February 25, 1936

SC

Percy John Rowe

Social Credit

Mr. ROWE (Dufferin):

What about 1921 to 1930?

Topic:   CANADA-UNITED1 STATES TRADE AGREEMENT PROPOSED APPROVAL SUBJECT TO LEGISLATION MAKING PROVISIONS EFFECTIVE
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LIB

William Lyon Mackenzie King (Prime Minister; Secretary of State for External Affairs; President of the Privy Council)

Liberal

Mr. MACKENZIE KING:

Every effort was made. We were not successful for the reasons I have just mentioned. The Republican party was in office in the United States and had put up the tariff to heights unknown before, and had done so largely as a result of the fact that the Conservative party in Canada had defeated the reciprocity agreement and had not when in office subsequently taken advantage over a period of years of the offer wThich continued to be made by the United States to effect a reciprocal agreement with Canada.

As everyone knows, in the matter of international negotiations it is much easier to work out the terms of an agreement when there is plenty of time for negotiation than when the time available becomes increasingly limited. If the Liberal party had been in office two years sooner, as it should have been, and would have been had my right hon. friend gone to the country when the country was demanding he should, we would have been able to make a more favourable agreement than was possible at the end of last year. As the matter stood, the present agreement was reached within two months of the reassembling of congress and within a year of the date on which a presidential election is to take place. As all who are familiar with public affairs in the United States are aware, it is extremely difficult for the government of the United States or the president to give on the eve of the reassembling of congress the consideration to such matters that at another time it might be possible for him to give. Also in the year of a presidential election all such matters become frought with fresh difficulties. Fortunately, however, there remained time enough for us to make a very good agreement, but as I say the path was made more difficult for us by the fact that my hon. friends held on to office long after they should have, and during the whole of which time they took good care to see that no agreement was entered into with the United States.

May I mention another handicap? It has been said that the Canada-United Kingdom agreement was not an obstacle to negotiation; that my right hon. friend proved that it was possible to enter into an agreement with the 12739-32

United States notwithstanding the existence of the Canada-United Kingdom agreement. Let me say that the present administration, when it began the negotiation of this agreement, made it a matter of policy that nothing would be done in the agreement with the United States which would in any way affect any of the provisions of the Canada-United Kingdom agreements. No matter what it would cost us and notwithstanding that we did not like many of its provisions, we were prepared to take that position and we took it and held to it throughout. And although every effort was made to have us consider the matter otherwise, to fix margins, peg rates of duty in this agreement as was done in the Canada-United Kingdom agreement we took as strongly the position that we would not agree to restrict in any way our complete freedom of action with respect to any arrangements or agreements we might have or hereafter might wish to make with Great Britain or other parts of the empire. Had my right hon. friend and his government followed that plan in connection with the Canada-United Kingdom agreement, we in Canada would be in a better position to-day to make agreements with other countries. But as hon. members know, provisions were inserted in the Canada-United Kingdom agreement under which fixed margins had to be preserved. These fixed margins have prevented reductions in duties to other countries, and to thait extent have limited the powers of the government in the negotiation of other agreements. My right hon. friend said the other day that there were some things not in the Canada-United States agreement which he thought should have been. Had there been no empire agreements, some of those things which he finds missing might have been included, but we were prevented as he knows from negotiating with respect to anthracite coal, Indian corn, canned fruits, dried currants, raisins and other commodities. These are only some of the principal products on which our obligations to empire countries precluded more extensive concessions being granted to the United States in exchange for which we might have obtained a still more comprehensive agreement. To preserve the agreements made with other parts of the empire by my right hon. friend, in which duties were pegged at certain levels, we had immediately to say, "On these things we cannot negotiate further," although in some cases it obviously would have been in the interests of our consumers and producers alike for us to have been able so to do.

Now I come to something which seems to me pretty effectively precludes my right hon.

Canada-UjS. Trade Agreement

friend from taking exception to the lines on which we have proceeded, assuming he was in earnest in the negotiations he was conducting with the United States. A few days ago my right hon. friend placed on Hansard at full length a note dated November 14, 1934, from the Canadian Minister in Washington to the Secretary of State of the United States. The note sets forth what my right hon. friend, speaking as the leader of the government of which he was the head, and in the name of the Conservative party in Canada, purported to be their position as he saw it with respect to trade between Canada and the United States, and the basis upon which he was prepared to negotiate.

I wish to read a few extracts from that communication to hon. members so that they may see how much we had reason to believe that in our efforts to effect an agreement we would meet not with the opposition of my right hon. friend but with his hearty approval and cooperation. I rather expected that, at a time like this and respecting an agreement of such importance, my right hon. friend would have adopted towards the present administration something of the attitude which the Liberal party in opposition took towards his government when we accorded it the fullest freedom to make an agreement with the United States and did what we could to assist it in securing the most favourable terms. However he has not taken that attitude. The note begins as follows:

Sir, the government of Canada for many months have been giving careful consideration to the means whereby the exchange of commodities between Canada and the United States might be increased, and I have been instructed to present a statement of their views for the information of the government of the United States. The government of Canada believe that the time has come for definite action and that the declared desire of both governments to improve conditions of trade between the two countries should now be carried into effect by the negotiation of a comprehensive trade agreement.

You will recall that when the Prime Minister of Canada visited Washington in April. 1933, at the invitation of the President of the United States, the development of trade between the two countries was sympathetically discussed. On April 29, 1933, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Bennett issued a joint statement at the end of their conversations, which concluded as follows:

"We have also discussed the problems peculiar to the United States and Canada. We have agreed to begin a search for means to increase the exchange of commodities between our two countries, and thereby promote not only economic betterment on the North American continent, but also the general improvement of world conditions."

