March 7, 1950

DOMINION-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE TABLING OF FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE WITH PROVINCIAL PREMIERS

LIB

Louis Stephen St-Laurent (Prime Minister; President of the Privy Council)

Liberal

Right Hon. L. S. St. Laurent (Prime Minister):

I should like to table some further correspondence between the Prime Minister and the premiers of Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Quebec, and British Columbia, respecting the proposed general conference to be held in the autumn of this year. The previous correspondence was tabled on the 16th of February. Perhaps hon. members would wish, as has been done heretofore, to have this correspondence printed as an appendix to Hansard of today.

Topic:   DOMINION-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE TABLING OF FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE WITH PROVINCIAL PREMIERS
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LIB

Elie Beauregard (Speaker of the Senate)

Liberal

Mr. Speaker:

Is it the wish of the house that this correspondence should appear as an appendix to today's Hansard?

Topic:   DOMINION-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE TABLING OF FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE WITH PROVINCIAL PREMIERS
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?

Some hon. Members:

Agreed.

(For text of correspondence, see Appendix, pages 559 and 560.)

Topic:   DOMINION-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE TABLING OF FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE WITH PROVINCIAL PREMIERS
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ANNOUNCEMENT AS'TO RATES OF PAY FOR STENOGRAPHERS AND AMANUENSES

LIB

Elie Beauregard (Speaker of the Senate)

Liberal

Mr. Speaker:

I should like to make the following announcement:

I have the honour to report that at a meeting of the commissioners of the internal economy on Wednesday, March 1, 1950, consideration was given to rates of pay for stenographers and amanuenses in the House of Commons.

Although I understand that it is not customary at this time to bring before the house such a report, I desire to do so in view of the general interest shown by members of the house in this matter.

After careful consideration it was decided to initiate a policy whereby, the commissioners believe, the stenographers and the amanuenses of the house will be remunerated according to their ability and experience, which should be an incentive to them.

I would assure the house that, before establishing the rates of pay set forth hereunder, inquiries were made as to the salaries paid outside the House of Commons for similar positions and for work under similar circumstances, and I might also say that they have been established in such manner that they may be acceptable if and when any of our continuous temporary stenographers are made permanent in the future.

In future the members' stenographers staff, except stenographers allotted to parliamentary assistants, will be divided into three groups, as follows:

Group I-well qualified.

Group II-competent but lacking main qualifications.

Group III-not as experienced as group II, or lacking in co-operation, or without experience in the House of Commons.

Salary to be paid: Group III, $5.90; Group II, $6.50; Group I, $7.00.

The rating is to be done by the chief of the members' stenographers branch, under the supervision of the Clerk of the House of Commons.

All new appointees will be paid at the minimum rate of pay, namely, $5.90 per day for the first session, after which they may be promoted to a higher group in accordance with their qualifications; and these qualifications are to be reviewed from time to time.

The stenographers working for parliamentary assistants will receive the maximum rate established for stenographers of the pool, namely, $7 per day, but only as long as they continue to work for a parliamentary assistant. If later they work for private members, they must revert to the stenographic scale above established.

In so far as the debates amanuenses are concerned, as they must have special qualifications, and during some sittings of the house have to work from 11 a.m. to 11 p.m., they will receive the following rates of pay: $7.50, $8 and $8.50 per day; the present rate of $7.50 per day to be retained for new appointments, and employees who give satisfactory service and are reappointed in ensuing sessions may be granted an increase of fifty cents per day for each ensuing session up to a maximum of $8.50 per day.

The above changes are to be made retroactive from the beginning of this session.

Topic:   ANNOUNCEMENT AS'TO RATES OF PAY FOR STENOGRAPHERS AND AMANUENSES
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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

LIB

Lester Bowles Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs)

Liberal

Hon. L. B. Pearson (Secretary of Slate for External Affairs) moved:

That votes numbers 64 to 84, Inclusive, of the main estimates 1950-51 be withdrawn from the committee of supply and referred to the standing committee on external affairs, saving always the powers of the committee of supply in relation to the voting of public moneys.

External Affairs

He said: Mr. Speaker, the motion I have the honour to move would refer to the committee on external affairs the estimates of my department, and therefore provide an opportunity for the work of the department and the policy of the government in external matters to be given the kind of examination by a committee which has in the past proved very useful. A similar motion also, Mr. Speaker, has in the past at times initiated discussion of our external relations generally.

A discussion on external affairs was initiated in the house ^last Friday on a motion to go into supply. As I understand it, the discussion was not completed on Friday evening, and therefore this motion will give hon. members a further opportunity to discuss our external affairs generally, if they so desire. It will also give me the opportunity, I hope, of which I am now taking advantage, to deal with some of the points raised last Friday, and to answer some of the questions addressed to the government at that time. I hope it will also give me an opportunity to clear up some of the confusion and misconceptions which I think might be created by some of the statements then made.

The hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon), in his interesting contribution to this debate, said that in discussions of foreign affairs the dice, in a sense, were loaded against speakers on the opposition side of the house because, naturally, they did not have access to all the confidential information at the disposal of the government. Of course, in a sense that is true, and up to a point must necessarily be true. But we do try to keep the house as fully informed as possible about these matters. When there are questions of very general interest and of great importance, I think it would be quite proper for leaders of the opposition parties to receive confidential information from government members on those questions; and if there are questions of a kind which preoccupy leaders of opposition parties or other hon. members, I hope I may be able to show to them confidential information bearing on these matters.

So far as loading the dice is concerned, I would only say that in the discussion we have already had the leader of the opposition (Mr. Drew) spent a good deal of time dealing with the situation in China and the recognition or non-recognition of the communist government in that country. I would point out that we had already supplied him with a memorandum which included a great deal of confidential and, in fact, top-secret information on that subject-a procedure which I think it was proper for us to follow.

