects for defence and related defence efforts over a three-year period. I presume that that is the target we still have in mind. It may be that because the military experts believe that 1953 will be a crucial year we are speeding up our expenditures during the current year, and that in the following year we may be spending less for defence; I do not know. But those are questions which I believe will have to be answered by the government in order that

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we and the country may know precisely what we are expected to do, not only in the current year but in the next year of the three-year period. Let me say at once that my party agreed that we would support the three-year appropriation defence expenditure, and we continue to support that total expenditure.

Canada's estimated spending on behalf of the Atlantic pact in the fiscal year starting April 1, 1952, is set at $351 million. This, of course, includes the $324 million mutual aid we were discussing a few days ago, and includes the air training scheme, shipments of arms and costs associated with those, broadcasts, films, materials and supplies. The balance of the $351,500,000 is, as I understand, the estimate of $27,500,000 for the contribution to the cost of permanent headquarters, certain airfield costs and other projects to support front-line formations; in other words, the infrastructure estimate that we have heard so much about. But in addition to the $351 million I think we should know that Canada will also spend some millions of dollars on the maintenance of the brigade in Germany, and on the balance of the air division in the United Kingdom and in France. This afternoon the hon. member for Nanaimo (Mr. Pearkes), who has recently visited Germany and the brigade that we have there, gave us an interesting report. He expressed a point of view which I know is held by others who have been in Germany in recent days. I am not going to recount what they have told me, because I rather expect that one or two of the members of this house who have been in Germany within the last four or five months will be able to put what they have gathered before this house much more ably than I can, and certainly with much greater authority.

We have to bear in mind, too, that there is one item which is looked upon perhaps partly as an item of expenditure for defence which is not included in the estimates, and that is the $45 million item for the development of atomic energy and the building of a new plant and equipment at Chalk River.

I believe that Canada is wise in undertaking further development of the atomic project.

I look upon that-as I know the people engaged in it do also-as more of a peacetime project than a defence estimate; and probably that is why-and I hope quite properly-it is not included in the defence estimates. None the less, it is an estimate linked up with defence and with our expenditures for defence.

One of the most striking features of the estimates now before the house is, I think, the large appropriation for the air force in the amount of $759 million, almost as much

as the $800 million to be appropriated for the army and the navy together. I believe that any military defence effort that Canada makes in co-operation with our allies can best be made in the field of air defence. During the second world war our young Canadians played an important part in the defence of the democratic countries, and indeed came out of it with flying colours, bringing much credit both to themselves and to the country which sent them overseas. Consequently, while the estimate looks large in comparison with the estimates for the army and the navy, none the less it seems to me that the part that Canada could play-and I hope will never be called upon to play-in another war is in the field of air defence. Situated as we are, with long northern boundaries stretching not only for hundreds but several thousands of miles from sea to sea, uninhabited and accessible only by air, for our own defence we are probably wise-as long as defence is necessary -in building up our air arm to a greater extent than either our army or our navy.

This afternoon mention was also made of civil defence. I know that the estimate for civil defence is increased some 50 per cent this year, jumping from $4,196,000 to $6,508,000. But may I point out that this amount, which looks large when we speak of millions of dollars, is in reality only approximately one per cent of the entire estimate for defence. As I said before, I am not going into the estimates, except in the manner in which I have already done, because they will be investigated either by the defence expenditures committee or item by item on the floor of this house in committee. I want to say, however, that I support the plea that was made this afternoon by the hon. member for Nanaimo (Mr. Pearkes) that careful scrutiny be given to these estimates and that every attempt be made, both by this house and by the government, to ensure that there is no waste of money or of material.

The hon. member for Nanaimo-himself a high-ranking military officer, with a distinguished record-this afternoon pointed out that it was quite normal for those who occupy high military authority and power to do all they could to build up the unit and the organization around them. I think that has been the story of the defence project in our own country. From time to time I meet people who are serving in the armed forces and they tell me that there is a great deal of waste. Within the past few days I was given some examples of how, as the end of the year drew near-I refer to the end of the fiscal year ending on March 31-every attempt was made to see to it that the entire estimate was spent before the year expired. I do not know how you can overcome that

situation, in government departments, for I think that it is to some extent true of departments other than the defence department. Where you have a department like the defence department, however, it is not, and perhaps cannot be, subjected to the same intensive scrutiny as are the civil departments of government, since we are so frequently met with the statement: Oh, well, we cannot give that information because security is involved. No one in this house wants to betray the preparations of this country in such a manner as would give aid and comfort to any potential enemy that we may have. Consequently, quite frequently hon. members remain silent when that answer is given.

It seems to me that is one reason why a defence expenditures committee should be established. I would even go this far and say it might be well, on some occasions, for that committee to sit in camera. I do not like the idea of secret meetings or of secret sessions; but if that answer is given and if certain information which hon. members of the committee feel the committee should have is refused on the ground that security is involved, I think the committee would be quite justified in deciding that at that point, on that day and for that time, they would sit in camera. I do not think it should be normal for the committee to do, but under such conditions I think they would be justified in deciding to sit in camera.

This afternoon the minister seemed to be rather worried, because he said that as our defence program had expanded and a feeling of more security had come over many people of the country, some people were inclined to support the defence projects with some "ifs" and some "buts"; that people might now be disinclined to pay the premium that was required for the insurance they were buying when they set up these defence expenditures; and that some people might say there was too much of this and too little of that. May I say to the minister and to hon. members of the house that I think that is not the attitude in which the government or the minister should approach the house or the problems of defence. As a matter of fact, I think it is the duty of this house to inquire as to whether we are doing too much of this or too little of that in order that we may know that we are doing the thing we wish to do most economically and most efficiently. An attitude of complacency that the government is always right and of resentment of any criticism that may be offered is, I think, one that is wrong. There is no infallibility anywhere in this house, neither in the official opposition nor in the Social Credit party, neither in the C.C.F. nor in the government party itself. None of us is infallible. We 55704-70

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should inquire whether we are doing too little of this or too much of that. In the doing of all things we should ensure that at all times this house is paramount; that civilian control of the defence projects and the armed forces is emphasized and continued, yes, indeed, under present circumstances, expanded to the fullest extent possible; because we must not allow the military to gain control of the country in any field or in any form, and most of all in the control of the navy, army and air forces themselves.

This afternoon the minister spoke of hindsight, ifs and buts and the fact that perhaps some people were thinking that we were doing too much. I do not know what he referred to, but I want to say again-and I say this with all the conviction that is in me-I think a mistake may be made in placing all of our eggs in one basket; that Canada should be doing more in the realm of economic aid. That is my criticism of the estimates now before us. I say to the house that within a short time the Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Gardiner) may find himself with a great deal of food that we shall not be able to export, cheese, meat, dairy products and so on; though I think we shall be able to export and market all the grain that we have. But we may find that we cannot dispose of surpluses that may have accumulated owing to the shortage of dollars overseas, and owing to the loss of our export market in the United States. If that be so I wish that we had a provision in these estimates as a part at least of our NATO obligation for economic as well as the military aid that we have before us at the present time. If we had such an estimate, then, out of that estimate, the agricultural producers of this country could be paid the proper floor prices for the goods, and we could make our contribution in a manner that I believe would be most acceptable to our allies overseas.

This has been our attitude throughout. An attempt was made a day or two ago to indicate perhaps that we are not supporting NATO in the manner in which we did heretofore. It is almost exactly three years ago to the day since I had the privilege of speaking in this house when we were about to join the NATO organization and to establish a regional defence pact out of which this estimate arises at the present time under the United Nations charter among Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. To the establishment of that defence organization we gave

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our approval, and we continue to approve it. On that occasion I said this, as reported at page 2072 of Hansard of March 28, 1949:

The C.C.F. is convinced that mere military-alliances cannot guarantee peace. Economic recovery must continue to be the primary objective.

Then I added this:

Nothing done or arranged through this proposed pact should be allowed to interfere with the rebuilding of the economy of western Europe and the world. Some rearmament is essential in the present circumstances and in view of the world situation, but surely it would be sheer folly to believe that armaments, at the expense of economic recovery or economic well-being, can serve as a basis for peace, even though armaments may still be necessary to guard it.

These estimates that we have before us are once again for military defence; and our contributions to NATO again this year, if I include that for infrastructure, amounting to approximately $351 million altogether, are all in that one particular held. Even after we had a whole year and a half's experience with NATO in May 1951 we gave a very perfunctory consideration to NATO in this house. If I may refer to the debate that has just concluded, I think that was one of the most valuable debates we have had in this parliament since I have been a member of it. It was an excellent debate in every respect. Though there was disagreement over certain details of policy, there was no disagreement on the objective, the objective being the prevention of aggression against the free world.

After more than a year's experience with NATO, I said this on May 7, 1951, as reported at page 2763 of Hansard:

We cannot win the struggle against totalitarian communism by military means alone. Indeed ultimate victory will lie with those who can do most to end poverty, misery and want wherever they may be found.

And I added this:

Even a billion dollars spent in technical assistance and in the provision of food over the three ensuing years-

We were discussing the very appropriation that I am discussing now, the appropriation of $5 billion for the three years and now that part of it which is the $2,106 million that we have tonight. I continue:

-would have been only one-fifth of the money we appropriated for military expenditures and defence . . . and in spite of our heavy commitments to the Atlantic alliance, we believe we should be doing more in economic aid to depressed peoples than the government proposes at this time.