They were taking the large view-not merely the mutual benefits to be derived, but

a general improvement in world conditions. Then, a little farther on in the note I find this:

On February 22, 1934, the Department of State issued to the press a statement concerning trade negotiations with Canada, which reads as follows:

"The trade between the United States and Canada is larger in normal times than that between any other two countries in the world, and it is natural that both countries should desire to restore the reciprocal flow of commodities to normal proportions. We hope to be in a position at an early date to take steps looking to the conclusion of a trade agreement with Canada which will further the interests of both countries. We hope thus to bring into practical application the 'good neighbour' policy between these two great countries which have so much in common."

That is the end of the quotation. Then the note continues:

A few days later, on March 2nd, the president requested the congress to enact legislation conferring on him authority to enter into trade agreements, in a message which concluded with the following words:

"1 hope for early action. The many immediate situations in the field of international trade that to-day await our attention can be met effectively and with the least possible delay."

The legislation in question became law on June 12.

That made clear the feelings of the govern^ ment of the day, and indicated not only that an agreement was desirable but that no time should be lost; that there should be immediate action. Further on I find this:

It is hardly necessary to stress the importance to both the United States and Canada of their mutual trade.

And elsewhere:

The relative importance of the market of each country to the other, and the persistence of trading on a substantial scale throughout the changing phases of the business cycle, as revealed by the trade returns, demonstrate the inherent advantage of this interchange of commodities, and the tremendous potentialities of expansion under favourable conditions. But no useful purpose can be served by calculating the relative shares retained by each country in a total world trade that for four years has been steadily shrinking, until in 1933 it fell in value to approximately one-third of the level of 1929. If peace and prosperity are to be established on an enduring basis, it is essential to increase the absolute volume of world trade. No better beginning can be made than by taking steps to increase without delay the volume of trade between two countries which offer the most notable opportunity.

Could any language be stronger than that as to the wisdom of a reciprocal agreement within the framework I have indicated for the purpose of furthering the trade of the two countries? I shall read this further paragraph:

It should be realized that certain formidable obstacles to the lowering of tariff barriers now

Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement

prevailing in other parts of the world are not present between the United States and Canada. The opportunities of a new continent have resulted in a parallel economic and social development almost without precedent.

I am putting these matters on record, because I believe they will serve to answer my right hon. friend, by his own words, when he rises to speak against the agreement which is now before us for approval. He will find in his own words the answer to the arguments which he will seek to urge against this agreement. He continues:

Standards of living and working conditions are similar on both sides of the international boundary. The measures of protection which each government has imposed against the products of the other country have not been determined by a desire to exclude the products of cheap labour. In these difficult times, countries seeking to maintain high domestic standards of living have a common interest in expanding trade with each other. For the past year, also, the Canadian dollar has been close to parity with the United States dollar, and the disturbing effects of exchange instability have in large part disappeared. Even if the desired general revival of international trade should still be delayed for a considerable period, there is much to be said in favour of an immediate attempt to increase the volume of commerce between these two neighbouring countries, whose traditions and ideals of social and economic progress are so alike.

And a little further on:

The government of Canada is prepared to join the government of the United States in a declaration that their common objective is the attainment of the freest possible exchange of natural products between the two countries. It is recognized that this objective cannot be attained in the immediate future, as important interests in both countries would be disturbed unduly by the sudden removal of existing tariffs on all natural products. The government of Canada would therefore favour, as the first step, the reductions included in the proposals set out in the next paragraph, to be succeeded by progressive mutual reductions in the duties on natural products, leading to the attainment of the declared objective.

The note goes on to set forth the basis on which an agreement will be entered into, and here it will be observed that it is the only basis, as I have pointed out, on which any government in Canada could have entered into an agreement with the government of the United States. The powers which the president had were circumscribed. The policy of the United States was to make an agreement only on an exchange of most favoured nation treatment. When we come to consider what was actually done, and what could actually be done today, it will be seen that the basis set out in this note was the only possible basis.

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REC

Henry Herbert Stevens

Reconstruction

Mr. STEVENS:

Would the right hon.

gentleman mention again the date of that note?

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LIB

William Lyon Mackenzie King (Prime Minister; Secretary of State for External Affairs; President of the Privy Council)

Liberal

Mr. MACKENZIE KING:

It is dated

November 14, 1934. It was in June, 1934, that the president had been given power to negotiate as I have indicated. This note was the outcome of careful consideration and compilation by the officials of the public service after investigation on their part and in collaboration with the ministers of the day. The note goes on to say-I ask the house to note this:

I am authorized to put forward' the following outline as a suitable basis for the negotiation of a trade agreement:

(a) A mutual undertaking to maintain during the lifetime of the agreement the unrestricted free entry of commodities now on the free list of either country.

That was the first step, and that has been done in the agreement which the present administration has effected. The note continues :

(b) The mutual concession of tariff treatment as favourable as that accorded to any other foreign country; this means that Canada would extend to the United States its intermediate tariff involving reductions from the present rates of duty on some 700 items, including both natural and manufactured products, together with a number of further reductions below the intermediate tariff rates through the extension to the United States of concessions made by Canada in trade conventions with foreign countries.

This again has been done in the agreement reached by this government with the United States-the exchange of most favoured nation treatment as between the two countries, with certain additional concessions. Then follows (c):

(c) The reduction by 50 per cent of the existing United States rates of duty, as authorized by the Tariff Act of 1934, on a specified number of natural products, including inter alia, lumber, fish, potatoes, milk and cream, and live cattle; a number of other agricultural products, and several minerals both metallic and non-metallic.