The hon. member for Peel stated once again that it was time we told the House of Commons and the country more about the policies

of the government in matters of external affairs. The graphic expression he used was that we should roll up the blinds in the east block. I am not quite sure what he meant by that, but I hope he will take the opportunity to go into the matter in a little more detail, possibly at the hearings before the committee-because, so far as I am aware, there is no foreign office in any democratic government that makes more information available to the public and to parliament than we do. Not only are we willing to roll up the blinds, but, on appropriate occasions, we shall be happy to open the windows of the east block as well, even though it may mean that at times we will find ourselves sitting in a draft.

In the statement he made last Friday evening concerning external affairs the leader of the opposition complained that in the statement I had made earlier in the afternoon I had ignored China. In his words, it appeared as if I was almost unaware of China's existence so far as that statement was concerned. He suggested it would have been better if I had been able to give the house some information on the question of the recognition or non-recognition of the communist government in China.

On that point I would say that this is a matter now before the government for consideration. It is a verjr difficult and complicated question indeed, as will be apparent from the fact that countries such as the United Kingdom and India have recognized the communist government in China, while other countries such as the United States and France have not done so. Therefore the question arises whether the government, in the midst of difficult and somewhat delicate discussions on the matter, should make public at this time all the arguments for and against a particular course of action.

I can assure you, Mr. Speaker, that when in the light of all the facts a decision is made, it will be given immediately to the House of Commons and to the country. Of course under our parliamentary system that decision is the responsibility of the government-as indeed the leader of the opposition himself indicated the other night. At that time he warned us of haste in this matter. To use his own words:

We are under no compulsion to act hastily, but I believe we are under great compulsion as a nation to act with caution, with great care and after a full examination of all the consequences that would flow from recognition at this time.

I agree entirely with that, and indeed we are acting with great caution. One reason for delay-and it is only one reason, of course- is to give to hon. members a chance to state in this house their point of view on this ques-

tion. Indeed, the request was made to the government by hon. members opposite that they should be given an opportunity to express their point of view on this matter before we came to a decision. They have had that opportunity. The C.C.F. party has indicated its position. The Conservative party, through its leader and the Conservative members in the house, have had an opportunity to express their views. As a result, these views will be of value to the government in coming to a decision.

In his statement the other night it seemed to me that the leader of the opposition jumped to a completely wrong conclusion on inadequate evidence when he said that a decision seems to have been made. The evidence he quoted for coming to that conclusion was a statement made by General McNaughton. The leader of the opposition used these words, as reported at page 462 of Hansard:

Let us see what it was that was under consideration in the remarks of General McNaughton when he made it quite clear that early recognition is under consideration or has actually been decided upon.

Those remarks of General McNaughton, indeed his whole statement, meant nothing of the kind. In the statement to which reference has been made, General McNaughton said- and I quote from his speech as it was quoted at page 459 of Hansard:

Unfortunately the further progress of these meetings-

That is, meetings of the atomic energy group consisting of the permanent members of the security council plus Canada.

-has been held up by the Soviet refusal to participate as long as the Chinese delegate represented the nationalist government. However, there is reason to expect that the meetings will again be resumed shortly when this difficulty has been overcome.

That was a personal statement of General McNaughton with respect to the composition and the hearings of the atomic energy group, an agency of the security council of the United Nations. I can assure you, Mr. Speaker, that in those statements General McNaughton was not referring in any way to discussions on this matter by the Canadian government. General McNaughton has not been informed of, nor is he indeed greatly concerned with, such discussions. The meaning of his statement is quite clear. He was talking about a group appointed by the security council to discuss atomic energy questions. The composition of that group and the representation of China on that group would be determined by a decision of the security council of the United Nations. General McNaughton apparently thought at that time that there might be added, to the five members out of the eleven of the security council who have recognized 55946-331

External Affairs

China, one or two others; that this would change the balance in the security council and might thereby make a change in the composition of the atomic energy group. But General McNaughton could not have been referring to Canada in that connection, because Canada is not now a member of the security council and would not be concerned in any such change in it.

In our discussion the other night the leader of the opposition devoted some time to "recognition" in international law. In discussing the question he quoted from a recognized authority in that field, Professor Lauterpacht. It seems to me, Mr. Speaker, that there has been a good deal of confusion in people's minds as to what is meant by recognition, and I think this might be a good opportunity to clear the matter up so far as I am able to do so. It is of immediate importance now in connection with this particular problem of China.

In considering this matter we must distinguish between recognition of a new state and recognition of a new government. The two things are quite different. Under recognition of a new government we must distinguish between de facto recognition and de jure recognition, between implied recognition and express recognition. We must distinguish between recognition of a government whose authority has been challenged and is still under challenge, and recognition of a government whose authority is no longer being challenged by any alternative form of government. Then finally we must distinguish between recognition on the one hand and diplomatic representation on the other-this is quite a different matter, although the two things were certainly confused, I thought, the other night.

In connection with China we are dealing at this time only with recognition of a new government, not recognition of a new state. In deciding whether recognition should or should not be given to a new government certain criteria-certain conditions, if you like-have been laid down by authorities on international law, such as Oppenheimer, Brierly, Jessup, Lauterpacht and others. But these conditions, of course, have never been, and were never meant to be, applied rigidly and without exception. I mentioned some of these criteria in my statement last December when I was talking about this Chinese question. I said then that if the particular conditions .which I mentioned were fulfilled in China to our satisfaction, and I quote from my words, we "would have to face the facts which confront us."

The four conditions-I think three of them were mentioned last Friday night by the

External Affairs

leader of the opposition, but there are at least four-are as follows. One is the effectiveness of the authority of the government concerned. The second is the independence of the government concerned-something that is not always easy to determine, especially in the case of countries like Tibet, Viet Nam and China. The third is the ability and the willingness of the government concerned to carry out its international obligations. That condition, of course, cannot always be applied too rigorously and too exactly. If it were always applied in that way we might today be recognizing the government of Mr. Kerensky in Moscow. Finally there is the question of acceptability of the new government by the people over whom it exercises authority.