So, with this huge estimate for military defence we provide no parallel, or apportion no part of it for economic aid- and may I say that I have read very carefully what the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) said, and his

admission that there was a desire on the part of those allied with us that they would receive some economic aid from Canada in various forms during this year. That was my comment then, and as recently as December 29, 1951, I said much the same thing. I said:

It seems to me we have been too interested in promoting rearmament without realizing that we must reinforce anything we do in that field with sound economic aid to our allies.

And again:

If we are going to meet the threat of communism and totalitarianism all across the world, the final decision will not be made on the field of battle . . . what we have always to remember is that totalitarian communism can be met only by removing the causes that give an opportunity for communism to grow and to make headway in the world.

There is the consistent point of view that we have expressed over these last several years, and I want to emphasize it tonight when I am discussing this estimate.

I noticed the other day that General Gruenther, General Eisenhower's assistant, in appearing before the United States senate committee on foreign affairs in dealing with defence, said that there was a necessity of giving immediate economic aid to the western European countries. He was, of course, urging congress not to cut the mutual aid program, and he contended that in defence support-and that is what we are talking about tonight-economic aid and military aid are inseparable.

He added that this was so because defence spending diverts manpower, material and industrial capacity away from production for export. Europe is able to earn fewer dollars. This is why western Europe needs some economic aid for defence support.

And I quite agree with the hon. member for Nanaimo (Mr. Pearkes) when he says that we should go very carefully into what we are sending to Europe. This afternoon he spoke of the necessity of sending more armour, perhaps, rather than more men. That, of course, is quite consistent with what the hon. member said in Paris at the end of December, and what he said upon his arrival here-that, after all, the solution lies not in arms alone sent from this side of the ocean, but more in more aid in armour-and, may I add, I believe more aid in raw materials in order that Europeans may not only train their own manpower, but that they may arm their own manpower effectively themselves.

And again, if I may quote General Gruenther shortly, in his appearance before the senate committee, he said that one dollar's worth of raw material sent to western Europe

was worth as much as two dollars and fifty cents' worth of military equipment from North America. And this is particularly true, of course, of the United Kingdom.

You will remember that we have got to see to it, not only that we send arms and equipment overseas, but that we make it possible for those who are co-operating with us to carry out their own particular programs. Hr. Churchill, just a few weeks ago, in the House of Commons in the United Kingdom said that Britain's rearmament program had been delayed for at least a year because Britain-and I will use Mr. Churchill's own words, taken directly from British Hansard-"has not received aid in keeping with our defence burden undertaken by the late prime minister."

He was, as hon. members know, referring to raw materials, and such defence materials as steel. And so it is, Mr. Speaker, I wish to emphasize the point that we are not offering ifs and buts in saying this today. We are not doing that. But what we are trying to do is to emphasize something that I believe is absolutely essential, that not in armies, not in navies or in air forces will the strength of the western democracies ultimately lie-although some are needed in order to guard the effort we are making-but rather to the extent that we can help them to improve their economies, and enable particularly the hard-pressed British and French, with some 14 per cent of their national production diverted to armaments.-remembering that our production is 10 per cent diverted to armaments-to meet the danger of economic and social collapse. Should that occur armaments would be of no avail, because the communist parties would take over the democratic countries and ally themselves with the Soviet union. Then democracy and freedom, as we understand them, would be endangered throughout the entire world-and that, may I add, includes North America.

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SC

Ray Thomas

Social Credit

Mr. Ray Thomas (Wetaskiwin):

Mr. Speaker, at the outset I should like to add my word of appreciation to those already expressed in the debate concerning members of the Canadian armed forces serving abroad. Undoubtedly they have done a wonderful job. They have stood up against tremendous odds, and have fought like true Canadians. They always have, and they always will.

I was somewhat amused this afternoon when the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton) said that the present Russian leaders were respecters of strength. What amused me about it was that, sitting here and thinking about it, I wondered how much respect the Russian leaders have for us. Undoubtedly the Russians are in a much 55704-70J

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stronger position than the NATO countries, both in the matter of manpower and in that of machinery. And in view of the Russian leaders' avowed stand that they would eventually control the world, I am led to believe that the only reason Russia does not attack the western powers today is not that she is afraid of our strength at the present time but rather because she believes, or has reason to believe, that she can still outproduce us, and continue to out-produce us.

This afternoon the minister reiterated a statement made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) that the United Nations forces in Korea were taking part in a police action to stop aggression- which makes me wonder whether or not the United Nations has reversed its original stand, that of forming a united and free Korea, and intends now merely to stop Chinese aggression in North Korea. I am wondering whether, if an armistice agreement is signed, the United Nations will be content to see Korea divided either at the 38th parallel or at some other place. In my opinion, if the United Nations are going to reverse their original stand and, in the event of an armistice, are content to allow Korea to remain divided, the communists can and probably will claim victory in Korea.

The minister made a quite lengthy comment on his visit to Japan and Korea and gave us an interesting picture of Canadian troops and forces in action in that country, as well as those stationed in Japan. We are pleased to have his report, and it is good to know that the Canadian boys are well-equipped and, it would seem, in good spirits. However, I would suggest to the minister that, on any future trips of this kind, it might be wise to take some members of the opposition along with him so that they may see for themselves just how well off our troops are or may be. It would satisfy opposition groups in the house, relieve the government of much of the criticism, and also add more strength to the minister's statement upon his return concerning the welfare of the troops.

According to the testimony of General Gruenther before the foreign affairs committee in Washington, Russia has an active force of 4 million troops or 175 divisions. These figures were put on record this afternoon, but they are worth repeating. She has something like 20,000 aircraft and 300 submarines. However, unless I misread General Eisenhower's statement, those figures were effective a year ago. The minister can correct me if I am wrong in that. I might say that as far as aircraft and submarines are concerned I think it is an understatement.

I think it is interesting to note that today the armed strength of Russia is 4 million men

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in 175 divisions, whereas NATO hopes to have somewhere in the neighbourhood of one hundred divisions by the end of 1954, or about four-sevenths of the present armed strength of Russia.

Another interesting fact that was placed before the house committee by General Gruenther was that the soviet exceeds the western countries in unity. While this unity has been brought about by force and fear, nevertheless it is there and something we have to take into consideration. A recent press report stated that 160,000 Russians in east Germany, representing about 50 per cent of the Russian force, went on spring manoeuvres. That would indicate a standing Russian army of something like 360,000 well trained1 and well equipped troops within east Germany.

It was pointed out also that the east German security police force made up of Germans numbers something like 360,000 men. Therefore the force available to the Russians in east Germany at the present time would be something in the neighbourhood of 720,000 men.

I should like to comment on a news report datelined Dusseldorf, Germany, March 13, as appearing in the Ottawa Journal. This report would indicate that the morale of the red army is very low and it is based on a statement of a Russian sergeant-major who deserted and was given asylum in the British sector in Germany. I shall not make any attempt to put his name on the record because I could not pronounce it, but in my opinion this sort of thing is not at all reliable.

When the Germans first started to march into Russia during the original offensive in the second war we heard many times that the Russians could not fight, that they had no morale, that they had no will to fight. Let us not kid ourselves. They pushed back the German war machine most effectively and there is no reason why they could not do the same today with the same will to fight.

According to the technical and trade magazine Aviation Age, Russia has about 85 aircraft factories, more than 28 engine plants and produced something in the neighbourhood of 22,000 aircraft during the past year. I should like the government to take particular note of the fact that these aircraft plants are scattered all across Russia. They have been decentralized to a very high degree.

I should like to refer briefly to six points which were dealt with in that magazine under a dateline, Washington, March 13. The first is that there are about 15 large, 30 medium, and 40 smaller plants producing airframes within Russia. The Russian ministry for the

aircraft industry supervises 360 factories which do all or most of their work for the red air force. Then they have a number of contributing industries such as 20 rubber factories and 15 to 18 aluminum plants.

I shall not go on to the other points, but they do mention that each plant is able to produce something like 3,600 engines and except for the fact that there is a bottleneck in the aluminum industry the output could be raised to 50,000 or 60,000 Russian planes per year.

It is pointed out that during the same period the United States had 27 airframe factories, about 15 smaller ones, and some 30 other companies building major subsections, et cetera. To get back to the claimed production of 22,000 aircraft for Russia, it is believed that about 10,700 are fighting planes, 539 reconnaissance planes, 3,060 light and medium bombers, 1,246 heavy bombers, 1,430 transport planes and 5,000 trainer and liaison planes. The production last year in the United States was something like 5,000 planes.

I was interested to note that the minister said that the secretary for air of Great Britain recently stated in the British House of Commons that the F-86 Sabre jet was superior in many ways to the MIG-15. Apparently General Vandenberg does not share that belief because he says that the MIG-15 is a better climber than the F-86, although the F-86 has a longer range. He says that at altitudes up to 25,000 feet the F-86 has equal speed and appears to handle better, but above 25,000 feet the MIG-15 is faster, has a higher service ceiling and a longer range. However, he does say that the two planes are roughly in the same area of technical development.

As has been pointed out in previous debates, many pilots returning from Korea have said that in many ways the MIG-15 is superior to the Sabre jets. Many of them have expressed the wish that United States pilots could have the MIG-15 and the red pilots the Sabre jets. We must not forget that while the MIG-15 is a good plane it is not the most advanced fighter aircraft the Russians have. I understand that at the present time they have under construction the MIG-19 and the LA-17, both of which are reported to be superior to the MIG-15 as far as speed, manoeuvrability, armament, range and fighting abilities are concerned. It is believed that both these planes are in production, but if they are not in production they are ready to go on the production line at the present time.

