April 3, 1952

On the orders of the day:


Paul Theodore Hellyer


Mr. P. T. Hellyer (Davenport):

In the light of a newspaper report, I should like to ask the Minister of Transport whether there is to be any change in the method followed last year of selling radio receiving licences.


Lionel Chevrier (Minister of Transport)


Hon. Lionel Chevrier (Minister of Transport):

So far as I know, there are no changes in the method of operation from that of last year.




On the orders of the day:


George Alexander Drew (Leader of the Official Opposition)

Progressive Conservative

Mr. George A. Drew (Leader of the Opposition):

I should like to ask a question of the Prime Minister, of which I have not given notice. If he cannot answer today, I suggest that he take my question as notice. This is a matter which has been brought to my attention.

Has a definite decision been reached which may give some assurance of interim payments to those with claims connected with German and Japanese occupation of territory, where Canadian non-combatants were affected? While the Japanese and German peace treaties may not have been fully concluded, in the case of Japanese nationals there was an announcement a few days ago that certain settlements had been made with reference to the Japanese themselves. For that reason we

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might hope that there would be a decision, possibly before the Easter recess, in regard to those who have claims against these funds.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent (Prime Minister; President of the Privy Council)


Right Hon. L. S. Si. Laurent (Prime Minister):

I shall take the question as notice, and try to get a statement as to the exact position.




Brooke Claxton (Minister of National Defence)


Hon. Brooke Claxton (Minister of National Defence) moved

that the house go into committee of supply.

He said: Mr. Speaker, the realization must be borne in on all of us that in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization we have a new concept of international co-operation and of international organization. The peoples of all fourteen nations, and, I hope, their children, have a new framework for their freedom and, indeed, for their lives. Though history, tradition and sentiment make many differences, this organization of NATO has in some respects a parallel significance to the commonwealth, to our relationship with the United States and to our feeling for France. NATO is not just an organization that meets at Ottawa or Rome or Lisbon and issues a press release. In time it may come about, perhaps the sooner the better, that NATO is not even news. NATO is neighbourhood; NATO must become as familiar as the family.

The beginning of a realization of this concept is indicated in some of the references made in the four-and-a-half day debate in this house on external affairs. We have to come to regard the NATO peoples, not as a parcel of foreigners but as partners having a common interest in meeting a common danger in order to arrive at a common security.

It must become just as natural for any boy in Canada to take his place on our frontiers in Germany or Europe as it is for him to take a summer job on the frontier in Canada. Both mark the beginning of work in the service; both are adventures; both enlarge the horizons; both earn money to be invested in laying better foundations for a future career.

Also it should cease to be sensational for there either to be a report of agreement or disagreement at the meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Our arrangements for our joint defence must be regarded simply as an extension of our arrangements for our own territorial defence. These concepts are new in the history of the world. You may recall that it was only three years ago tomorrow, on April 4, 1949, that the North Atlantic treaty

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was signed at Washington. It was only one year ago yesterday that General Eisenhower took office as supreme commander. It was two years ago today that at The Hague we first agreed to military plans and an estimate of the requirements and directed the standing group to state how these should be met.

How did this come about? This partnership of free nations working to stop aggression in Korea and working to prevent aggression in Europe came about because of the policy of communist aggression, of the practice of communist aggression and of the power of communist aggression. The "Struggle for Europe" by Chester Wilmot has been described as the most important book yet written about the war. In his concluding paragraphs Mr. Wilmot sums up the causes, the results, the agonies and the lessons of those five years, and he went on to say:

The course of the wartime negotiations with the Soviet union-whether conducted by the United States and Britain or by Germany-shows plainly that the present Russian rulers, while relentless in pursuit of what they believe to be Soviet interests, are respecters of strength. Concessions made as gestures of good will were invariably interpreted by Stalin and Molotov as evidence of weakness and served only to encourage them to drive a harder bargain-witness the development of Stalin's demands during the discussions about his entry into the war against Japan, and his handling of the Polish problem. Over the last decade and more the only policy that has proved effective in dealings with the Kremlin has been the firmness in diplomacy backed by military strength: a combination of patience and power. This, it seems, must be the policy of the countries now associated in the North Atlantic alliance.

That is why nations are co-operating in the Far East and under the North Atlantic treaty. That is why they have been working together to do what is necessary to meet the danger. This means that each one of us is not always doing what is easiest or what is cheapest, but rather the things which fit into a larger pattern which have not been imposed upon us but which we helped to fashion and work for.

The objectives of Canada's defence were stated last year as, first, the immediate defence of Canada and North America from direct attack; second, the implementation of any undertakings made by Canada under the charter of the United Nations, under the North Atlantic treaty or under any other agreement for collective security and, third, the organization to build up our strength in total war. Similar objectives were stated first in this house in 1947 and they have remained the same ever since.

That does not mean that the means taken to achieve the objectives have remained the same. While generally we have followed the same policy and the same program, the yardstick of change and size and speed can be seen by comparing the amount expended in

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1947-48 of $196 million with the estimate for 1952-53 of $2,001 million. Increases, some greater and some smaller, have been made in all the countries working on our side. They reflect the assessment of the danger and the people's willingness to meet the challenge of the threat of danger to which weakness exposes us.

While we regard the defence of our country as the overriding object, when we have men in battle facing a foe abroad, we put above everything else the necessity of supporting in every way those men who are risking and giving their lives in order that peace may be restored and freedom preserved. Consequently, I take up first the position of our forces in Korea. They are there supporting the action of the United Nations. There is no need to review the course of events which began with the unprovoked act of aggression by communist North Korea on June 25, 1950. Numerous reports on that have been given in this house.

Twenty months have gone by since communist North Korea made a ruthless and unprovoked attack on South Korea. That brought into action sixteen of the united nations, who contributed forces. Among the first was Canada. In the truest sense of the word the action taken by the United Nations in Korea is police action, action to stop aggression. Our forces fighting there are in every sense of the word international police.

Our sailors, soldiers and airmen are grand people. They deserve the best we can give them; and generally I think that has been provided. Since the house was last in session, with the Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Lapointe), the hon. member for Vancouver Centre (Mr. Campney), Dr. Solandt, chairman of defence research, and other officers, and four members of the press, I visited Japan and Korea. We had the privilege of seeing our destroyers in Far Eastern waters, the men of the 25th Canadian infantry brigade, and the Tokyo end of the R.C.A.F. Pacific airlift. In his most interesting speech on December 10 the hon. member for Skeena (Mr. Applewhaite) made a full report on his visit there, and I do not propose to go over the same ground.

I can report, however, that all our party found, as the hon. member reported, that the morale of the troops everywhere was high. We went from the rear areas up to the foxholes within a thousand yards of the enemy front. We found that our men are as well clothed and fed and led as any troops that ever went into battle. The view of everyone who has visited the front, including the four leaders of the churches, representatives of the press and members of the armed forces of our own and other countries, is that they

have never seen troops in better spirit or with higher morale. When we were there some soldiers pointed to a frozen reservoir and asked if there was any chance of getting some hockey equipment. Within a few days after our party returned enough equipment, including pads for the goalkeepers, was on its way by air to outfit six teams. As hon. members have probably noticed in press reports, this equipment was used not only by men of the 25th brigade but also by Australians and New Zealanders, and over 100 scheduled games were played at "Imjin Gardens".