In dealing with this fourth question, acceptability-and it is an important question-[DOT] Professor Lauterpacht, the authority previously quoted, has stated, and I think he is right, that acceptability does not necessarily mean now acceptability by-and I quote his words-"freely expressed popular approval." There must be other evidence. There must be the question of the people's resistance to the challenger of the government, or the reaction of the people to the new government-how they accept the new government's rule. But in dealing with this question the other night the leader of the opposition said that the United Nations resolution passed in 1946 establishes once again the principle that acceptability must be by freely expressed popular approval. I should like to refer to that part of his statement. He said that in 1946 a resolution of the United Nations assembly was passed dealing with Franco Spain, and that its purport was that a decision was made by the United Nations that there would not be recognition of the government of Franco Spain until it was a government with the consent of the governed. He then went on to argue that it altered the existing system of international law in so far as this point is concerned, because this was a resolution of the United Nations, and as the leader of the opposition said at that time:

This-

The reference is to the resolution.

-becomes a most emphatic statement of international law, and remains so until it has been repealed.

On that point I should only like to remark that resolutions of the United Nations do not make international law by their passage at Lake Success. It has been well established there, and it is accepted by every delegation attending the United Nations, that a resolution of that body is not international law. It is an expression of international opinion, but it

does not of itself alter international law, and, as I understand it, it did not alter international law on this occasion.

Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, this particular resolution had nothing whatever to do with recognition. It was a resolution which concerned the government of Spain. Among other things it was a resolution against the participation of the present government of Spain in meetings of the United Nations, and it was a resolution for the recall of ambassadors and ministers from Madrid. It did not concern in any way, shape or form the recognition of Franco. As a matter of fact it did not even recommend a diplomatic break with Franco. It merely recommended that ambassadors and ministers should be withdrawn from Spain. It did not recommend that diplomatic missions should be closed, and they have not been closed since the resolution was passed.

Therefore I suggest there is no use, Mr. Speaker, in trying to draw an analogy on this occasion between our attitude towards Franco Spain and our possible attitude towards the government of China. As a matter of fact, the Canadian government recognized the Franco government of Spain in 1939, and has not withdrawn or altered its recognition since that time.

Another argument which was made the other night against the recognition of communist China by the leader of the opposition- and I quote him again-was when he said:

In that area recognition of China would be regarded almost as a fatal blow to Viet Nam. . . .

He was referring to the new state of Indochina. If that is true, then in that area Burma, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and the United Kingdom all have struck that fatal blow because they have all recognized the communist government of China. The government of Indonesia, now a very important state in that area, has said that it will be glad to recognize the government of communist China as soon as that government recognizes it. Nevertheless the leader of the opposition said, with reference to the opinion that it would be a fatal blow to Viet Nam:

. . . that is the view publicly expressed by men with a great deal longer experience than the Secretary of State for External Affairs in this government.

That might well be the case, but if so it would be helpful in our discussion of these matters if we knew who were the gentlemen who advocated that course. Furthermore, on this point the statement was made by the leader of the opposition that we had already recognized the state of Viet Nam, and when I shook my head the other evening to negate his statement I was met merely by the reply which I have just quoted. What I wanted to

point out at that time, and of course can point out now, is that we have not recognized the state of Viet Nam at this time.

In dealing with this matter the leader of the opposition rejected the argument that if we did not recognize communist China the Soviet delegation would walk out of the United Nations, and that would be blackmail. I entirely agree with him. It is blackmail, but it will have nothing to do with our decision on this matter one way or the other. I have already condemned as childish arrogance that kind of tactic on the part of Soviet delegations and their satellites, and I entirely agree with the leader of the opposition that we should not submit to such tactics.

In dealing with this point the other night the leader of the opposition added that such walkouts render the United Nations impotent. They are of course unfortunate in relation to the efficient conduct of the work of the United Nations, in one sense; they bring the United Nations into disrepute, but not as much disrepute as they bring on the delegations who walk out. They do not make the United Nations impotent, and should not be allowed to do so. Indeed, since these walkouts have occurred we have had continuous meetings of some of the most important agencies of the United Nations, including the economic and social council, which has never been able to do its work so expeditiously and effectively as on the occasion when there was no Soviet delegation present. Furthermore, the security council has been meeting since these walkouts occurred.

The situation in regard to recognition of communist China and its effect on the United Nations was referred to by the leader of the opposition the other evening when he said that only two proponents of recognition were now in the security council, and only three in the other agencies of the United Nations. As a matter of fact the situation is that in the general assembly of the United Nations there are fifteen members who have recognized communist China. Of the eleven members of the security council, five have recognized communist China. Of the twelve members of the atomic energy commission, five have recognized the government of communist China. In the economic and social council seven have recognized it; in the international labour office, seventeen; in the food and agricultural organization, sixteen, and so on. More members of the United Nations have taken this step than was indicated the other evening by the leader of the opposition.

The fact is that in some of these agencies we are approaching a position where a majority of the members concerned may be representatives of governments which have

External Affairs

recognized the new government of communist China. If we reach that position in fact, those states which have not concurred in such recognition will be confronted by a very difficult situation indeed. If we find ourselves in the minority, should we walk out? Of course that would be absurd; but if we do not walk out and we do not recognize communist China, then the alternative is to remain there and work with delegations from communist China, and by so doing give them a form of recognition. All this shows how complicated and difficult the problem is.

In his remarks the other evening the leader of the opposition stated, with great emphasis, great eloquence and great impressiveness, I thought, that we had to stem the Red tide in Asia. Well, so we do; but how? When he attempted to answer that question I venture to suggest that he got into the same kind of difficulty I often get into when I make general statements and then try to follow them up with concrete observations. He did say, however, that in answering that question we should not fall into the language of diplomatic mumbo-jumbo. I entirely agree with that. When he attempted to answer that very important question himself he set out certain things * which I might just mention-and I hope I am putting them correctly.