The United States has no light bomber of any value. They are relying on the old B-26,

which was fast becoming obsolete at the end of world war II. Those planes are doing a good job in Korea because they have not the air opposition; but the Soviet has in production at the present time the IL-26 and the TU-10, both of which are light jet bombers which it is believed are capable of something like 600 miles an hour, with a range of about 2,200 miles. The closest thing we have to them is the Canberra bomber which is produced in Britain and which before long may be produced in the United States, though none are being produced at the present time. So we are extremely short of suitable, fast, light bombers in the event of any hostilities in Europe.

The opinion expressed by General Gruenther that the Russians have 300 submarines is I think an understatement. I will not mention the cruisers and other ships; I think we could deal very adequately with those. Jane's Fighting Ships for this year credits Russia with somewhere between 300 and 400 submarines. This, too, I believe is an understatement. In 1948 Jane's Fighting Ships gave Russia approximately 280 submarines with 100 more building, to be completed in 1948 or 1949. So even if they had 280 in 1948, they have had ample opportunity to increase their production and have many more today. It is believed that their ultimate aim is 1,000 modern, fast, up-to-date submarines. When we think that at the beginning of the last war Germany had only 60 submarines, the idea of Russia with perhaps 500 leaves us rather cold. As a matter of fact, as far as our naval production is concerned, I would not doubt that some of those submarines could sail up the St. Lawrence to Montreal and torpedo the Vickers shipbuilding plant before we could get any of our ships off the slips.

I believe we need a little more information on the naval shipbuilding program. Today the minister mentioned 52 anti-submarine vessels for NATO by 1954, and 48 coastal vessels. We have had very little information in that connection. However, I will not go into that at the present time; I will have a few questions to ask when the naval estimates are under consideration.

This afternoon the hon. member for Nanaimo (Mr. Pearkes) made a plea for more aircraft carriers. I will go along with him on that. I would not want to see the Canadian navy build or buy a number of carriers the size of the Magnificent or anything like that, but I do think Canada, with an anti-submarine fleet, should have a number of aircraft carriers possibly something like those we had in the past war, converted carriers, if you like, though perhaps a little faster than those we had at

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that time. We should have something that will give us some sort of air cover. In the event of hostilities breaking out I believe we should have at least one aircraft carrier for each trans-ocean escort group that may be set up.

Then we see many reports in the press, which may be simply scare reports, that the Russians are working on nerve gas, bacteriological warfare, and so on. I hope that is not the case. I am not going to say very much about it; I am not too worried. But we must remember that at the present time Russia is throwing accusations at the United Nations, charging that they are using bacteriological warfare in Korea. It may be just possible that they are making those charges at the present time so that if hostilities should break out in western Europe they could use that as an excuse to launch into bacteriological warfare on their own. This I believe is something for the Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Martin), as head of the civil defence program. We have no reason to believe that any bacteriological warfare would necessarily be directed against human beings. It might be in the form of virus which would infect livestock. I suggest to the minister that he set up some sort of co-operative scheme with the provinces so they might be prepared if anything like this should happen. We have a good argument for that in this foot-and-mouth disease epidemic. Immediately we heard of that some of the provincial governments became panicky and slapped on embargoes, tying up the entire livestock industry of Canada. We would not want that sort of thing to happen if it should become necessary to increase our production of livestock because we were dragged into an all-out war.

Now I want to say just a word about the defence expenditures committee. We all appreciate that the Department of National Defence has a job to do and that it is necessary to greatly expand our defence expenditures in order to protect ourselves. But we in parliament also have a responsibility to the taxpayers. I do not think we should spare any expense that is necessary to protect our way of life and our beliefs, because after all this is a war of beliefs and ideals. If we have to spend every cent we have, if we have to suffer hardships here in Canada in order to achieve our objective, then I say let us go ahead. But that does not give us any licence to waste the money of the taxpayers. The war expenditures committee set up in 1941 did an extremely valuable job. There is no reason why the defence expenditures committee presently set up in this house cannot do the same

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valuable work. As has been said already this evening, it is necessary to scrutinize our expenditures very closely. There is no doubt in my mind but that the heads of the various branches within the department are honest and sincere; but they are not infallible, and it is the job of this committee to look out for any errors that might be made.

During the brief interval between the two sessions I made it a point to talk to servicemen wherever I went, and also to civilians employed at various army camps and so on across Canada. Everyone to whom I have spoken has pointed out to me that there is local waste, and a great deal of it. That is something which we have to investigate. We may have to lop off a few heads in the process, but it should be cleared up. Last fall the committee made a good start and if they continue in that manner, with the idea of honestly scrutinizing everything and not with the idea of finding some fault with the government, I believe they can make an extremely valuable contribution towards our defence effort.

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LIB

Leonard T. Stick

Liberal

Mr. L. T. Stick (Trinity-Conception):

believe we could sum up our defence policy in the phrase that we are playing safe, and that it is better to be sure than sorry. We have no alternative to building up our armament today to such a point that we may deter the communist world from setting this world on fire. Our policy is based on strength, peace through strength. We can only ensure peace if we have the strength to enforce it. I think that is true, and I think everyone in this house agrees that is the safe policy to pursue. We may disagree as to the methods by which we build up that strength, and we may have a certain amount of criticism of the Department of National Defence as to how they are going about it, but our basic principle of peace through strength stands for the policy of Canada supported by all members in this house.

During the last two or three weeks I have heard much about the economic side of defence, the fear that we may spend so much money we will wreck our economy. My answer to that is this. It is the government's duty to see that we do not wreck the economy, and I have faith in the government and the common sense of all members on all sides that we will not do that. The impression has been left here that communism is largely the result of poverty. No doubt poverty is a cause of communism in some instances, but it is not the only cause. I think we should stress the other causes.

At this point I should like to quote from an article by the Right Hon. Richard Law,

M.P., in the British House of Commons, which appeared in the "National and English Review" for March, 1952. He has this to say, and I think there is a lot of truth in it:

Rearmament is an instrument for the maintenance of order, but it is not, of course, of itself an alternative to communism . . . we tell ourselves that we cannot put the clock back. We tell ourselves that the new nationalism which is arising all over the Middle East, all over Asia, is something that cannot be resisted. Once again we are bound hand and foot to a phrase. How do we know that this new nationalism cannot be resisted, when we have never sought to resist it? All that we can be sure of is that for as long as we roam about the world, wringing our hands and loudly bewailing our impotence in the face of movements which are too strong for us, for just so long will we be kicked around, and for just so long will communism make headway. For this new nationalism which "cannot be resisted," and which we are always hearing about, is just one of the instruments which communism uses to break up the old order: it is by no means certain that it is an irresistible force. And even if it were, there might still be something to be said for the policy of opposing to it an immovable object.

There you have another idea of what communism is. A week ago, when speaking about the Orient during another debate, I said in this house that we have a situation in Indochina and in the Federated Malay States which is fraught with great danger. The impression was left in this house by other speakers that the reason for this trouble is economic. It is not economic; it is racial and it is just as well for us to acknowledge that fact. It is economic to some extent, but it is a racial problem between us and the Orient. The sooner we recognize that fact the sooner we shall be able to make headway towards beating the communists at their own game. It is all very well to get up in this chamber and blame South Africa for what she is doing, and blame us for what we did in India for 150 years. I have heard it said that we have exploited the Orient. There may be a certain amount of truth in that statement, but go out to the Orient yourself and see what we have done to raise the standard of living. Let us have the other side of the story for once, and then you will have a balanced idea of what the Orient thinks and what its ambitions are. True, we tapped the wealth of the East, but we gave something in exchange. We improved their methods of living, and we gave them great irrigation works. We taught them democracy, and we kept the peace while we were there; that is the other side of the story.

I have been asked by numbers of people, both here and at home, "Are we going to have a war?" That is a question which is upon the lips of everyone in this world today. I do not know whether or not we are and neither does anyone else, except probably the men in the Kremlin. We do not want it,

but if Russia wants war she will have it in her time. It is our job to persuade her that war does not pay, just as we hear it said that crime does not pay. The only way we can persuade her of that is by being strong. If we pussyfoot with peace in this house and say that our commitments for national defence are going to break the economy of this country, we are playing right into the hands of the Russians.

I am going to read an extract from a book which I obtained from the library and read last year. I advise members to take this book and read it. They should read it with the book in one hand and the daily newspaper in the other, then they could make up their own minds as to whether or not we are going to have a war. The book was written by Rear Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias, retired from the United States navy, who was chief of the United States intelligence service for the navy during the last war. I want hon. members to listen to this, because it is rather interesting. I am not saying that it is the gospel truth, but it is worth listening to. It reads as follows:

The uncertain days of the precarious peace that we call the cold war are numbered.

War between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which would be the third and probably decisive world war in the life of this tragic, unruly generation, is likely to materialize some time between the summer of 1952 and the fall of 1956.

War may come in response to a series of aggressive Soviet moves, which the kremlin will regard as essential to Russian security but to which we shall react violently and with determination.

Or it may come, as Soviet experts now say it will, as a move of desperation on the part of the United States to stave off an "inevitable" depression or, better still, to turn depression into prosperity.