What is set forth in that clause has not been accomplished in full, but it has been accomplished in very large part. I shall have more to say on this point later. It i3 to be remembered this was a basis only for negotiation and represented undoubtedly a maximum demand. The note represented the proposals which were to be the subject of negotiation. Then (d):

(d) The reduction of the existing rates of duty by the United States on a number of partly or wholly manufactured products of Canada, including some processed natural products and certain products in which hydroelectric power comprises an important element in the cost of production.

Canada-UjS. Trade Agreement

That objective has been, secured in the agreement reached by the present administration. Then (e):

(e) The reduction of the existing rates of duty by Canada on a number of natural and partly or wholly manufactured products of the United States.

That was Canada's concession to the United States as proposed by my right hon. friend opposite. We have followed him again in that, and have made concessions in accordance with this particular clause. This ends the part of the note dealing with the basis of negotiations. The note goes on to say:

In view of the declared policy of the governments of the United States and Canada to improve existing trade relations, and of the progress already made in both countries in the necessary preparatory studies, there would appear to be no barrier to the immediate initiation of negotiations and their speedy conclusion.

That was on November 14, 1934. Remember that the general elections in Canada did not take place until the month of October, 1935, nearly one year after, but my right hon. friend through his minister in the United States said to the government of the United States in the month of November, 1934:

In view of the declared policy of the governments of the United States and Canada to improve existing trade relations, and of the progress already made in both countries in the necessary preparatory studies, there would appear to be no barrier to the immediate initiation of negotiations and their speedy conclusion.

I agree with that statement. I do not think there should have been any barrier to immediate negotiations and to their speedy conclusion. But why did that barrier come into existence? There can be only one answer, and that is that my right hon. friend himself did not proceed with the negotiations as he should have proceeded with them, and would have proceeded with them, had he been anxious to effect an agreement.

How did the United States government receive the proposals of my right hon. friend? I shall not read the entire note from the Secretary of State of the United States to the Canadian minister, but I shall quote from it. It is dated Washington, December 7, 1934, and makes clear that the United States shared the view expressed by the then Canadian government that it should be possible to make an agreement in a short time. It indicates in order that there might be no mistake as to how far the United States might be able to go, one additional point which the United States government felt they should bring to the immediate attention of my right hon. friend before they negotiated further. We

shall see later how my right hon. friend viewed the point thus raised. The note is signed by the Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull:

I have given careful consideration to your note. I fully subscribe to the views which you express in regard to the importance to each of our countries of its trade with the other, and I am happy to note the willingness of your government to undertake negotiations looking to an increase in trade in both directions. It is not necessary to comment in detail on your statements respecting the balance of payments as between our countries. As you are aware, international balances are settled on many fronts, and it would be a serious setback to world trade if countries undertook to achieve balances with individual countries.

This would seem to indicate that my right hon. friend had been seeking an agreement on a balance of trade as between the United States and Canada alone. That may account for some delay in the negotiations. Obviously the view expressed by Mr. Hull is the correct one, and the only correct one, namely, that in international exchange trade balances are settled, not on one front, but on many fronts. Mr. Hull goes on to say:

I believe that a point has now been reached when an exchange of views on this subject with Canada should be undertaken, and I am, therefore, gratified, to learn that your government is of the same mind. Whatever the desirability of the freest possible exchange of natural products, and indeed other products, between the United States and Canada as an ultimate goal, the United States government must in any negotiations undertaken at this time restrict itself to measures authorized by the Trade Agreements Act, 1934, of which I enclose a copy.

The outline which you suggest as a possible basis for discussions has been noted. You mention several specific products upon which your government proposes to seek reductions in existing rates of duty in this country. In communicating to you the willingness of the government of the United States to enter upon negotiations with your government looking to a trade agreement calculated to increase trade in both directions. I must, of course, make it clear that in advance of negotiations this government can not make any commitment as to whether it will be possible to agree to a reduction in the rates of duty on particular products, each of which must be carefully studied in the light of existing economic conditions before any decision can be reached. This is the procedure which has been adopted and followed in connection with the trade agreement negotiations with other governments. Correspondingly, it is understood that your government will wish to give the same study to individual products upon which this government may request reductions in the Canadian rates of duty.

I suggest that to the proposed outline of discussions there be added the question of methods determining the value of merchandise for duty purposes in either country, a matter which I consider of importance in the proposed negotiations.

Canada-US. Trade Agreement

In that communication the Secretary of State of the United States made it perfectly clear that there was one clause in the proposed basis of negotiation, as put forward by my right hon. friend, to which the United States could not agree in its entirety, namely, that they should give to the extent that was indicated a reduction of duty on certain specific commodities. They were prepared, however, to take into account existing conditions and circumstances and to see how far they could go in the matter. They stressed also the importance of including in the discussion the method of determining the value of merchandise for duty purposes, the administration of customs laws, artificial restrictions upon imports, and powers taken by the governor in council with respect to customs regulations which were particularly objectionable to the United States, as they had been to other countries.

How did my right hon. friend proceed from that stage? The following is the reply which was sent on January 4, 1935:

I have the honour to acknowledge your note of the 27th December, 1934, in which you advise me of the willingness of your government to enter upon negotiations with the government of Canada looking to a trade agreement calculated to increase trade between our two countries, and to assure you that my government, who have noted the suggestion that the question of methods of determining the value of merchandise for duty purposes be added to the proposed bases for discussion set forth in my note of the 14th November, are ready to commence negotiations immediately with a view to the conclusion of a commercial agreement with the government of the United States of America.

