May 9, 1951


John Horne Blackmore

Social Credit

Mr. Blackmore:

That is a mighty serious



Clarence Gillis

Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.)

Mr. Gillis:

I would say to the minister

that if you are going to raise an army by voluntary means, you are only going to get the boys of this country to put on a uniform who have some patriotism in their hearts and who recognize the fact that this country is worth fighting for. If these boys leave dependents behind and go out to do that kind of job, I do not think it is asking too much of the fellow who stays at home in order to make more money, and who has the comforts of a home, to pay a little tax to look after the family the chap leaves behind. If the man who volunteers is willing to offer his life, as he is doing in Korea today, I think his father, mother, dependent brothers and sisters are entitled to some subsistence allowance from the government. The precedent is there, because we did it in both of the last wars. We even had auxiliary dependents allowance boards and committees across the country with power to make grants in addition to the basic allowance given by the government. I am telling the minister that that is a very strong point when you go out to sell voluntary enlistment to the young men of this country, as you are doing today. Their fathers have gone through a war, and we are asking these boys, twice in one lifetime, to volunteer. This time it is necessary. It is our war this time. If we do not go out and meet it somewhere else, it is going to meet us here. We have to get away from this philosophy of "business as usual, and I am not going to make any sacrifice because a supernatural something is going to inspire the people of this country to do the job themselves". That is not going to happen.

We have to show the young man who leaves this country that we are interested to the extent of granting an allowance that will replace, to some extent at least, the obligation he accepted before he decided he had a greater obligation in the service of his country. I strongly urge the Minister of National Defence to consider those three points. There should be a manpower survey, and a resources survey conducted as soon as possible. I believe that is the basis for our whole defence set-up. As long as you are getting recruits on a voluntary basis, at least you should not make the reserve army pay taxes. Then we should follow that up by granting a dependents allowance where young men were maintaining homes before going into the service. I know that most of

these boys fully expected there would be an allowance. Perhaps some of them would not have volunteered if they had known otherwise. I have had letters from them, and I have made representations to the deputy minister. The deputy minister informs me there is no regulation covering the situation, and there is no dependents allowance board. If we are going to get a defence program going which will take us over the next ten or fifteen years, then we had better commence setting up the mechanics necessary to administer it. We should do something to meet the requirements of those who are expected to leave this country to meet the enemy somewhere else and stop him before he gets here.

These points are not very difficult, but you have to do something about them. You cannot put them on paper and file them away in a desk. When the minister speaks in closing the debate I shall expect him to tell us that he has considered these three points, and to give us his assurance they are going to be taken care of immediately.


George Harris Hees

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Hees:

Mr. Chairman, I should like to deal with three aspects of the defence program. They are:

The raising of a larger reserve army,

Making that reserve army more effective, and

The pay for the active forces.

First of all, I should like to deal with the raising of a larger reserve army. I believe all members will agree that if we are to raise an active force quickly, we must rely on a large and well-trained reserve. For the past five years, Mr. Chairman, I have been a staff officer in the reserve army. From my observations, I would say that the great majority of reserve units would not, on an average, parade more than twenty-five per cent of their authorized strength, and a large part of the numbers on parade are made up by the band.

Why is it that our reserve army is so small today, during a period which is vitally critical, and which adds up to undeclared war? Why is it, we must ask ourselves, do our young men not volunteer in larger numbers than they have for both our active and reserve forces? I have come to the conclusion that it is simply because they have not been told by this government that today the situation is critical. In fact, the government has attempted to lull the people into a false sense of security.

An outstanding example of that, I believe, is the statement which was made by the Prime Minister last December 12, and which was recorded by the Canadian Press all

across this country. I intend to put it on the record, so there can be no doubt about it. This statement appeared in the Ottawa Citizen of December 13. The headline reads: "P.M. Optimistic General War Will Not Come at This Time." That is a big three-column heading on the article, and it reads:

A reporter asked Mr. St. Laurent if he was satisfied with Canada's defence progress.

He smiled and said:

"I think the progress is satisfactory."

Then he added:

"I am just as optimistic as Lloyd's." He noted that the London insurance firm had quoted odds of 50-1 against a general war breaking out. He concluded:

"I am just as optimistic as they are."

Now, Mr. Chairman, this statement was interpreted by people right across this country as meaning that the Prime Minister was saying he believed the chances were 50 to 1 against our becoming involved in a general war. I know that the Prime Minister has denied any intention of conveying that impression. However, as so often happens in these cases, the original statement gets the headlines, and the denial makes no news at all. That was the case in this instance. The result is that people only remember the Prime Minister's original statement, and it remains very clearly in their minds today.

I have talked to a great number of young men about joining the active or reserve forces. Time and again I have heard them say, "How can you expect me to take the situation very seriously if the man who is supposed to know most about the situation tells me there is only one chance in 50 I shall be needed?"

What is needed immediately is a statement by the Prime Minister which will outline, without the shadow of a doubt, the gravity of the situation today, and which will issue a clear-cut call to duty that the young men of this country can understand. Then, and only then, shall we begin to get some worth-while results from the hundreds of thousands of dollars we are spending every month in advertising designed to get young men to enlist in both the active and reserve forces.

What I believe we want to hear a great deal more of from this government is the kind of statement which was made by the Minister of National Health and Welfare yesterday morning while he was addressing a meeting of civil defence workers. I should like to quote what he said, as it was reported in the Ottawa Journal of last evening. The heading is "Whip up Fury against Soviet Threat" and the report reads as follows:

Civil defence minister Paul Martin, in a sizzling preparedness speech tliis morning, lashed out at

Supply-National Defence

what he termed Canada's "over-defence-minded-ness" and urged a campaign to "whip up fighting fury" against the Soviet threat.

"You can't win wars by hiding behind trees," Mr. Martin told a group of civil defence instructors at the opening of a training course at Connaught ranges.

"Defence alone never results in victory," Mr. Martin added.

The minister-who was accompanied by civil defence co-ordinator Major General F. F. Worthington-made it plain the prospect of atomic fire raining down on key Canadian target centres was no idle dream

"Now, if ever, we must take this thing seriously. God knows what the situation will be within a year." .

