May 24, 1938


On the orders of the day:


CON

Henry Herbert Stevens

Conservative (1867-1942)

Hon. H. H. STEVENS (Kootenay East):

I should like to ask a question of the Minister of Labour (Mr. Rogers) regarding a Canadian Press dispatch indicating that Mr. Humphrey Mitchell, "director of labour transference in the federal Labour department," is in Vancouver consulting with the mayor and other authorities. My question is, what are the instructions that Mr. Mitchell has in this matter, and what is the attitude of the government to-day in regard to this very perplexing question, which according to the dispatch has not made any progress towards solution?

Hon. NORMAN McL. ROGERS (Minister of Labour): Mr. Mitchell, who is an

officer of the Department of Labour, left for Vancouver on May 7. While in Vancouver he has been assisting in providing the Department of Labour here with information with respect to developments there. As I stated to the house yesterday, we have been proceeding upon the basis of consultation and cooperation with the provincial government in connection with this question of the single unemployed who are now in Vancouver. Mr. Mitchell has been a means through which that consultation is being effected.

As to the situation in Vancouver, I am informed that it has not changed since the statement I made yesterday.

51952-201 i

Topic:   UNEMPLOYMENT
Subtopic:   CONCENTRATION OF SINGLE UNEMPLOYED MEN IN VANCOUVER-MR. HUMPHREY MITCHELL
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CON

Henry Herbert Stevens

Conservative (1867-1942)

Mr. STEVENS:

Would the minster say

what Mr. Mitchell's instructions are? He is described as "director of labour transference in the federal Labour department."

Topic:   UNEMPLOYMENT
Subtopic:   CONCENTRATION OF SINGLE UNEMPLOYED MEN IN VANCOUVER-MR. HUMPHREY MITCHELL
Permalink
LIB

Norman McLeod Rogers (Minister of Labour)

Liberal

Mr. ROGERS:

I have nothing to add to

what I have already said on that point. Mr. Mitchell is there to keep in touch with the situation and to keep me advised of any developments.

Topic:   UNEMPLOYMENT
Subtopic:   CONCENTRATION OF SINGLE UNEMPLOYED MEN IN VANCOUVER-MR. HUMPHREY MITCHELL
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FOREIGN POLICY-STATEMENT OF MR. MACKENZIE KING ON MOTION OF MINISTER OF FINANCE


Hon. CHARLES A. DUNNING (Minister of Finance) moved that the house go into committee of supply.


LIB

William Lyon Mackenzie King (Prime Minister; Secretary of State for External Affairs; President of the Privy Council)

Liberal

Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister):

Mr. Speaker, as hon. members of the house are aware, I had intended to make a statement on external affairs at about the time of the Easter recess. One circumstance or another has rendered it inconvenient or inadvisable to make that statement until to-day.

In view of the very serious condition of affairs in Europe and the grave unrest that exists in many parts of the world, I am not going to attempt this afternoon to rely upon my memory for what I have to say. Rather I shall follow somewhat closely what I intended to say in a statement which I had prepared several weeks ago. It may be that the statement will be the more significant in the light of events of the last few weeks. I shall endeavour in what I say to be as concise and at the same time as comprehensive as possible. By that I mean I shall endeavour not to omit any of the subjects which I believe hon. members will wish to consider in discussing foreign policy or, better, external affairs. I use the words "external affairs," because our relations with different parts of the British Empire are affairs which lie beyond the dominion; they could hardly be called foreign affairs, but they are external affairs, while our relations with other countries come under the heading of foreign affairs. I shall endeavour, as I say, to anticipate what may be in the minds of hon. members in the way of questions as to the attitude and policy of the government with respect to situations that have arisen in which Canada may be expected to have some interest or to take some part.

It may be desirable at the outset to make some observations of a general character in

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view of the concern which events abroad have caused in all our minds. We look out upon a disturbed and seemingly chaotic world. Bitter and destructive wars are being waged in two continents. Force is openly glorified. Solemn pledges are disregarded. Armaments are mounting to fantastic heights. A war of propaganda is filling the air. We ask ourselves, how, within twenty years after a war to end war, is the war spirit so strong in many quarters? Why, after a war to make the world safe for democracy, has dictatorship attained such acceptance and momentum?

It is not possible to give a short answer to such questions. It is clear that no one factor and no single country can be held responsible. The fact is the great war never completely ended; the world is still suffering from its consequences. The effects of four years of world struggle and destruction and convulsion did not end in 1918. The results of a great war are usually entirely different from the intentions and the objectives of any of the peoples who embark upon it.

For a time after the war it appeared that a stable world might shortly be attained. A genuine passion for peace spread through all the countries engaged in the war, the losers as well as the nominal victors. In great part this new will to peace found embodiment in the League of Nations, but it found expression in many other movements as well. No one who visited Europe in the middle twenties could doubt the strength or the genuineness of that desire. But meanwhile other forces had been at work which in time overcame this will to peace in many quarters. Over a great part of Europe, except the democratic states fronting on the Atlantic, political and social revolutions were in progress. Countries which had not been fortunate enough to work out political freedom and economic progress by gradual effort found themselves compelled to face these belated tasks through revolution. The war had broken down the accepted social structure, the habitual conventions and restraints. The new controls were established by violence, by dictatorship of a class, dictatorship of an individual. New men, with new ambitions and new methods, were thrown up in the conflict; masters of violence and propaganda were given free hand. Inevitably the revolutions and class conflicts which have dominated the internal affairs of three countries out of four in central, eastern and southern Europe found reflection in their foreign relations as well. The new religions of race or class or social doctrine were as explosive, as expansive, as intolerant as Islam was a thousand years ago. The world was called

upon to subscribe to their new creeds of communism or fascism or other isms.

The peace settlement had left problems and grievances which these explosive forces turned to account. It solved some territorial grievances, some nationalist aspirations, but it created new problems. Some countries or minorities when given freedom denied that freedom to others. Some countries which had lost territory or prestige were stirred up to plan for vindication and revenge. Some of the victors could not forget their fear or their pride. The fact that the earthquake of the war had disturbed the existing balance of world power, had given America and Asia new power relatively to western Europe, further complicated the organization of peace.

I do not believe these forces would have reached the explosion point if economic depression had not swept the world in 1929 and the years that followed. Depression sharpened every problem, shook the individual's security, increased the tension of international intercourse, provided the unemployed and discontented recruits for the new gospels. That depression, at least in its magnitude, was also a delayed consequence of the war, the war that left a crushing burden of debts and reparations, that broke down international credit and currency arrangements, that created new customs boundaries and new vested economic interests.

It may be that if the world had the last ten years to live over again the present breakdown might have been averted. A realistic settlement of war debts and reparations might have been effected. Trade barriers might have been reduced. Some would say the league should have attempted more strenuously to put down force by force, notably in Manchuria in 1931, while others would1 say the trouble lay in the very attempt to use collective force to maintain the Versailles settlement. Perhaps if any single cause and time might be isolated, it would most reasonably be held to be the failure, during the disarmament discussions in the early thirties, to recognize the futility of maintaining against Germany the one-sided policy of disarmament prescribed by the treaty of Versailles, the failure to make moderate concessions to a democratic regime in Germany, which later were grasped and far exceeded by a dictatorial regime.

It is a dark outlook, but not one that calls for despair. Some measure of internal stability survives even in states that have suffered many shocks. It may be years, however, before freedom and tolerance revive.

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The equilibrium of military force, which might have been secured at a moderate height five years ago, will be secured at a much higher level. Where resort to arms appears to be inevitable, every effort should and, I believe, will be made to circumscribe the area of conflict. The reversion to prewar or pre-modern age standards of internal and external conduct has not materially affected the western or north Atlantic world. No country in which democracy was firmly established has given up its ideal and its practice of liberty at home, its ideal and its practice of peace abroad, even if that peace has had to be assured by new outlays for defence.

The question is asked, What is Canada's foreign or external policy in such a world? In some quarters it is contended that Canada has no foreign policy, a contention which on analysis usually turns out to mean that the Canadian government does not make weekly announcements about other countries' foreign policies. Too often it is assumed that foreign policy is something that must be made in Geneva, or in London, or in Moscow, [DOT] according to the centre of the speaker's interests, and that Canada should line up in support of or opposition to other countries' foreign policies.

May I refer to some observations on this subject which I made at a conference in England some years ago. I intend to embody in what I have to say quotations from speeches made at imperial conferences in Great Britain and at Geneva, and some references to statements of policy made in this house at different times in the past. I do that lest it be assumed that what I am setting forth at this time is set forth in the light of conditions as we see them and know them to be to-day. I prefer rather that what has been set forth in the past as a statement of our position should be made clear at this time, particularly as I have had reason to say with pride and satisfaction that our foreign policy has remained to the present what it has been in the past.

This statement was made at the imperial conference of 1923:

Foreign policy I conceive as simply the sum of those dealings or relationships or policies which the government of one country carries on with other countries. It is in large part an extension of domestic policy. It depends upon the balance of social and political forces, upon the industrial organization, upon the whole background of the people's life. . . . Foreign affairs nowadays have to do largely with economic questions, trade or tariff, oil or railway concessions, international debts, migration, fishery or power or navigation rights in boundary waters. They are largely neighbours' disputes, arising naturally most frequently with the countries with which there is most intercourse.

The question whether a certain matter in dispute will lead to friction, or even to war, is frequently not so much a question of the character of the specific issue, as of the spirit and traditions and supposed general interests of the countries concerned.