First he said there should be no hasty recognition. I entirely agree; and I do not think we can be accused of undue haste in this matter. He said that recognition should not be granted until certain conditions were fulfilled, and those conditions he enumerated in his statement. I think the most important one-and I hope I am quoting him correctly -was that there shall be common action, that there shall be a clear and universal pattern of strategy which will be known to the people of the free nations, and which will be known in the clearest detail to the nations which threaten our peace and security. Certainly, he went on to state, there should be no recognition of the Mao regime until those conditions are fulfilled.

Well, Mr. Speaker, it is going to be a little difficult at this date to agree on a common policy, which was a condition he suggested before we could give recognition; because no such common policy is possible as long as some of the states out in that portion of the world have already recognized communist China. On that point the hon. gentleman quoted from a statement of Mr. Anthony Eden, the former secretary of state for foreign affairs in London, to the effect that we should be very careful on the question of appeasement and hasty recognition. I venture to read into the record again one paragraph of the

Topic:   ANNOUNCEMENT AS'TO RATES OF PAY FOR STENOGRAPHERS AND AMANUENSES
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Sub-subtopic:   REFERENCE OF ESTIMATES OF DEPARTMENT TO STANDING COMMITTEE
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External Affairs statement by Mr. Eden quoted by the leader of the opposition, as it appears at page 465 of Hansard: As regards actual recognition, there is a fair field for argument on practical as well as on legal grounds. It is a real misfortune that in this, as in other Far Eastern matters, we should be acting piecemeal . . . That was the quotation given by the leader of the opposition the other evening. The copy of Mr. Eden's statement on that occasion which I have seen, and which I would like to put on record, adds a few words to that quotation; and I now quote from the text of Mr. Eden's statement: As regards actual recognition, there is a fair field for argument on practical as well as on legal grounds. The decision to recognize is no doubt eventually inescapable . . . Those are the additional words in my text. The third condition laid down by the leader of the opposition-though I do not know whether you could call it a condition- was that we should agree on help to the peoples of Asia; and I am sure there will be no difference of opinion on that. The fourth suggestion he made was in his reference to a Pacific pact, and on that very important question he quoted me as follows- I refer to his words as reported at page 464 of Hansard: The proposal has been put forward in this house on different occasions by the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green), that a Pacific pact to complement the Atlantic pact should be brought into being. Today the Secretary of State for External Affairs said that that could not be done because if the nations of the Pacific were to be invited to consider a Pacific pact it would be necessary to invite Russia and China. That is not exactly what I said. I said that would be one consideration, whether it would be possible to invite Russia and China to a conference which would be discussing a regional pact in the Pacific. Of course I am not quite so naive as to suggest that if an invitation of that kind were sent, and if it had the conditions which normally attach to such invitations, the Russians would accept it. I am not even sure whether it would be of any use to send them such an invitation. My argument against a Pacific pact at this time, which is not mentioned in this statement, was that in my opinion it would be futile and unwise to proceed with a conference to negotiate a Pacific security and mutual guarantee pact at a time when the United States, the United Kingdom and India have indicated that they would not be able to participate in any such conference. Surely that serious argument is enough to explain why we have not accepted certain advice which has been given us in this house to push ahead with a Pacific pact at this time. I thought I had made my position perfectly clear on this matter both on Friday and on previous occasions, and that in doing so I had not lapsed into the diplomatic language of mumbo-jumbo. If, however, the situation in the Pacific should change and should become analogous to the situation that obtained in the Atlantic when we proceeded to work out the North Atlantic pact, then certainly we would have to reconsider Dur attitude toward this matter. Finally the leader of the opposition made a strong and eloquent appeal against anything which might be interpreted as appeasement of communist aggression. I agree with him, though appeasement is one of those very difficult and dangerous words which can be interpreted in many ways. If by appeasement we mean prejudicing our own security or the security of the democratic world by making extorted and unnecessary concessions to a possible aggressor in the hope that it might keep him quiet; or if we mean assisting, encouraging and strengthening those whom we thought had aggressive designs, then of course I am sure everyone in this house is against appeasement. But it is a dangerous word, which should not be used carelessly. Appeasement is not the same as peace, nor is it the same as a desire for peace. In his statement last Friday evening the leader of the opposition also said, as reported at page 465 of Hansard: Every word I have spoken Is a word to urge upon this government the duty to say in no uncertain terms, no matter what may be said by other governments in the world: "Appeasement is going to go no further: we have learned the lessons of the past and there will be no truck and trade with tyranny of this kind unless and until they are at least prepared to accept the ordinary standards of international conduct." In my statement I said, as reported at pages 429-30 of Hansard: So far as Canada is concerned . . . there will never be any lack of willingness to search for a solution to this and the other problems which divide us from the communist world. I suggest there is no contradiction between the two statements. In this connection I referred to the necessity of genuine compromise and accommodation; and I made it abundantly clear, I hope, that the Canadian government was fully aware of the danger of appeasement of the kind I have just indicated, but at the same time was conscious of a duty to keep searching for some way out of the present impasse. Last Friday the hon. member for Peel spoke in a similar vein, with perhaps fewer qualifications than I gave, when he said, as reported at page 434 of Hansard: . . . the most vital job at the hand of every responsible nation of the world today is somehow to find the way to stop the present aimless international drifting. . . . This, I remind the house, is a quotation from a speech made by the hon. member for Peel. . . . which is causing no end of alarm to the ordinary citizens of the world, because they have a revolting fear that a continuation of this squaring off of one group of nations towards another may end in another armed holocaust. With those words, Mr. Speaker, I entirely agree.


PC

George Alexander Drew (Leader of the Official Opposition)

Progressive Conservative

Mr. George A. Drew (Leader of ihe Opposition):

Mr. Speaker, the motion now before us has just been moved and therefore was not under discussion when this broad subject was being discussed on Friday night. I shall now, therefore, deal with the motion and with the remarks which the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) has made.