On the other side of the Atlantic, and especially behind the iron curtain, abundant and tangible evidence reveals that the U.S.S.R. has definitely decided to abandon the prolonged shadow boxing of the cold war.

This decision was reached on the basis of an "estimate of the situation," prepared in the fall of 1948 at the specific request of Generalissimo Stalin by a select group of top-ranking Soviet specialists-military experts, economists, political observers, diplomats, and spies.

Upon that estimate, the politburo unanimously agreed, in extraordinary session on January 28, 1949, to accept as immediately valid Lenin's thesis that war between capitalism-imperialism and communism is inevitable. At once they ordered the whole vast Soviet state to gird itself for the showdown between the United States and the U.S.S.R. . .

There are available to us several convincing clues as to the date the U.S.S.R. regards as most likely to be the D-day of a shooting war.

The years 1952, 1954, and 1956 are regarded as crucial in the calculations of the kremlin.

It is no mere coincidence that the year 1952 was the only future date explicitly mentioned in the recent Russo-Chinese treaty between Moscow and the communist regime in Peiping.

The same year, accepted by Soviet analysts as the last tranquil year of the cold war, also recurs in the secret protocols of the treaties and military

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alliances Moscow concluded with its satellites in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, and Sofia. It is frequently mentioned in cominform documents as a "year of decision"-the outside date at which certain plans have to be concluded, quotas reached-"the end of an era and the beginning of a new epoch."

These are serious words for a man of the standing of Admiral Zacharias to write. If you read that book and if you follow events of the last two or three years you begin to get a better idea of what Russia is doing and of what she is trying to do. As I see it, her whole plan is so to weaken us that if we do get into a shooting war we shall be fighting with one hand behind our back.

The first duty of this government is to provide for the security of Canada. That is a sound policy. It has been stated also that the policy of this government is to defend Canada as far away from the shores of Canada as possible. I think that is sensible, and I think any sensible person will agree with that policy. By doing that, we shall keep war from the shores of Canada, if that is possible. Furthermore, we shall be supporting in other pants of the world other freedom-loving peoples who are dependent upon us for support. That policy I agree with. Any other policy would be a cowardly one and one not fit for Canada or the Canadian people to support. If we get into a shooting war our policy is to play it safe. There are certain dangers which were pointed out this afternoon by the hon. member for Nanaimo (Mr. Pearkes) with whom I am in agreement up to a point. He stated that the under-belly of Canada was on the Pacific. It could be on the Pacific if we had lost the war in the other hemisphere. My opinion is that the greatest danger point for Canada, if we get into a future war, is on the Atlantic. We in Newfoundland know what war is on the Atlantic. During the last war, war was right at our back door. We came in contact with it at close quarters. Every week we had men coming in from convoys that were sunk. We had survivors coming in to St. John's, as my colleague from St. John's knows. We had first-hand accounts of how our ships were sunk and of the brutality of the U-boats. That danger was -there. It has been stated here on more than one occasion that Russia has a tremendous number of submarines. I do not know exactly what state they are in, but they have some of the most modern ones; and until we can have sufficient defence forces built up to cope with them, if we ever get into a shooting war we shall have hell on the Atlantic. There is no use in mincing words about the matter. That danger has got to be

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faced. If we lose the battle on the Atlantic, we shall lose the war. I am going to quote from Mr. Churchill, and I know of no greater authority than he on that matter. In his book "Closing the Ring", he has this to say:

The single-handed British struggle against the U-boats, the magnetic mines, and the surface raiders in the first two and a half years of the war has already been described. The long-awaited supreme event of the American alliance which arose from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor seemed at first to have increased our perils at sea. In 1940 four million tons of merchant shipping were lost, and more than four million tons in 1941. In 1942, after the United States was our ally, nearly eight million tons of the augmented mass of allied shipping had been sunk. Until the end of 1942, the U-boats sank ships faster than the allies could build them. The foundation of all our hopes and schemes was the immense shipbuilding program of the United States. By the beginning of 1943, the curve of new tonnage was rising sharply and losses fell. Before the end of that year, new tonnage at last surpassed losses at sea from all causes, and the second quarter saw, for the first time, U-boat losses exceed their rate of replacement. The time was presently to come when more U-boats would be sunk in the Atlantic than merchant ships. But before this lay a long and bitter conflict.

The battle of the Atlantic was the dominating factor all through the war. Never for one moment could we forget that everything happening elsewhere, on land, at sea, or in the air, depended ultimately on its outcome, and amid all other cares we viewed its changing fortunes day by day with hope or apprehension. The tale of hard and unremitting toil, often under conditions of acute discomfort and frustration and always in the presence of unseen danger, is lighted by incident and drama; but for the individual sailor or airman in the U-boat war there were few moments of exhilarating action to break the monotony of an endless succession of anxious, uneventful days. Vigilance could never be relaxed. Dire crisis might at any moment flash upon the scene with brilliant fortune or glare with mortal tragedy. Many gallant actions and incredible feats of endurance are recorded, but the deeds of those who perished will never be known. Our merchant seamen displayed their highest qualities, and the brotherhood of the sea was never more strikingly shown than in their determination to defeat the U-boat.

One of the reasons I am mentioning this matter is that I believe the new province of Newfoundland from which I come is the key to the north Atlantic. I have stressed the importance of defence measures in that province. By taking them, not only are you strengthening us but you are strengthening Canada and the whole of the North American continent.

This is a joint effort. We have the United States bases down there. We get on very well with the Americans. This afternoon the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton) stressed the fact that the defence of North America is a joint effort on the part of the United States and ourselves. I think that fact should be driven home and be recognized, and that we should allow nothing to make us forget that fact. However

we may differ with the United States on matters of policy and however we may differ with them in other ways, we are together in this matter and we are all seeking the same end.

I am glad to be able to say here tonight that arrangements are now being made whereby the defences in Newfoundland are being augmented. I am not going to go into details, but will merely say that steps are being taken today-and they will be carried out sometime this summer-whereby the harbours that played such a large part in guarding the convoys and the convoy routes are now to be taken in hand; and the work going on there will be of inestimable value not only to us in Newfoundland but the whole of North America. I am glad that has happened. I have advocated it here on many occasions.

Finally I want to say this. I do not think anybody here can accuse me of throwing bouquets around, and I do not propose to do so tonight. I must say this, however, and I believe it is fair to do so. The new policy inaugurated by the Minister of National Defence is now showing results and is a tribute to his foresight, his courage and his ability to take a risk. I should like to say that I like a person who is able to take a risk. The minister could have taken a middle course and played the safe game but in the interests of this country, exercising his judgment, he inaugurated this policy which he was responsible for. He has taken these risks, and I believe that Canada today is playing her full part, and more, in the cause of peace. I wanted to say that to the minister. I think it is something which should be understood not only in this house but in the whole of Canada. He is a hard-working man. He is carrying a terrific responsibility.

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An hon. Member:

He is carrying a terrific load.

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LIB

Leonard T. Stick

Liberal

Mr. Stick:

And he is carrying a terrific load, as the hon. member says. It is a load that I would not like to carry, nor would I like to carry the responsibility either. But he has carried it. Our defence effort and our preparation are largely the result of his hard work and his effort; and I want to say that.

Furthermore, I am a new Canadian. I believe Canada has a part to play, and I believe she is playing a part for peace out of all proportion to her population. I think we have a record to date of which we can be proud. If we all do our duty as Canadians, as peace-loving and hard-working citizens, we shall win this war, we shall win any war that may come; but we shall

only do that with united effort, by standing shoulder to shoulder with the United States and our other allies, and by putting forth every effort we can. When we have done that we shall have done our duty, we shall have played our part, not as Canadians but as citizens of this world, and whatever war may come we shall win. Let us have no fear about that whatsoever. Let us have courage; let us have faith; let us be Canadians, one and all.

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PC

Gordon Francis Higgins

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Higgins:

Mr. Speaker, I wish to ask the hon. member one question before he finishes his speech completely. He has announced a special policy with respect to defence in St. John's harbour. I am a little bit unaware of what it is. I wonder whether the hon. member could give a little more detail.

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LIB

Leonard T. Stick

Liberal

Mr. Stick:

It is not for me to announce defence policy. I announced that there were certain works going on. I regret I cannot give the detail. I do not believe in giving comfort to the enemy.

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PC

Gordon Minto Churchill

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Gordon Churchill (Winnipeg South Centre):

Mr. Speaker, I should like to join with other hon. members who have spoken in this debate in expressing the respect and admiration that I am sure we all have for our fellow citizens who are serving Canada so well in the armed forces at home and abroad. We have confidence that they will uphold and enhance the great traditions so firmly established by our navy, army and air force.

The twentieth century, to our misfortune, Mr. Speaker, is establishing a record for war and destruction exceeded by only a few scattered periods in the history of the world. Despite our desire for peace we are compelled by circumstances to give attention to warlike preparations as the price we must pay to maintain our freedom. As General Eisenhower has stated in his recent report, and I quote his words:

We want peace. We want freedom, too, and the individual rights to which our whole civilization is dedicated.

To ensure that freedom, to protect those individual rights, we have found it necessary to make an alliance under NATO and to provide armed forces as a deterrent to the threat imposed by the armed might of Russia. We have been told, time and again, that the task ahead of us is serious and burdensome, and that for many years, and perhaps for a generation, we may have to maintain our armed forces in a state of readiness for any emergency. That seems to imply that until the threat of world war is removed we must resolutely apply ourselves to creating and maintaining armed forces suitable to the tasks

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that may confront them. Whether we are developing suitable forces is the question to which I desire to direct attention, with particular reference to the Canadian army.