No two countries have the same neighbours, the same relationships; no two countries can have the same questions to deal with, the same policies for their solution. Argentina and Finland, China and Switzerland, have widely different preoccupations. There are of course world movements, trade, cultural, military, which affect every country, affect all countries increasingly, but they affect no two countries alike or in the same degree. And so even in times of world disturbance, the policies of no two countries can be alike, provided they are rooted in their own interests or the ideals in which their interests are sublimated, and are not merely echoes of the policies of other countries.

So far as Canada is concerned, the question of foreign or external policy is at once extremely simple and extremely complex. Our direct and individual relations with other countries are important; they involve difficulties and differences of opinion; but the issues are issues within our knowledge and competence, issues for which we can find our own solution. Our indirect relations, as a member of the League of Nations, as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, present issues of a more varied and complicated character.

Our direct relations with other countries are increasingly important. In large measure they are relations with one or other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Questions which arise with these communities are frequently difficult, frequently involve, particularly in trade matters, conflicts of opinion between different sections or interests in our own country; but the frank and friendly attitude which exists, the understanding based on similar political and social and ethical standards and ways of life, ensure a settlement.

In large measure also our external relations consist of our relations with our great neighbour. These relations are so intimate and continuous that some people in Canada seem to imagine they are not foreign relations at all, that they do not constitute foreign policy at all; they unconsciously assume that foreign policy should mean to us the relations and. issues involved in some other country's foreign policy, or that our foreign policy should mean only relations with distant countries with which we have little contact and connection.

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These relations with the United States, which constitute and always will constitute by far the most important part of our foreign policy in the strict sense, have not always been easy to carry on. Real differences of interest arise from time to time; these differences are expressed with an openness and frankness that leave nothing concealed; constitutional divisions of authority complicate agreement. Within our memory a good deal of friction has existed, exclusive trade policies and pin-pricking attitudes have roused resentment. But that attitude has largely disappeared. On both sides of the border there is a realization of common ideals and common interests, a genuine friendliness and increasing understanding, which facilitate agreement on most issues that- arise and make it no serious calamity if for the moment agreement is not reached on others.

Incidentally, I may say from my experience, and I am sure the right hon. the leader of the opposition would say the same from his experience, the existence of a Canadian legation at Washington and a United States legation at Ottawa have greatly aided in the growth of this understanding and the prompt and effective consideration of questions that arose. It is one of our national assets-and we need all our assets to offset some of our liabilities-that we have a good neighbour- a neighbour that any free country in the continent of Europe or elsewhere would thank its stars to have.

I need not refer to our increasingly close relations with other lands in Europe, particularly France, and in Latin America and Asia. They are largely, but not wholly, relations of trade. Here I might point out that the increasing intervention of the state in business in many countries abroad, the growth of exchange controls, of quota regulations, of state monopolies, make it increasingly difficult for the business man to do business in the old way, require the intervention of his government with the government of the other country to ensure a reasonably fair and definite opportunity to carry on business.

The Secretary of State of the United States, in the significant address which he delivered a few weeks ago on the foreign policy of the United States, declared:

The primary objectives of our foreign policy are the maintenance of the peace of our country, and the promotion of the economic, the social and the moral welfare of our people.

Within our more limited range of activity, we could, I think, say much the same thing. Our foreign and external policy is a policy of peace and friendliness, a policy of trying to

fMr. Mackenzie King.]

look after our own interests and to understand the position of other governments with which we have dealings. It is a policy which takes account of our political connections and traditions, our geographical position, the limited numbers and the racial composition of our people, our stage in economic development, our own internal preoccupations and necessities-in short, a policy based on the Canadian situation. It is not and cannot be under these conditions a spectacular head-line policy; it is simply the sum of the countless daily dealings with other countries, the general resultant of an effort to act decently on every issue or incident that arises, and a hope of receiving the same treatment from others.

Canada, it is hardly necessary to say, cherishes no design of aggression or expansion or revenge. We have no ancient grudges, no envy for others' possessions, no ambition for controlling others' destinies. We know and the world knows that we have neither the power nor the will to attack any other land for our own ends.

Nor are we inclined to organize or join in crusades in other continents. We are a part of the modern world. We cannot help but be affected in some measure by the policies and actions of other countries. We cannot be indifferent to the fate of democratic institutions, the suffering of unfortunate minorities elsewhere. But we must keep a sense of perspective. Resolutions or speeches on affairs in Austria or Spain or Santo Domingo may afford an emotional outlet, but they do not give our country any power to shape the destiny of other peoples. We have a tremendous task at home. Our eleven million people are trying to develop half a continent, to find a decent livelihood, to build up a distinctive national life. We have neither the power nor the knowledge to settle the destinies of countries thousands of miles away. We are no more likely of our own motion to intervene in Europe than Sweden or Bulgaria or Switzerland is to intervene in America. It is sometimes forgotten that in Canada itself we have an area as large as Europe, with problems of communication, of development, of adjustment of sectional and cultural groups quite as difficult to deal with as many of the problems of adjustment which the different parts of Europe are facing, and which constitute a great part of European "foreign affairs," that we are not asking and will not receive any help from outside in meeting these difficulties, and that we are unlikely to have any surplus of statesmanship or good fortune to bestow elsewhere.

Foreign Policy

If we are unlikely of our own motion to take part in wars of conquest or wars of crusade, it is equally unlikely that at the moment, with the world as it is to-day, any other country will single out Canada for attack. The talk which one sometimes hears of aggressor countries planning to invade Canada and seize these tempting resources of ours is, to say the least, premature. It ignores our neighbours and our lack of neighbours; it ignores the strategic and transportation difficulties of transoceanic invasion; it ignores the vital fact that every aggressor has not only potential objects of its ambition many thousands of miles nearer which would be the object of any attack, but potential and actual rivals near at hand whom it could not disregard by launching fantastic expeditions across half the world. The truth of this is recognized in every country. At present danger of attack upon Canada is minor in degree and secondhand in origin. It is against chance shots that we need immediately to defend ourselves. What may develop no one can say.

Thus while it is well we should see our country and its security as viewed from other lands we should also have a clear vision of how dangers that threaten in other parts of the world may expand under circumstances which lie beyond any control of our own, and be prepared to meet any situation which may arise in a world of the character that our world is to-day.

If we are not likely to be directly involved in a conflict, are we likely to be drawn into European conflicts indirectly, for example, through our connection with the league? That is an important question which I think many Canadians are asking at the moment. I have pointed out that so far as we ourselves are concerned, being a country by ourselves, if we were confined to looking after ourselves we have little to fear. But we have other associations and out of those associations arise obligations. The question naturally arises as to what, in determining our attitude, the significance of those associations may be.

We are a member of the League of Nations which was founded for the purpose of advancing international cooperation and world peace. From the beginning, wide differences of opinion have existed as to the means by which those ends were to be sought and achieved. Successive Canadian governments have supported one of those views. In this house in June, 1936, and at the assembly of the league in September of that year, I restated that view. Developments since that time have only served to confirm the soundness of the position then taken. [DOT]

Briefly, the Canadian government believes that the only feasible and constructive basis of league activity under present conditions is to develop all its possibilities of conciliation, all its possibilities of cooperation in agreed tasks, all its possibilities of shaping and focusing world opinion. As indicated in a statement made on behalf of the present government in October, 1935, we are convinced of the value and necessity of the league "as an indispensable agency for organizing and strengthening the forces of good will in the world, and for effecting the essential adjustment of conflicting national aims." As Lord Curzon declared at the first session of the council of the league, which has just held its hundredth session:

The League of Nations is the expression of a universal desire for a saner method of regu-. lating the affairs of mankind.

That desire, that need, continues. In some way we must adjust our international relations to the economic forces, the scientific inventions which have made all nations neighbours, adjust our theories and practices of national sovereignty to the requirements of world cooperation. It is not a task which can be performed in a day. It is not an end which can be attained by shutting our eyes to facts, by assuming that nations are ready to-day to resign their sovereign right of decision to a world superstate. We must build on what exists, must extend the habit of cooperation in steadily wider fields, must seek to remove .the causes of friction and fear.

Equally definite is our belief that at the present juncture of world affairs it is not possible to make the league an international war office, an instrument of force, military or economic. As I said at Geneva in 1936:

There is a general unwillingness of peoples to incur obligations which they realize they may not be able in time of crisis to fulfil, obligations to use force and to use it at any place, any time, in circumstances unforeseen, and in disputes over whose origin or whose development they have had little or no control. This difficulty of automatic intervention increases rather than decreases when conflicts tend to become struggles between classes, between economic systems, between social philosophies, and, in some instances, between religious faiths, as well as between states.

In recent years the peoples have become more aware of the difficulty of localizing and restricting a war once it has begun. They have come to realize that the consequences of wars are different from either their real or their alleged objects, that war is war regardless of the labels and the slogans devised at the outset. They have become more aware of the horrors and suffering involved for any people at war from indiscriminate air

Foreign Policy

and gas attack. They have become aware of the strain on national unity and social order a long struggle may involve. They have become aware of the uncertainty, the very grave uncertainty, whether in any country engaged in a long war individual liberties can be maintained. They realize more clearly the difficulty of putting on economic sanctions unless the countries doing so possess overwhelming force and are firmly bound to apply military sanctions if the occasion arises, and prepared to exchange firm and explicit territorial and military guarantees among each other in advance.

In Mr. Eden's words in the British House of Commons last December:

There are two possible forms of sanctions, the ineffective, which are not- worth putting on, and the effective, which mean the risk, if hot the certainty, of war.