That was the situation on January 4, 1935, before the previous parliament had held its last session. I submit that at that time my right hon. friend knew entirely the framework within which the agreement was to be made, how far it would be possible for him to go, and if he was prepared to carry on negotiations, about how far it would be possible for the United States to go. But have we a record of any further communications? Nothing further was given to this parliament or to the country until we were in the midst of a general election. Over and over again during the last session we asked my right hon. friend what progress he was making in the negotiations. We sought to discuss tariff matters; resolutions were introduced favouring reductions in the duties on farm implements, on machinery for mining and on the instruments of production in the other basic industries such as fishing, lumbering and the like. Each time a resolution of the kind was introduced my right h'on. friend asked us to allow it to be dropped, not to proceed further

with it because it might prejudice his negotiations with the United States. In that way we were prevented from discussing the matter throughout the session. Until after parliament was dissolved no word of any agreement was forthcoming. No doubt when my right hon. friend speaks he will give us the reasons for all these delays. What I want to ask is this: Why did my right hon. friend find it necessary to wait until the country was in the midst of a general election to publish the document setting out the basis of negotiation? The correspondence was handed out to the press by my right hon. friend in the month of September.

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CON

Richard Bedford Bennett (Leader of the Official Opposition)

Conservative (1867-1942)

Mr. BENNETT:

It was tabled here in the house.

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LIB

William Lyon Mackenzie King (Prime Minister; Secretary of State for External Affairs; President of the Privy Council)

Liberal

Mr. MACKENZIE KING:

This statement was brought out publicly only in the press.

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CON

Richard Bedford Bennett (Leader of the Official Opposition)

Conservative (1867-1942)

Mr. BENNETT:

It was publicly given to the house when the house was in session. It was laid on the table.

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LIB

William Lyon Mackenzie King (Prime Minister; Secretary of State for External Affairs; President of the Privy Council)

Liberal

Mr. MACKENZIE KING:

It was given to the press in its entirety only in the month of September.

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CON

Richard Bedford Bennett (Leader of the Official Opposition)

Conservative (1867-1942)

Mr. BENNETT:

It was laid on the table of the house.

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LIB

William Lyon Mackenzie King (Prime Minister; Secretary of State for External Affairs; President of the Privy Council)

Liberal

Mr. MACKENZIE KING:

A great deal was made of it by my right hon. friend during the course of his campaign. Throughout its course, he continually drew attention to it. The impression that he sought to leave with the country was this: Here is what I am standing for; I am seeing that you will get amongst others the things that I have mentioned here; negotiations are under way, and the only hope you have is to return the present administration and let me get these things for you as a consequence of having commenced the negotiations. Fortunately, both parties had been on record in the past with respect to their willingness to negotiate agreements with the United States. The public believed that if further negotiations were to be carried on with any hope of success, it was better to trust them to a party that had stood consistently for better trade relations with the United States, than to one that had defeated the reciprocity agreement that had been reached with the United States in 1911 and had made no headway in negotiating an agreement while it was itself in office.

When the present administration came into office our position was perfectly clear. My right hon. friend asks, "Why all the haste? Why was everything done so quickly? What you did do was either what had been done

Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement

before, in which event it is very good, or if not, it is very bad." In other words, "What I did was good, but what you do is bad." Perhaps we should have expected such an attitude, but I submit that it is not much of an argument. In negotiating with the United States my right hon. friend had to rely upon members of the public service for the information necessary to guide him and his colleagues. As all hon. members must know, agreements of this proportion have to be studied and worked out with the utmost care. It is true that negotiations are carried on in part by principals, but for the most part the actual work of accumulation and compilation of data, [DOT]of making comparisons and estimating values is performed by members of the public service. .1 think this country owes a very special debt to those officers of the Department of Finance, the Department of Trade and Commerce, the Department of National Revenue and the Department of External Affairs who had to do with negotiations while my right hon. rfriend was in office and since we have been in office. I am sure he will be the first to say that they rendered exceptional service in seeing that the whole situation was surveyed from every possible angle, and that they brought to the attention of the ministers every consideration of which account would have to be taken. More than that, they succeeded in effecting the happiest of relations with their opposite members in the departments at Washington, an important factor in the successful completion of the agreement. -

May I say at once that we sought an agreement which would be fair and square, and which would be helpful to both countries. We were not seeking, and I do not believe my right hon. friend was seeking, to get the better of the United States. I do not believe the United States was trying to get the better of us. I think that both countries had come to the conclusion that, in this period of depression when things were going from bad to worse in our respective countries and other parts of the world, the sooner we all adopted a different attitude of mind and decided that, instead of seeing how far we could keep away from each other, we should see how close together we could come in the matter of trade on a mutually helpful basis, the better it would be for all concerned. In the working out of this agreement, I believe the officials of both governments were sincerely anxious to find what would be a fair equivalent each way. I think exactly the same is true of the ministers of both governments. The government of the

United States and the government of this country were actuated by one and the same motive, namely, to make an agreement which would be equally beneficial to both countries.

May I point out a special reason why such should have been the attitude? This agreement is only for a period of three years. It is necessarily restricted to three years; but it may be continued indefinitely if, in the intervening three years, it proves to be mutually beneficial. Could anything destroy the agreement more effectively than that it should be shown in the course of the _ next three years that one country had got considerably the better of the other? Would not the effect of an agreement reached in that way be to destroy the possibility of its continuance beyond the period of three years. We believe that what has been done is a step in the right direction, a step which during the next three years will prove its wisdom so conclusively that, when that period has expired, the agreement will not only be continued indefinitely, but will be materially expanded to the increased mutual advantage of the two countries.