Concern for the welfare of the troops was one of the main reasons for our visit to Korea. It had been suggested in Canada, generally by people who had never been in Korea, that we should have auxiliary civilian services to help look after the needs of the brigade at the front. Members of our party made it a special point to discuss this suggestion with commonwealth, United States and other officers and authorities as well as with members of the Canadian forces from generals to privates. There was general agreement that it was neither practical nor useful to have outside agencies in Korea at the present time. Only last week, however, I visited Toronto and said bon voyage to a group of eight fine young Canadian girls who are going out as workers with the Canadian Red Cross at Kure and Tokyo in Japan. This arrangement was worked out with the Red Cross, which was most co-operative, immediately following my return from Korea. From what I have seen of them, from the training they have had and from their splendid background, I am sure these girls will be a credit to the Red Cross, to the women of Canada and to their country.

The troops off duty have always been able to see a nightly movie back of the lines and we have made arrangements whereby more movies will be supplied from Canada on a regular circuit. We have also made arrangements for the more regular and speedy distribution of news and mail, and amenities of that kind. The C.B.C. is now sending to Korea special Canadian programs which are rebroadcast in Japan or through the wireless facilities of our ships when they are available.

At the end of our trip to the front we went back of the lines. Altogether we had visits with over forty different groups of men. These were no formal visits. On each occasion the men available would be lined up but there were no guards, except for one ceremonial parade of the R.C.R. The men would be broken off; we would gather them around and discuss with them arrangements for rotation, for rest and recreation, and so on.

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We would ask their views, and at each group I offered to see privately any man who wanted to see me, either then or later. At the end of this discussion-because we always had some wisecracks together-I would usually see three or four who would come up to me. It gave me some satisfaction to learn that not one of those who came up had a complaint about any of the conditions of service. In the main their problems concerned welfare problems of their families back home, which were under process of investigation by the regular agencies. In some cases it was possible to speed up the reports, and in one or two to see that additional consideration was given to what seemed to be borderline cases. But there were no complaints about the conditions of service, or anything that could be remedied by speedy action, with one exception. Apparently there was a delay in forwarding some mail just before Christmas. We were able to trace this down to the manner in which the mail was handled by the air transport service of the United States at McChord field; and that has been rectified.

Following this visit we went back to Japan by air and saw the officers and men of the reinforcement group and the other base units at Kure. We also visited the two ships that happened to be in port, the Cayuga and Athabaska; and there the same practice was followed. We walked through every mess deck; we had a few words with the men on every deck, and later they could see me, as some of them did. The same privilege was open to all members of the party, and was taken advantage of by the press. I think hon. members who read the press reports of this visit, by the five Canadians who participated in it, will agree that they gave a fine and fair account of gallant Canadians facing difficult conditions and adding lustre to the name of our country.

Altogether five ships of the navy have been working in rotation. In all they have taken nine tours and have sailed 450,000 miles in Far Eastern waters. With its airlift the R.C.A.F. has travelled nearly four million miles without a serious accident, without a forced landing, and without loss of life or serious damage, still less the loss of a plane. In Tokyo and elsewhere in the Far East, we share some facilities with the rest of the commonwealth forces. Sometimes the standards provided through those sources are not the same as ours. Sometimes we would like to see them different, but we believe we should co-operate with the commonwealth because that makes military sense, as well as being in accordance with our traditions. As long as we do that we shall probably, on some occasions, have rations

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and conditions of service which might be different if we had our own pipeline. We have made arrangements with the commonwealth forces to share in the cost of every thing on an out-of-pocket basis. We have made arrangements to divide those expenses in Korea, and to pay for everything we get from the United States in consideration of a capitation fee of $4.6187 per man per day.

In Korea, our men usually have United States rations which are similar to our own. It may astonish hon. members to learn that introduced, there has already served in the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force in the Far East a total of 14,183 officers and men. We are well up on the system of rotation that we introduced of replacing men after they have served for one year. Some time next month we expect to see Brigadier John Rockingham return. At this time, I should like to pay tribute to one of the finest soldiers this country has put in the field. A great soldier and a great Canadian, he is loved by every man in his command. On New Year's eve we attended about half a dozen singsongs in tents and dugouts, and if you ever heard the boys sing a rowdy number entitled "Won't you join old Rocky's army?", you could feel that this was a man they respected and liked.


Brooke Claxton (Minister of National Defence)


Mr. Claxlon:

I can remember only one occasion upon which a member opposite endeavoured to sing a song, and he did not remember any more than the first few lines.

With regard to rotation, the Princess Patricia's have already been replaced by the first battalion, and the second battalions of R.C.R. and the Royal 22nd are in process of being replaced. This whole operation will, we expect, be concluded next month or at the latest in June. Our policy is to replace commanding officers rather sooner than twelve months, following the practice that was established in the second world war, because no one is under such constant strain as commanding officers in fighting conditions such as these, where troops are always in the line; where they are facing an enemy superior in numbers; where the front is not continuous, and where what appears like a patrol may be the beginning of an all-out attack. As far as possible, therefore, we follow the policy of replacing commanding officers sooner than the twelve months. In this way we give more of them battle experience.

On August 31, 1950, as reported at page 99 of Hansard I said:

All the senior officers have been chosen, and the evidence of their fighting records is exemplified in the nation-wide reputation of their commander. Brigadier John M. Rockingham, C.B.E., and a double D.S.O. In no case was a unit commander a second choice.

In advance of units having commenced training, I was sticking my neck out a bit, but I can state this: that every single one of the commanding officers of the unit has already added to the good record he made for himself in the second world war. And I should add that every one of them would be the first to state that the credit is not due to them but to the men.

The 25th Canadian infantry brigade is generally recognized as one of the finest fighting formations on the front or for that matter ever raised in Canada. The brigade is maintained at full strength, and there are ample reinforcements in the theatre and here to provide for wastage and rotation. Whenever you see a Canadian in Korea or Japan, you find that they are the same kind of man as those of you who are veterans of the first and second world wars knew. They are alert, engaging, robust and tough. They are distinguishable from others in their dress, in their bearing and in their attitude. Their fighting qualities are superb, their disciplined obedience to orders and their bearing on parade leave nothing to be desired. But despite this trained teamwork they remain intensely individual, and have every kind of initiative.

Now, if I may leave the scene in Korea and the Far East and move on to our other major operation abroad, in Germany and Europe, it is interesting to observe that this scene of operations is just about on the opposite side of the globe from Korea. The locations of our 25th brigade in Korea and that of the 27th brigade in Germany are about 12,000 miles apart. It must be of interest and of some satisfaction to hon. members that our commitment for one-third of a division or a Canadian infantry brigade was completed by the date we planned, early in December. So far as I know we were the first to complete our military commitment. As I said before, tomorrow win be the third anniversary of the signature of the treaty, and in that connection perhaps I may recall that Canada was the first to suggest it and the first to ratify the treaty. It is some satisfaction, therefore, to find we are possibly the first to comply with our military commitments.