After stating:

I say deliberately that nobody could contemplate any action of that kind in the far east unless they are convinced that they have overwhelming force to back their policy.

Mr. Eden continues:

Do right hon. gentlemen opposite really think that the League of Nations to-day, with only two great naval powers in it, ourselves and France, have got that overwhelming force?

In other words, Mr. Eden recognized that a league which fell far short of the universality contemplated by its founders, could not hope to carry out the role of universal policeman.

In the statement at Geneva from which I have quoted, I made it as clear as possible that Canada could not accept the theory of automatic commitment to the application of force, economic or military.

The covenant as originally drafted provided alternatively for peace by conciliation and peace by collective coercion.

In its original conception the covenant was predicated upon the practically universal acceptance of its provisions. Without this assumption. the latter alternative of seeking peace by collective coercion, embodied in articles 10, 16 and 17, would not have found place. It was recognized that formal amendment of the covenant by the removal of those articles was not possible in view of the difficulty in securing action by the requisite two-thirds of the members even on amendments on which there is general agreement in principle. Nor was it necessary:

The powers and duties of the league-

I quote now from what I said at Geneva.

-develop by usage and experience as well as by explicit amendment. What its members will and will not do can be read more clearly from what they have done and not done than from fMr. Mackenzie King.]

the text of the covenant. What is now called for is to register in the light of actual facts the position which has developed during sixteen years of league history by the interpretations given and the action taken or not taken as occasion for decision arose.

It is a fact, as has been indicated by representatives of the Scandinavian countries and other members of the league, that many provisions of the covenant have not been observed, or have been applied unequally or ineffectively. The pledge of reduction of armaments in article 8 has not been honoured. The provisions for the revision of treaties "which have become inapplicable," contained in article 19, and which were in form and fact an essential complement to the provisions of article 10 for the maintenance of the territorial status quo, have not yet been applied. The sanctions provisions of article 16 were tacitly recognized at an early stage as unworkable in their entirety, and were modified by the assembly resolutions of 1921. Modified, or unmodified, sanctions against an aggressor have never been tried when the conflict took place in Asia or America. Applied once in an Afro-European conflict, they failed and were abandoned because of general unwillingness under the conditions of the day to press force to the point of war.

It has been alleged by some strong advocates of the collective coercion theory in Canada that Canada is responsible for wrecking this conception of the league. That view is part and parcel of the exaggerated idea of Canada's power and duty and the unwillingness to face the realities as to the attitudes of other states that underlies the advocacy of the 100 per cent sanctions doctrine. The influence of any small state at Geneva is definitely limited, except occasionally when it acts in the direction of one or another of the great powers' wishes. Every member of the league, whether from Europe, or from South America, or from Asia, has its own approach to the problems of the league, its own views of its interest or the league's interest. The Canadian government did not cause those countries to take the action or lack of action they have taken. It did in some measure realize what that course of action was likely to be. It was apparent years ago that in the opinion of many of the countries most influential in the league, the covenant was intended to be a one-way street, operating toward Europe, not from Europe. Chaco and Manchuria only confirmed that analysis. Ten years ago, the Canadian government, in a communication to the government of the United States on the relation between the covenant and the Kellogg pact, declared:

It is plain that the full realization of the ideal of joint economic or military pressure upon an outlaw power, upon which some of the founders of the league set great store, will require either an approach to the universality of the league contemplated when the covenant was being drawn, or an adjustment of the old rules of neutrality to meet the new conditions of cooperative defence.

Foreign Policy

Not all the forecasts we and others made in 1928 have required as little alteration as

that one.

As relatively little attention has been given the matter in Canada-itself a significant fact -it may be worth while to refer to the latest occasion on which the varying views of members of the league on this question of sanctions were set forth.

The whole question was reviewed in the January meeting of the council, this year, and in the proceedings of the committee of twenty-eight in January and February. This committee, it will be recalled, was appointed by the 1936 assembly to explore the whole question of the application or reform of the covenant. Every phase of that question- the problem of universality, cooperation with non-member states, regional or continental organization of the league, methods of amending or interpreting the covenant, article 10 (territorial integrity), 11, 12, 13, 14 (intervention in disputes). 16 and 17 (sanctions), and separation of the covenant from the peace treaties, were studied by special rapporteurs.

The first question, the possibility of securing the participation of all states in the league, was surveyed in a report by Lord Cranborne, who envisaged three types of league, (1) a coercive league, (2) a non-coercive league, and (3) an intermediate league, in which any members would retain the right to apply sanctions in cases where they considered it advisable. This report on universality was the only one which was formally before the committee on January 31 and February 1, but the discussion covered the whole range of the covenant and par* ticularly the question of article 16; it was impossible to consider whether it was desirable to bring all states into the league without considering what changes would be necessary to accomplish that end, and whether such changes were desirable or practicable.

The discussion brought out radically different points of view, but on one point there was little dissent-namely, that article 16 had never been enforced in its entirety and only once partly attempted; that there was no proposal in any quarter to apply it in the conflicts now waging, and that member states are not now prepared to regard the provisions of article 10 and article 16 as binding. The delegates of Sweden declared:

The league in practice has ceased to be a coercive league. ... By the force of events, without any amendments to the covenant, the practice has been established according to which members of the league do not consider themselves bound to undertake coercive action against an aggressor state.

That position was not seriously challenged. There was, however, wide difference of opinion as to whether a coercive league was or was not desirable, and whether or not the existing practice should be translated into amendments to the text of the covenant. Mr. Paul Boncour admitted there was some ground for the fear of certain small powers that the great powers which had shown little zeal for article 16 might demand its strict observance in conflicts in which they themselves were concerned. Some small states also appeared desirious of maintaining the possibility of sanctions being used in their support, though not ready to pledge their use when others were in need.

Broadly speaking, the U.S.S.R., France, Spain, China, Iran (or Persia), Czechoslovakia, Mexico, Colombia, New Zealand, indicated they were convinced that ultimately, if not now, sanctions might be workable, and that it would be a mistake to take article 10 and article 16 out of the covenant in response to what might prove a temporary difficulty. Sweden, and in other connections the other Scandinavian states, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, emphasized the danger of the present ambiguous position. Sweden and Holland proposed that article 16 be formally recognized as being at present optional and not obligatory in character. Poland indicated definite qualifications. Chile urged the removal of all sanctions to facilitate the entry or return of all countries to the league.

The Canadian government, through its representative on the committee, indicated its belief in the necessity of attaining substantial universality for the effective working of the league. It did not consider, however, that it was now possible to obtain universality by putting through formal amendments to the covenant. Some members of the league had indicated they were not prepared to consent to the explicit changes in the sanctions article necessary if some great countries were to enter. On the other hand, some countries outside the league had indicated their unwillingness to enter or re-enter the league, whether organized on a coercion or on a conciliation basis. The Canadian government therefore believed it desirable to keep the league operating as effectively as possible within the scope which experience had shown to be practicable, and to seek at a more opportune time such formal adjustments as may be required to secure the cooperation of all states which are prepared to renounce aggression and to cooperate in the peaceful settlement of international problems. Meanwhile, it was stated, the position of the Canadian government as to sanctions and the sanctions articles re-

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mained as set forth by the Prime Minister in the assembly in September, 1936. As has been indicated, no one in the recent discussion at Geneva ventured to hold that the sanctions articles were now in force. It would have taken considerable hardihood to make such a contention in view of the absolute refusal of league members, great and small, to invoke sanctions in the present conflict between Japan and China.

In fact, the present situation as to the interpretation of the sanctions articles was well summed up by the representative of Belgium in the committee of twenty-eight:

To-day is a grave conflict, the anxiety is to avoid procedures that might lead to the application of article 16, because account is taken of the obstacles that would be met with in its application.

At the same time, the possibility must be taken into account, that, in the phrase of another speaker, the article may be resurrected, or, as it has been put elsewhere, may be taken out of cold storage when it suits the interests of some of the members that now completely ignore its existence.

To avoid any possibility of ambiguity or misunderstanding, it is therefore desirable to repeat that the position indicated in the assembly of 1936 and in this house earlier in the same year remains the position of the Canadian government. We recognize the honesty and the idealism of those who call for a universal and automatic application of sanctions. We do not consider that it would make for honesty or decency or good will among nations to attempt an in and out interpretation of the covenant, based on the varying interests of some of the members of the league. So far as the Canadian government is concerned, the sanctions articles have ceased to have effect by general practice and consent, and cannot be revived by any state or group of states at will.

Now may I pass to the question of our relationship to the foreign policy of other members of the British commonwealth of nations, and particularly the United Kingdom. The task of the United Kingdom in the field of foreign affairs has been an extraordinarily difficult one of late years. Its own position has been modified by shifts in the balance of power throughout the world and the invention of weapons of war which have ended its own insularity, and introduced new factors into the Mediterranean area. As one of the great powers, it has had to consider not only its own protection, but the maintenance of peace throughout the world and particularly on the continent of Europe. There may be differences of opinion as to the wisdom of

some of the policies adopted to secure these ends in the twenty years since the war, but I think there can be little question of the unremitting care and anxiety which those responsible for the foreign policy of Britain have devoted to their task, or of their strong and determined effort to establish peace and maintain respect for solemn pledges and the principles of law.