When we came into office it was obvious that, if an agreement was to be effected no time was to be lost. My right hon. friend sought, in the debate on the address, to make it appear that there had been undue haste in this matter. One of the reasons I have taken the trouble to read what I have read to-day is to make clear to hon. members and to the country that every conceivable angle of the situation had been canvassed by members of the permanent service while my right hon. friend was in office. Their knowledge of the facts was available to the new administration. I cannot make that too

clear. I want to express, indeed I have expressed, my appreciation of all that had been done in a preliminary way, and that helped to make it possible for the new administration to obtain, at a moment's notice, all the necessary information.

The elections were held on October 14 and we came into office on the 23rd. On the 24th I called on the Hon. Mr. Armour, the United States minister, and told him that our government felt that the most important question we had before us was the negotiation of a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States. I asked if he would be kind enough to arrange a meeting between the President of the United States and myself at the earliest possible moment so that we might discuss, with regard to a trade agreement, such features as it might be necessary to have considered in that way.

Canada-UjS. Trade Agreement

Let me stress this point-I have overlooked it up to the moment but I want to emphasize it now. This government came back with a mandate from the people of Canada to put through a reciprocal agreement at the earliest possible moment. So far as asking the approval of this house is concerned, I regard that in some respects as an almost unnecessary step; the country itself has given so overwhelming an expression of approval of its confidence in a reciprocal agreement with the United States to be negotiated by a Liberal administration. The necessity for such was emphasized from every platform. As my right hon. friend has pointed out, I said more than once that if we were returned to power, the country might expect to see an agreement effected before the year was out. Why did I say that? Because I had before me the basis of the agreement as presented by my right hon. friend; and I knew very well if an administration were in earnest, if it were anxious to effect an agreement with the United States, and if that country were as it had said, equally desirous of achieving that end, that, with the knowledge which would be immediately available to us, it would be possible to work out an agreement in a very short period of time. I assured the country, if it returned us to power, that it could expect us to take the matter up immediately. The country believed what I said, and it has not been disappointed in its expectations.

Immediately after I had seen Mr. Armour, as I explained the other day, members of the cabinet went into conference with members of the service from the different departments who had been dealing with the matter. We canvassed the situation back and forth. We carefully considered how far we would be justified in granting certain concessions to the United States, what our demands should be, and what we would consistently stand for -the basis on which alone we would conclude an agreement. We were in a different position from my right hon. friend in one very important particular. We had said to the electorate throughout the campaign that in our opinion the duties in this country on implements of production were far too high. We said that if returned to office we -would reduce those duties substantially. When we sought to negotiate an agreement with the United States we were prepared to offer, for concessions on their part, a reduction in those duties, as we were pledged to do, on instruments of production in the great basic industries of the country. To that extent we were in a much more favourable position than my right hon. friend in seeking to negotiate; we could negotiate for better

terms than he would have found it possible to secure. I might mention other things, but I cannot go into certain matters which are more or less confidential. The one referred to, however, was known generally, and it was a factor which helped very much in the negotiation of the present agreement.

After discussing the matter fully with my colleagues in the cabinet, and after arranging to see the president, 1 went to Washington for that purpose. I think it is advisable to put on the record the communications given out at the time, because they help to tell the story in no uncertain terms. My right hon. friend said it was a matter of going south for my health, but I believe that anyone who read this statement at the time it was released will appreciate the significance of it.

On November 5 I handed to the press the following statement:

I have thought it advisable, before entering upon the duties of the dominion-provincial conference, which will be held at the end of the present month, to take a short trip to the

south My intention is to go south via

Washington so as to have an opportunity of visiting the Canadian legation and of calling upon the President of the United States. In arranging my plans, I sought to ascertain through Mr. Armour, the American minister at Ottawa, a time which would be convenient to the president for my call upon him. Mr. Armour has since conveyed to me an invitation from Mr. Roosevelt to be his guest at the White House during a part of my stay at Washington. I plan, accordingly, upon arrival in Washington on Thursday noon, to go to the Canadian legation. I have accepted the president's very kind invitation to be his guest at the White House on the day following, and to spend there the night of Friday, the eighth. On Saturday I shall resume my stay at the Canadian legation. In these particulars my visit to the White House will be similar to that of Mr. Bennett when, as Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, he visited the Canadian legation in April of 1933 and in the course of that visit was the guest, at the White House, of the President of the United States.

I ask anyone at all familiar wth political matters and with the methods of proceeding in international negotiation, whether, reading that statement, it would not appear that the purpose of that visit was to discuss matters of trade with the President of the United States, just as my right hon. friend had done on a previous occasion. I was making it perfectly plain to this country that the government had before it the question of a reciprocal agreement with the United States, and that my visit to the president was unquestionably and primarily for the purpose of discussing the matter of trade relations between the two countries.

When my right hon. friend paid his visit to the president, a joint statement was issued

Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement

from the White House after their interview as to the main subject of their conversation. The joint statement was to the effect that they had been exploring means of improving trade between the two countries and were in agreement upon the objectives and the methods to be adopted. After my visit to the president, a statement was similarly given out at Washington on behalf of the president and myself, a joint statement indicating the nature of the matters discussed during the course of that visit. It was released at Washington on November 9:

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada have considered the question of increased trade which has been discussed for some time by representatives of the two nations. There is complete agreement on the objective of a greatly increased flow of trade for the benefit of both countries and substantial progress has been made towards this end. It is recognized that such an increase would be beneficially felt in all activities, because trade is but another word for increased employment, transportation and consumption.

So, again, there was no effort at concealment. As a matter of fact, on that occasion there was present at Washington, both before and after this visit with the president, a large number of the permanent officials of the departments that I have mentioned. Everyone knew or ought to 'have known that a trade agreement or something equally important was being negotiated at the time. The presence of these officials along with myself, and the interviews with the secretary of state, the president, and others made that perfectly clear.