I am not going to go over the ground that was covered so fully in the debate on external affairs. The development up to Rome has been explained many times, and the recent debate on external affairs carried it on to Lisbon. There is no concealing from hon. members the difficulties that had to be faced. As I indicated from the outset, this is a completely new idea that fourteen nations should combine together in peacetime in order to preserve peace, not to win a war, not to obtain a victory, but to preserve peace. We have seen considerable progress in that respect. The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) reviewed the situation, and reported on the achievements at Lisbon. I have read the statements of Mr. Eden, Mr. Acheson, Mr. Lovett, Mr. Schuman and they all say substantially the same thing, and reach substantially the same conclusions. But yesterday there was issued to the North Atlantic treaty nations the first report by General Eisenhower, on the anniversary of his appointment as supreme commander a year ago yesterday. That document has already received attention in the press; but in case any hon. members desire to have copies, we have prepared copies following an 11,000-word service message yesterday, and more will be available in printed form in a few days.

In this report the supreme commander reviews the situation as he found it when he came into office, and describes the steps he took to set up the organization and to build up the commands. Then he describes the situation as it now is. About the progress that has been made I am not going to give my own estimate. I am going to give that of General Eisenhower, with which I agree. At the outset of this report he says:

It would be disastrous if the favourable signs and developments recorded in this report were to put any mind at ease, or to create a sense of adequate security, for there is no real security yet achieved in Europe: there is only a beginning.

Equally, it would be unfortunate if anyone were to find excuse for defeatism in the manifold difficulties and shortcomings of our joint effort to date, for we have made progress in all aspects of security.

_ And he adds, and it is interesting and important to observe that this is a soldier speaking:

The momentum must be continued with renewed vigour, and since moral force is the genesis of all progress, especially progress towards security and peace, we must give primary attention to this vital element.

Then he speaks of the unity of NATO:

The unity of NATO must rest ultimately on one thing-the enlightened self-interest of each participating nation. The United States, for example is

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furnishing much of the material resources of this project during the current year because it believes that America's enlightened self-interest is served thereby. Most American people agree as to the wisdom and necessity of this course.

That, Mr. Speaker, is precisely the position of the Canadian government. Later General Eisenhower continues:

For the United States and Canada, the future could promise ever-greater danger of attack, requiring endless sacrifices and defence costs which would ultimately break their economies.

That is, unless we work together through NATO. General Eisenhower describes the situation as he found it a year ago:

At the moment, however, in western Europe there were fewer than 15 NATO divisions adequately trained and equipped for war. National service programs, existing in all European member countries, had trained, or partially trained, a reservoir of manpower since the end of the war. Unfortunately, equipment was inadequate to convert this pool into effective reserve divisions. In the air the situation was no better, perhaps worse. We had fewer than one thousand operational aircraft available in all western Europe, and many of these were of obsolescent types.

Next comes a description of how he got on with the job and proceeded with the organization of his headquarters, of his commands, and of the forces and then the beginning of the build-up:

Very quickly after the establishment of a command structure we began to see definite improvement in the morale and readiness of troops. But first and foremost was the need for more forces. The United States and Great Britain alone possessed previously formed and disposable reserves, and they proceeded to deploy additional strength in Germany-four divisions from America and two from the United Kingdom. France already had the equivalent of four divisions in Germany. Air reinforcement, although sorely needed, had to await the accomplishment of major programs for air crew training, production of aircraft, and construction of additional airfields.

He goes on to deal with the situation in Europe today:

Already our active forces have increased to a point where they could give a vigorous account of themselves, should an attack be launched against us. In terms of army divisions whether in service or quickly mobilizable, our forces in western Europe have nearly doubled in numbers. The national units pledged to this command a year ago were for the most part poorly equipped, inadequately trained, and lacking essential support in both supplies and installations. Because of their weakness on all fronts, and the absence of central direction, they could have offered little more than token resistance to attack. Today, the combat readiness of our troops has improved markedly. Readjustments in their deployment have enhanced their potential effectiveness against the threat from the east. Behind them is a steadily-expanding supply system, and a command organization to plan and direct their co-ordinated efforts. Still far-disappointingly far-from sufficient for a determined defence, they nevertheless represent a fighting force in whose spirit and increasing fitness our nations can take considerable pride.

National Defence The result is summarized:

Pursuant to the recommendations of the temporary council committee, our member countries have pledged to produce this year 50 divisions for European defence, exclusive of those to be provided by the two new NATO nations, Greece and Turkey. Roughly, one-half of the 50 divisions will be standing forces; the remainder are planned as reserve divisions available for employment at periods varying from 3 to 30 days.

Then he says:

The defence of the west must necessarily be based on highly-trained covering forces, backed up by reserve units which can be brought into action immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. Admittedly this is the only system-

It will be noted that he says it is "the only system".

__of defence which can be adopted without excessive cost or crippling damage to national economies. To make the system work will demand far more attention than is now being given to the organization and readying of reserve forces on the continent.

Speaking about airfields he says:

Air power is the dominant factor in war today. It cannot win a war alone, but without it, no war can be won. Our goal is to create air strength capable of answering immediately the onslaught of an aggressor and covering, at the same time, the mobilization of reserve forces.

That is why in the Canadian program we put the greatest emphasis, and spend by far the greatest proportion of the defence dollar, on the air force. Still speaking about air strength he says:

There is still a long way to go in developing air strength in western Europe. A major task has been and continues to be the provision of adequate air bases and communications to link them.

The airfield problem stems largely from the fact that jet fighters require runways substantially longer than those in current use for even the largest commercial aircraft. During the past year some thirty airfields have been put into use, but these were largely an inheritance from previous European construction programs and involved improvements on fields already in existence. A vast amount of new construction is needed to accommodate the air power necessary to the defence of the west.

One of the most heartening achievements of the Lisbon conference was the approval by member nations of a cost-sharing scheme to build a large number of additional airfields in Europe. Action was also taken to provide headquarters sites and communication facilities.

I have only one thing to add, and that is that in this report General Eisenhower gives the figures for the estimated strength of the enemy at the figures which are commonly given, 175 front line divisions, one-third of which were either mechanized or armoured, and an air force of 20,000 aircraft. The navy at the same time stood at twenty cruisers and some 300 submarines. Behind all this was the vast sprawling economy still largely harnessed to war.

That concluding quotation from General Eisenhower's magnificent report is the reason

why the government is putting before this house estimates seeking the huge sum of $2,001 million. I am sure hon. members would wish me now to say what Canada is going to do as her part of the build-up of the North Atlantic alliance, in terms of navy, army and air force. I should emphasize that there have not been any substantial changes in the program, as announced to the house on February 5, a year ago. That had been foreshadowed in the speech from the throne at the beginning of the first session in 1951, and reference was made, too, to the organization of the 27th Canadian infantry brigade as part of that operation in a statement to the house on May 4. A white paper giving this information was tabled on May 7. There was a further statement when the estimates were discussed on May 8, and then the same matter was dealt with in the speech from the throne beginning the second session of 1951, and in the statement tabled on October 18 regarding the dispatch of the 27th infantry brigade overseas.