No course of action adopted by the United Kingdom in foreign affairs can fail to have repercussions, great or small, upon Canada and the other members of the commonwealth of nations. The problem of adjustment this fact presents is one of the most difficult and complicated that faces Canada and other parts of the commonwealth as well. A number of courses have been urged or practised. It may be helpful to review these briefly. I believe that all of them have been mentioned in this house in the course of discussions on defence matters and other questions. They have been mentioned by one or another member who has been prepared to support the point of view he urged.

One attitude that has been proposed is to say that we will accept any policy adopted by the British government of the day, and give it our support, regardless of our own views and interests, and regardless of consequences.

It is only necessary to spell out the implications of this view to make it clear that even its exponents would hesitate to adopt it in all cases. The goal of United Kingdom policy may remain the same, but the paths by which that goal is sought vary widely. The view which I have mentioned would involve being prepared to follow every variation in the trend of British policy due to changing situations on the continent, changing party fortunes or changing ideas of national advantage. It would mean one year following a Conservative government, next year a Labour government; one year leaning toward collective security, next year perhaps toward isolation.

A second course would be to say that we will accept the policy of Great Britain whenever she acts through the league and in accordance with the covenant.

It was held in some quarters some years ago that the fact that all parts of the commonwealth were members of the league and that Great Britain would not go to war except under a league decision and in accordance with a covenant binding all parts equally and automatically, had conveniently and permanently solved the question of intracommonwealth war relations. Experience has shown that no such automatic solution is

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afforded by the league, that it does not operate automatically, and that the question whether an attempt is to be made to set its sanctions or war provisions in action depends in last analysis on whether influential European members of the , League wish to invoke these provisions.

A third course that might be advocated is to say we will advise Great Britain as to what course she should follow, so that we will not be involved in the consequences of a policy we thought wrong. I believe that position has been stated many times in this house.

This attitude has more to be said in its favour. Occasions arise where consultation is both necessary and possible, and where it will be open to each government and sometimes necessary for each government to indicate its attitude. The difficulty, however, is that a United Kingdom government, for example, must be responsible to its own people for its actions. The direct and main responsibility for its policy must rest with its own parliament. They are closer to the danger point, and must bear the main brunt of any misjudgment or failure. They might be prepared to take advice which fell in with their own views; but otherwise they would find it difficult to do so unless the adviser could guarantee them against the consequences. It could not be anticipated that Canada and South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland would always advise the same way. The necessity of the United Kingdom consulting certain other powers in Europe would not be affected. The danger would arise of intervening in controversies between the government and the opposition in Westminster. In many cases, there is not time or opportunity for such consultation or advice. A policy is not adopted at one stroke; it is the sum of many actions, accumulating decisions on what often appear points of detail, ordinary routine. Daily and sometimes hourly new situations must be faced, conversations held, decisions taken.

Again, it has been urged that we should say we will declare here and now our neutrality in any future conflict, decline to take part under any circumstances in any conflict in which the United Kingdom may be engaged.

I stated the government's position on this proposal last session in the following terms. I have stated it in similar terms in other sessions:

This would amount to tying the hands of parliament regardless of the circumstances of the war or the participants, what interests of

Canada may or may not be involved. Over and over again we have laid down the principle that so far as participation by Canada in war is concerned, it will be for our parliament to decide. Having taken that attitude in respect to participation, I think we might well take a similar attitude with respect to neutrality. At the present time there are no commitments, so far as Canada is concerned, to participate in any war. Equally there are no commitments . . . whereby we agree to remain neutral under all circumstances. The policy of the government with respect to participation and neutrality is that parliament will decide what is to be done.

That position has not been changed. To make such a declaration would be unjustified by the policies of British governments. It would be an unwise encouragement to potential aggressors.

Finally, we may take the position that parliament will decide upon our course when and if the emergency arises, in the light of all the circumstances at the time. In the meantime we should endeavour to keep informed upon the situation, to keep in touch with the United Kingdom and other countries striving for peace, to carry through a reasonable and effective defence program of our own, to support any constructive program of conciliation and removal of economic barriers to peace, and to strive in our own relations to build up friendships which will serve our need and the need of others.

I made a statement at Geneva in September, 1936, in the presence of British ministers and representatives of other nations, which later, on January 25, 1937, I declared was "a statement of the present administration's policy and the policy which the present administration intends to follow as long as it remains in office." It was as follows:

The nations of the British commonwealth are held together by ties of friendship, by similar political institutions, and by common attachment to democratic ideals, rather than by commitments to join together in war. The Canadian parliament reserves to itself the right to declare, in the light of the circumstances existing at the time, to what extent, if at all, Canada will participate in conflicts in which other members of the commonwealth may be engaged. .

The Canadian House of Commons by unanimous resolution has made the adoption of undertakings to apply either military or economic sanctions subject to the approval of parliament.

What I have said and quoted-

I am still quoting what I said at Geneva two years ago.

-does not mean that in no circumstances would the Canadian people be prepared to share in an action against an aggressor; there have been no absolute commitments either for or against participation in war or other forms of force. It does mean that any decision on the part of Canada to participate in war will have to be taken by the parliament or people of Canada

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in the light of all existing circumstances; circumstances of the day as they exist in Canada, as well as in the areas involved.

It will be argued, it has been argued, that it is not satisfactory to postpone decision until the eve or the fact of an outbreak of war, that under such circumstances calm decision will not be possible, that the decision should be made in advance.

I do not agree with that view. In the first place it would be impossible to frame to-day the questions which might have to be decided later. Many "inevitable" wars have never happened. The opponents of one year may be the friends of the next. It is impossible to forecast what the issues abroad, the alignments abroad, the situations at home, may be in a year or five years from now. In Mr. Hull's address on foreign policy on March 17. to which I have already referred, after indicating his country's firm adherence to the faithful observance of international agreements, the settjement of international issues by peaceful negotiation, the scrupulous observance of the rights of others, and the maintenance of international law and order, he continued:

There is one thing that we cannot do. And that is, to prepare and place before every government of the world a detailed chart of the course of policy and action which this country will or will not pursue under any particular set of circumstances. No man, no nation, can possibly foresee all the circumstances that may arise. Moreover, to attempt to make such a detailed chart of future action would merely result in impairing our effectiveness in working for the one objective toward which we constantly strive and on which, I am certain, there is not a vestige of disagreement among the people of our country-the establishment of durable peace.

In Mr. Chamberlain's speech of March 24, referring to suggestions of assurances to France regarding Czechoslovakia, or assurances of military assistance direct to Czechoslovakia, Mr. Chamberlain declared:

From a consideration of these two alternatives it clearly emerges that under either of them the decision as to whether or not this country should find itself involved in war would be automatically removed from the discretion of His Majesty's government, and the suggested guarantee would apply irrespective of circumstances by which it was brought into operation, and over which His Majesty's government might not have been able to exercise any control.

Again, it should be plain to everyone, it is explicitly recognized by some of those who urge a decision now. that to force an issue like this upon the country would bring out deep and in some cases fundamental differences of opinion, would lead to a further strain upon the unity of a country already

strained by economic depression and ether consequences of the last war and its aftermath. To invite this risk on a hypothetical question would be as great a disservice to Canada as any government could render.

It must be recognized that this policy is not wholly satisfactory, not free from difficulties, not a completely logical position. Like many other policies it is not an ideal solution; it is only the best of the available solutions. That, however, is not the fault of the policy. It is the inevitable outcome of the present stage in the relations between the several parts of the British commonwealth. It is inherent in the contradiction between -the recognized independent responsibility of the several members of the commonwealth, "equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affaire," to quote the declaration of the imperial conference of 1926, and the possibility that war proclaimed by the king as regards part of his dominions may involve other parts in the conflict. In other words, we have worked out a satisfactory and enduring solution of the relations between the several members of the British commonwealth in peace time; we have not yet worked out a completely logical solution of the position in war time.

Now may I turn briefly to some more specific comments on developments abroad, and first, the Sino-Japanese conflict. The terrible war now waging on the soil of China has aroused intense interest and concern in Canada. It is a conflict of great moment for the future of the Pacific and of the relations between the countries that border on the Pacific. It is a c]ash between two ancient and distinctive though allied civilizations, in which all the powers of destruction and terror which western civilization has made available to the whole world are being employed. Canada has many close ties with both countries-cultural and church and trade associations. The immediate tragedies have stirred deep feeling. Similar conflicts, with similar losses of life, have been waged in Asia over many thousands of years, but to-day the telegraph and the camera and moving pictures have brought home to millions on this continent a direct and poignant knowledge of the suffering and the horrors such a conflict involves, both for the tens of thousands who die in battle and for the tens of millions who are driven from their homes to wander and to starve. A distinguished Chinese visitor to Canada recently stated that he did not wish to dwell upon charges of atrocities in the conflict. It is true that, once the die is cast and war is

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entered upon, the difference between a humanely conducted war and an inhumanely conducted one may not be very great, though it will still be significant. Some armies may show greater arrogance, greater callousness in battle, greater recklessness as to attack on civilians, but with airplanes and bombs and gasses available, no modern war can be anything but mass slaughter, mass destruction, mass suicide.

It is natural that many Canadians have asked what they could do, what the government and parliament could do, in the face of this calamity.

So far as the government's action is concerned, Canada has a direct interest as a member of the League of Nations and as a signatory of the nine-power treaty. The covenant of the League of Nations provides under article 10 that the members of the league agree to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league. Article 11 provides that any war or threat of war is a matter of concern to the whole league, which shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. Articles 12 to 15 of the covenant providing for means of peaceful settlement of disputes between members of the league, and article 16 providing for sanctions in the event of a member of the league resorting to war, do not directly apply, as Japan is not now a member of the league. Article 17, however, provides that in the event of a dispute between a member of the league and a state which is not a member, the non-member shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership. If it does not accept and resorts to war against a member of the league, the provisions of article 16 shall be applicable against it.