The present policy appears to be the provision of infantry brigades in Korea and Europe, with small tank components in support and an infantry airborne brigade for use in Canada. Our reserve army appears to be based largely on the plan of providing infantry divisions, with the addition of one or two tank brigades. If for any reason we were required to supply additional troops for service overseas, or if we were required to mobilize for general war, do our army plans provide for forces other than infantry divisions with their supporting arms?

A study of the second world war indicates that, increasingly, mobile armoured forces have been developed to a position of dominance on the battlefield. Along with that change there are present developments in new weapons of destruction which make even more perilous the position of the unprotected infantry soldier.

What is the task confronting NATO's armed forces in Europe? We are informed that Russia has 175 divisions east of the iron curtain, one-third of them being mechanized or armoured. Thirty of those divisions are supposed to be within striking distance of our NATO forces, eight or ten of the divisions being armoured. I should like to quote from the report recently furnished by General Eisenhower, which has been mimeographed and made available. On page 5 of this mimeographed report he says-and this is in respect to the satellite countries adjoining Russia:

Under duress, the satellite countries had been obliged to follow the policy of Soviet Russia. Their foreign masters had set them to work immediately to train for war and had merged their economy with that of Russia. By the beginning of 1951, these nations had been forced to produce, between them, a total of some sixty divisions, while their air forces were also under development.

Then on page 20 of the same report in the section which deals with the present situation he says:

The Soviet army casts its shadow over the length and breadth of Europe. The satellite countries have increased the size and combat effectiveness of their armed forces.

I would judge from that that we have facing us more than just 175 Russian divisions. We have those satellite formations as well. And then on page 11 of the document General Eisenhower has this to say, in speaking of the difficulty of offering prolonged resistance east of the Rhine barrier:

Defensive depth is indispensable in countering the striking power of mechanized armies, and the speed and range of modern aircraft.

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Obviously, General Eisenhower sees the action of armoured units as the spearhead of any attack on the western powers. It is interesting to recall that with ten armoured divisions the Germans penetrated the Franco-British line of defence in May of 1940, and within seventeen days reached the channel. This feat was accomplished by 100,000 to

150.000 men thrusting forward with 2,800 tanks. The Franco-British forces, including French reservists, numbered 5 million, with

4.000 armoured vehicles, most of which were superior to the German ones both in armour and in gun calibre. Only a fraction of those armoured vehicles were organized for operational employment. The majority were assigned in detail to the infantry divisions just as, for example, are the tanks with our brigade in Europe at the present time. In other words, the allied forces in 1940 were preoccupied with defensive positional warfare. The Germans were intent on penetration and envelopment. Liddell Hart, in his comments on this campaign, in his book "Defence Of The West", which merits careful study, says:

In the light of all the evidence now available from the enemy side it is very clear how easily the German drive could have been paralyzed by a combination of air bombing and armoured counterstroke, whereas the immobile mass of the hundred Franco-British foot-marching divisions proved helpless. Their action was always too late.

It was fortunate for us that the Germans repeated in 1944 the Franco-British mistake of 1940. The chief emphasis, as you will recall, was on the fortification of the Atlantic wall, the Maginot line of the seacoast. And Rommel, experienced commander of mobile forces in North Africa, chose positional warfare in western Europe. Instead of concentrating his mobile armoured forces he used them piecemeal and thus suffered defeat.

I notice that General Eisenhower, in dealing with the forces required for the defence of the west, says, at page 15 of his report:

The defence of the west must necessarily be based on highly-trained covering forces, backed by reserve units which can be brought into action immediately after the outbreak of hostilities.

I judge that by his "covering forces" he must be referring to mobile armoured forces. The astonishing thing about the German success in 1940, if I may refer back to that, and their near-success against Russia in the fall of 1941, is that they were applying to warfare the lessons they had learned from British experiments with armoured fighting vehicles in earlier years, and from the writings of Fuller, Liddell Hart and Martel.

The German general who was primarily responsible for organizing, training, and subsequently directing the panzer divisions to

success was Guderian, who has recently written his biography under the title "General Guderian, a Panzer Leader". At page 20 there is this passage:

It was principally the books and articles of the Englishmen, Fuller, Liddell Hart and Martel, that excited my interest and gave me food for thought. These far-sighted soldiers were even then trying to make of the tank something more than just an infantry support weapon. They envisaged it in relationship to the growing motorization of our age and thus they became the pioneers of a new type of warfare on the largest scale.

Belatedly the allies followed the German example and organized many armoured divisions which subsequently crushed the German armies in Africa, Italy and northwest Europe in conjunction, of course, with the infantry divisions and the air force. The combination of infantry, armour and air power proved decisive.

As I said in the house last fall, the Canadians went further than the Germans and developed successfully the tracked armoured infantry carrier. On a score of battefields the armoured infantry carrier solved the problem of the combined assault by infantry and armoured formations. Before the fully-tracked infantry carrier was used the tanks all too frequently got too far in advance of the infantry and the infantry, plodding along in 1914-1918 fashion, were cut down by artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire.

Thirty years ago Liddell Hart, in forecasting the nature of the armies of the future, had emphasized the necessity of armoured tracked vehicles to carry forward the infantry in company with the tanks. He envisaged a mobile armoured force comprised of all arms, mounted in tracked vehicles capable of crosscountry movement. Armies that are tied down to railway tracks or to roads tend to become immobile. When one considers the organization of the divisions as they were in the last war, he can understand how easily they can become immobile, if they are dependent solely upon roads. An armoured division and an infantry division each require 3,500 wheeled vehicles for supply purposes. Those 3,500 wheeled vehicles spaced out, at 50 yards apart, occupy 100 miles of road. Many times the allied forces were hindered by the fact that their wheeled transport was unable to go across country. The Germans had the same trouble.

In the recent war the Germans carried their infantry, supporting their armoured regiments, in lorries or in half-tracked vehicles. Their success in France was so unexpected and so easy that they were content to make no further improvement. In the fall of 1941 the poor roads and the mud of Russia immobilized their infantry forces

and their supply columns, and cheated them of success. Liddell Hart states as his opinion at page 27 of his book that-

-tank forces that had tracked transport could have overrun Russia's vital centres long before autumn.

Push-button war is still a figment of the imagination. In the face of the present threat to Europe from the Russian army, one third of which is a mobile armoured force, the answer lies for the present in mobile armoured forces supported by air power. If at any time in the future Canada should be called upon to fight again in Europe, her contribution should be armoured mobile forces and air. And the infantry portion of her forces should be given the protection of tracked armoured carriers.

I am aware that there is a school of thought that considers that the tank is no longer a potent weapon. Some people had that idea in the 1920's and 1930's. They were entirely wrong. During the war the defences against tank attacks were improved. Anti-tank guns, bazookas, and mines were increasingly used effectively against tanks. Water obstacles were a serious handicap. On the other hand, the offensive power of tanks was not fully utilized on all occasions. Wheeled transport tied to the roads, marching infantry, failure of gasoline supplies-all these and other factors contributed to reduce the mobility of the tank forces.

Despite these handicaps there remains a great field for development. For example, in the opinion of General Fuller, the war in Europe might have been shortened by six months if gasoline supplies had been available in sufficient quantity by air transport for the armoured spearheads after the break-out from Normandy.

What will be the nature of armoured forces of the future? General Eisenhower gives us some indication of that. I should like to quote a short paragraph from his report at pages 19 and 20. These are his words:

The military forces we are building must be continually modified to keep pace with new weapons. To this end an annual review of the full nature and composition of our military programs should be accomplished. We are at the very point, for example, of seeing a whole sequence of fundamental changes made in response to development of new types of arms. The tendency in recent decades to produce weapons of greater range, penetrating power and destructiveness is accelerating. As a result, the balance between men and materiel is bound to shift, probably reducing the concentration of manpower on the battlefield, increasing the ratio of materiel to men, increasing the complexity of equipment as the price of its power. There will be more and more demand for the highly-skilled and specialized men in which our democracies excel. Military forces in the field may

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become lighter, faster and harder hitting, but the support which gives them these very qualities will become more elaborate and more costly.

Let us look for a moment at what Great Britain is doing, and in this connection I should like to quote briefly from the official report of the British House of Commons containing a speech made by Mr. Winston Churchill on March 5, 1952. As usual, he gave a fairly frank forecast of what was ahead of Great Britain when he said:

The disturbed condition of the world compels us to maintain outside Europe the equivalent of nearly six regular divisions, as well as the equivalent of five divisions, including three amoured divisions, which we now have on the continent. As soon as a sufficiency of modernised equipment can be provided we shall have available for service abroad or at home a total of 22 divisions which are of a much more complex character than anything known in the late war, and a considerable proportion of which will be armoured.

Here then is Canada's opportunity. Armoured mobile forces should be the aim of our army. We have the men with the technical aptitude and experience to handle machines. We have the open spaces essential for the training of mobile formations. We have the successful experience of the last war to guide us when we were the first to use the armoured tracked carrier for infantry and ammunition. Let us now go further and develop here in our own country the completely mobile force that modern warfare has shown to be essential, the mobile force capable of cross-country movement, supplied with fuel and ammunition by tracked transport vehicles or by air transport, with infantry, artillery, and engineers equipped with tracked armoured vehicles.