Hon. members will also recall that the debate on external affairs and defence was introduced on October 22, when the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) moved this motion:

That this house approves the continuation of Canada's participation in the efforts being made through the United Nations to establish international peace, and in particular to defeat aggression and restore peace in Korea, and by the North Atlantic treaty nations to deter aggression and promote stability and well-being in the north Atlantic area.

That was followed by a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) and myself. In mine, I again referred to our proposed contributions, and in the course of that speech tabled a revised white paper, where the same references were made.

It is within the recollection of all hon. members that the motion introduced by the Prime Minister was carried without a single dissenting voice, and so far as I know, there was no objection throughout the country, either as to our participation in NATO or as to the nature of our contributing forces. When the Prime Minister introduced the motion on October 22, it was accepted by all parties without a dissenting voice, and I take it from the debate we have had that so far that attitude has not materially changed.

The figure of eleven air force squadrons that I announced for NATO for 1954 was subsequently increased as I announced on my return from" Lisbon to twelve, and we believe that these twelve squadrons can be raised and equipped by suitable adjustments in the reserve aircraft for the other eleven squadrons, for which we had provided on what is now believed to be a basis more ample

than that generally regarded as necessary by other countries. It was announced then that we would supply or have for our defence a hundred ships for th'e navy by 1954. About 52 of these are at present planned for use in connection with NATO. The others would be used for our own territorial defence.

The army and air force figures for 1954, one-third of a division and twelve squadrons, remain the same. In consequence of our last meeting at NATO I am now in a position to give figures for our 1952 NATO program: twenty-four ships, one-third of a division, four fighter squadrons. We have complied with the requirements for the army; we have the ships commissioned, and men to comply with the navy requirements. We have the squadrons with the men and the aircraft to comply with the requirements for the air force, and expect to do so, subject only to the possibility that the necessary airfields may not be available.

From the point of view of planning for our effective defence, together with our allies, it of course would be more desirable not to make, each one of us in turn, these figures available to the only possible aggressor. That is the information he most wants to get; but in a democracy it is necessary to give information to enable our own parliaments and people to understand in order to support what is involved; but while this is done we must recognize that from the military point of view, this is just the information any possible enemy would most like to have.

In addition to these contributions of forces, we have been contributing arms, and have provided in the estimates for another $324 million. Altogether the amount that we shall have contributed to NATO or provided for over the last two years in arms and training facilities will total over $600 million, a pretty substantial contribution of mutual aid and economic assistance.

We are also prepared to train an output for NATO of 1,400 aircrew, and we are looking to the question of working things out so that possibly this figure may be increased without increasing facilities, so that if the standing group, or other appropriate NATO agency, makes such a recommendation we might be able to train more aircrew for the R.A.F. We are giving consideration to our doing that without increasing the facilities, which are already stretching our resources.

I referred to the possibility that our air force may not be able to place the squadrons required in Europe at the time when we will be able to have them there.

And this brings up the question of infrastructure, about which I should like to say a

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word. As General Eisenhower said, this is a most urgent requirement. We shall need, by 1954 to have four airfields of which it is expected now that two will be in France and two in Germany-all four in a group in the neighbourhood of Metz. This means the building of airstrips, the constructing of hangars, the providing of maintenance facilities, living quarters, headquarters and communications.

I am sure part of the mystery attached to the subject of infrastructure is due to the word itself. I have made some search in the matter and I find there is such a word-and this may astonish hon. members. But there is such a word, in French, and with this meaning:


Infrastructure (from Lat. infra, below and structure) f.n. (Railroads) : All works relating to the

construction of the earth roadway previous to the laying of the tracks. Infrastructure includes embankments and trenches, bridges, viaducts, subways, level crossings and fences. The track and its appurtenances, stations, depots and signals belong to the superstructure.


This use of the word in French railway language has been extended to military language, and it was first used in connection with western union. Indeed the first slice of infrastructure was the result of the .work already done by the western union countries, and it is quite possible that the first airfield that will be allocated to Canada will be one of the airfields which have been built by the western union.

Infrastructure, then, is the name given to the operational headquarters, communications facilities and airfields, the costs of which are to be met out of a common fund. The lists of headquarters, the communications facilities and the airfields that will be required to carry out this plan, to be initiated in 1952, were prepared by SHAPE. They were considered and amended by the military committee of the chiefs of staff. They were considered by the committee of defence ministers, and approved. They were considered by the committee of ministers on infrastructure, and they were approved by the council.

The arrangement is that in the case of airfields the host country provides the land, without charge, and the infrastructure fund meets the cost of constructing runways, taxi strips, hangars and operational facilities up to what is called the minimum NATO standard.

The user country-in this case Canada- pays the cost of any additional operational facilities, living accommodation, messing and recreational facilities. Any equipment that can be moved away continues to belong to

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the user country. Prior to the Lisbon meeting efforts to agree on a method of sharing the cost for infrastructure to be initiated in 1952 had failed. At Lisbon a committee of ministers-some ministers of finance, some of external affairs and some of defence-was set up to deal with this matter, and to try to arrive at an agreement. I had the privilege -I must say it was not precisely a pleasure- of acting as chairman of that committee.

It was a difficult undertaking, because obviously there was no principle that could be applied to the division. Neither the principle of user, nor the principle of capacity to pay could be applied. So that in the end, by mutual agreement the nations concerned arrived at a basis for sharing the costs, in consequence of what may be called multilateral ten-sided negotiations on a protracted basis. That arrangement made provision whereby Canada's provision in these estimates is put at $22,700,000 in respect of all these undertakings. But it is expected that only a small proportion of that will be met this year.

This brings me to the question of financial arrangements regarding our forces in Europe. Hon. members will be interested to hear what they are. It has been extraordinarily difficult to work them out, both there and in the Far East, because of the complication that at the present time negotiations are going on with both Japan and Germany to end the occupation, and ,to arrive at an agreement. This was not the best time to negotiate such arrangements.

Here they are:

For the 27th brigade in Germany we shall pay $0,973 per man per day to the U.K., and $2.0364 to the German government per man per day, representing the actual cost of the services and supplies furnished, so that the brigade will not add to the cost of occupation;

We shall pay expenditures directly attributable to our occupancy of the accommodation we have had in the neighbourhood of Hanover;

We shall pay for the cost of living accommodation and additional facilities for the two airfields in France but probably not for the two airfields and the permanent quarters of the 27th brigade in Germany. That has not been worked out.

In Great Britain we shall meet costs resulting from our occupancy of the airfield at North Luffenham and capitation fees for maintenance and supplies as well as costs of construction, maintenance and supplies for the air material base at Langar, England, which will provide logistics support for our air division.

Perhaps I have spent too long in describing our arrangements for co-operation with the

other united nations in the Far East, and with the North Atlantic treaty nations in Europe. The primary object of this, however, is the defence of Canada, as well as the prevention of war itself.