A final decision was reached, after conference with the president on matters that up till that time had remained unadjusted between us, on the main features of the agreement subject, of course, on the president's part to further conference with his colleagues, and on my part to further conference with my colleagues. Negotiations then proceeded to the extent of drafting the agreement in a form ready for approval. On the night of November 9 I gave out the following statement, which indicated the further progress that had been made:

In view of the conversations which I have had with the President and the Secretary of State respecting a trade agreement between the United States and Canada, I have thought it advisable not to continue my journey to the south, without first returning to Ottawa to acquaint my colleagues with the substance of these conversations.

I have accordingly asked the members of the government to meet me in Ottawa on Monday, and have arranged to leave Washington to-night, so as to be in the Canadian capital in time to be present at the armistice day

ceremonies which take place on parliament hill on Monday morning. I shall probably leave Ottawa again on the day following, to complete the short vacation in the south to which I have been looking forward.

There again I think it must have been evident to any one who could read between the lines that my purpose in coming back to Ottawa was to bring to the attention of my colleagues the matters which had been discussed at Washington with the president and the members of the cabinet there, and that I would return to Washington again.

On November 11, after having had an opportunity of discussion with the cabinet and of communicating further with the president by direct telephone from Ottawa to Washington and- having ascertained that matters which bad been subject to further consideration there had been duly settled in accordance with what was acceptable to us, I was able to inform the president that the agreement had been approved by the Canadian government, and to make the following statement to members of the press:

I am glad, on this armistice day, to be able to inform you that the governments of Canada and the United States have reached a definite trade agreement. The terms of the agreement were approved by the government of Canada at a meeting held this morning, prior to the proceedings on parliament hill. The formal text is now being prepared for signature. The agreement will be made public simultaneously in Canada and the United States on the date of signature. It is expected that it will be possible to have the agreement in readiness for signature in the course of a few days.

Then followed the strenuous work of getting the agreement into final form for signature. The agreement was formally signed at Washington on November 15.

I think I should place on record what was said at Washington on November 15 when the agreement was signed. These statements help to bear out what I have said about the agreement having been framed, not with the view of one country scoring as against the other, but rather with that of both seeking to further their mutual advantage, and of doing something which might be of some advantage to the world as a whole in its present plight.

When the agreement was signed on November the fifteenth in the office of the president at the White House, Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt, the president, made the following statement:

The trade agreement which has just been signed between the United States and Canada places the trade relations between the two countries on a basis of mutual agreement for the first time since 1866. I am happy to have a part in removing this anomaly in the relations

Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement

between two countries which are united by so many bonds of friendship and common heritage.

The signing of this agreement marks the reversal of the trend of the last two decades towards undue and unnecessary trade barriers between our two countries. I am confident that this constructive step will contribute greatly to the economic recovery of both the United States and Canada.

Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States, then made the following statement:

The United States and Canada are neighbours with a common frontier of 5,000 miles. It is manifest that innumerable opportunities for mutually profitable trade between these friends and next door neighbours must exist. During 1929 the United States was selling to Canada about $900,000,000 of commodities, a substantial proportion of which was farm products, and was purchasing over $500,000,000 in return. Since 1929, our exports to Canada have slumped to about $300,000,000 or a loss of some $600,000,000. This loss has resulted in large measure from shortsighted tariff policies.

Notwithstanding its increase in population, the world to-day is producing and consuming substantially less than it did in 1929 and prior years. This trade agreement will make possible the profitable sale of much of our surplus production as it will also result in the re-employment of a large number of American wage earners now idle.

The people of our two countries have common interests and common aspirations, socially, morally and materially. The progress of each depends more and more upon the progress of the other. .

The problems of commerce and peace facing all nations to-day are acute. While many other parts of the world are devoting their primary efforts either to war or to the feverish building of vast armaments, with consequent neglect of the dislocated and collapsed business conditions, with resultant unemployment and widespread distress, it is for the western hemisphere to point the way to a more far-seeing, constructive basis for prosperity and for peace.

The trade agreement between our two countries will, I hope, mark the beginning of a new epoch in the affairs of our respective peoples. It will mean the common advancement of their economic and their cultural life. Underlying this agreement are the twin policies of the good neighbour and mutually profitable trade.

While many other parts of the world are slipping in the direction of economic suicide, the trade agreement between our two countries marks an outstanding step in the direction of economic sanity. It seeks to stimulate sound and healthy trade relationships and thereby to restore employment to the unemployed and a wholesale prosperity to the peoples of both countries.

It sets an example of what must be done to establish a solid foundation upon which to rebuild a suitable structure of world peace.

To these two statements, one by the president and one by Mr. Secretary Hull, I made the following reply:

The kindly words and sentiments to which you, Mr. President, have just given expression,

will be warmly welcomed by His Majesty the King, in whose name I have had the honour to sign the trade agreement which has just been concluded betwen the United States and Canada.

They will, 1 know, be deeply appreciated by the people of Canada.

May I say, Mr. Secretary, that I very cordially endorse all that you have said of the mutual advantages likely to flow to our respective countries from the terms of the agreement.

On behalf of Canada, I heartily reciprocate the sentiments of international good will you have so generously expressed.

I believe with you that the signature of this agreement is witness of the joint intention of the governments of the United States and Canada to give rapid effect to our policies in a practical manner. At last our formal trade relations have been brought into harmony with the underlying realities of public and private friendship between our two peoples. The agreement will, l am confident, confer substantial benefits alike on the producers and consumers of both countries, while safeguarding with great care every essential interest. I feel sure that its value will be shown beyond question by a marked increase in commerce within the next few months. This undoubtedly will help both countries to make more rapid progress toward complete economic recovery.

Nor will this agreement benefit North America alone. All the world will gain from greater trade on this continent.