I believe it is regrettable that we have had to wait for so long for a statement containing some realization of the gravity of the situation today, and that that statement would have to come from the Minister of National Health and Welfare, instead of from the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence, from whom it should have come many months ago. Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, it indicates that there is an imminent cabinet shake-up in the offing, in which the present Minister of National Health and Welfare is going to follow in the steps of the former minister of national health and welfare. But whether that is the case or not, the present Minister of National Health and Welfare has certainly well earned the nickname of "the Windsor Warrior" which is being bandied about the parliamentary lobbies and corridors today.

The second matter with which I should like to deal is the making of our reserve forces more effective. I believe that if our reserve units are going to become effective fighting formations, capable of taking their part in the defence of this country if needed, they must train as complete units each year for a minimum of two weeks at a summer camp. In order to make this possible, it will be necessary to pass legislation requiring employers to grant to employees who are in the reserve forces a two-week leave of absence during the period of the camp each summer, without jeopardizing the employee's job or seniority. This was found to be perfectly feasible during the last war, and the results were highly satisfactory. I believe it is the only way that units can become effective, so that they can take their place in the defence of this country, if that eventuality should ever arise.

The third point with which I should like to deal is pay for the active force. I should like to deal with it under two separate divisions: first, the freeing from income tax of the pay of those who serve outside of this country; and second, the paying of danger pay to those who serve in the front line.

Supply-National Defence

First, as to the question of freeing from income tax the pay of soldiers who serve overseas, may I say this. The Minister of Finance, during the debate, when this question arose, stated that he believed that no group of earners within this country should be exempt from income tax. I think we will all agree that that is perfectly satisfactory in so far as it affects those of us who live and work in the comfort and security of this country; but it is quite another matter when you are dealing with those who risk their lives every hour on some foreign battlefield, to fight our battles for us. I believe that these men should be allowed to retain intact what they earn while fighting our battles overseas. I believe it is the least we can do in repayment to those gallant men, for their magnificent efforts on our behalf.

The second matter is the payment of danger pay to those who serve in the front lines. During the last war members of air crew in the air force were paid flying pay; and it was quite right that they should be so rewarded because of the danger which their job involved. The paratroopers were paid jump pay, and I believe that was quite justified because of the danger involved. Also, those who served on small ships in the navy were paid hard-lying pay, because of the discomfort involved in serving in those small ships.

I do not think that anybody undergoes any more danger-in fact, I do not think that anybody undergoes as much constantly -or that he undergoes as much discomfort over a long period, as do forward troops who are in slit trenches, under almost constant bombardment, as is the case in the forward areas.

During the last war, in the army, you could receive trades pay if you were a motor mechanic, a driver mechanic, an artificer or an orderly room clerk, or if you were skilled in any one of several trades, most of which were performed in the rear areas. But there has never been any trades pay for proficiency in the most important job of all, namely, killing the enemy, without which we cannot win battles. That job involves by far the greatest chance of getting killed or maimed, and it involves living in what are, in many cases, almost unendurable conditions.

I therefore strongly urge on the minister that he and his department seriously consider the question of paying danger pay to those who serve within a reasonable distance of the front line, and in this way properly reward those upon whose courage and skill we must rely for the winning of our campaigns.

[Mr. Hees.l

In -conclusion, I should like to say to the minister that the suggestions I have offered arise out of a certain amount of experience in these matters, and that they are offered as an attempt to be constructive. I sincerely hope that they will be considered in that light by the minister, and that he will comment on them when he sums up at the end of this debate.


John Decore


Mr. Decore:

Mr. Chairman, I intend to be brief. I should like to -draw to the attention of the minister the importance of finding a place in the defence of this country for those resident in Canada who have not yet been able to become Canadian citizens or British subjects. My information is that, to date, there are to be found in this country some 40,000 men who are between the ages of 20 and 40 years, and who are not yet British subjects. Nearly all those people are newcomers who have arrived here in this country since 1945. Many of them came from d.p. camps. The majority of them belong to the following ethnic groups: Polish, Dutch,

Ukrainian, Italian, Hebrew, Lithuanian, French, Czechoslovakian, Belgian and others. I also understand that some have come in from the United States who have not become Canadian- -citizens. My information is that it is not the policy of the Department of National Defence to admit into the Canadian armed- forces, both active and reserve, any person who is not a British subject. I should like to point out some of the reasons why I think these men should be permitted at least to train in the reserve army. To begin with, many of these men have important qualifications which should be considered. Many of them came from countries which in the last war were right in the midst of fighting. Many of them are acquainted with life under war conditions. Many of them served with various armed services, and are therefore familiar with military technique. Some of them had a very wide experience and have held high positions in the army. Admitting these men now into our reserves would, I think, do two thing from the military point of view. It would first of all give them a degree of military training, and those with battle experience would become acquainted with the Canadian military technique; and, second, in the event of war it would- prepare them for their task before they are needed, thereby saving precious time.

In -addition to the military advantages, perhaps the greatest advantage to Canada would be in the realm of Canadian citizenship. I have met many of these -newcomers, and they are anxious and willing to serve this country. In reserve services a newcomer would be a member of a purely Canadian organization. He would intermingle with

Canadians and become better acquainted with our way of life. I think it would be the best school for him in Canadian citizenship. The newcomer would feel that he is not merely getting certain advantages in this country, but that in addition to other services he is prepared to offer something more to this country,-he is prepared to defend it.

There are certain arguments that I have heard people use against the admission of these non-citizens. One argument is that serving in the armed forces is a prerogative of a citizen and should not be extended to others. The other argument against admission is for security reasons. Dealing with the first objection, my point is that the admission of non-citizens is not urged as a matter of course, but in the light of the present grave international situation I think it is essential that Canada use all the possible means at her disposal to prepare for defence. May I point out at this time that in the United States male non-citizens are required to register for service between the ages of 18 and 26 under the compulsory service act of 1948. But at the same time I am informed' that United States military intelligence is actually encouraging United States residents with only the "first papers", which is equivalent to our declaration of intention, to enlist for special duties with the army.