First of all I regret that, on so important a subject, the Secretary of State for External Affairs should have spent so much time in quibbling about what he said last Friday. I should start by removing the wholly improper impression he sought to convey-that any words had been withheld from the quotation of the statement by Anthony Eden. I shall correct that impression by reading the whole statement into the record, although it involves some repetition.

So far as this government is concerned, so far as this parliament is concerned, each member is responsible for the fulfilment of his duties. It is not for us to follow anyone else blindly. Nevertheless I do not hesitate to say that Mr. Anthony Eden, who had the courage to resign from the British cabinet over the Italian issue, has had longer experience than the present Secretary of State for External Affairs for Canada. I attach a good deal of importance to the views he expressed. Although it will take a few minutes to do it, I propose to read into the record, because of the suggestion that words had been left out which might have changed the effect of the quotation, the whole of the statement.

I need hardly point out to those who either have read Hansard or have followed the course of this debate that I quoted a great deal more than the Secretary of State for External Affairs mentioned. This article appeared on January 16; it was syndicated and was published in a great many newspapers throughout the world. It appeared exactly ten days after the recognition by Britain of the Mao regime-it is important to remember that it was not before that time. The article reads as follows:

The Far Eastern policies of the Atlantic powers and their friends are in a rather dismal tangle. They all apparently intend the same thing but they are moving at so different a pace that they are jerkily out of step.

External Affairs

Recognition of the communist government in China provides a recent example of this inconsistency, though not the most important. The divergence of view and discrepancy of action between the British and American governments in this instance may even do good if they draw attention in both countries to the urgent need to coordinate policies without further delay.

As regards actual recognition, there is a fair field for argument on practical as well as on legal grounds. It is a real misfortune that in this, as in other Far Eastern matters, we should be acting piecemeal both within the commonwealth and as between the commonwealth and the United States.

At this point I should say that that was the quotation in respect of which the Secretary of State for External Affairs read further words. This is what immediately follows:

The French, too, appear to be embarrassed by our timing. I regard all this as deplorable, not for any reasons of diplomatic neatness, but because it emphasizes that there was no agreement between friends on handling Far Eastern affairs.

This is tempting to those communist forces who seek to drive a wedge between us.

On my return from Malaya last spring I gave warning that the communist challenge in southeast Asia was growing in force. I urged that common policies should be agreed upon within the commonwealth and with the signatories of the North Atlantic treaty in an attempt to hearten and sustain anti-communist forces.

Unfortunately, the last year has been largely wasted. The Colombo conference has given the first sign of any positive co-ordinated plan to meet this threat. There are some who have regarded resurgent upheavals in the Far East as no more than the growing pains of a new nationalism, but even they must surely now accept that in this disruption may be found seeds of mortal weakness.

We must first determine the nature of our problem in southeast Asia and next consider how

together we can make headway toward its solution. In the first instance, the problem is economic.

We should make a fatal error were we to underestimate the extent of the challenge free nations have to meet. The overwhelming triumph of Mao Tze-tung in China has transformed the whole position in the Far East. His methods have now

become the blueprint for communist plans and the pattern for communist action throughout the Orient.

For the time being, at least, China is taking the orthodox road mapped out by Lenin, and that is the road which starts and finishes in Moscow.

Independent nationalist communism is certainly possible later, but we should be unwise to count upon it.

The problem that confronts the powers in southeast Asia is infinitely more complex than that

which Marshall aid is combating in Europe. These eastern countries have widely contrasting resources in wealth, wisdom and statesmanship. Their traditions, experience, religions and sense of purpose and responsibility are poles apart. They have scarcely a common denominator, yet all must be gathered in and helped to build together with the limited contribution that other free lands can bring to the economic life upon which their political resistance to communism can be founded.

We must make a broad plan for economic help for southeast Asia that takes account of the free world's existing commitments and remaining resources. Such a plan must facilitate foreign investment, without exacerbating national feelings, without treating such investment so roughly as to make sure that it is never repeated. There should be provision for capital equipment and new plans for irrigation, transport and communications. In all

External Affairs

these matters the Atlantic powers and the nations of the commonwealth can help in the material and in the technical sphere.

Aid to the east should therefore take three forms. The first is essential to give that financial and economic support without which we cannot hope to create conditions that can successfully withstand the challenge of communism. Second, some military help will be necessary in the form of military missions, arms and equipment. Here close coordination between neighbouring countries is urgently needed. Third, there should be an agreed strategy in all this area between the powers principally concerned, and their burden both in troops and political responsibility fairly adjusted.

It is equally necessary that our several intelligence services in the Far East should be reviewed and co-ordinated.

I therefore repeat that the most urgent need is for us to have a common policy in these affairs. No nation can, by itself, save the Far East.

Our common policy must be founded upon determination to help the peoples of southeast Asia to live in freedom from want or fear. Without our aid they are doomed to all the consequences of communist rule, and if they should fall, who can doubt that the danger to the peace of all the world would move nearer and yet nearer to home?

That is the complete quotation from the great wartime foreign secretary of Great Britain. I might say that appeared, as I have read it, in the New York Times of January 20, 1950, a paper that I believe will be regarded by everyone as a completely reliable publication.

When the Secretary of State for External Affairs, in a rather jaunty manner, talks about the difficulties that he has encountered when he makes general statements and then tries to follow them up with positive statements, he is quite competent to speak for himself. I have no doubt that is an accurate description of the situation in which he usually finds himself; but I followed with the very clear statement that here was the answer to the problem. This was not a statement made before there was British recognition. When he suggests that British recognition and the recognition of India, Pakistan and other countries makes it impossible now to have a uniform pattern, he is challenging the common sense and accuracy of the statement of Mr. Anthony Eden, which I have read, in regard to this very subject; because these other recognitions had been made at the time that this positive statement was made.