Nor will its benefits be confined to trade. To an anxious and troubled world we hope that there will be opened to the nations, by the force of our example, vistas of a surer path to progress and a more lasting road to peace.

I submit, Mr. Speaker, that in that exchange of views, made openly before the peoples of both countries, we have all that is needed in the way of argument to support the wisdom and the soundness of the agreement into which we have entered.

I have still to give the house the main features of the agreement itself. As I indicated at the outset, the purpose of asking approval in this preliminary way is to enable hon. members to have before them, before we enter into a discussion of details, a general view of the situation and the broad aspects of the agreement.

From now on I must ask the indulgence of the house while I place before hon. members the outstanding features of the agreement. Seeing that these involve to some extent the enumeration of rates and1 figures, I hope the house will permit me to do as the Minister of Finance does when he presents his budget, and quote exactly the statements I wish to give. As far as the agreement itself is concerned, hon. members have had it before them; I shall not do more than indicate what the fifteen clauses contain.

There is first the preamble. Then article I sets forth that there shall be mutual exchange of unconditional and unrestricted most-favoured-nation treatment.

Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement

Article II provides for most favoured nation treatment in regard to import and export restrictions; in the event of quantitative restrictions, quotas, etcetera, a quantity of restricted goods equivalent to the proportion enjoyed in a previous representative period shall be allocated to the exporting country.

In Article III Canada fixes maximum rates of duty on imports from the United States in relation to items enumerated in schedule I to the agreement.

In article IV the United States fixes maximum rates of duty on imports from Canada in relation to items enumerated in schedule II to the agreement.

Under Article V each country may impose on imports from the other a tax equivalent to any internal tax levied on domestic products of like nature.

Article VI provides that internal taxes on imported articles shall be no higher than those levied on like articles of national origin or any other foreign origin.

Article VII provides that no quantitative control shall be applied by either country with respect to the goods of the other, except as specifically provided for in schedules I and II; that regulations for control of markets applied to domestic products shall apply equally to goods imported from the other; that all changes must await thirty days' notice, after which, though no agreement has been reached, such change may be made; and that when such action is taken, the other country may, within fifteen days, give thirty days' notice of terminating the entire agreement.

In article VIII each country promises fair and equitable treatment to goods of the other in the event of a national monopoly over any product.

Under article IX, if either country adopts control of exchange, the other will be granted an allotment based on a previous representative period. Sympathetic consideration will be given any representations of the other in this respect.

Under article X, in the event of a wide variations in exchange rates between the two countries, either may propose modification of the agreement, and failing agreement within thirty days, may terminate the agreement in its entirety on thirty days' notice.

Under article XI, in the event of either country enacting any measure deemed as nullifying or impairing objectives of the agreement, provision is made for friendly negotiation and consideration by a joint committee of experts.

Article XII provides that the agreement shall not preclude the regulation of exports

and imports of gold and silver; regulation of trade in arms; and regulation based on the following grounds: moral or humanitarian protection of human, animal or plant life, prison made goods, enforcement of police or revenue laws, and unfair or fraudulent practices.

Article XIII provides that only the most favoured nation clause of the agreement applies to the Philippines, Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and Guam. None of the concessions apply to the Panama Canal Zone, and the agreement is not to apply to concessions between (1) United States, Cuba, Philippines, the Panama Canal Zone and (2) British empire countries.

Under Article XIV, any concession may be withdrawn or subjected to quantitative restriction if through extension to a third country such country obtains the major benefit, and undue increase in importation from such country takes place. Then there is a provision as to how that difficulty may be settled.

The last article of the agreement provides that the agreement shall be ratified by His Majesty and proclaimed by the President of the United States. The agreement was proclaimed by the president on November 29. The following articles of the agreement came into force on January 1, 1936: article I, most favoured nation treatment; article III, concessions made by Canada to the United States in schedule No. I, article IV, concessions made by the United States to Canada in schedule No. 2. The entire agreement shall come into force on the day of exchange of proclamation and ratification at Ottawa. It shall remain in force until December 31, 1938, subject to the provisions of articles VII, X and XIV, the so-called escape clauses. The agreement shall thereafter be subject to termination on six months' notice.

Accompanying the agreement was a note given to the Secretary of State of the United States by the Canadian charge d'affaires at Washington declaring the Canadian government's intention to amend the Customs Act in certain particulars, as follows:

1. To change the method of determining values for duty purposes to eliminate arbitrary executive interference: (a) value for duty will not include advance for selling cost or profit greater than ordinarily prevails in country of export; (b) discounts shall not operate to increase value for duty purposes beyond ordinary price prevailing at time and place of shipment in ordinary trade; (c) in case of fixed values for duty purposes established under section 43 of the Customs Act there shall be an appeal to the tariff board; (d)

CanadaAJ.S. Trade Agreement

"class or kind made or produced in Canada" shall mean "in commercial quantities," and adequate notice shall be given of proposal to transfer any goods into this .category.

2. Pending legislation, fixed valuations under section 43 of the Customs Act are abolished on twenty specified articles.

3. Canada is to allow Canadian visitors to the United States to bring back incidental purchases up to $100 in value under regulations "substantially equivalent" to those now in effect in the United States with respect to Canada.

This is a summary of the main provisions of the agreement. In estimating the advantages of the agreement to Canada, there is one feature which does not altogether appear on its face, namely, that as the United States enters into agreements with other countries granting to such other countries most favoured nation treatment in the United States, automatically Canada gets in the United States market the benefits accorded to those other countries. In other words, the agreement, as far as the advantages Canada will obtain from it are concerned, will become increasingly beneficial to this country, because, with each new agreement entered into by the United States, we get the advantage of what is conceded by them to the other country by way of most favoured nation treatment.