Dealing with the other objection, namely, the question of security, those who use this argument seem to disregard the fact that newcomers have already been screened before they were allowed to enter Canada. We must not forget that most of these people are political refugees; that they are therefore the greatest opponents of Russian communism that we can find in this country. Many of them have been victims of Russian brutality, and have actually witnessed the workings of Russian communism in its worst form.

May I add further that if they were allowed to join the reserve army they would undergo further screening before they were admitted. Other important qualifications of these newcomers are that they are specialists to this extent, that they have a knowledge of a language which is other than English or French; that they are acquainted with the geography and the way of life of some country other than Canada; that some of them have lived for many years in countries now behind the iron curtain, and they are well acquainted with the lands and with the people. I think that this type of people would indeed be an asset for our defence purposes.

I should like to point out that although the admission of the newcomers to the Canadian reserve forces may be accompanied by certain difficulties, yet I feel that the

Supply-National Defence advantages to Canada would far outweigh the disadvantages, and for that reason I urge that the minister give this matter serious consideration.



Léon Balcer

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Balcer:

Mr. Chairman, we are asked today to concur in the adoption of the defence estimates which will not only add tremendously to our national budget but also endanger the economic future of our country. Every man, every woman, every family in the country will therefore be forced to shoulder a heavy burden of taxes for a period of at least three years.

Together with the rest of the house I deeply regret that it should be necessary to devote such enormous sums to our national defence preparedness when that money could be put to such advantageous use in promoting our economic development and the social progress of our country.

It may very well be necessary to buy radar equipment, fighter planes, guns, and so on, but who holds that such production is creative and productive!

One has but to consider the military operations taking place in Korea, Indo-China and the Malay peninsula, to realize the menace which hangs over our free world. All the free nations of the world must unite against such aggression.

It is now impossible to mistake isolation for national interest. Canada's obligations are those of a great sovereign nation. Without committing ourselves beyond our means, or without imitating the frog that wanted to be as big as an ox, we nevertheless have a responsibility in this search for world peace.

Unfortunately, I regret that the present government, which likes to take all the credit with regard to Canada's status as a sovereign nation, has not yet seen fit to give our country a truly Canadian flag as a symbol of such sovereignty. Canadian soldiers are being asked once more to fight abroad and shed their blood under a flag which is not theirs.

Besides, the problem of choosing a national anthem to honour Canada, both at home and abroad, has not yet been settled.

Obviously such a state of affairs is inconsistent with Canada's present status as a sovereign nation.

Furthermore, the selection of a flag and national anthem, both truly Canadian, would help considerably in this recruiting campaign which has been launched by the Department of National Defence.

Supply-National Defence

I was pleased to learn yesterday from the minister himself the part now taken by the French-speaking Canadians in the Korean war and their representation in the Canadian army.

I also wish to congratulate the minister for his reply to the unfounded articles which have appeared in the Contemporary Review and in Foreign Affairs.

I agree with the minister that we should avoid and condemn anything that might create friction between the various racial groups of this country.

Like the minister who quoted these figures in order to reply to unfounded accusations and also to help the recruiting campaign which has just been launched, I would like to make a few remarks prompted by these same feelings.

Voluntary enlistment should supply the recruits needed by our armed forces. But if we want the recruiting campaign to be really successful in my province, we must see to it that in serving his country Jean-Baptiste is not given the impression of being a sort of mercenary.

And yet, if upon enlisting Jean-Baptiste gives our general staff a glance, he will most certainly be struck by the fact that the Department of National Defence does not go overboard, as far as generosity and national spirit are concerned, in the choice of superior officers.

Here is what he will find. At national defence headquarters in Ottawa: 2 lieutenant generals, both English-speaking; 7 major generals, all English-speaking; 33 brigadiers, of whom only 2 are Frenchspeaking; 43 colonels of whom only 4 are French-speaking; 220 lieutenant colonels of whom 18 are French-speaking, and 560 majors of whom only 57 are French-speaking.

Turning to the different army services and looking over their staffs, one will notice that the representation is about the same.

Consider, for instance, the staff of the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps, with headquarters in the French-Canadian city of Montreal; there, one finds 20 lieutenant colonels, of whom only 1 is a French-speaking Canadian, and 50 majors of whom only 4 speak French.

The same state of affairs applies to the headquarters of the different branches of the Canadian army. But when one considers the Quebec command headquarters, located

[Mr. Balcer.l

in Montreal, it is even more surprising to find that the commanding general is an English-speaking Canadian, as is the chief of staff. The G.S.O. 1 and G.S.O. 1 (planning) are both English-speaking. If one examines the various services of the Quebec command, one finds exactly the same situation.

Let us now deal with the reserve army. Montreal has a population of about a million and a half, of whom 70 per cent are French-Canadians. Only four reserve regiments are actually French-Canadian regiments. There are nine English regiments where roughly 50 per cent of the soldiers are French-speaking Canadians; yet hardly 1 per cent of them are officers.

In so far as the Canadian navy is concerned, the situation is even more deplorable. There is not a single French-speaking officer above the rank of commander.

There is no excuse for this. Not only does it harm recruiting in the province of Quebec, but it shows how senior officers of this service are utterly devoid of the spirit of national unity.

Besides it is not surprising When it is remembered that, to instil a little Canadian-ism in the navy, near-mutinies and a strict investigation were required.

This situation should be improved as soon as possible, not only because of the present recruiting campaign, but also for the good of the services themselves.

Again, it is a situation like this which provokes articles like the one that the minister answered yesterday. Seeing so very few French-Canadians in senior positions, strangers cannot but draw conclusions such as those evidenced in these two articles.

I trust that the minister will make a note of those few remarks and that the situation will soon improve. In closing I wish to make a few suggestions. May I be permitted to request again, as was done several times in this house, that a military college be established in the province of Quebec in order to provide the necessary officers to ensure a fair representation within the general staffs of our different units.

I also wish the department would consider the advisability of creating French-Canadian naval units along the lines of the French-Canadian regiments in our army. During the last war, the R.C.A.F. established French-Canadian squadrons and everyone knows that this arrangement produced excellent results.