In addition to great mobility an armoured formation has the additional advantage of requiring a smaller number of men and of having a greatly increased fire power than an infantry formation. For example, the number of men in an armoured division may be two thousand less than in an infantry division with a fire power in excess of that of an infantry division by approximately 120 guns and 400 machine guns. Mobility, fire power and economy in men mark the armoured division.

The saying of the lives of our soldiers is to my mind the most compelling reason for advocating mobile armoured forces. Our own experience was similar to that of the Germans. Guderian, on page 73 of his book, writes as follows concerning the campaign in Poland, with particular reference to a three-day battle:

Hitler asked about casualities. I gave him the latest figures that I had received, some 150 dead and 700 wounded for all the four divisions under my command during the battle of the corridor. He was amazed at the smallness of these figures and contrasted them with the casualties of his own old

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regiment during the first world war; on the first day of battle that one regiment alone had lost more than 2,000 dead and wounded. I was able to show him that the smallness of our casualties in this battle against a tough and courageous enemy was primarily due to the effectiveness of our tanks. Tanks are a life-saving weapon.

Canadian experience also showed that tanks are a life-saving weapon. And Canadian experience showed that the armoured carrier for infantry was the greatest lifesaving device ever used on a battlefield.

In conclusion, our objective for our army should be the development of the most effective striking force that can be devised in the light of modern experience. Canada should be in the forefront of experiments with mobile armoured forces in conjunction with air power. Canada's experience with such forces in the past, her emphasis on such forces for the future should give her authority to guide in the councils of the NATO allies.

If we must prepare for defence, and perchance for war, no effort should be spared to give our young men every advantage and every means of protection that the ingenuity of man can provide.

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Walter Gilbert Dinsdale

Progressive Conservative

Mr. W. G. Dinsdale (Brandon):

Mr. Speaker, I want to approach this topic from the standpoint of one who has been interested in defence matters since the end of world war II, but who has not had the privilege of sitting in this chamber and keeping as intimately in touch with these important matters as those who have been here for a longer period. Looking at it from that standpoint it was with some degree of disappointment that I saw the evidence of relaxation, and the attitude of taking it easy appear so soon after the end of hostilities in 1945.

When the war ended in 1945 the western nations threw away their arms with wild abandon. War assets which had accumulated were tossed out for civilian use with astonishing loss and wastage. The armies, navies and air forces dwindled to rather small proportions. Generally speaking, the west wanted nothing more than to be rid of war and all its works.

This is not the first time that this attitude of mind has developed following a world war. We saw the same thing occur after world war I when it was thought that the world had been made safe for democracy, to use the well-known phrase of President Wilson. We thought that never again would we be faced with global war. I am reminded of Tennyson, who said;

For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see,

Saw the Vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be;

Tennyson went on to say;

Till the war-drum throbb'd no longer, and the battle-flags were furl'd

In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.

Our western way of life has been saturated in the belief that we are heading for inevitable progress and perfection. Notwithstanding the difficulties that arose following world war I we seemingly fell into the same error after world war II. Perhaps we were lulled into that attitude of mind because of the close relationship we had enjoyed, on a military level, with the U.S.S.R. during the period of hostilities when the western world and the soviet came together to resist the aggression of nazi Germany.

Actually of course the picture that has emerged and has become quite clear today is quite different from that which we anticipated in 1945. Today we are faced with wars and rumours of wars. We have passed through a depression of extreme significance and extent; and sometimes when we get pessimistic we think we see all the signs of a civilization in decay. True, we boast of our material progress. We have the finest machines and technologies in the world; we have the greatest resources, and we can measure progress in terms of accumulating financial wealth. We like to boast of those things. But actually if we get down to the grass roots of the matter there is very little to boast of. I feel that this easygoing optimism that has been radiated following two world wars is the result of the intellectual atmosphere and the social and political background of 19th century liberalism. I believe we have seen evidence of it in some of the discussion that has taken place in this chamber today.

Actually if we are to boast of anything in a democratic country it should be of our preservation of a sound democratic body politic; because it might even be that totalitarian systems such as were developed by Hitler and Mussolini and today by Stalin are even more successful in promoting material wealth than are the democracies. They can build roads; they can build bridges; they can exploit their resources; they can develop their industry, as Germany did during world war II to an unprecedented degree. So this booming material prosperity is no unique boast of the democracies. During the heyday of Mussolini we used to hear the great boast of the Italians that he made the trains run on time, another evidence of a technological civilization.

I believe the test of good government from the standpoint of our standards is the maintenance and promotion of the democratic way of life; where the government is the servant

and not the master of the people; where there is encouragement of the spirit of responsibility among individual citizens. When a difficulty arises in this country today we hear too often "What is the government going to do about it?" Of course that is inevitable as we develop the philosophy of Santa Clausism, or the belief that everything will come our way from an all-benevolent, all-kind and all-powerful government. A good government in a democratic country encourages a vital and dynamic local government. Coming from the west I may be looking at the situation from a biased point of view, but sometimes I get the feeling that our smaller communities are dying. There is this process of depopulation which has tended to interfere with the development of a healthy, vital democracy at the local level, with more and more citizens failing to take an active interest in their responsibilities and the problems that are close to their hearth and home.

I speak in this way because I believe the major difficulty we are facing, the major battle, is ideological; and we are not too successfully building up the necessary mental and spiritual resources to take part in this conflict. In 1825 Count de Tocqueville, a French writer of some reputation on historical events and social affairs, made a rather comprehensive analysis of democracy in America. He predicted that within a hundred years we would be faced with these problems on this continent: we would have responsibility bartered for security; second, we would find democracy tending to degenerate into majority rule. Majority rule, of course, is peculiar to democracy; but at the same time we must admit that some of the more important ideas, some of the more creative ideas, have emerged from the minority groups working under a benevolent majority. Again he said that dull uniformity resulting from this situation would tend to depress individual creativity and initiative; and, finally, that the increased complexity of our society and our national life would lead to autocracy or, even worse, to bureaucracy.

Well, in other parts of the world these very things have taken place. Just after world war I, when President Wilson sought to propagate the idea that the world had been made safe for democracy, at that moment of time we saw democracy go on the defensive. The revolution, or counter-revolution, as it is sometimes called, which overthrew Kerensky's democratic regime, set up reverberations which have increased in power and in their impact down through the years. During this debate, as well as during the recent debate on external affairs, we in this chamber have felt those reverberations in

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no uncertain fashion. Even in those countries which have been the heart and source of democracy we find democracy tending to go on the defensive, with governments able to perpetuate themselves indefinitely and the trend toward a one-party state, as de Tocqueville predicted from his careful analysis away back in 1825.

These are internal problems which I feel are important because with such conditions prevailing we are ill-prepared to meet the onslaught of the ideological side of the offensive, militant communism. I need not go over the territory that was covered during the four-day debate on external affairs; but it became obvious that there is a great deal of uncertainty and anxiety notwithstanding the United Nations, notwithstanding the commonwealth of nations, and notwithstanding the more recent alliance under the North Atlantic treaty. Recently Max Freedman has been quoted quite frequently as the result of a speech he made dealing with the United Nations, which in many quarters was received with a great deal of enthusiasm. He expressed his disappointment in the ability of the United Nations to cope with the international problems facing the world today. He has been quoted as follows, for example, after having been a keen observer of the United Nations in action:

Here is no brave crusade for peace, but instead a paradise of platitudes and a cynic's delight.

Again, he has said:

The general assembly has become less a forum of peace than an arena where the world's two strongest powers measure their strength.

We had the same idea expressed many times during the debate on external affairs. We tend to ignore the significance of the commonwealth as a political organization for international relationships, even though it has developed and evolved in a realistic way and today is actually based on social and political organic reality, and does have the machinery for exchanging international ideas and the solution of international problems as far as the member nations of the commonwealth are concerned. But we are tending to ignore or at least understress the significance of the British commonwealth of nations which, in reality, is the only bridge between east and west at the moment. We are placing most of our hopes on the NATO organization or the union of the European countries which, because of the developing awareness, have been awakened from their post-war lethargy and are now preparing to resist the obvious aggression of Russia by a heroic defensive effort. Much as we do not like war, as citizens of a Christian democracy, we are up against a situation that might plunge us

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into a global war on a scale never before witnessed. We are faced with the tragedy of going back to the dreary waste of armament, in spite of all that has been pointed out by the C.C.F. regarding the economic and social solutions to the problem. We are faced with the stark reality of defending ourselves against an aggressor nation such as the world has never seen.

During this debate we have had the staggering appropriations of Russia for arms quoted amounting to some $28 billion. We find that nation busily engaged in producing an efficient air arm. The MiG's operating in Korea already have gained considerable prestige amongst the members of our air forces, and are sometimes presented as superior to anything that we have been able to produce. I believe that is to be expected, because the Russians have the advantage of the expert knowledge of the German technicians who disappeared behind the iron curtain following the close of world war II. It is said that Russia is engaged in the production of a long-range bomber which would suggest that they are interested in carrying atomic warfare to this continent. This, combined with the crusading zeal of the Russian ideology that is sometimes called communism, a materialistic perversion of the Christian ethic, has forced us from our lethargy which, it seemed to me as an outside observer, existed following world war II.