Let me deal with some of these points that have been brought up today-because this is not a situation that can be disposed of by quibbling or by badinage. It is a subject that, as has been pointed out by Mr. Anthony Eden, presents a critical challenge to the whole world at this hour. It should be the first concern of this parliament and of the government of Canada to recognize that, if this critical situation should lead to an explosion, then our full compliance with every other undertaking we have accepted, and our full

and wholehearted support of the Atlantic pact, will have proved completely unavailing to preserve that peace which is the aim of every sensible person in this country and of every thoughtful human being throughout the world.

I just want to make one point quite clear. I do not for a moment question the fact that the Secretary of State for External Affairs has acted in his official capacity. with courtesy to the members of this house with whom he has dealt and to those who have no official positions, whether on the government side or on the other side of the house. I want one thing to be quite clearly understood. I have received no information from him on this subject which would adequately explain to me what knowledge the government now has in regard to this extremely important subject. The Secretary of State for External Affairs did present to me a memorandum dealing with the Chinese question, which was a confidential memorandum. He said it was top secret, and it was so marked. It was delivered to me on November 29, 1949. It was delivered before he was in the Orient, and incidentally before recognition had taken place by India, the United Kingdom, Pakistan or the other nations he has mentioned. A great deal has happened since that time-a very great deal. There has been a wholly changed situation in China and in the Orient. For one thing, there has been an agreement between the Mao regime and the Soviet union. I was under the impression it was suggested that the government was not fully informed in regard to that agreement. Was I correct in that?

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LIB

Lester Bowles Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs)

Liberal

Mr. Pearson:

Apparently there are secret clauses.

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PC

George Alexander Drew (Leader of the Official Opposition)

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Drew:

The reason I asked the question is that the whole text of the agreement was published on February 15 in the New York Times. There may be secret clauses, but there is a very full agreement which does indicate the nature of the thirty-year alliance that has been signed between the Soviet union and the Mao regime following some two months of negotiation in Moscow. And as I recalled the other night, there is a startling similarity between many of the terms in this agreement and those of the agreement that was signed on August 26, 1939, between Hitler's government and the government of Russia.

I would commend to the earnest consideration of those who are following the course of history the photograph that appeared in the New York Times of February 16. There they will see Mr. Stalin, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Vishinsky taking their part in the signing of this agreement in the presence of Mr. Mao.

I commend that picture to their attention because of the extraordinary similarity of it to a picture which appeared after Ribbentrop had signed an agreement on behalf of Germany on that fateful day of August 26, 1939.

So far as that memorandum was concerned, the Secretary of State for External Affairs did make it available to me, but 1 want it known that I am not informed secretly of any information which would assist me in understanding what course the government is likely to take in the light of subsequent events, and it is within that period that there have been important events. Certainly we have gained no information from the three speeches made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs that would assist us in that respect.

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?

An hon. Member:

Mumbo-jumbo.

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LIB

Jean-François Pouliot

Liberal

Mr. Pouliot:

Jumbo yourself.

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PC

Arthur Leroy Smith

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Smith (Calgary West):

Jumbo's baby.

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PC

Gordon Knapman Fraser

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Fraser:

He has not opened the window yet.

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PC

George Alexander Drew (Leader of the Official Opposition)

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Drew:

The Secretary of State for External Affairs has tried to create the impression that General McNaughton's statement was simply a personal statement in regard to what was taking place at Lake Success. General McNaughton cannot divest himself of his official position. He is there as an official appointed by the Canadian government, and he is still Canadian representative on the atomic energy commission of the United Nations. He still is the chairman of the Canadian section of the permanent joint board on defence. He occupies these official positions, and he cannot on one occasion wear the cloak that indicates his responsibility in that respect, and on another occasion divest himself of it.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs says that General McNaughton was referring to the discussions of a group dealing with atomic energy questions. General McNaughton was referring to the walkout of the Soviet delegates and of the delegates of the satellite nations-and this was not just once; there were fifteen walkouts from different committees. When the Secretary of State for External Affairs indicates that Canada is not concerned, I should think Canada should be very much concerned about this pressure that is being exerted to have the other nations bow to their will in a matter of this kind. It is not something that might take place; it is something that has taken place. And when we talk of the position that Canada would be in if they did it, I say they have done it. They have walked out, and they have walked out for the particular purpose of asserting their position in regard to the Chinese situation.

External Affairs

What I said the other night, and what I repeat now, is that this is a form of blackmail; and if the other nations accede to that procedure, then the discussions there will become practically meaningless. I said the other night, and I repeat today, that Russia has a way of presenting its case. It can make arguments; it has a right to make arguments if it does not think that the present Chinese representative should be there and that the representative of Mao should be there, and that that is the way they should proceed.

No; I never suggested that Canada should walk out. As the Secretary of State for External Affairs has said, it would be an absurd suggestion; and frankly I think it is absurd for him even to indicate that anyone would think of it. We do not suggest that for one moment. What was being suggested was that this is a new set of events since Great Britain and India recognized the Mao regime.

Let me come back to the statement of General McNaughton. The Secretary of State for External Affairs has read it. It states:

Unfortunately the further progress of these meetings has been held up by the Soviet refusal to participate as long as the Chinese delegate represented the nationalist government. However there is reason to expect that the meetings will again be resumed shortly when this difficulty has been overcome.

What I said when I mentioned this before, and what I say again, is that General McNaughton's words on that occasion have no meaning unless they were intended to imply that this difficulty, the presence of the present Chinese representative, would only be disposed of by his being replaced by a representative of the Mao regime. The Secretary of State for External Affairs nods his head in seeming approval. That is exactly what I said the other night, and it is what I say now. General McNaughton was saying that the Soviet delegate and those supporting him were pointing out that we were holding things up. The Secretary of State for External Affairs says nothing is being held up. General McNaughton said, "further progress of these meetings has been held up." Well, perhaps he does not know, but he is the Canadian representative at those meetings. He is referring to a situation which relates to fifteen separate acts which were part of a common pattern.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs went on to deal with the question of recognition. He said we have to distinguish between a government whose authority is being challenged, and a government which has just been formed; also that there is a difference between the recognition of a state and the recognition of a new government. He said

522

External Affairs

what we can see taking place almost before our eyes in this house, and what can be seen in similar parliaments, I think at this time there should be an urgent appeal to wake up before it is too late and act together to save the peace for which so many men and women have died.