It is recognized that the establishment of such French-speaking units has a valuable effect on the new recruits, as our young men

obviously do not feel at home at the beginning of their military careers and it is easy to understand that they feel less at home when they are not surrounded by people who speak their language and who received the same kind of education.

Undoubtedly such units could not be established without difficulty, but experience has shown that the results secured are worthwhile. I hope that the hon. minister will be able to solve that problem.



Ray Thomas

Social Credit

Mr. Thomas:

Mr. Chairman, on a question of privilege, the five o'clock edition of the Ottawa Journal today contains an article from which I should like to quote in part as follows: *

Reference to the Martin speech, as reported in the Journal, also was made by O. L. Jones, C.C.F. member for Yale and by Ray Thomas, C.C.F. member for Wetaskiwin.

I want to express my appreciation of the write-up given to me by the Journal, but I do not like the added title of C.C.F. that I have been given. I am afraid they might go just a little bit further and refer to me as a Liberal.


Gordon Graydon

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Graydon:

Mr. Chairman, I shall occupy only two or three minutes of the time of the committee, but coming from a constituency which is so keenly interested in the matter about which I desire to say a word, I want to rise at this time and take part in this general discussion with respect to national defence in order to place my own personal views upon the record.

Linked closely with our plans for national defence is an issue which because of its overriding urgency requires government action at once. I am fully aware that the minister and the cabinet have been considering their course of action very carefully relative to the vital St. Lawrence seaway development. Members like myself and others, including members of the government, have during the last few weeks stressed the urgency of immediate action on the treaty which is presently before congress for ratification. I want to stress it again while we are considering the nation's defence program.

Time is rapidly running out for planning the needs of power for the production of war materials, to say nothing of the strategic necessity for this new means of water transportation from the mines to the mills for the iron ore so urgently needed for defence purposes.

It now appears that the chances of a favourable congressional decision are becoming more remote. That means Canada is faced


National Defence with a decision of her own. The premier of Ontario yesterday pointed out in clear terms the advisability of Canada doing the job herself. Construction of the seaway alone was not our original plan but the government has arrived at a point now where in my personal view a new all-Canadian development should be announced at once.

The Prime Minister in the house last week expressed confidence that Canada could handle the undertaking without help from south of the border and he will have heavy support for that view.

The risk in delaying commencement of the project as an all-Canadian one arises from several factors. One is that a favourable decision by congress might conceivably mean a long series of delays with respect to appropriations and the like which could well nullify the objective of urgency surrounding the work and put back the completion for an embarrassingly long time. Another is that many time-consuming procedures are required', such as an application before the international joint commission which should be started if the project on an all-Canadian basis is to be initiated in the early future. Time becomes therefore a vital element from a defence point of view. In my opinion the decks should be cleared for action. Otherwise the deep waterway may well get bogged down and lost in a maze of international negotiations and delays beyond description. We have waited many years for the treaty to be ratified and implemented. No one in the United States could reasonably expect us to wait longer in this atmosphere of acute and compelling urgency. In my own humble opinion we should go it alone.

I want to impress upon the minister now the great urgency and concern with which those in my part of Canada view this very important matter. I know that he, charged as he is with providing for the defence needs of this country, will realize that the situation has become alarmingly acute. I urge the government to make that declaration now, and to proceed on an all-Canadian St. Lawrence deep waterway scheme.


Brooke Claxton (Minister of National Defence)


Mr. Claxton:

Mr. Chairman, in the course

of the debate a number of very helpful suggestions have been made, and I can assure members of the committee that all of them will receive the most serious consideration. I appreciate too the constructive attitude taken again by the official critic for the opposition, the hon. member for Nanaimo, and I take this opportunity to congratulate him on his reformation. For a long period of his life he has been a very gallant soldier in a branch of the services which we respect


Supply-National Defence as the queen of them all, the infantry, but recently I took advantage of a vacancy in the honorary colonelship of an artillery regiment to approve his appointment to it, so that now at last he is a gunner.

At the outset I do not want to say anything much by way of general remarks except that this time the discussion has followed extraordinarily closely those of the last four years in which there have been charges of no information and that we should have done something before. As to information, I have answered that, and so have some other hon. gentlemen. Certainly the complaint I have from persons outside the house is that far too much information is given for our own good. Certainly far more is given than in any other country I know of with the only possible exception of the United States. I wish hon. members would1 look at the debates on defence matters in the parliament at Westminster. They would see how restricted they are on questions of policy, they do not go into matters of detail. There is no reason why we should follow them, but I suggest that when we are criticized on that account on this side of the house it would be well to look at what the mother of parliaments considers desirable.

For example, this year the debates on the defence estimates took place on March 6, 1951, for air, March 8 for the army and March 12 for the navy. They occupied a total of twenty-three hours. So far as I know, that is all the time that will be spent on defence estimates by the British House of Commons. As we know, their select committee on estimates, which has a subcommittee on defence, deals only with matters of finance and the like. This year, in addition to the list of public announcements that I gave at the outset of my statement yesterday, we have had the white paper which was tabled in the house on Monday, and which gives much more comprehensively and in greater detail than ever before information about the work of our defence forces, about what has been done, what is planned and what the money is needed for. I think it should enable all hon. members to see the picture very well,

In addition, this is an occasion when hon. members can secure additional information, and during the last day and a half they have not been backward in asking for it. I will endeavour to answer every question.

There is only one other general comment with which I wish to deal. It was said that we should have done more in 1946, 1947, 1948 and 1949, Let me give an illustration. If we had preserved in the air force, for example, ten or eleven fighting squadrons at full strength, equipped with the aircraft

they were using at the end of the war, we would now have an air force with personnel almost entirely over age for the job they had to do and out of date with respect to equipment. Instead we deliberately set about, starting with our wartime experience and war-trained officers, to build up the training establishment and depots, and also to develop aircraft which would enable us, as I believe they will, to be right among the leaders of the world as we would expect to be in that field.