On September 12, 1937, the Chinese government appealed to the league under articles 10, 11 and 17. The assembly was then in session, with Senator Dandurand, Mr. Ilsley and Mr. Massey representing Canada. The council referred the question direct to a far eastern advisory committee of twenty-two members which had been set up in 1933 to deal with the previous Manchurian conflict. Canada is a member of that committee. On September 27 the advisory committee which included the United States, passed a resolution which was accepted the following day by the assembly condemning airplane bombing of open towns and cities in China by Japanese aircraft. On October 1 a sub-committee was set up, on which Canada was not represented. Four days later the sub-committee brought in two reports,

the first setting forth the facts of the present situation in China, and declaring that the action by Japan was a breach of its treaty obligations and could not be justified. The second report expressed moral support for China, recommended that members of the league should consider how far they could individually extend aid to China, and further recommended that the signatories of the nine-power treaty should be asked to examine the situation. The report and resolutions were adopted by the assembly on October 6 with the approval of all members represented except Siam and Poland, which abstained.

It must frankly be recognized that the league's treatment of the situation has not proved of very material benefit to China. The question whether the sanctions provisions of article 16 should be invoked was studiously avoided. The plain facts were, first, that with more than half the great powers outside, there was not the concentration of potential force within the league that had been contemplated when the covenant was framed, and, second, that given the unrest and the threats to peace in the Mediterranean and central Europe, the European countries that were in the league were not prepared to weaken their own position at home by taking steps which might involve having to despatch a large and possibly still inadequate part of their forces to the other side of the earth.

The league assembly, as has been noted, proposed that the question be further considered by the signatories of the so-called nine-power treaty. That treaty was one of the series of inter-related treaties and agreements signed at Washington in the winter of 1921-22, with the object of bringing about stability and security in the far east. It was signed for the United Kingdom and Canada, Australia, New Zealand, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Japan and China, and was later accepted by other powers. The contracting parties undertook to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China, to seek to maintain the open door in China and refrain from seeking for special privileges, or spheres of influence. Article 7 provided that when in the opinion of any signatory a situation arose involving the application of the treaty, there should be "full and frank communication between the contracting powers concerned." In view of some misunderstanding on the subject, it is necessary to remember that this treaty, unlike the covenant, included no provision for sanctions against a signatory which broke its pledges. It bound each party to refrain from aggression and intrigue, it provided for consultation if peace was threatened, but it did not involve joint action against a violator.

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The conference met in Brussels early in November, on an invitation by the Belgian government issued at the request of the British government and with the approval of the government of the United States, for the purpose "of examining, in accordance with article 7, the situation in the far east and to consider friendly peaceable methods for hastening the end of the regrettable conflict now taking place there." All the countries which signed or adhered to the treaty were represented, with the all-important exception of Japan. Earnest and repeated efforts were made to bring the warring parties into consultation. The services of the other signatories, or alternatively of a small group of states, were offered in an effort to suspend hostilities and work out a lasting settlement. Japan refused to take part, declared she was acting in self-defence and that the conflict therefore lay outside the scope of the treaty, and that a solution could be attained only by efforts between the two parties directly concerned. The conference found itself at an impasse. The members of the conference, with Italy definitely opposing and the three Scandinavian countries, while sympathetic, abstaining from voting on account of their limited direct interest, declared their right and interest to intervene in the issue, their condemnation of force and breaking of pledges, their rejection of the view that direct negotiation between the two parties could achieve a settlement, and their readiness to continue further efforts for suspension of hostilities and negotiation. They then adjourned at the call of the chairman. In the circumstances, nothing more was possible; it was probably worth while holding the conference to determine whether more was possible. Canada concurred in the action taken. It did not think less could be done; it did not urge the great powers represented to do more.

There is another phase of this question about which a good deal has been said in Canada. I have received a good many communications protesting against the shipment to Japan of munitions and of raw materials available for war purposes. Many of those communications reveal a common inspiration from sources more concerned with the welfare of certain other countries and systems than with Canada's welfare. But many are genuine, based on an honest hatred of war, disgust at atrocities, unwillingness to see profit made out of others' misery. Those views I respect. I think we all share the feelings that lie behind them. But they are also based on erroneous ideas as to the facts both of Canada's

position and the position of other countries, and erroneous assumption as to what action by Canada alone would effect.

Perhaps before I give the facts with regard to shipments of munitions and the like I had better touch on the other conflict, the civil war in Spain, because what I have to say with regard to the shipment of munitions has a direct bearing on both. In Spain, the conflict is in form at least a civil war, not a war between independent states. It is not the first conflict that has marked the history of that unhappy country. The transition from mediaeval feudalism to a modern social order has been a slow process, marked by more than one civil war, more than one armed revolt. The conflict which began in July, 1936, has been particularly destructive because of the nature of modern weapons of warfare, and because of the intervention of outside governments in the struggle, the Italian and German governments directly assisting the insurgents and the soviet government assisting the government. There was imminent danger of the conflict spreading into a war of isms, of class conflict and of conflict of national strategic interests. On the initiative of the governments of France and Great Britain, a non-intervention committee of twenty-seven European states was formed to endeavour to prevent or restrict outside participation in that war. The committee has not succeeded in preventing continued extensive participation by outside states, all members of the committee. Its critics in England and France contend that it was unfair to put an unrecognized insurgent force on a par with a recognized government, that the committee has merely furnished a veil, an excuse for shutting one's eyes to a flagrant invasion of Spain with plane, tank, and heavy artillery, and that a serious danger exists of a threat to British and French communications in the Mediterranean and on the Atlantic coast. Its sponsors contend that it has lessened the amount of such intervention, that it has prevented an open break which would have led inevitably to a general European war, and, that whatever the outcome and whatever the assistance received, no Spanish government, when firmly in power, will tolerate outside control.

Canada of course did not take part in the establishment or the work of this European committee, nor did any other non-European country. But when the United Kingdom, the United States and other countries had prohibited the export of munitions to Spain, the possibility arose that orders for munitions might be diverted to Canada, and in order that the efforts to localize the conflict in Spain might not be frustrated in this manner, an

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order in council prohibiting such imports was passed in July last, under the authority of the amendment made last year to the Customs Act.

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CON

Richard Bedford Bennett (Leader of the Official Opposition)

Conservative (1867-1942)

Mr. BENNETT:

When my right hon.

friend said "imports," was he not referring to exports?

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LIB

William Lyon Mackenzie King (Prime Minister; Secretary of State for External Affairs; President of the Privy Council)

Liberal

Mr. MACKENZIE KING:

Exports from Canada, but imports of the country in question.

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CON

Richard Bedford Bennett (Leader of the Official Opposition)

Conservative (1867-1942)

Mr. BENNETT:

Yes.

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LIB

William Lyon Mackenzie King (Prime Minister; Secretary of State for External Affairs; President of the Privy Council)

Liberal

Mr. MACKENZIE KING:

Similarly, in order to prevent Canada from being drawn into this European struggle by the recruiting of Canadians for service in Spain, an order in council was passed in July, applying the Foreign Enlistment Act to the Spanish conflict, as had previously been done in the United Kingdom and administratively in the United States, and early in August the issue of passports to Canadian nationals proposing to go to Spain for the purpose of participating in the conflict was prohibited.

As there is some misunderstanding on the subject of both these measures, it may be advisable to refer briefly to their scope and subsequent application. The purpose of both measures was to prevent Canada from being drawn into foreign conflicts by the actions either of manufacturers of munitions or of organizers of recruiting.

The provision for the control of exports was based upon the reports of a Geneva committee, and an examination of the practice of other countries. An amendment to the Customs Act, which took the place of an old section which was comprehensive but not adapted to present conditions, empowered the governor in council to set up a system of permits or licences for the export of munitions or food or raw materials; to provide publicity for exports or imports of munitions; to register persons engaged in manufacturing or exporting munitions, and to prohibit the exportation of munitions or war materials. Under this authorization a system of permits was subsequently set up to regulate the export of arms and munitions, the definition of which was based substantially on the recommendation of a League of Nations committee.

No exports of munitions to any country can be made without a permit, and statistics of such exports are made public by the enforcing agency, the Department of National Revenue, every month. The licence system, it will be noted, applies to arms and munitions only. Further, the discretionary power given the government to prohibit exports, has, as I have already indicated, been applied

to exports of munitions in the case of Spain. The prohibition in this case does not apply to raw materials or any other class of goods- solely to arms and munitions as defined. The power thus given has not been applied by Canada, or any other country, as regards either munitions or any other materials, in the case of the Sino-Japanese conflict.

The Foreign Enlistment Act of last session, which took the place of an old act of the parliament of the United Kingdom extending to Canada, made it unlawful for a Canadian national to enlist anywhere for service against a friendly state, or for any person within Canada to induce any other person to enlist. This act contains many collateral provisions and empowers the governor in council to provide for its application to a civil war, and to facilitate these purposes by passport control.

An organized campaign for recruiting Canadians and foreigners living in Canada was under way, and a substantial number of persons had left Canada and proceeded to Spain. Since August no passports for Spain have been issued to Canadian nationals, though a small number of Canadians and of foreigners have made their way to that country by indirect routes.