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CCF

Major James William Coldwell

Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.)

Mr. M. J. Coldwell (Roseiown-Biggar):

Mr. Speaker, my first word must be to say that we support the reference of these estimates, as proposed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson), to the standing committee on external affairs. I believe that the house should be supplied with all available information that can be given to hon. members from time to time in order that we may understand, better than we have in the past, the external relations of this country and the international situation. I am glad indeed to note that there is a greater interest in external affairs in this parliament than in former parliaments. In the days before the last war we usually had a debate for half a day which was most often asked for by the former leader of the C.C.F., Mr. J. S. Woodsworth, and it usually petered out in a few hours. It is indeed good to see the house interested in this subject as evidenced by those who were here on Friday last, although I was absent myself, and again today.

I was hoping that the debate today might range over a rather wider field than the relationship between Canada and China. It has taken that course, however, and I propose to say something about the situation a little later. What I should like to say first of all is that too often in the past and even at the present time we have been inclined to discuss international affairs apart from certain economic realities. After all, I think we should have learned by this time that economic realities are responsible to a greater degree than possibly we have appreciated in the past for the political and other disturbances that arise internationally. In my remarks I do not intend to confine myself to one type of totalitarianism because in the past twenty-five years we have seen two types, that which is called soviet communism and that which is called fascism. The seeds of both have been implanted deeply in the world and are still there, and we cannot tell when fascism may appear again in opposition to communism.

For a good many years we have tried to drive home the fact that we must pay attention to the economic conditions all over the world, including those in our own country. It was out of the misery and oppression of the czarist regime that the present form

[Mr. Drew.l

of communism arose in Russia and spread across the world. It was out of the misery and poverty of the Italian people that Mussolini was able to organize the march on Rome and set up the fascist regime. It was equally out of the unemployment and misery of the German people that Hitler and his nazi party, to our sorrow, were able to rise and obtain power in that great country.

Today the threat of communism is serious because millions of people in the world are existing in the direst poverty, misery and want. In a dispatch, for example, from London, dated March 6, Lord Boyd Orr, the former director general of the United Nations food and agricultural organization-and incidentally the 1949 Nobel peace prize winner- is reported to have said:

Hunger and not politics is responsible for the spread of communism in Asia.

May I point out that we have also been saying the same thing continually over the years. I recollect that in discussing the government's white paper on the war appropriation bill in April of 1945 I said:

No financial agreement can be successful unless a solution is found for the distribution of the real wealth of the world, across the world, and for raising standards of living everywhere in the world. This world cannot remain at peace; this world cannot remain free, as we call free, if one-half of the world is underfed, underclothed, underhoused and, indeed, underprivileged in any respect.

We believe that. We have tried to bring this truth before the House of Commons and the country again and again. I believe it is because nations have failed throughout the years to meet this fundamental requirement of human existence that we are faced with the serious challenge of soviet communism all over the world today. We know that the acceptance of such communism by depressed peoples involves a surrender of something that we consider to be very precious indeed, freedom of speech, freedom of thought and freedom of worship, which are the very fundamentals of the kind of democracy in which we believe. We may discuss plans for military rearmament, and unfortunately we must; we may set aside vast appropriations for the building up of war supplies, for the making of atomic bombs and all the rest of it. But we shall not have met the challenge of totalitarian communist or fascist propaganda until we have improved the standards of life for millions of people all over the world. Under present circumstances and because of our past failures we have to play our part-and I am not complaining about it-among the democratic nations of the world in preparing to defend our free institutions and our democratic way of life if they are threatened by military aggression. But if we fail to play our part in the removal of poverty, misery and

want in our own country and elsewhere we shall lose the battle in which we are now engaged. I think this is the fundamental position from which we should view Canada's international relations.

A great deal of discussion has taken place in the house today and on Friday last about the recognition of China. The article by Professor Lauterpacht, K.C., F.B.A., professor of international law at the university of Cambridge, which was published in the London Times, has been referred to on several occasions. What did he point out therein? He pointed out that the problem of recognition of governments is one of the crucial issues of international law. I think we all agree with that. He said that to decline to recognize a government is to withhold from the community which it governs most of the advantages of international law. It involves, among other things, a refusal to acknowledge the validity of its legislative and judicial acts; and the denial to it and its organs of the ordinary jurisdictional immunities. On the other side it involves the government refusing recognition in a series of difficulties since it is unable to use the ordinary international methods of protecting its own nationals and interests in territory controlled by the governments which it refuses to recognize.

And if I may quote directly, he says this:

There are some who maintain that, all this notwithstanding. recognition is a purely discretionary act of policy-an act of grace which may be withheld at pleasure and may legitimately be used as a weapon of political intervention or of economic pressure. There is no support for any such view in the bulk of the practice of this-

That is, the United Kingdom.

-and other countries. On the contrary, overwhelming authority points to the fact that, provided that the conditions presented by international law are fulfilled, there is a legal duty to recognize.

Then he goes on to discuss what are those fundamental conditions of international law. First of all he says that recognition is of course a declaration of an existing fact. Once a revolutionary government enjoys the obedience of the mass of the population and is in effective control of the bulk of the territory, it is entitled to recognition. Then he adds, and again I quote directly:

Its revolutionary origin or the method of the revolutionary change is irrelevant.

Then, second, he says that recognition of a revolutionary government is prohibited so long as the lawful government has a reasonable prospect of reasserting its authority; and I do not think anyone will contend that at the present moment the former lawful or legal government of China has any possibility of regaining control over its territory. Then he goes on to say, thirdly:

The government, by consent of the governed, is not a condition, though it was insisted upon in the

External Affairs

early part of the present century. It was abandoned after the first world war and is not at present part of the law.