With reference to this ideology, I should like to say that I believe it is closely related to the philosophy which formed the background of social reality for the rise of nazi Germany. The nazi believed in a pure race theory, a perversion of the science of eugenics. It is to be noted that this has a relationship with the unrealistic belief in progress and perfectibility which has motivated western civilization up until quite recent times. Now we are forced to remove our heads from the sand and realize that, just as other civilizations have collapsed, so could western civilization. It has no guarantee of eternal life any more than the Roman, Greek or other civilizations that have risen and fallen before us.

Now, that is the basis of the situation as I see it, and we are faced with this reality today. Unfortunately, we have to engage in the struggle for survival. First of all, we must see that our military defensive bulwarks are established. As I listened to the minister of defence this afternoon, I felt he was tinged with an optimism which might be described as a hangover from the easygoing optimism that has been strongly felt in Canada and other western countries during the first part of the century. I remember last session that

the minister justified the post-war policy by saying that the delay was going to be to the advantage of Canada, because we have been able to get rid of obsolete equipment. We have been able to start from scratch with airplanes, tanks and other armament of the latest style, the most up-to-date equipment that our military inventive genius can produce. This afternoon I believe figures were quoted-I cannot recall them exactly-to show that our defence budget in 1947 was something like $700 million as compared with the $2 billion today.

There are just two difficulties in that argument. First of all, it follows that the sudden necessity of reactivating our military forces to bring them to a state of preparedness necessary to meet the present aggressive tendencies of Russia has made a large contribution towards the inflationary trend that has been felt in our economy. We have had to indulge in astronomical expenditures in order to make up for the lost years following world war II. As a second query, I wonder whether4 we have entirely gotten rid of our obsolescent equipment, and whether we are starting from scratch with the best equipment possible for the three services. For example, the Canadian troops that were sent to Germany last fall returned to Europe with exactly the same weapons they used in world war II with the exception of the British Centurion tank, which has proved to be superior to the Churchill tank. I am informed that it is generally accepted as a superior weapon. I am not going to deal with the army situation, because that has been dealt with most satisfactorily by the member for Winnipeg South Centre (Mr. Churchill).

I should like to deal with aircraft, a field with which I am a little more familiar and perhaps have something to contribute. Looking at this matter of retiring obsolescent equipment, I recall that only last October there was an unveiling ceremony at Fort William when the first Harvard aircraft came off the assembly line of the Canadian Car and Foundry Company at Fort William. An article appeared in the magazine Canadian Aircraft which suggested that this was made up from a series of stock equipment items and was actually the only one that was produced for some considerable time. The Harvard, of course, was the stand-by in service training schools during world war II. Then again we were faced with the necessity of re-purchasing Mitchells and Mustangs in order to equip our reserve squadrons. In Canada we have been building up our reserve squadrons quite rapidly and the only equipment available for those squadrons was the equipment left over from world war II. Some

of these had to be repurchased from the United States, mostly Mitchells and Mustangs.

Then there is the history of Avro Canada Limited at Malton which has been engaged during the past six or seven years in the production of a jet liner, the much heralded CF-100 and again the highly tooted Orenda jet engine. This, of course, is military equipment that is entirely new, and is something that we did not have at the end of world war II. What is the fate of those three projects? What progress have we made in getting rid of obsolescent equipment and in equipping the important military units with the latest up-to-date equipment?

The jet liner project has been abandoned after reaching the flying stage, and we are now dependent on the purchase of Comets from England. As to the Orenda engine, although I have not up-to-date information with regard to it, as far as I can determine it is still in the experimental stage. It has not been used in any of the aircraft flying with our operational front-line squadrons. The greatest mystery of all, perhaps, surrounds the highly tooted CF-100: the allCanadian, superior, all-weather fighter that was going to be called the Canuck. There was again an unveiling ceremony down at Malton last October when the first of these aircraft came off the assembly line, and it was to be followed in grand procession until squadron 413 at Bagotville was to have been equipped with those aircraft and also the No. 3 all-weather training unit at North Bay. Neither of these squadrons has seen the CF-100; and I understand that there are no R.C.A.F. markings on any CF-100 at the present time. It would therefore seem that we have not been too successful. Let me point out that I am throwing these comments out more or less as queries rather than forthright statements. It is very difficult to get information. But from personal observation and discussion with those who know, this seems to be the situation prevailing at the moment.

The prototypes were produced of these three projects and that is where the matter ended. I would imagine that huge expenditures have been involved in the production of these prototypes. One expenditure is well known, namely that for the jet liner, which amounted to some $8 million before the project was abandoned. I can therefore readily conclude that there is a real need for careful scrutiny of these items by the committee on defence expenditures when it finally assembles, and I am sure that some interesting information will be revealed as a result of the deliberations of this committee.

So much for our battle against obsolescence. I just want to deal with the famous Sabre

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F-86E which I think is the designation. It is the front-line aircraft of the western powers. It is in mass production in the United States and is apparently in mass production in Canada at the present time. There have been some complaints, particularly from the men flying the machines, to the effect that they are not the equal of the Russian MIG in performance. That was the statement of Major George A. Davis, Jr., who has since been shot down in Korea. I say again that with the technical skill of the German experts who are working with the Russians on the development of jet aircraft it is quite possible -indeed probable-that they have produced a superior aircraft. We are going forward to equip our twelve squadrons for NATO with the Sabres. Apparently we are making progress here.

As we were informed this afternoon, we are in a position whereby we can equip, every two months, one entire fighter squadron, with all the maintenance personnel and all the paraphernalia associated with a fighter squadron. Then by the year 1954 we shall have completely equipped the twelve squadrons required for NATO. It would therefore seem that we are making progress in that regard. But by the time 1954 comes around from my air force experience, I would say that the speed of development in aircraft is such that if the Sabre is not obsolescent today it will be by the time 1954 arrives. For example there is the famous Mosquito that went through so many changes. Our squadron, 410 squadron, had three different types within the period of a year or a year and a half; and by the time the war ended the authorities were preparing to discard the Mosquito entirely and substitute for it the de Havilland Hornet. This will indicate the speed at which modern aircraft become obsolescent. We shall have to be exceedingly nimble and flexible in our planning if we are to be able to overcome this difficulty.

I say again that it would seem that the phantom air force that has been talked about and the phantom aircraft that have been talked about by so many with such great enthusiasm and optimism are at last taking tangible shape, although in reference to one statement I should like to read, from the report in the British Hansard, a statement of Mr. Shinwell, during the defence debates on March 5. With regard to the Sabres that Canada is going to supply to Britain, he had this to say, as reported at page 458:

The right hon. gentleman mentioned provision by the Canadians of the F.86's. More than 12 months ago we had negotiations with the American government and Canadians.

- (Hon. Members: "What happened?")

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1 will tell hon. members what the trouble was. I will be glad to-not glad, because there is nothing to be glad about. The Canadians were very willing to produce the air frames but the engines were produced in the United States of America and they have not been supplied yet. That is the trouble.

That was a statement made on March 5, so it might be that the aircraft are still very-much in the phantom stage.

There is one other item with regard to which I should like to say a word before I leave that topic, and I have been pursuing this for some little time. I did not intend to say anything at the present time on the subject, but the other day I was reading, in the Toronto Saturday Night, a report of 410 squadron stationed overseas. Some of the comments made by the aircrew flying the Sabres were recorded. I am greatly interested in the armament policy of the air force because, since world war II, we have changed from 20 millimetre cannon to 50 calibre armament. The aircrew were discussing the problems of modern aerial warfare, and they are the boys who know the score if anybody does, because they actually fly and handle the aircraft, and know them intimately. This young chap said:

What we need is some effective armament . . . Four cannon maybe instead of those six peashooters up front.

Yeah, and what about those air-to-air rockets? . . . They'd be the real McCoy for bomber interception like this morning.

I was curious -when I read that, for this reason. According to the careful instruction I received under the R.C.A.F. training program, we were taught that armament was basic to successful aerial interception. If you do not have the firepower you can have the most wonderful aircraft in the world, the greatest speed in the world, but unless the armament is deadly effective in aerial combat it is all to no purpose. The Germans found that difficulty during the battle of Britain when their aircraft, perhaps superior to our own, were inadequately equipped from the standpoint of armament. All through the war they suffered from that handicap. Although latterly the Germans had the 20 millimetre cannon, because they did not use high explosive and incendiary shells it was possible to get a shell in your gasoline tank and come out of it scot free; whereas with our 20 millimetre armament, one shell in the lethal gasoline tank was all that was necessary. That was during the relatively slower flying operations of world war II. Today with jet aircraft and the high speed-s they attain, the armament and the concentration of firepower must be more important than ever. You are lucky if you get any strikes, but whatever strikes you get on the enemy must count. To that end the most

effective and lethal armament possible is necessary. I should like to recommend the statement of the young chap who was speaking apparently in the dispersal hut of 410 squadron overseas.

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An hon. Member:

What was the magazine?

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Walter Gilbert Dinsdale

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Dinsdale:

It is taken from the Saturday Night magazine of some two weeks ago. The date is not on the sheet. I should like to recommend the statement to the minister because without any doubt there will not be the opportunity for the young man himself to make the representation.