I now come to a consideration of the shipment of munitions. First, as to Canadian exports. Arms and munitions are not made in Canada in any appreciable degree, and our export trade in this field is still more negligible. So far as exports to Japan are concerned, I am informed that the only shipment has been a single plane ordered before the war; to China, a few planes ordered since the war.

It is, however, the trade in raw materials and particularly in non-ferrous metals, against which complaint is mainly directed. Our exports of lead, zinc, aluminum and nickel to Japan are substantial, and take a leading place in the list of our exports to that country. They have increased since the war broke out, though in some cases they are again declining. The exchange restrictions introduced by the Japanese government before the war, in the endeavour to conserve its declining gold supply, have given that government a power of discrimination, and altered the proportions of the commodities imported into Japan. To China, our exports of these commodities are much smaller. It has been contended in some quarters that Canada's supplies and Canada's supplies alone are vital to the continuance of Japan's war effort, and that it is our duty as it is within our power, to take action to end this effort.

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Let us first get the facts in perspective. Our total exports to Japan have increased rapidly, but they are still far below the total of 1929. The recent increase in that trade is part of the general improvement in exports as a result of the industrial revival of recent years. Our exports to all countries are much nearer the high water mark than our exports to Japan:

1929

1932

1935

1937

Canadian exports to J apan $37,504,692 11,995,887 14,915,577 25,851,829

Canadian exports to all countries $1,182,412,313 493,808,841 729,293,800 1,110,192,151

In our exports, as in our production, and in fact in the revival of prosperity and stability in Canada, minerals have come to hold a relatively greater place in recent years as the result of new discoveries mainly in the pre-Cambrian shield. We are now among the world's important producers and exporters of gold, silver, platinum, copper, lead and zinc, as we long were of nickel. In many cases, as is generally known, these are joint products, lead or copper or zinc being found in the same veins with silver or gold, and recovered in the same operations.

So far as our exports of lead, zinc, aluminum, copper and nickel are concerned, there is nothing special in our shipments to Japan. Of nickel in the last two years we exported ninety-eight millions in all, of which only five millions were to Japan; of aluminum twenty-five millions, of which five million were to Japan; of lead, twenty-one millions, of which seven were to Japan; zinc, twenty-two, of which two were to Japan; of copper, over ninety-one millions, of which less than one million was to Japan. Incidentally, over 75 per cent of all these exports went to the British empire and the United States, (less than 10 per cent to Japan, Italy, and Germany, and the balance to other foreign countries). It is true we are the largest exporters of nickel to Japan as to most other countries, and important suppliers of aluminum and zinc. But it also is true that of iron and steel and scrap, and of copper, we supply only an insignificant fraction. (One single country's exports of iron and steel and scrap alone are three times in value our total exports of all goods whatever to Japan). It is also true that of the oil, coal, cotton and rubber which are equally necessary for mechanical operations, whether in war or in peace, we supply nothing whatever, nor of the wool necessary to clothe the armies in the field.

Some misconception exists regarding certain figures given out at Brussels by the Chinese delegation to the conference, showing the

percentage of certain materials-oil, coal, cotton, rubber, wool, iron, aluminum, antimony, manganese, tungsten, chrome, copper, zinc, tin, etc., exported in 1936 to Japan, with the object of showing that an embargo on exports would be effective if imposed by all parts of the British commonwealth, the. United States, France, Holland and a few other countries. Canada was said to have supplied 71.7 per cent of Japan's imports of aluminum, 97 per cent of the copper and 34.5 per cent of the zinc. It may be pointed out first that the figures referred to 1936, a period of peace; that only three items were listed affecting Canada, and that as regards copper, the statistics were highly erroneous, the percentage from Canada being one-half of one per cent instead of 97 per cent. These misconceptions formed the basis of much of the demand for a Canadian embargo on raw materials.

Having noted the facts in some perspective, the implications that are drawn may next be considered. In the first place, it is erroneous to assume that metals such as lead, zinc and nickel are used only for armament purposes; quite the contrary is the case; the vast bulk of these three metals is used for industrial purposes, though it is of course true that when a country is at war, the industrial uses will be rationed and restricted. In any case, an embargo would be economically futile. It must be evident to anyone familiar with foreign trade that no system of administrative control which we could devise in peace time could hope to prevent Canadian nickel, lead, zinc, copper, aluminum, scrap-iron, and the rest, sold to purchasers in third countries, from reaching Japan. Once these commodities leave Canadian territory and enter into the commerce of another country, this parliament has not and cannot have any further control over them.

It is equally evident that, except in the case of nickel, of which Canada produces about 90 per cent of the world's annual production, this country has no monopoly, nor even an approach to a monopoly of production. There are, with respect to all these commodities, including nickel, other producing countries, alternative sources of supply, to which Japan, or any nation desiring to place an order, could easily turn. In addition to other sources of production, there are-and this aspect of the question is frequently overlooked-enormous stocks of all these metals readily available, stocks far more than sufficient to fill any possible Japanese demand. It is clear, therefore, that an embargo on the export to Japan of nickel, lead, copper, zinc, aluminum, and other commodities neces-

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sary to the production of war supplies, on Canada's part alone, would not achieve the ends proposed.

As to concerted action for that purpose, there is no present prospect of such a policy being adopted. No proposal for an embargo either on munitions or on war materials was made either by the league assembly or by the Brussels conference. No country has placed an embargo on shipments to Japan or to China. In the circumstances it would appear there is nothing in Canada's position which would make isolated action on our part either necessary or effective. It has been stated that. New Zealand has placed an embargo on exports to Japan. This is not correct. Last year a New Zealand labour union refused to load scrap-iron on a vessel sailing to Japan. The New Zealand government induced the union to abandon this action. Later, the government prohibited the export of scrap-iron to any country. No embargo has been imposed on the export of wool or any other commodity to any country.

I have spoken of the conflict in the orient and of the civil war in Spain. But Spain is not the only troubled area in Europe. There are few countries on the continent that are not undergoing a social and political revolution. In some, the revolutionary forces of the left or of the right have already attained power more autocratic than the regimes they have displaced; in others, the struggle still continues; and even in those countries that still seek progress by ordered freedom, the repercussions of the upheavals elsewhere spread fear and confusion. No country, however distant and however preoccupied by its own problems, can be unconcerned with the revival of violence, intolerance and disregard of the rights of weaker states. To countries in the whirlpool or on its verge the situation is particularly disturbing and of overwhelming import. It is not surprising that in democracies such as Britain and France the imminence of these threats to national and social and individual security, and the close association and sympathy of groups in each country with one or other of the forces and theories warring in central and eastern Europe, have led to a wide and violent conflict of opinion as to the policy that should 'be adopted to meet these new conditions. There are many shades and variations of opinion, but two main tendencies have developed.

In the opinion of one group, Armageddon has already come, the forces of light and darkness are irrevocably swinging into battle line for the final test of destiny. Europe and liberty, it is contended, can be saved only if the democracies firmly and unitedly call a 51952-202

halt here and now. The other widespread attitude is to recognize the situation as dangerous, but to insist that the policy of dividing Europe or the world into two antagonistic camps, organizing a holy alliance against fascism, would be still more dangerous, and is neither possible nor necessary. There is no warrant, it is urged, for fighting a preventive war or for seeking to form a hard and fast alliance against the authoritarian states. If such an alliance could be formed, it would only drive the fascist countries into firmer alliance and put any possibility of peaceful settlement out of the question. The wiser policy, it is urged, is to try to bring all Europe back to sanity, to emphasize and strengthen the points of agreement, not of difference, to seek to adjust each specific difficulty in turn. In what I have just been saying I am not stating my own views, I am stating the views which I believe are contending against each other in Europe to-day.

I am sure that every government in Great Britain since the war, and certainly not least the present government, has striven for peace. Differences of opinion may exist as to the wisdom of the policies adopted toward that end at different times. Governments may have failed to appreciate the strength and trend of changing forces, but taken broadly they have shown a realism and a patience that few if any other countries can equal.

I do not consider we are called upon to pass judgment or to take sides in United Kingdom discussions. Inevitably the rise of such contentious issues, such party cleavages, lead to efforts to secure or to claim the support of Canada or Australia or South Africa or New Zealand for one or other view. Statements appear in the British press that the dominions demand this or that, that Australia supports the government or that New Zealand supports the opposition view. So far as the Canadian government is concerned, it does not consider that it is in the interest either of Canada or of the commonwealth to tender advice as to what policy the United Kingdom should adopt week by week, or become involved in British political disputes. We have expressed no opinion on that policy, and no one in London is authorized or warranted in interpreting us as doing so.

Incidentally, may I say that the time has come to cease speaking of "the dominions" as if they were some peculiar half-fledged type of community, and all alike in their interests and views. Such a usage leads to confusion at best, and to alibis and misrepresentation at worst. South Africa is South Africa, New Zealand is New Zealand, Australia is Australia and Can-

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ada is Canada, and it will help to good understanding if that elementary fact is borne in mind.

We have made clear our own policy as regards the league. We have indicated our own attitude toward the frequent demands that we should thrust ourselves into the European picture, take sides in the struggle of ideologies, make commitments in advance. We have equally made it clear that we are opposed to making in advance proclamations of neutrality or abstention that would be used to encourage aggressive designs. We shall try to maintain old ties and old friendships and at the same time be ready to enter into friendly relations with every country that will reciprocate. We shall try to keep in mind the difficulties and dangers that other countries are facing, but we shall not assume that it is our duty or within our power to work out their problems for them, to make over their social structure or their political ideas or their racial attitudes. In seeking within our own country, which constitutes half a continent, to build up a genuine democracy, to promote sound social relationships, to develop a tolerance and readiness to work together in achieving unity and furthering and maintaining the ties with the other members of the commonwealth, and the most friendly relations with our immediate neighbour and with all other countries, we shall be doing the task that lies to our hands, our Canadian task.