In connection with the defence of Canada we have two objects, both the defence of Canada as a territory and the provision of the necessary administrative and training establishments to provide for the greatest and speediest possible mobilization in the event of all-out war. And while these two objects are different, the forces available for one may be available for the other, depending upon the situation.

There is much more real danger to Canada, of course, than there has been in previous periods; but not the most real danger. That is in Europe. Obviously we cannot deal with the defence of our half of the North American continent, three and a half million square miles, by our own unaided efforts. We must do it in association with the United States. Also the United States alone cannot do it efficiently. We must work together. So we have worked out with the United States very full and detailed arrangements for our joint defence. This arrangement forms part of the arrangements under the North Atlantic treaty because Canada and the United States form one of the regions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

One feature which differentiates our defence territorially in Canada from the defence of European countries is that every man in the line in western Europe stands there for the defence of his own country territorially as well as to make his contribution toward the common defence. What we do in Europe then is a combined effort. Since we regard the defence there as a defence of Canada, it is our defence. But it does not add to our immediate territorial defence.

While there is only one defence today, just as there is only one potential aggressor, we must see to it, with our neighbours, that we provide as much defence of our continent as seems appropriate to the risk. The main possibility of attack would be by air, and therefore we have worked out with the United States an arrangement for air defence entailing radar stations with the necessary communications to enable the effective operation of fighter squadrons. These radar stations will be successively brought into operation to replace the mobile stations we now have.

For the army we have had in existence for some years the mobile striking force of well-trained, largely airborne and Arctic-trained officers and men forming a combat team designed to clear up any situation that might develop. For the navy we have ships

designed to meet our need for coastal defence and minesweeping and we are building up our seaward defences.

Adding these operations together the approximate strengths of the three services as at March 31, 1952, were as follows:

Officers Men TotalNavy


4,800 11,600 44,400 25,800 13,500 49,200 32,600Air Force

6,800 Total 81,800 95,300

We have increased our strength since Korea from 47,000 to 95,300, which is a 100 per cent increase in twenty months. During that period we have increased the number of officers from over 7,000 to a total of 13,470. The strengths of the three services as at March 31 of the previous five years were as follows:






During this period of five years we have increased the number of officers from 5,201 to the figure of 13,470 which I have just mentioned. In addition there are today 7,304 officer candidates in training, of whom 3,157 are already in the services and the others are additional.

Over the last three or four years there have been alarming reports about the difficulty of getting men whom we require at the rate necessary. So far with very few exceptions we have been able to meet every target and I believe that with continued stern efforts and strong support we will succeed in meeting the target for manpower we have set ourselves for 1954 even before that date. That does not mean that we get all the men we want right across the board. We would like more doctors, engineers, more junior officers, aircrew and tradesmen.

If there was an emergency we could fill up the gaps because there are over 26,000 officers and men who have retired into civil life since the end of the second world war. We have 58,000 in the active reserve and a good many tens of thousands of officers who were veterans of the second world war but who are still young enough to serve.

With regard to equipment the Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe), gave a very full report recorded on page 436 of Hansard of March 14 and I have no intention of going over that again. He dealt with the situation regarding ships and armaments for the navy, tanks and weapons for the army and aircraft for the air force. I should like to call attention to one thing which might be causing some hon. members and others certain con-

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cern, the relative merits of the F-86E Sabre aircraft. The Globe and Mail of February 1, 1952 contained the following editorial:

For Lack of Engines

If we are determined to produce our own jets, we should settle on one type and set our aircraft industry to producing them-giving them top priority on materials, manpower and everything else.

The article was referring to the slowness it alleged in producing jet aircraft. It then goes on, and I ask hon. members to note these words and that the date is February 1:

Failing that, all we can do is to ask Britain or the United States to produce jets for us.

The timing of this was a bit unfortunate because on February 13 the announcement was made that we had arranged with Britain and the United States to supply Britain with some hundreds of Sabre jets. A few days later, on February 17, the announcement was made that we had arranged to supply, not only Great Britain but the United States with Sabre jets made in Canada.

With regard to the relative merits of the aircraft, I should like to quote from a speech made by Mr. George Ward, under-secretary of state for air, when introducing the air estimates in the British house on March 18, 1952. This is quoted from column 2115 of the British Hansard. Referring to the situation regarding the production of aircraft in Britain he said:

Even more Important is the fact which the Prime Minister has already told the house, that we are in some respects inferior in the performance of our aircraft. We have today no fighter in service to match the MIG. 15 which is already operating in large numbers in Korea, and it will be some time before we begin to re-equip our squadrons with our own latest types.

Just the previous Monday the Globe and Mail had suggested:

Failing that, all we can do is to ask Britain or the United States to produce jets for us.

The under-secretary of state goes on:

The day fighters with which our fighter command is now armed are still capable of intercepting and shooting down any type of enemy bomber likely to invade these shores in large numbers for some time to come. It is in a fighter versus fighter battle that our inferiority is likely to be apparent although the high quality of our pilots would no doubt largely counteract the difference in aircraft performances. However, we are very glad to have with us in this country Canadian and American fighter squadrons equipped with the Sabre, a high performance fighter which has proved itself in many ways superior to the MIG. 15 in combat. Their presence will improve the defensive power of the whole fighter force in this country.

I do not want to delay the house by going into questions of construction, but the very considerable increase in the amount of construction reflects the increase in the size of the forces. That perhaps is shown most

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prominently by the figures for permanent occupation. Currie barracks at Calgary, which had accommodation for about 100 officers and men in 1939, now has during most of the year upwards of 3,000, with very little in the way of additional permanent accommodation. With a total of 95,000 officers and men in the armed forces, 47 per cent of them married, we have a service population including dependents which is estimated at over 200,000. On the completion- of the contracts now placed or planned we will have over 20,000 married quarters of all types. It may also interest hon. members to learn that following the practice of employing civilians where they would be used in war we have in the department as of March 31 a total of about 40,000 civilians. The major construction projects underway today, apart from married quarters, total 508; and in dollar value and to some extent in complexity and number they rival the wartime peak.

All this, Mr. Speaker, mean-s that in order to meet our requirements for 1952-53 we are seeking the sum of $2,001,725,000, an increase of $329,410,629 over the appropriation for the present fiscal year. This last year we will have underspent by an amount which it is not possible yet to estimate but which is mainly made up of two items, one of approximately $140 million for equipment not delivered, and the other of $40 million for construction not completed.


Howard Charles Green

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Green:

Is that for the year which has just expired or the new year?


Brooke Claxton (Minister of National Defence)


Mr. Claxion:

The year which has just expired.

Actually our appropriations and expenditures have been very close indeed over the previous three years. In 1948-49 the appropriation was $275 million and the expenditure $268 million. In 1949-50 the appropriation was $387 million and the expenditure $384 million. In 1950-51 the appropriation was $784 million and the expenditure $782 million. In other words the difference is less than one-half of one per cent of the amount of the appropriation. This year the underspending is almost all if not entirely due to the two factors I have mentioned, delays in delivery of equipment, largely from the United States, and construction not completed for various reasons.