He also stated there was an impression that a lawful government holding out in one isolated fortress-perhaps I should have said this earlier-is entitled to continued recognition de jure; and went on to say that to hold this view was to strain to the breaking point an otherwise unimpeachable rule. Then he said that it was a question of fact, to be ascertained in good faith, whether the authority of the lawful government has become purely nominal; but it was the fourth point to which the leader of the opposition (Mr. Drew) drew attention on Friday evening, and I quote from page 460 of Hansard where he is reported as saying:

I should like to read that fourth point again.

"There is finally the question of the willingness to fulfil international obligations and of assurances to be given to that effect by the government recognition of which is under consideration."

Even if the first three conditions were met, a question might well be asked as to whether the fourth condition can be met at the present time by the Mao regime in China.

Well, what does Professor Lauterpacht say? At the risk of reading a little more than I usually do I am going to quote the paragraph which refers to this fourth point. I think it is important, particularly since that point was under discussion, and since the other day I suggested that the time had come when we should recognize the new government of China. He says:

There is, finally, the question of the willingness to fulfil international obligations and of assurances to be given to that effect by the government recognition of which is under consideration.

He goes on to say, and this is important:

That particular test of recognition has been often resorted to, and has recently loomed large in the public discussion, including leading articles in The Times. But it is extremely doubtful whether it is a sound test and whether it forms part of international law. It was absent from British practice in the nineteenth century. It is a condition of recognition which has often been abused, in relation to weak governments, for the purpose of extracting unilateral advantages and concessions. In relation to the government of a large state its futility is obvious, for it is a clear rule of international law that a newly-recognized government is bound by the obligations of its predecessor and of international law generally.

No special assurances are required. Neither can it be expected that the government of a great state-will be induced to give them unless on a basis of mutuality and equality. The value of any such assurance, if not accompanied by good will, is insignificant. The proper course is to assume that the government of a sovereign state will fulfil its obligations in good faith. Failing that, it is open toother states to adopt such methods of persuasion as circumstances and international law permit.

There I think we have an explanation of the fourth point, to which reference has been made. Then he goes on to say something else I should like to quote:

External Affairs

The distinction must be asserted between recognizing a government and entering into diplomatic relations with it. No state is legally obliged to enter into and maintain diplomatic relations with a state or government which it recognizes. On the other hand, it cannot enter into full and normal diplomatic relations with a state or government which it does not recognize.

Recognition of a new governmental authority, accompanied as it must be by automatic withdrawal of recognition from its predecessor, necessitates an invidious decision which, in relation to old friends, may be distasteful and not free from anxiety. But decisions of this nature are unavoidable. They do not become easier by dint of being postponed.

Then he adds this:

It may be of importance, in the case now before His Majesty's government-

That is, recognition of China.

-to reassure public opinion that the decision at which they have arrived is not arbitrary or intended to minister to what may be a transient advantage, but that it is in accordance with principle and with the practice of enlightened nations, including that of our closest friend and ally.

The reference there is to something he said a little earlier in the same article in regard to the historical background of the United States with respect to the recognition of revolutionary governments. Apparently the London Times agreed with this view that China should be recognized because of the conditions laid down in this article, and because of the necessity. Indeed I have here a report which appeared in our local newspapers as an Associated Press dispatch dated London, January 7, the day after the British government granted recognition to the new Chinese government. These are the main points in the dispatch: The British press, in a chorus of

approval, greeted Britain's recognition of the new government of China. All papers, including Labour and Conservative, gave approval. Lord Beaverbrook's Daily Express termed the recognition wise. The London Times said Britain was accepting a communist regime in China as she already had done in Russia, but would resist any attempt by the Chinese government to enforce communism on other countries.

Thus we see that in a country with long experience in international matters and the way these things are done in the field of international affairs, all the newspapers from the London Times through to the Daily Herald, the Labour paper, welcomed recognition and approved of it. Consequently I say that under international law, and in the interests of their own nationals, this recognition was granted.

This afternoon the leader of the opposition (Mr. Drew) referred to the article by Mr. Anthony Eden which appeared some ten or twelve days after recognition had been granted. But note this, for it is on the record: If one reads Mr. Eden's article, one finds that what he was criticizing was not the recognition of China as such, but the timing of that

recognition. He was deploring the fact that all the commonwealth nations, indeed all the nations with interests in the Pacific, did not act together. As the leader of the opposition indicated when he read the article, and as the Secretary of State for External Affairs pointed out in his speech, Mr. Eden stated that recognition was inescapable. It had to come. The only criticism he made was of the timing of that recognition. Mr. Eden thought a common policy should have been agreed upon. I know that for a long time that had been the position of the British Conservative party. They had always thought that there should be an imperial foreign policy, which would be controlled from one central point. None of the commonwealth nations, at least in the last 25 or 30 years, have felt inclined to co-operate in sending representatives to one point, or in the setting up of any organization, which would bring about a common foreign policy of this description.

I am certain of this, that the people of Canada would not have wanted to have this parliament approve of the establishment of a super-cabinet to deal with foreign policy on an imperial basis. I feel that this is a relic of the old plea for an imperial foreign policy, an idea which, fortunately or unfortunately according to one's viewpoint, was discarded long ago. As a matter of fact, even if we liked the idea, it is not possible to put it into effect now, because our economic and geographical circumstances are so different. A policy that is suitable for the United Kingdom would not necessarily be suitable for Canada. Certainly, as we have seen, it would not be acceptable to the new republics of the commonwealth, India and Pakistan. In my opinion it is far better to have the type of commonwealth association we have, an association of free peoples and free governments, than it is to have something rigid, because in time it would break, and we would find ourselves with no real association at all.

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PC

James MacKerras Macdonnell

Progressive Conservative

Mr. Macdonnell (Greenwood):

Would the hon. member permit a question?

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March 7, 1950