The same thing applies to the other services. We have very good' schools in practically every line of activity teaching officers and men to do the best kind of work. If we had not had those schools we would not have been able to train the Korean force or to keep on training our men at the rate we have. Notwithstanding the overhead required for administration, training, supply and transportation, I submit that we still have a lower overhead than other countries with which I am familiar with the single expection of countries behind the iron curtain.

Coming to the questions asked, the hon. member for Nanaimo remarked that the present method of recruiting was haphazard. He said we were taking on men whom we should not enlist, and he referred to the wastage which resulted in taking on the special force. Wastage in the army this year is by no means abnormal. During the first half of the year it was 4-3 per cent and in the second half

5- 3 per cent. These figures may be compared with 3-4 and 4-2 for 1949,

6- 1 and 5-1 for 1948; 10-2 and 2-2 for 1947; and for 1939, which in some ways perhaps was a comparable period from the point of view of defence preparedness, 10-9 and 9-9 per cent. There is no evidence whatever that we are taking on men who should be engaged in industry. In point of fact we are not taking on as great a proportion of tradesmen as we would like to have. This matter is thoroughly worked out with the Department of Labour and my colleague, the Minister of Defence Production. It is felt that the present system is working as well as anything we could devise.

With respect to quotas for the C.O.T.C., the hon. member suggested they might be higher. These quotas are worked out on a local basis through the commands in discussion with the universities. The universities have co-operated magnificently in these plans, which I think are unique in the world. They have asked for more members whenever they felt they could get men who were desirable. Quotas have not been a limiting factor and, as the hon. member will see from the figures given, whenever a quota is

reached it is increased. Quotas are fixed for purposes of planning, pay, allowances, supplies, equipment, and the supply of army and training staff. We can really congratulate ourselves that some thirty-two universities and colleges are co-operating most wholeheartedly in this plan. However, we hope to expand it, and to that end a conference is being arranged with the heads of the university contingents and the representatives of the services for the end of this month, which will be followed immediately by a conference jointly with the universities conference military committee, with which we work very well.

Then the hon. member asked whether we were getting full value from the service colleges, whether they were meeting our more urgent needs. Well, it is too early to say. The first class to have taken the full four-year course has just graduated, and we do not know yet how many are going into the active and reserve forces; but so far we have no reason to regret this development in tri-service officer training. It may be that it should be modified. It may be, for example, that the curriculum to cover in four years the equivalent of four years of arts and three years of engineering, with an additional 15 per cent on military subjects during the school year, is too heavy; but the combination of academic work during the seven school months and four months of practical work with the services has worked out very well.

The next question was whether we can afford to have such colleges which do not insist on the men continuing with the active force. We believe that so far it has been useful to have these men train in this way and then mix with the university men during the summer months. Some of them, of course, go on to the universities. They are all available. They are trained officers, qualified to take the rank of captain in the reserve force or lieutenant in the active force, and so far we have no reason to regret this very important development.

Then the hon. member regretted the failure to standardize, which was mentioned by half a dozen hon. members. I also exceedingly regret the failure to have more standardization. If there were any way in which one in Canada could force the United States to standardize with Britain or Britain to standardize with the United States, I would be glad to use all the persuasive force possible to bring that about. That is what we have been doing for five years in joint committees and joint activities, but it is an exceedingly difficult operation. For one thing both the United Kingdom and the

Supply-National Defence United States have large stocks of equipment on hand. They have those stocks at a time when the world is short of military equipment. Nobody is going to dump any equipment into the sea; nobody is going to give it away to any country behind the iron curtain. So until we can gradually build up our stocks of military equipment there is no possibility of standardization to any great degree. But what is disappointing is that in the adoption of new weapons the United Kingdom and the United States have not seen eye to eye.

Faced with this, and remembering all the difficulties we had during the second world war, a good many months ago we decided to standardize our equipment-not right across the board but generally-with United States-type equipment. It so happened that we had the armament equipment for practically five divisions in mobilization stores, equipment of the latest type in use at the end of the second world war. We were probably unique in that respect. When the North Atlantic treaty organization was developed we saw at once that the one chance we would have to standardize with the United States would be by giving away this equipment of United Kingdom type to the North Atlantic treaty nations, and we proceeded to do so. Equipment for one division was given the Netherlands; for a second division to Belgium; and equipment for a third division is to be transferred to Italy, as well as artillery for Luxembourg. This is a practical way of getting on with the job, and at the same time each weapon we have put into the hands of a European has armed a soldier who is there waiting for a weapon with which to defend his country and ours. So we did a double job very quickly.

I should say that we have made good progress in standardization with the United States, in addition to weapons, which are on the way. To mention a few items hastily, there are aircraft fuels, oxygen equipment, photographic equipment, instruments and personal flying equipment, mapping and charting, air force training equipment, vehicles for the northland, pilot handbooks, geographic reference systems for maps, navigation tables, 3-5 rockets and rocket launchers, confidential signs and symbols, and many other things which are on the secret list. Some of these are Canadian products, or the procedures and techniques have been worked out in Canada.

The next question was with regard to unification, and the statement was made that we seemed to be going into reverse in the matter of motor vehicle maintenance. The fact is that in 1947 we decided on the unification of motor vehicle maintenance,

Supply-National Defence and determined that it should be done by the army for the three services. That was my decision, and I put it into effect. We tried' it for a year and a half, and it was found that it did not work. We had gone too far in unification. We have reversed it in part; but as in the case of other services common to the three branches, we avoid duplication just as much as possible. These are the principles on which we have made this decision: (a) the peacetime organization of each service should be capable of rapid expansion in war without major reorganization or reallotment of functions; (b) maximum economy is to be achieved in peacetime without prejudicing either efficiency or ability to mobilize rapidly for war; (c) administrative functions necessary to each service in war should be performed to an appropriate extent by each service in peacetime to ensure familiarity with the function and provide a nucleus for expansion in war.