Another subject that I want to mention briefly is that of the auxiliary services. We had a very comprehensive survey of the auxiliary service, or the welfare service situation as it exists, particularly in Korea at the present time. There was some discussion of this subject last fall, and the minister has kindly dealt with it in more or less comprehensive terms. There is just one aspect of his statement that I could not quite comprehend. I think he said that there were no complaints at all from the army. Well, that is an unusual state of affairs. An army that does not complain must be in bad shape indeed because they say-and this is more than folklore-when the soldiers are griping most, morale is highest; when they are not griping, they are muttering under their breath, and that is an indication of relatively low morale. I rather suspect that the statement that there are no complaints is something like the experience of the typical orderly officer who walks into the mess. He says: "Any complaints?" And nobody dares say a word. The orderly officer walks out again, and then the hubbub starts after he has disappeared. I cannot possibly conceive, regardless of how efficient welfare services are, of a group of men gathered together in a military organization away from home, in the sort of country and in the situation in which the boys find themselves in Korea, not having any complaints whatsoever. That is just a little too optimistic, and a little bit too rosy-

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Walter Gilbert Dinsdale

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Dinsdale:

It is a little bit too optimistic and a little bit too rosy for common sense.

On this subject of auxiliary services, it would seem that now the government is going to make use of the services of the voluntary organizations because we already have a group of young ladies from the Red Cross en route overseas. I am happy to see

that this is so, because I do believe that the voluntary welfare organizations have a unique contribution to make when it comes to serving men who find themselves in the unnatural and difficult circumstances of modern warfare. No matter how many cigarettes you have got, how many shows you have got, how many sing-songs you have, or how many other comforts are supplied, it is still a difficult situation to be separated from your normal associations. We are only too well aware that the major tragedy of modern warfare is not necessarily physical wounds. We are all familiar today with war neuroses and hysteria. We have many men who are receiving war veterans allowances today, the pension popularly known as the burnt-out pension, who have no obvious physical defects, but yet are suffering from the impact of war neuroses.

I would suggest, Mr. Speaker, that voluntary welfare organizations are especially equipped, and uniquely equipped, to make a worth-while contribution in this area of service. Our troops, our soldiers, our navy men and our airmen are essentially civilian soldiers, and the closer we can keep them to the home front, the more we can avoid situational maladjustments-that is the term the psychiatrists use-the better. These men find themselves away from the support of home, the support of the church and of the other bulwarks of normal society. The closer we can keep our civilian soldiers to that atmosphere the less severe will be the impact, the effects of these war neuroses that used to be called shell shock. These voluntary organizations with experienced personnel, with personnel who are highly motivated, with personnel who have gained valuable experience in world war I and world war II, are in a much happier position, I submit, to provide the necessary welfare services than any regimented military scheme of welfare services. It is hard to visualize a military man providing the type of human service that is necessary in order to help a man keep his balance, keep his proper perspective, when he finds himself amidst the - dangers, confusion and uncertainty of modern warfare.

I do not think I need say anything further on that subject. It seems obvious that we are not going to depend entirely upon military welfare services. We have made a start in using voluntary services, and as the need arises I am sure that the services which have been so generously offered by the four voluntary organizations, the Canadian Legion, the Y.M.C.A., the Salvation Army and the Knights

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of Columbus, who have a large number of experienced personnel available for the job, will be taken into consideration.

On that subject just one further point: not only can they keep a man on the battle-front in touch with the home front; they can also keep the home front in touch with the man on the battlefront, and through their widespread organizations back home they can deal with domestic problems and problems of juvenile delinquency as a result of father being absent overseas, and so forth, in a way that military personnel cannot possibly hope to do.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I believe that while military preparation is necessary in this situation in which we find ourselves, there has to be in addition a total preparedness, the psychological effect that the Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Howe) spoke about in a recent speech in the city of Ottawa. We have to equip our people in their thinking to accept the sacrifices that are necessary in order to meet the onrush of Soviet military and ideological aggression. It involves an educational program, and this is being stressed in the adult education movement. It is a matter of using our defence production in the most efficient way possible; it is a matter of controlling defence spending wisely. It is a matter of integrating defence production as closely as we can with peacetime production, dispersing industry so that we will avoid the dislocation of the period between 1939 and 1945 when Manitoba, for example, lost 200,000 people who wended their way to the factories of the industries in the east. With the threat of atomic warfare, there is no reason why, facing military reality, we cannot disperse our industries realistically.

Undoubtedly we must establish the necessary moral fibre by strengthening the values of our civilization. A much more dangerous threat to our way of life than the communist is the "apathist", the ordinary citizen who is overcome with apathy, and could not care less what happens.

We are all in the front line. I believe the sooner we tell the truth and give all the facts concerning the situation, and refrain from painting rosy and optimistic pictures of the inevitable glorious future, and the sooner we realize that our nation and western civilization are up against the greatest challenge they have ever faced, the sooner we will be prepared successfully to meet that challenge.

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LIB

George Matheson Murray

Liberal

Mr. G. M. Murray (Cariboo):

Mr. Speaker,

I have been particularly impressed by the speeches made here this evening, which seem to indicate that among all parties there is

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a uniformity of opinion, a sort of patriotism that one rarely finds in a country where there are diverse parties, and where debate sometimes becomes heated.

In his concluding remarks the last speaker said something which impressed me greatly, and that is the necessity in this country of bringing together peacetime qualities with those of defence. Up in the northwest, where possibly we are not so exposed as hon. members from Newfoundland, who fear hell on the Atlantic, we are nevertheless in a part of this continent which is exposed to possible enemy attack.

We may have our air force, a strong naval force and our army; but I say to the house that in the northwestern part of Canada we should seek along peaceful lines to settle those vacant valleys and build roads and railways, and possibly bring over here some of the surplus population from Europe. I believe that would be the more economical procedure, in the long run. Let us place them on the land and allow them to share in the light of this Canada of ours.

Only one unpleasant thought developed during the recent session, and that was by way of some unkindly references to the United States of America. In my own constituency certain speakers have spoken disparagingly of the United States, and have sought to divide the Canadian people from their good neighbours to the south. In the making of peace in the world the policies so well outlined by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson), indicating that we are walking hand in hand with the United States in our policy of defence, are salutary and good, and are re-echoed in all the capitals of the world.

We are going along here peacefully. In his speech the other day in which he dealt with atomic energy, the Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Howe) made one of the most historic observations ever made in parliament when he said that we are well advanced into the atomic age, and that the time is not far distant when atomic energy will be harnessed for peaceful purposes. We achieve these things by friendly co-operation with our allies.

I would like to see even more friendly exchange of plans and inventions with our allies to the south. And when I say this I do not wish to leave out the motherland from which we all spring. Great Britain has led throughout the world; and it grieves me greatly when I hear people speak about British imperialism, and make reference to the way in which England invaded certain

countries in times past and sought to bring various peoples under her domination in a purely military sense.

I do not think any power in the world has been more beneficent than has Britain in her contact with all the nations. She has improved the peoples in every country in Asia with which she has been in contact. I have referred to the defence of the northwest part of the continent because I know a good deal about the Pacific region. I know that if Britain had remained in China it would have been better for the world today, and better for the Chinese. I know that where Britain did operate in China she built hospitals, installed sanitation, provided fresh water supplies, paved streets, built roads, established industries, and built great docks and warehouses.

Had it not been for England's operations in China, and in other places across the seven seas, we would not have known the prosperity of the Victorian era. Englishmen went out in their ships and brought raw materials back to their country to keep the mills turning, and to manufacture useful goods for the welfare of the world.

She set a fine example in the Far East. Her contact with Japan was on the highest level; and the world is finding out today, many years too late, that the Anglo-Japanese alliance was a very useful and proper thing for the maintenance of peace in that part of the world. We now have an American-Japanese alliance. Britain has led the way in all those countries; and we in Canada could do nothing better than to follow in her footsteps, and associate ourselves with the Americans to that end.

I wish to compliment the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton) upon the good work he has done up in the northwest in recent months by way of the improvement of airways, the improvement of highways, and co-operation along the Alaskan perimeter. In that part of the country we have a very friendly feeling toward the United States. Their capitalists are sharing in the development of our industries. Many of them are coming in, settling upon the land and becoming Canadian citizens. It is good to have a sort of harmonious feeling in Canada, and to know that we are united with our good allies the United States of America, the mother country and the other nations making up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and that we are firmly behind the United Nations in its efforts.

I have had the opportunity of visiting at the United Nations, and I am one who feels

that the work of that great institution is just dawning. It has already accomplished great things. And, under the fine leadership of the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent), and the ministers clustered about him, I hope we may continue to give unstinted support to the United Nations. I hope some day to see raised that emblem which they have raised on Mount Royal, the Christian cross, raised above the United Nations building down there near the Goddess of Liberty.

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Agar Rodney Adamson

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Adamson:

In view of the importance of this debate and the fact that the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton) finds it inconvenient to be present, I move the adjournment of the debate.

Motion agreed to and debate adjourned.

Business of the House BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

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LIB

Alphonse Fournier (Minister of Public Works; Leader of the Government in the House of Commons; Liberal Party House Leader)

Liberal

Mr. Fournier (Hull) moved

the adjournment of the house.

He said: Tomorrow we will continue this debate and if it is concluded we will call items in national health and welfare, trade and commerce and resources and development. We will then proceed with the resolution to approve a treaty of peace with Japan. If that does not take too long, we will deal with some of the small bills; bill No. 9, respecting the appointment of auditors for national railways, and the resolution of the Minister of Labour to amend the Government Employees Compensation Act, and perhaps some other small matters.

Motion agreed to and the house adjourned at 10.45 p.m.

Friday, April 4. 1952

Topic:   NATIONAL DEFENCE
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April 3, 1952