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CON

Richard Bedford Bennett (Leader of the Official Opposition)

Conservative (1867-1942)

Right Hon. R. B. BENNETT (Leader of the Opposition):

Mr. Speaker, I do not

propose to make any extended remarks. The party with which I am associated meets in convention at a not distant day, and will doubtless make a declaration regarding the foreign policy of this country. The views I express to-day are my own personal views and not necessarily the views of my party. I think every hon. member will understand quite clearly why I should make that statement.

I have listened, as every member of the house has, with very great interest to the observations of the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King). With respect to much of what he has said I think there can be no possible differences of opinion, but there are some matters about which our views are widely divergent.

In the first place, I wholly agree that it is not probable that this country, of its own motion and in the exercise of a choice, will be compelled to go to war. I cannot conceive it likely that the Dominion of Canada would find it necessary to resort to arms with respect to any matter that might arise in

fMr. Mackenzie King.]

the conduct of its affairs. But I am not ignorant of the teachings of history', and it well might be that by reason of Canada's trading and other relations with the nations of the world a situation would be created which would make the alternatives a resort to arms or the loss of prestige by the commonwealth of nations.

Yesterday I saw an issue of the New York Times, I think of Saturday' or Sunday'. On one of its pages devoted to foreign affairs was a map of the world. Radiating from Washington there were straight lines to all the centres in which the United States was vitally concerned and interested, and there was not one of them upon the north American continent-not one. There is one in South America. And there was concern in Mexico if you regard it as part of the north American continent; their interests were with China, Japan, Spain and elsewhere-in countries, ten I think in all. And not one of those points in which the United States was vitally' interested at the moment was, with the exception of Mexico, on this continent.

How did that condition arise? It arose because of conflicts of interest, because of the activities of citizens of the United States in trading and commerce, because of matters of nationality, the position of her people, in some cases missionaries-all these problems had arisen by reason of the United States being a world power and carrying on its operations in every part of the globe.

Now it well might be that the Dominion of Canada, with its business transactions extending to every part of the globe, if we carry out the idea that is suggested not only, I think, in the speech to which we have listened but by many members of this house, as to our complete isolation, our complete independence, might find that the situation which has developed in the United States has its counterpart in this country. To my mind there is no gainsaying that fact. Upon that first point to which I direct the attention of this house, I have no hesitation in saying that very many people in this country have forgotten that it is because we are part of the British Empire that we have attained the position we enjoy to-day in doing business abroad. Let there be no misunderstanding about that. Why is it that when questions arise affecting the position of our citizens, questions in connection with trade, commerce and nationality, the power which protects is not that of Canada? A frank recognition of that fact, sir, is essential to any understanding, in my private opinion, of the foreign policy of Canada,-the fact, whether we accept it

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or not, that to-day we are the trading nation we are and enjoy the privileges and advantages we enjoy because we are part of the British Empire. If any gentleman questions that statement, I invite him to study the historic position of this country. I will not traverse it myself to-day, but I invite him to consider it carefully, and as he does so I am sure he will be satisfied that our position today as individuals as well as that of our country is attributable to the fact that we occupy a place amongst the commonwealth of nations that is known as the British Empire.

But I accept and always have accepted as a foundation point of my conception of national policy that it would be an extraordinary situation which would drive this country into the position of having to resort to arms. That is the direct side of our foreign policy. The Prime Minister referred to the implications of certain activities of ours; and there is clearly an implication there. It was contended in this house by an hon. member, and it is frequently stated outside,-indeed the Prime Minister this afternoon directed attention to the fact-that the likelihood of our being engaged in war arises from our peculiar relationship to other parts of the world. He dealt with that from two angles: first, our position with respect to the League of Nations; second, our position with respect to the British Empire.

I have said, Mr. Speaker, in this house on more than one occasion that in my judgment there would have been no League of Nations had it been thought by those who were responsible for its creation that the United States of America would not become a continuing member of it. I have grave doubts whether the United Kingdom or many parts of the commonwealth of nations would have become signatories to the covenant had they not believed that the great republic to the south was to become one of the dominant figures in the league. When the president of the United States executed the covenant, when he succeeded in inducing other nations to agree to its being made a part of the treaty of peace, they had the clearest view that it would be accepted and adopted by the country which he represented. It was not accepted, and from that refusal consequences have flowed that are of the gravest moment to the world. To-day I do not personally regard it as of tremendous importance, because the League of Nations has fallen to pieces. The withdrawal of Germany and of Japan, and I think one might say the virtual withdrawal of Italy, means 51952-202i

that the League of Nations has ceased to function for the purposes for which it was created. Therefore, our obligations to the League of Nations have become much less than they were when in the full flood of public opinion it was launched upon the world as the organization that would cure many of the evils from which we suffered.

Its history has been very interesting. I am still an incorrigible optimist with respect to some of its operations. I believe that consultation, discussion between the representatives of the nations of the world, and cooperation of a limited character have achieved very beneficial results. That these results can no longer be very important follows, I think, as a necessary corollary from the fact that the United States is not a member of the league, and that other great powers have withdrawn from it. It is very difficult to think that our relationship to the League of Nations could indirectly impose upon us military operations. But, sir, I must deal very briefly with one point raised by the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) and that is with respect to sanctions. For it is a matter about which so much has been written and said that it might appear that I was endeavouring to escape making any observation about it at all if I did not refer to it.

Everyone knows that a statute without sanctions is valueless. I can remember reading a great address by Edward Blake dealing with the question of the value of sanctions with respect to legislation. What good is it to place upon the statute books a number of prohibitions unless you also provide that a breach of them shall involve penalties and punishment? "Thou shalt not" was thundered from Sinai, and has found a place in our statute books; but unless there is some punishment following a breach of any prohibition, whatever it may be, then the prohibition becomes of little value.

A sanction determines largely the value of a statute. If you read the criminal code you will have a clearer appreciation of what I mean. For the breaches of statutes we provide adequate penalties. The sanction for ncn-performance of an obligation in our criminal law is well understood, and a sanction sounding in damages in civil matters is not unknown to most of us. But I will agree with every member of this house that sanctions no longer became a reality with respect to the covenant of the League of Nations when the United States withdrew, when Germany withdrew, when Japan withdrew.

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What was the whole theory of sanctions? The whole theory of sanctions as expressed in the covenant of the League of Nations was that an offender should have the world massed against him. And he could not withstand it; certainly he could not withstand it. With all the might and power of Great Britain, the United States. France and Italy- Germany was not then in, but came in later- with all the power of these nations massed against the wrong-doer, who could stand against it? It was an application of something that is the basis of all our law. We talk about our liberties. They are grounded, our freedom is grounded, in respect for law and order and the orderly administration of the law of the country; and the law of the country depends upon an enlightened public opinion providing sanctions for violation of provisions made by the people themselves. Whether they make them in parliament or whether they are the growth of common law matters not. There you have on the one hand the great body of common law, which includes part of the criminal law of England, and on the other hand you have statute law as embodied in criminal codes; and behind it we have an enlightened and powerful public opinion. That public opinion provides the sanction that enforces the penalties for breaches of the law.

When this covenant of the League of Nations was prepared, when the nations of the world met together and agreed unanimously what action should be taken against nations who violated the provisions, then the sanctions provided by the covenant of the league were all-powerful-the massed power of the world, the massed public opinion of the world. The power of a world demanding peace, a world weary of war, shocked beyond expression at the results of war, the destruction of millions of men and of billions of treasure-all this found expression in that enlightened and ennobled public opinion that was embodied in the covenant of the League of Nations. I think therefore, without going into the matter in detail, that one might say that the likelihood of Canada being involved in warlike activities by reason of our relationship with the League of Nations is very remote. In fact, it is so remote as to be almost improbable. But we come to what is after all the vital point in the foreign policy of this country. We are part of the British Empire, and that relationship involves responsibilities. I wonder whether we have clearly appreciated what the responsibilities are that we have accepted. They were not imposed upon us. They were of our own seeking. We settled them in 1926. The long fMr. Bennett.]

process of evolution, the long years of effort, the resentment against what we regarded as subordination, the desire for equality of status, the desire for self-expression; all these, coupled with our magnificent achievements during the great war-the achievements not of Canadians alone but also of the thousands of Australians who crossed leagues of sea; of the New Zealanders; of the great Botha and Smuts, in crushing not only a rebellion at home but the German power in southwest Africa, the first victorious campaign of all the war-all these united to induce the representatives of the dominions in conference to suggest that the time had come when we should endeavour by some form of words to define our relations one to another. You will recall, sir, it was suggested that after the war there should be a great empire constitutional conference. But conditions in South Africa hastened the search for a solution. I have no doubt that the Prime Minister has been told by General Hertzog, as I have, that but for the settlement of 1926 he believed that civil war would have been inevitable in South Africa. I think that view was also held by General Smuts.