With regard to motor vehicles we found this, to give a concrete example. The air force has to keep its runways open the year round. They have to contend with very heavy snowfall in many parts of the country, and they have very good heavy equipment for this purpose. When that equipment had to be maintained and supplied by the army, the air force would sometimes say they were not given a sufficiently high priority because we had too much to do in connection with motor vehicle maintenance with the personnel we had. We found that where a service had an essential special function to perform in peacetime, it was desirable that the service must be responsible for that performance.

With regard to avoiding duplication I can tell my hon. friends that we have gone very far indeed, both in respect to this and other matters. We have the following motor vehicle workshops across Canada. The navy has two workshops, at Halifax and Esquimau, and both workshops look after army and air force equipment. The navy also has one other workshop at St. Hubert in Quebec, where the navy does its own work. That is combined with an armament workshop there. The army has workshops at Halifax, Saint John, Lachine, Ottawa, Kingston, Picton, Petawawa, Toronto, London, Winnipeg, Macdonald, Shilo, Calgary, Vernon and Vancouver, where it does any work there may be for the navy and air force as well. At Quebec city it does work for the navy; there is no air force at that point. At Kingston it does work for the navy; there is no air force there. At Churchill it does work for the R.C.A.F.; the navy has no motor vehicles there. At Rivers it does work for the R.C.A.P. At Regina it does work for the

navy; there is no air force. At Fort Nelson it does work for the R.C.A.F.; there is no navy. At Whitehorse it does work for the R.C.A.F.; there is no navy. The air force has depots at Calgary and Trenton, where it does work for all three services.

So hon. members will see that in this respect there is no duplication, but there is sound military reason for maintaining the three maintenance activities.

The next question was, when will the new anti-submarine vessels be commissioned? It is very hard to make an estimate, and I do not know that we should make any announcement of this kind. It is not usual, but we can tell him that some of the new antisubmarine vessels are expected to be launched this autumn before the close of navigation. We expect it will take a considerable time longer before these are commissioned. These anti-submarine ships are of a new type. They were worked out with the British and Americans, but we are the first country to make them. The British are making a somewhat similar vessel but are about a year behind us in their production. There is no corresponding vessel, so far as we know, anywhere in the world.


John Horne Blackmore

Social Credit

Mr. Blackmore:

Will the minister permit a question?


Brooke Claxton (Minister of National Defence)


Mr. Claxton:

I think I had better go ahead because my time is getting very short, if you do not mind. Then, with regard to the Magnificent, it is suggested she is out of date, because she has sixteen Sea Furies and twenty Fireflies and cannot take modern jet aircraft necessary in chasing subs. The Magnificent is not out of date at all. It has three or four more years of useful life, and is of the same type as several carriers the Royal Navy has in commission. The Sea Fury is still an effective aircraft for protecting aircraft carriers and ships against attack by the kind of aircraft that could make that attack. It must be remembered that the range of the jet fighter possessed by the Russians is not very extensive. Then, too, the carrier is also equipped with Avengers which are still in front-line use in the United States, and are considered to be an effective weapon in anti-submarine work. It is not considered desirable to have jet aircraft at this time for work against submarines.

It was suggested that we should have an aircraft carrier on the Pacific coast. There is a limit to what a country of 14 million people can do, and I am afraid this is one place where that applies. So far as I know, no country of our size has one aircraft carrier, still less two. Incidentally, I do not know if I am breaching security, but to provide that

type of protection in that way is not a part of our assigned role in accordance with our arrangements with our allies which have been worked out in detail with regard to the employment of each ship and the times at which it will be available.

Why is a second cruiser being commissioned? It is immediately- for training purposes but it would also be useful in the event of war. We find it is much more satisfactory to give the first training to officers when they go to sea in the larger ships, because there is accommodation for them to take a much greater number. There is also room for classrooms, and there is every kind of instrument they would have to use on a small ship. Also we can handle, in proportion to the cost, very many more officers for training in this way. Without putting the Quebec, as the ship is called- I hope the member for Three Rivers will recognize this change-into commission, we could not possibly train all the officers we shall have to take in to meet the build-up of the navy. In the small ships such as destroyers, frigates, minesweepers, there is very little room indeed for the officers and men necessary to operate the ship. At a later stage, when the officers have had some sea training, they are fitted into the crew and they continue their training on the job in the small ship. This is considered to be the fastest way to take care of the biggest number.

What types of ships are now being operated by the navy? I should think hon. members would be fully familiar with that, but I shall list them: The carrier, with its naval air groups, cruisers, destroyers, anti-submarine escorts first class; anti-submarine escorts second class; minesweepers; seaward defence craft; Fairmile training vessels at selected reserve divisions; supply ships; tankers; research experimental ships; auxiliary vessels and harbour craft; loop layers; gate vessels, in reserve; repair ships, in reserve. Then there is the northern patrol icebreaker which is nearing completion. We have some 27 ships under contract, and there will be many more ordered shortly to be proceeded with as soon as we build the prototypes of the new vessels and learn by experience what modifications are needed.

The suggestion was made that we should not keep ships in reserve if they are obsolete, because it costs money. It costs much less money to keep ships in reserve than to keep them in commission. We keep in commission the number of ships we can man, and the ships in reserve are of the same age and class as corresponding ships in commission, and I cannot regard them as obsolete, as we

Supply-National Defence would want almost everything that was available in the event of war. If we scrap any ships that are seaworthy and useful to the navy at a time like this, I would regard it as a retrograde step.

The hon. member said that we should not have gone to Fort Lewis because it was a waste of money to go there with the additional expense to the United States government and the additional pay of the men. I should like to refer to a speech which the hon. member made and which is reported in the Calgary Herald of April 11, 1951, under the heading "Pearkes Criticizes Use of U.S. Training Base". It reads:

Failure to provide a proper training centre in Canada tor the Korean forces had cost the Canadian people an extra $200,000 a day for the forces under training at Fort Lewis, Washington, Major General G. R. Pearkes, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., M.P. for Nanaimo, told a public meeting in the Canadian Legion west end branch hall Tuesday night.