By way of summary, Mr. Speaker, in the twenty months since Korea the navy has commissioned nine ships and launched six others. It has twenty-seven more on order, with forty awaiting refitting. It is operating sixteen schools. In Korean waters alone it has sailed over 450,000 miles. Its ships have made cruises like that of the Ontario to Australia and New Zealand, and that of the Magnificent,

the Micmac and Huron to the Mediterranean and north Atlantic. It has steadily built up its strength, largely at sea.

In the army we have raised, equipped and trained the 25th and 27th brigades; provided for their reinforcement and rotation; maintained the mobile striking force and continued the training for airborne and Arctic warfare. We have had the operational, training and administrative staffs to build up these forces.

There has been an increase to twenty-four squadrons of the regular and auxiliary air force. One squadron has had a tour of duty in the United Kingdom and has returned to Canada, and two more are in the United Kingdom. We have provided the manning and training machinery, and the aircraft, for the build-up at a rate of approximately one squadron every two months, equipped and manned with aircrew and ground crew, until the total of forty squadrons for NATO and the defence of Canada is reached. We have added nearly 500 aircraft, 1,300 aircrew and 10,500 ground crew to the strength. We have increased from seven to seventeen the number of schools for aircrew and ground crew, and the number of airfields from thirty-one to forty-two.

I have already referred to the resolution which was adopted by this house on the motion of the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) without a dissenting voice. I take it that nearly everyone in this house and nearly everyone in the country supports NATO. But as the full cost begins to appear in lives and manpower and money-yes, and in things we have to do without-there also begin to appear qualifications in that support. There are the people who say "yes, but." We begin to see emerging the cautious tribe of "yes, but'ers. Yes, but something more of this, something less of that, something sooner, something later, something else instead." We may have a good deal of that. One other thing that is likely to become evident is that with the advantage of hindsight some people will begin to say that things were being done too big and too soon rather than too little or too late.

We do not know which will be right, but we should never forget that the ability of anyone to exercise any hindsight at all is made possible by the fact that we have had three years of peace. It was bought by the price we have paid for the prevention of war. The insurance premium buys us time as well as security. But there is the danger that as we get time, as we all hope, people will become less inclined to pay the premium. Moreover, too many suggestions like "not this but that" and "later and smaller" rather than "enough and now" will tend to do two things. It will tend to weaken support of

our effort and that of our allies and our understanding of what we are doing together, and our confidence and trust in each other, all of which are fundamental ingredients of this kind of partnership. Then also it will tend to take away our attention from the danger which is so well described in General Eisenhower's report. It is the reason we are doing this in co-operation with thirteen other friendly peoples.

As I have said from the beginning, this is a tough operation. We must avoid both complacency and despair. We must lay our plans so that we strike the medium between too much and too little, too late and too soon. As I have mentioned, tomorrow April 4, we celebrate the third anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic treaty. It means that we have had three more years of peace than a good many people counted on our having at that time. The opportunity we and our allies have created has been not only to have those three years of peace, but also to set under way those long lead operations which will enable us to increase our strength still more in the next few years.

This has been done by the North Atlantic treaty nations, despite the dangers and difficulties of Korea, Indo-China, Malaya, Iran and Egypt. General Eisenhower referred, quite properly, to the build-up of military strength. He is no armchair optimist. He has referred, and properly so, to the growing sense of community. That, Mr. Speaker, is the greatest reality. At Lisbon, at Rome and here in Ottawa, I am sure the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of Finance (Mr. Abbott) would agree with me, there was no tendency to make rhetorical speeches, to take up defensive or bargaining positions or to indulge in recriminations. Those were business meetings of like-minded people working together to do a job, probably the most difficult joint undertaking ever to be attempted by sovereign states in peacetime. To continue with that job will stretch our resources, but we all must stand the burden-Canada and the United States, fortunately are in a better position than most of our partners. I said that this is one of the largest and most difficult jobs ever to be attempted by nations working together. It is also one of the most hopeful, because on it depends the hope of peace, the promise of security and the survival of freedom.


George Randolph Pearkes

Progressive Conservative

Mr. G. R. Pearkes (Nanaimo):

In rising to join in this debate, Mr. Speaker, I feel it is my first duty to join with the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton) in paying tribute to the forces of Canada which 55704-69

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are now engaged on the battlefields of Korea, those forces which are patrolling the seas around that peninsula and our air transport units supplying those forces. From time to time, as dispatches have reached us from Korea, we have been proud of the achievements of those troops. We have been proud of the gallantry that they have shown. We have been proud of their tenacity when holding to exposed and advance positions, and we are also pleased to hear of the high morale and cheerfulness which is prevalent amongst those troops.

I am sure that every member in this house was pleased to hear the personal report given by the minister this afternoon of the visits he had made to those troops. He was able to tell the members of this house, in fact the whole of Canada, what he bad seen, and how his own impressions confirmed the reports which had reached this country through the press. Personally, I feel indebted to the minister for having taken the time to give that detailed description of what was happening in Korea.

It is no easy task to follow the minister's detailed and carefully prepared review of the activities of the armed forces during this past year. Owing to the rather meagre information that he has given concerning the expenditures which have been planned for the coming year, and because of our lack of information as to how these vast sums of money are going to be spent, I feel that it will be necessary to ask some questions. I hope the minister will answer them when he closes this debate. If at times suggestions are made as to what might be done, whether a little bit more here or a little bit less, whether too soon or too late- the "buts" to which the minister referred are perhaps forgivable because of the difficulty members of the opposition have in fathoming the plans the government has for the future. We heard about what has been done in the past, but we do find it difficult to know what is going to be done in the future. There must be, therefore, a certain degree of hindsight expressed. I hope that if, in the course of my remarks or any other member's remarks, we appear to be a little wiser after the event than before,' the minister will realize that it is in no way intended to be an insult to his judgment, nor is it any sort of outrage against the plans that he has made. We are trying to be constructive and helpful.

The minister gave us an idea of a new concept of the world under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He referred to it as being almost as natural for a Canadian boy to serve on the frontiers of Germany during

National Defence the summer months as it would be for a Canadian boy to serve on the frontiers of Canada. I think we owe thanks to the Canadian youths who are now serving in western Europe, who believe that they are doing the job which the minister has defined for them to do and in which they were carefully instructed by the issue of a pamphlet or book laying out what the objectives were. I feel that we owe a word of thanks to those young men who are over in Europe doing that particular task.

There is one other general observation I should like to make arising out of the minister's remarks. There were times when I was confused by the frequent use of the word "we". He followed the example of the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson), and it was rather difficult for somebody sitting on this side of the house to know whether "we" meant Canada, NATO, Canada and the United States, or Canada with the rest of the commonwealth nations. I refer particularly to his closing remarks where he took considerable credit under the title of "we" for the peace which has reigned for the past three years. I do not think that the efforts which were made by Canada-certainly until the last year-have in any way changed the long-planned designs of the rulers of the Kremlin; and I was at a loss to understand quite the implications of that remark.