When the imperial conference was held in 1926, attended on behalf of this dominion by the right hon. the present Prime Minister and others, an effort was made to formulate an expression of the position and mutual relations of the various parts of the British Empire. If, sir, you ask me what the foreign policy of this country is, I say that is found in the declaration of 1926. I listened this afternoon to the Prime Minister reading a portion-and a portion only -of that declaration. I now propose to read it in its entirety. In the report which was made by the committee presided over by the late Earl of Balfour, the second section deals with the status of Great Britain and the dominions. It proceeds:

The committee are of opinion that nothing would be gained by attempting to lay down a constitution for the British empire. Its widely scattered parts have very different characteristics, very different histories, and are at very different stages of evolution; while, considered as a whole, it defies classification and bears no real resemblance to any other political organization which now exists or has ever yet been tried.

There is, however, one most important element in it which, from a strictly constitutional point of view, has now, as regards all vital matters, reached its full development-we refer to the group of self-governing communities composed of Great Britain and the dominions.

I interpose there to point out that the words are "composed of Great Britain and the dominions," placing Great Britain and the dominions upon a parity.

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Their position and mutual relations may be readily defined. They are autonomous communities within the British empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs. . . .

It is not sufficient to stop there. That ended the declaration of position. There follows a statement of responsibility:

. . . though united by a common allegiance to the crown, and freely associated as members of the British commonwealth of nations.

What are the governing words of that section? "Freely associated"-not by force, not by coercion, but freely associated together. And free association means that in every action that is taken there is at least an understanding with the persons with whom you are associated.

Let us proceed a step further. It continues :

A foreigner endeavouring to understand the true character of the British Empire by the aid of this formula alone would be tempted to think that it was devised rather to make mutual interference impossible than to make mutual cooperation easy.

Such a criticism, however, completely ignores the historic situation. The rapid evolution of the oversea dominions during the last fifty years has involved many complicated adjustments of old political machinery to changing conditions. The tendency towards equality of status was both right and inevitable. Geographical and other conditions made this impossible of attainment by the way of federation. The only alternative was by the way of autonomy; and along this road it has been steadily sought. Every self-governing member of the empire is now the master of its destiny. In fact, if not always in form, it is subject to no compulsion whatever.

But no account, however accurate, of the negative relations in which Great Britain and the dominions stand to each other can do more than express a portion of the truth. The British Empire is not founded upon negations. It depends essentially, if not formally, on positive ideals. Free institutions are its life-blood. Free cooperation is its instrument. Peace, security, and progress are among its objects. Aspects of all these great themes have been discussed at the present conference; excellent results have been thereby obtained.

And mark these words:

And though every dominion is now, and must always remain, the sole judge of the nature and extent of its cooperation, no common cause will, in our opinion, be thereby imperilled.

Equality of status, so far as Britain and the dominions are concerned, is thus the root principle governing our inter-imperial relations. But the principles of equality and similarity, appropriate to status, do not universally extend to function. Here we require something more than immutable dogmas. For example, to deal with questions of diplomacy and questions of defence, we require also flexible machinery- machinery which can, from time to time, be adapted to the changing circumstances of the world. This subject also has occupied our attention. The rest of this report will show

how we have endeavoured not only to state political theory, but to apply it to our common needs.

That declaration of 1926 was a declaration in which the present Prime Minister took his part. The right hon. Minister of Justice (Mr. Lapointe) took his part in formulating it. In its ultimate expression and form it contemplates complete autonomy and freedom of action on the part of the dominions, subject to limitations, each of which is expressed so clearly that he who runs may read-"though united by a common allegiance to the crown," and "freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations"; (1) a common allegiance; (2) a free association. Association does not mean separation. It means unity of action and of purpose.

I recall the language used by the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Mackenzie) in making his statement to this house on March 24 last. What did he declare to be the security for Canadians on the high sea? He reviewed our foreign trade and referred to our position as an exporting country.. Then he used these very impressive words, at page 1650:

In regard to the exact position of Canada it is only fair to say that to-day the main deten-ent against a major attack upon this country by a European power is the existence of the British fleet in north Atlantic waters.

He referred to that fleet again in these words:

Just as the British navy on the Atlantic is our greatest security in that quarter-

Then he went on to say that we might have some hope that our neighbouring friends would not desert us in time of peril. The British fleet! Who maintains it? Who is being taxed to death that it may live? From what quarter is it maintained? Yet, speaking for the government of this country in a moment of great peril and crisis, we are told that the British fleet is to protect us on the Atlantic. Sir, there you have the application of the declaration of 1926, "free association." Just as the minister pointed out that we would freely associate with others in maintaining our position, so he relies as of right, because of free association, upon the British fleet to protect our great trade and commerce to which he referred as being largely an export business sent from these shores. Have we not there, Mr. Speaker, the foreign policy, the external policy of Canada?

Then the Prime Minister put to this house live propositions, at least one of which I think must have been the creation of his own mind; for I have not heard anyone in this

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house suggest that we should supinely follow the policy of the United Kingdom in any matters of foreign concern. In fact the whole conference of 1926 was the negation of that. The Prime Minister said there was a certain class who accepted any policy of Great Britain, regardless of what it might be, and followed it blindly. Well, I have not seen any people of that sort in this country. In that regard I recall a communication sent to me by the late Sir Robert Borden containing a letter which he had received from the late Sir Austen Chamberlain. It was a very simple statement, but it embodies the very view that I have expressed so poorly. These were the words, and they were written in February, 1931:

If I allowed myself a further observation, it would be this. As regards the liberties and status of the Dominion of Canada you have achieved all that you set out to secure. But your policy had two sides-while insisting on the one side on the rights of Canada, you consistently coupled them with the duties and responsibilities which were inseparable from the exercise of those rights.

That again is but an expression on the part of a foreign secretary, to one who had been prime minister of this country, of the thought contained in those words "freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations."

I proceed a step further. That first class of persons to which reference has been made, who in peace or war would blindly follow any policy initiated by the United Kingdom, in my judgment are not to be found in this country; at* least if they are, I have not come across them. Then there was the second class of persons to whom the Prime Minister referred, who accepted Great Britain's policy when it was within the principles of the League of Nations. I agree with what has been said in that regard by the Prime Minister, and I need not do more than say that when it was suggested that because all the dominions of the British Empire and India were, with Great Britain, members of the League of Nations, any action that might be taken looking toward conflict- was action that could be taken only with the approval of the league, and therefore there was no further necessity for our giving great concern to our inter-imperial relations, since they were covered and governed by the provisions of the covenant of the league.

The third class referred to was the class that would consult and advise with Great Britain through the governments of the dominions and thus hope to be able to arrive at a common policy. Well, I think that is not an unsound view to take. I cannot but think that in view of what we said in 1926

it would be the essence of sound common sense that we, by kindly suggestion and by discussion antecedent to events, should arrive at a common policy with respect to matters touching the life itself of the British Commonwealth of Nations. I think most people believe that possible and desirable.

Then as the fourth class the Prime Minister suggested those who believe in the complete neutrality of this country. That raises an issue at once, sir, of tremendous import. The late Sir Wilfrid Laurier regarded that as hardly worth even discussing; for he held the view that when any part of the British Commonwealth of Nations was at war Canada also was at war. He expressed that view in this house in terms so clear as to admit of no possible doubt. How could this country be neutral and remain in free association with the other members of the commonwealth of nations? Yet it is to this free association that the Prime Minister very properly committed this country in 1926. It is to this that the house gave approval. It is this that parliament has accepted. How, sir, eordd you have anything such as the neutrality of Canada and a free association with the other members of the commonwealth, which includes the United Kingdom?

Then there was the fifth class of citizen to which reference was made, and that reference was summed up by the statement of the Prime Minister that parliament would govern. He said that we would keep in touch with the other dominions, but that parliament must determine these issues. If the view taken by Sir Wilfrid Laurier was a sound one-and it was a view which was accepted by constitutionalists in every part of the world -then, sir, this parliament would in such event be dealing with a reality, not a theory. For if war were to result by reason of difficulties between any of the other self-governing dominions or Great Britain and any other part of the world, then, as Sir Wilfrid pointed out, we also would be at war, and parliament would be dealing with an actuality, not a theory.

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LIB

Ernest Lapointe (Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada)

Liberal

Mr. LAPOINTE (Quebec East):

But he said more than that.

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CON

Richard Bedford Bennett (Leader of the Official Opposition)

Conservative (1867-1942)

Mr. BENNETT:

Yes, much more than

that; but I am talking about what he said in this connection.

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LIB

Ernest Lapointe (Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada)

Liberal

Mr. LAPOINTE (Quebec East):

But that was not the whole sentence of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. He said, "but it does not follow that Canada will participate in any war."

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CON

Richard Bedford Bennett (Leader of the Official Opposition)

Conservative (1867-1942)

Mr. BENNETT:

I was just coming to

that point, and I thank my right hon. friend

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for bringing it to the attention of the house. He made a declaration, one which I say is accepted by constitutionalists as sound, that if any part of the British Empire were at war-and within that expression, we of course are included, as is the United Kingdom- then also Canada is at war. But whether or not Canada should participate in that war is a matter to be determined by the Canadian people and the Canadian parliament.

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LIB

Ernest Lapointe (Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada)

Liberal

Mr. LAPOINTE (Quebec East):

That is right.

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CON

Richard Bedford Bennett (Leader of the Official Opposition)

Conservative (1867-1942)

Mr. BENNETT:

: There never has been a doubt about that.

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LIB

William Lyon Mackenzie King (Prime Minister; Secretary of State for External Affairs; President of the Privy Council)

Liberal

Mr. MACKENZIE KING:

That was my fifth point.

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CON

Richard Bedford Bennett (Leader of the Official Opposition)

Conservative (1867-1942)

Mr. BENNETT:

I am sorry it was not put quite in that way.

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May 24, 1938