I do not know where the hon. member got his information or how he made his calculation, because generally he is exceedingly careful and very responsible indeed. The cost of our being in Fort Lewis was not $200,000 a day, but a bit less than $20,000 a day. About $13,000 was paid to the United States government for food and accommodation and the provision of services of every type, at a capitation fee of $2.46 per man day. I hope the United States congress and the United States quartermaster general will not hear me say this-you have to say unwise things sometimes in answer to criticism- but we could not have done it for that cost in Canada. We had a generous and fair arrangement. Moreover, we could not have put our troops in any quarters in Canada without spending millions of dollars on the rehabilitation and winterization of those quarters. We have never had a force of seven to ten thousand people training during the winter in Canada as a brigade. Our experience in this connection indicates it will be very difficult to do it in any part of Canada and have really effective training. In almost every part of Canada there is such a heavy snowfall that in training men, particularly to fight in Europe, they would have to spend a big part of their time in shovelling snow and keeping themselves warm. That does not apply to the same extent to individual and sub-unit and even company training, but as soon as you get up to unit and brigade training you need a lot of space with roads for vehicles so as to correspond to something like the terrain in Europe. For good training on a brigade scale we would like to have an area twenty miles wide and a hundred miles deep. We use live ammunition fired from 155 guns over the heads of the troops, and they fire up to

Supply-National Defence 20 miles. To provide for advances with all arms working together we should have, if we can get it, an area 100 miles long.

We have searched Canada ever since 1946 to find such an area. We have our eye on one or two that might be suitable, but only at tremendous expense to put them in shape, with accommodation, roads and so on. It was extremely fortunate that we were able to go to Fort Lewis. However, that was not the real reason for going to Fort Lewis. We went there because that was the staging point for the shipment of troops from Seattle to the Far East. When our movement was arranged for there we did not know whether they would move immediately to the Far East or stay there for training. Hon. members will recall the statements of a rather optimistic character that were made at that period when it appeared to some that the war was virtually over. We had to be prepared either to move the brigade off almost at a day's notice to the Far East to complete training there or to remain where they were but with uncertainty as to when the brigade should move forward. On that account it was highly desirable that the brigade should be at Fort Lewis. Further, we had exceedingly good experiences with our United States friends at Fort Lewis which was under the command of Brigadier LeRoy Watson. No. 426 squadron was at McChord field nearby, which was under the command of Colonel Bennett. I should like to pay this tribute to these officers and all working with them for the magnificent co-operation they extended to us. They treated us just as well as friends could be treated. Anything we wanted in the way of facilities, changes in rations-because our ration is rather different from theirs-or the like, was put through at once. It was as fine a demonstration of partnership in our joint defence as anyone would want to see.

The actual cost for the other item that the hon. member mentioned, of the extra pay for officers and men while they were out of Canada, is estimated at $6,000 per day; so that the item of $13,000, for the $2.46 capitation fee and the $6,000 for extra pay, total $19,000, not $200,000.

Then the hon. member suggested that we need now to provide winter quarters for training. I agree, and we are doing that. We are making substantial changes at Valcartier, Wainwright and other places. We hope that it will not be necessary to use those places for training units as large as brigades. Valcartier is not suitable for that purpose at the present time. Wainwright is the only camp in Canada of sufficient size [DOT] and having the terrain suitable for this purpose. We hope to get another camp for this

purpose in the east, but so far we have not been able to get the area. There is the question of fire hazard; and that is something which is highly important.

The next point was that in the air we should concentrate on essential types. We believe we are doing that. With regard to the supply of aircraft, the priority that is generally recognized is: Fighters, bombers, tactical aircraft, transport and maritime reconnaissance. We do not think that it is desirable at this time, particularly when there is no aircraft specially designed and in production for this purpose, to build in Canada the relatively small number of planes required for maritime reconnaissance. We have therefore worked out an adaptation of the Lancaster, the modifications in which are either completed or well under way at A. V. Roe Canada Limited; and it is considered to be a highly desirable aircraft for the purpose. It has good range with the additional tanks we put on it; and it carries weapons, equipment, cameras and so on quite well. It is an economical way of doing this particular job.

Another question was: What percentage of officers trained by D.V.A. are now serving? I think that is the only question that I have been asked during the past two days as to which I have not an answer. D.V.A. has not the answer. It is necessary to go through either all the army officer cards or all the D.V.A. cards in order to find it out, and that would be a large job. I am trying to have an estimate made; and I am sure the hon. gentleman would accept this.

I think that concludes the questions put by the hon. member for Nanaimo.

The next come from the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar. He asks what has been done to inform young men what they are fighting for. Lectures have been given right from the outset by trained officers who were given special publications and briefing on current affairs. Every camp has a library and a number of them are very good. They are extensively used. A number of them have a wall map service and special magazines on current affairs, and these supplement the lectures. We have doubled the size of the chaplain service, and the chaplains are useful indeed in giving general talks. But we felt that the time had come, in view of the formation of the Korean force, to give direction in this matter. Accordingly, two months ago we appointed Mr. Harry Low as director of the bureau of current affairs. He served with the air force in this capacity during the war. He is responsible to the chiefs of staff committee. He will be holding courses for

officers and N.C.O.'s of various types, to instruct them in the job of passing on the information, organizing study groups, classes, and the like.

As to the charge that the young men joining our forces are confused as to why we are fighting in Korea, I am surprised that they are not more confused than I have found them to be, in view of the conflicting ideas, as to why we are fighting in Korea, expressed by, say, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the hon. member for Vancouver -Quadra. While some of the young men may not be able to express themselves like a college professor, I think they are rather in the position that anyone would be in if someone came up to him in the street and asked: Why are you a Christian? You find it difficult to answer that question in a few sentences. They know why they are fighting but they would find it difficult to express the reason in a few sentences. But that does not prevent their being fine, understanding and intelligent in the work in the armed forces.

It was suggested that we should make an appraisal of our manpower resources. These appraisals especially made for a special purpose can soon become out of date. The dominion bureau of statistics and the Department of Labour have continuous appraisals, and I have been told that from most points of view the information they have is adequate for statistical planning with regard to manpower in this country. To have a further survey for this purpose may be desirable, and it may be done. That matter is being considered by the advisory committee on manpower; and if they report in favour of it, no doubt the government will see that it is done. But the information so far put before me from the point of view of planning-and we have planned it out for several years ahead-is that the information is fully available on which to do the job.