George Randolph Pearkes

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Pearlies:

I presumed that meant NATO, but I did not know. We will take it that way, anyhow.

The general defence policy of Canada, as the minister said this afternoon, was defined a year ago in a pamphlet entitled "Canada's Defence Program" and in the speeches which were made by the minister shortly after that pamphlet had been issued. The minister said that the object of all defence policy is to preserve the security of our country. That is a quotation from his speech in the house. It will be found in Hansard at page 2798 of May 8, 1951. He then went on to elaborate on that statement; and, boiling down a rather long and involved sentence, I think one can say that he explained that by referring to the fact that it is better to prevent war than to fight a war to victory, that the best place-to defend Canada is as far away from our shores as possible, and that we cannot do that alone but we must have allies.

This party has no quarrel with those general objectives, as set out either in this program or white paper as it is referred to or in the speeches which were made at that time by the minister, as part of that general policy. This party recognizes the necessity

for making adequate contributions of men, arms and materials to the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that are marshalled or are in the process of being marshalled to deter aggression or, if necessary, to suppress aggression in Europe and also the necessity for providing the economic assistance which is so essential in this struggle with communism. I think it is interesting to note the reference made to the economic side in the report which is published by General Eisenhower, and in which he says:

Unless the economy can safely carry the military establishment, whatever force of this nature a nation might create is worse than useless in a crisis.

Then he goes on to say:

Since behind it there is nothing, it will only disintegrate.

Those were statements made by General Eisenhower in the report as published in the New York Times of April 2. We therefore recognize the fact that the economic side is of great importance in this struggle against communism. For these reasons we supported the government in its proposal not only to send the arms and the equipment for three divisions to Europe but also to dispatch the 27th brigade which is now in western Germany.

After listening to the speeches of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, it must be remembered that the contributions which we are making to NATO are not the only commitments that Canada has assumed. In the first place, this government and any other government-as the minister has said this afternoon-must provide the forces required to defend Canada against any sudden attack which might be directed against our country. Second, we have our commitments with the United Nations, as for example our forces which are now deployed in Korea. Third, as the minister has intimated again this afternoon, we must maintain the organization for the expansion of our forces should the present world situation deteriorate into global warfare. Quite recently many people in authority have been stressing the importance of building up reserves not only in this country but in Europe and in America so that there may be organized reserves ready as soon as possible after the outbreak of war, should war come.

I hardly refer to those formations which are now earmarked as being reserves for NATO to be produced in the first thirty days. I am referring to the reserves which must follow up behind them because actually you cannot refer to a formation which is ready to take the field in three days as being a reserve formation. In fact, I would say that in my conception of a reserve formation, you

could not have it ready even in thirty days, because I do not think that any reserve army formation in Canada could begin to be ready in that length of time. As for the reserve formations such as territorial divisions in the United Kingdom, they could not be ready in that short period of time. I am not clear yet really as to the type of the reserves which are going to be ready in this period of from three to thirty days. They are much nearer to being line formations than they are to my conception of a reserve formation. It is therefore essential that the forces allocated to any particular role which Canada has assumed must be reviewed constantly in the light of the changing conditions and the varied importance of these three roles that I have mentioned, namely our commitments to NATO, our commitments for the defence of this territory of Canada and our other commitments with the United Nations.

Since we share responsibility for these commitments with other nations, many influences beyond our control affect the situation almost daily. For example, a change of government in western Germany when the elections are held in 1953 might alter the whole attitude of that country towards the European defence community. Nor can the possibility of a unified Germany as a sequence to the allGerman election along the lines proposed recently by Russia be altogether disregarded, in which case a neutral Germany might be established, and therefore might not have forces available for NATO.

Again, since the first announcement was made that Canada would contribute an infantry brigade to NATO and this brigade would be stationed in Europe, the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been increased by the addition of Greece and Turkey, thus extending NATO's commitments to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean; although, on the other hand, you might well say that they form a point of vantage or a horn of a defence in the Far East and of Europe.

Progress has also been made toward the fulfilment of the Pleven plan and the establishment of an integrated European army, in which it is intended to include formations of a re-armed Germany. If these plans mature, emphasis will be shifted from one factor to another. Europe may then become better able to supply what has been referred to by General Bradley, and also referred to in this Canadian defence program, this white paper, as the hard core of ground power. Similarly every scientific development affects the relative importance of the various roles that the Canadian armed forces 55704-69J

National Defence

have to carry out. Modern scientific development tends to increase not only the destructive force of weapons, but also their range. Distance and time have been almost eliminated by jet aircraft, thus exposing the most remote parts of the world to danger of sudden attack.

A year ago western Europe appeared to be the most likely theatre in which operations would break out. It may remain so, but the danger point may easily have shifted elsewhere by the end of this coming year. During world war II frequent reference was made to Greece and Roumania as being the soft under-belly of Europe; and, as history now records, Churchill frequently advocated that that theatre of operations should be the line of approach against Germany. I venture to say that the soft under-belly of this country is the undefended west coast of Canada. The inference is quite obvious.

Even in General Eisenhower's report he refers to the fact that if there is a continual advance of the iron curtain, then the United States and Canada would be in greater danger of attack than they have been in the past. Therefore it is for these numerous reasons that I wish to stress the necessity of constant revision and examination of the resources allocated to our various divisions.

Canada is represented on the council of NATO by ministers of the crown, by the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton), They have the responsibility for approving, or otherwise, the recommendations of the chiefs of staff committee. Civilian control and responsibility in accordance with established constitutional practice must of course remain paramount.

When I was in Europe last December I had the privilege of visiting our 27th brigade there. I could not help but be impressed by

what seemed to me-hindsight if you like_____

as being the unsuitability of the composition of our Canadian contingent for the role that it had to carry out there. For instead of supplying a very mobile, fast-moving, hardhitting formation of armoured and technical units, we have dispatched a formation which was built around three infantry regiments. This Canadian infantry brigade would operate, should war break out in the great plain of central Europe, the very cradle of the panzer divisions of Hitler's army, a territory flatter than our western prairies, traversed by great strategic highways, and intersected by innumerable crossroads in every direction.

This afternoon the minister, repeating what General Eisenhower had said, told us that the enemy would have his 175 divisions behind the iron curtain, line divisions, of which one-third would be either motorized or armoured.

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The British have also recognized the importance of armour in this particular part of Europe; for the British army on the Rhine has three armoured to one infantry division. To say that armour was not available to Canada is an admission that, as I have intimated many times in this chamber, our Canadian forces have not been kept up to date, and that they have been organized since the cessation of hostilities along time-honoured though out-dated lines.

We have in Canada two armoured regiments of the active army. We have a dozen units of the armoured corps in the reserve army. It is a pity that the units of the Canadian armoured corps had not been given greater opportunities to fulfil their role when plans were originally prepared for Canada's contribution to NATO. It may be that had we drawn the contingent from these units of the armoured corps it would not have been possible at that time to give them the full and complete equipment; but it must be remembered that in the first years of the last war Canada sent two armoured divisions over to England, and subsequently they went to Europe. When these divisions arrived in Europe they were not fully equipped by any manner of means. It was many months before they were fully equipped, but they were men who had received training in the use of armour, and their officers had been inculcated with the idea of fast-moving armoured units.

Furthermore, there is in Europe, as I saw with my own eyes, a vast reservoir of manpower from which the infantry components of NATO could have been drawn. For many years the youth of Europe have been accustomed to serve in their national armies for certain periods as soon as they have finished their education. They receive very little pay for this service, and it does not weigh heavily upon them, because they are usually stationed near their homes where they can visit their parents during their frequent leave periods. As has been said by General Eisenhower in his report, the national service programs existing in all European countries have trained, or partially trained, a reservoir of manpower since the end of the war. But he said the great difficulty there was that these troops did not have adequate equipment.

Now, the lot of the Canadian soldier in Germany is entirely different. His pay is many times greater than that of the young European infantryman. He is far away from his home, and consequently must be provided with compensating facilities such as leave centres, and the like, all of which add to the burden of the Canadian taxpayer.

It is just possible that the minister, knowing that this brigade was to be stationed near the site of the battlefield of Minden, might have remembered the lines Kipling wrote in his poem "The Men Who Fought At Minden"-

The men that fought at Minden, they was armed with musketoons,

Also, they was drilled by 'alberdiers;

The British general who fought at the battle of Minden was cashiered because he failed to use his mobile forces. I think a lesson can be drawn from that. We must utilize fully our mobile forces.

The communist strength lies in their huge manpower; their weakness in the fact that their manpower is relatively unskilled and uneducated. They can produce countless divisions of infantry, equipped with simple but effective weapons. But they can no more match the western powers in the production, maintenance and use of high-grade modern equipment than we can hope to match, division for division, their teeming hordes.

In this situation we must face the facts. It is vital that we should plan our armed forces to keep abreast of the times and to make the fullest use of our scientific and technical superiority. The size of the force and the actual numbers made available are not the prime requisites. From the point of view of military effectiveness one brigade, one third of a division, in an army which today numbers some fifty divisions, and which we are told in another couple of years may number a hundred or more, is neither here nor there. It is really only a drop in the bucket.

In speaking the other day the Secretary of State for External Affairs said that everyone knows we have been talking of a plan to be achieved by the end of 1954 which would result in having sufficient defensive armed strength to halt an invasion, and estimated that for that purpose there would be between 80 and 115 divisions. So I think we can take the question of 100 divisions in this uncertain state of combat readiness as being a fairly good average.

On the other hand history is replete with instances where a few men, specially skilled, or equipped with new weapons, have changed the course of a whole battle, if not a whole campaign. Hon. members will recall what happened at the battle of Leipzig, which ended in the defeat of Napoleon I, as well as his capture and exile to the island of Elba. The course of that battle was changed by the employment of a British rocket troop of less than 100 men. Rockets at that time were an entirely new weapon. The enemy was so terrified by the noise and appearance

of these rockets that they surrendered literally in thousands, and the day was won by the employment of a special force, specially armed, but very few in numbers.

There are many other instances of that same sort of thing. I therefore stress the importance of our contribution to NATO being that of a mobile and thoroughly modern organization.

Our naval forces have been given no offensive role, but their task has been to keep open the vital sea communications, vital sea lanes which may be threatened by air or by underwater attack. These threats can be dealt with only by a combination of escort carriers and specially equipped surface vessels. Canada has developed special surface craft for this purpose, but our carrier strength is negligible.

The only carrier we have is now out of date and, as the minister stated a year ago, will soon be in need of major overhaul. She is in fact the only carrier of her class whose landing decks have not yet been converted to taking jet aircraft. With one carrier, no matter how modern, the Royal Canadian Navy cannot fulfil its occupation of escorting convoys from Canada across the ocean. And, a continuous escort policy being adopted, subsequent convoys would have to wait until the carrier had completed its first mission and returned again in order to pick up the second convoy. If carriers are to be stationed at nodal points along the route, then the range of the aircraft from those carriers, under weather conditions that may be expected to prevail in the ocean, is inadequate to give protection throughout the danger area, if only one carrier is to be used.

Quite irrespective of the fact that Canada is flanked by two oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific, it is now an imperative necessity that the Royal Canadian Navy acquire an additional carrier, if our navy is to carry out the mission assigned to her under NATO. The time has come when the Magnificent will have to be converted. She will have to be laid up for major overhaul. Let the plans now be made for her replacement by at least two modern aircraft carriers.

Various experiments are being carried out, and are now meeting with considerable success, in the use of steam catapults for the purpose of launching jet aircraft from carriers. We must have modern carriers if our navy is to carry out its particular role.

I referred the other day to the importance of maintaining flexibility in our air force, and the need of maintaining adequate fighter squadrons in Canada for the protection of our industrial plants, the loss of which would

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create such a crippling blow to our NATO effort. I trust that there is no need to repeat that warning today.

The minister's reference this afternoon to the suitable adjustment of aircraft with the other eleven squadrons was not quite clear to me. I do not know whether he was referring to the transfer of aircraft from squadrons in Canada to squadrons which would be stationed in Europe or to the transfer of aircraft within those squadrons.

We have some cause to be concerned about the number of aircraft which will be available for the defence of our industrial plants in Canada. Reference has been made to the fact that these twelve squadrons are to be available in Europe by 1954 if the airfields can be provided, either in Europe or in Great Britain. The minister referred to four fields which 1 think he said were to be located near Metz. I was not certain, but I presumed that that was for the servicing of the whole twelve squadrons and it could not be expected to have those ready until the end of 1954.


Brooke Claxton (Minister of National Defence)


Mr. Claxton:

I should correct that. The last one would not be ready until the end of 1954, but we hope that one will be ready in 1952.


George Randolph Pearkes

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Pearkes:

There is some concern regarding the ability of Canada to produce the aircraft which will be required for these twelve squadrons plus whatever squadrons are retained for the defence of industrial plants in Canada. I should like to ask particularly regarding the progress which is being made in the production of the CF-100. A year ago a good deal was made of the CF-100, but in his remarks this afternoon no mention was made by the minister of that special Canadian aircraft which we were all looking forward to being in production this year. A year ago the minister intimated that the CF-100 would be in production early this year. On May 10, 1951, the minister said, and I quote from page 2877 of Hansard:

It takes a minimum of four years to develop a new type of aircraft, which was about the time taken in the case of the CF-100, the design of which began in the late months of 1946. We expect that the planned rate of production on the CF-100 will be reached early next year.

That is early this year. Somehow or other we have heard little of late about the CF-100 and I think one is justified in expressing some concern in view of the fact that the minister made no mention of it in his remarks today. I understood that the CF-100 was to be equipped with Orenda engines. When will those engines be available? In an article in today's Globe and Mail by James Hornick

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it is stated that the new engine plant of Avro is still in the process of tuning up and that Orendas will not likely be available in substantial numbers for a few years yet to come.


April 3, 1952