The hon. member asked about motor vehicle contracts, apropos the remarks of Mr. Sale. This is a complicated subject which falls under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Defence Production. I am not sure that I have the whole picture; hence anything I say must be taken subject to that qualification. I can say this, however. For some time we have desired to manufacture in Canada a limited number of motor vehicles of military type. We in the defence department provided in our estimates a considerable sum of money-I think it was $21 million-for this purpose. The reason was not so much to supply ourselves with these motor vehicles, because it would have been much cheaper to buy them from the United States. The reason was primarily to tool



Supply-National Defence up for their production in Canada. We had in mind particularly the one-quarter ton, the three-quarter ton and the two and a half ton vehicle. The one-quarter ton vehicle is the jeep. Our own requirements were not great. Having regard to the cost of tooling up and the number required, each motor vehicle would have cost an almost fantastic sum; but we thought it was desirable to tool up to manufacture those cars in Canada, and we requisitioned the Minister of Trade and Commerce in September, 1950, to obtain these. He entered into negotiations with the United States authorities and the industry both to secure the right and to make arrangements with the automotive industry to do it. It was found that the cost of tooling for the production of these cars in toto in Canada was far more than the sum estimated. I am speaking from recollection, but I believe that the cost of tooling for quantity production of cars of these types, the smallest military types, would be well in excess of the amount provided. I mean by "well in excess" much more than twice as much as the amount we had estimated. From the outset it was apparent that this would not be an economic move unless we could secure orders for these cars from the United States either for delivery to meet United States needs or for shipment to Europe at United States expense, because we had already committed all the money we had voted or were in process of doing that. However, United States military requirements for these vehicles now were not sufficiently great to justify their production in the United States and here. These discussions took some time; and in the end the Department of Defence Production decided to make part of the cars in Canada and buy part from the United States, and to tool up to make the parts which we could do most economically and most efficiently in Canada, just as was done at the commencement of the commercial automobile industry in Canada. But before we made that decision we wanted to explore every possibility with the United States of getting orders which would enable us to do as much as possible of the job in Canada. I understand that arrangements have now been worked out and that we shall be going ahead on that basis. The next question is: Do we have to pay customs duty on war equipment, personal effects of service personnel, et cetera? Yes, we pay sales tax and duty on all purchases of war equipment, with the exception of the equipment we purchase from the United States to replace divisional and other equipment released to countries which are members of the North Atlantic treaty under the Defence Appropriation Act, 1950. On all

Supply-National Defence other military equipment we pay sales tax and customs duty to the Department of National Revenue. Personal effects of service personnel generally enter duty free under reciprocal arrangements. Then the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar said that it was stated in the public accounts committee that on March 31, 1950, we did not possess a single modern tank. I was not present at the public accounts committee, and I have not yet seen the report of the proceedings for that day, so I am speaking without exact information. But I would doubt very much whether the statement was made in that form. At the end of the second world war we had a large number of worn-out tanks. We scrapped these and we arranged to buy from the United States a very considerable number of the very latest tanks that were available at that time. Since then these have been maintained for training and are available today, except for those that we have shipped already to Europe, for two divisions, namely, the self-propelled guns, Which are on tank chassis. It would have been utterly ridiculous for us either to have contemplated the manufacture of tanks of an intermediate type or to have bought tanks from the United States when these tanks were still in the process of development, and were not yet in large-scale production in the United States. We have now the opportunity of buying from the United States the latest tanks, and they will be coming with the equipment for the two divisions we transferred to Europe. But our tanks are by no means obsolete. If a war were to come tomorrow this would be the kind of weapon that would be in most current use on our side, the Sherman Mark IV, with modifications, but there are more modern tanks. I hope hon. members do not think for a second that it is possible for any country, United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, Canada, France or any other country in peacetime to keep up to date on every development. Why, the number of developments and the modifications of radar sets would keep us poverty stricken on that account alone. What we have to do is to plan and make our replacements when we think a type has been developed that is going to be in good use for five years, or ten years or fifteen years, and then to keep up to date as far as we can with modifications. But these modifications cost a fantastic sum. Take the 3 * 7 heavy anti-aircraft gun that we have, the United Kingdom type. To modernize it to standards that we would regard as up to date would cost upwards of $200,000 per gun-the gun originally cost about $100,000-and the result would be a cost per gun of more than that type of weapon completely new at some future indefinite date when we get into another sphere. We cannot follow each weapon through every development. We must get from period to period. The hon. member asked whether the manufacture of jeeps was held up because of difficulties with patents. The answer is no. He referred to standardization. I have gone into that. He said: If we are working with the United Kingdom in Korea will not there be complications through the use of United States equipment? No; our forces in Korea are supplied almost entirely with United Kingdom equipment so that they can work with the British, as was planned from the outset; but we use a number of United States-type motor vehicles and mortars and some other weapons just as the British do. There will be no difficulty or very little difficulty there. Since we will always be working with the British or with the Americans usually in a theatre where both are represented, we will not have quite as great difficulties, through having either equipment of one type or mixed equipment, as would otherwise be the case. During the second world war we had in the Canadian army at one time a division of United States troops using American equipment, a division of British troops using British type of equipment and others, and provided that you have a unit as big as a division it can be worked out. Of course it is much better to have it all uniform, and Canada has a greater interest in seeing to that than any other country, and we have worked harder to bring it about than any other country. I only regret that we did not succeed to a greater extent in bringing about standardization.


Some hon. Members:

Six o'clock.

Topic:   S0709-183

Brooke Claxton (Minister of National Defence)


Mr. Claxion:

I am afraid it will take a few more minutes to answer hon. members' questions.

Item stands.

Progress reported.

Topic:   S0709-183



Alphonse Fournier (Minister of Public Works; Leader of the Government in the House of Commons; Liberal Party House Leader)


Mr. Fournier (Hull):

Tomorrow we will continue with this debate.


At six o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to standing order.

Thursday, May 10, 1951

May 9, 1951