Topic:   CANADA-UNITED1 STATES TRADE AGREEMENT PROPOSED APPROVAL SUBJECT TO LEGISLATION MAKING PROVISIONS EFFECTIVE
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REC

Henry Herbert Stevens

Reconstruction

Mr. STEVENS:

The right hon. gentleman will of course admit that the same principle applies in the other direction, that goods coming from any of those twenty-three nations to Canada will receive the same treatment as goods coming from the United States into Canada.

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LIB

William Lyon Mackenzie King (Prime Minister; Secretary of State for External Affairs; President of the Privy Council)

Liberal

Mr. MACKENZIE KING:

Yes, certainly, exchange of most favoured nation treatment is mutual. Since the agreement was signed the United States has entered into trade treaties with Honduras, The Netherlands, and Switzerland, I believe that there are some eleven other countries with which the United States are now negotiating agreements, and in the event of satisfactory agreements being arrived at, Canada will of course benefit as I have indicated.

May I point out another feature which is all important in connection with this agreement? If no agreement were entered into, there would be no guarantee that Canada would continue to enjoy the opportunities which she now has in the American market under existing rates. The United States came to have last year, for the first time, a two-column tariff. Formerly it was a general tariff the same as against all nations but now there is another tariff, which gives more

favourable rates, and of that tariff Canada has had the benefit. That benefit was extended last year when my right hon. friend was in office, because negotiations were still continuing, but if this agreement is not approved Canada will cease to have the benefit of those more favourable tariff rates and will again come under the general tariff. Moreover there is to-day no guarantee that on goods which are at present admissible into the United States from Canada free, duties may not be imposed. One of the main features of this agreement is that it assures for the next three years a continuance of the favourable opportunities which we already have in the United States market and the prevention thereby of new impositions against this country.

As I have indicated, prior to May 1,

1935, the United States had a single column tariff, but when the trade agreement with Belgium came into operation there was inaugurated a new commercial policy on the part of the United States, namely the beginning of a two column tariff. Eventually all countries will be divided into two classes so far as United States imports are concerned, those with which the United States has trade agreements incorporating the most favoured nation clause, which will receive the lower rate, and all other countries failing to conclude an agreement with the United States which will pay the higher rates.

In embarking upon this new policy the United States government announced that the more favourable schedule of duties would be extended temporarily to all countries. This was done in order to promote friendly relations with other countries and to encourage them to conclude agreements with the United States. Meanwhile, negotiations towards such an end had been opened with a number of countries and the intention of the United States government to undertake such negotiations with others had been announced.

It was made known that Canadian exports to the United States would enjoy the benefits of the most favoured nation treatment until October 1, 1935, since negotiations with Canada had already begun. Later, when no agreement had been completed by that date, the concession was extended to January 1,

1936. Failing an agreement by the 1st January, 1936, there was every probability that Canada would have been removed from the favoured list and would thereby have ceased to enjoy the lower rates of duty. Already Germany had denounced the most favoured nation clause of her agreement with the United States and had suffered this fate.

Canada-U-S. Trade Agreement

At the present time the difference between the two schedules of rates, the most favoured nation and the general, in the United States tariff is not great; but it is the expressed intention of the United States government to endeavour to conclude bilateral treaties with all countries with whom she has any significant amount of trade. If such a course is followed, the disparity between the two tariff schedules will increase in a cumulative fashion. Therefore, if Canada had not concluded an agreement with the United States, while the latter continued such a policy, Canadians would have had to contend with obstacles in the United States tariff that would have become increasingly onerous as time went on.

It should, at the same time, be remembered that the policy of this country toward the United States left Canada, on a number of scores, open to attack by the people in United States adversely affected thereby. We had come to think of the general tariff as one maintained practically against goods of the United States, for the latter was the only country with which Canada had an important exchange of trade, against which the general schedule was levied. The general rate applied also to goods from Russia, but trade with that country had been largely prohibited by embargoes in any case. Thus, there was considerable weight in the United States contention that we were discriminating against them and the complaints being made at Washington were adding greatly to the pressure being put upon the United States government to retaliate against this country.

The privilege enjoyed by citizens of the United States returning to that country to bring with them goods for their own use to the value of $100, duty free, has always met with opposition from those who feel themselves adversely affected by this provision. In recent years this opposition has grown due in part to the general feeling, mentioned above, that Canada has discriminated in one way or another against the United States, but more especially because this country has consistently refused to grant any similar privilege to Canadians returning from the United States. An increasing demand was being made that this privilege no longer be given to citizens of the United States returning from Canada, and a strong lobby in Washington were pressing for action to this effect. If Canada had persisted in her refusal to reciprocate on this point it is most probable that we should have lost a trade worth several million dollars yearly.

In regard to direct shipment may I say that prior to the entry into effect of the trade agreement, the Canadian tariff provided that imports enjoying the lower rates of the intermediate tariff must not pass in transit through countries to which the intermediate rates were not extended. Similarly, goods entering Canada under British preferential rates must not pass through a non-British country, if they were to secure full benefit of British preferential treatment. The United States had for some time asked for the complete abolition of these direct shipment provisions, which they contended were grossly discriminatory against United States ports and transportation facilities and against which they had threatened retaliatory action for some years. Representative White had twice introduced a bill of this nature and on January 7, 1935, representative McCormack introduced a similar measure. The good offices of the United States Department of State had succeeded in delaying the enactment of such legislation by holding out the promise that the question would be dealt with whenever a commercial agreement with Canada was concluded.

Canadian transportation officials have for some years made representations to the government of this country pointing out the serious nature of this threat and appealing for the abrogation of the direct shipment regulations in the case of United States so far as the intermediate tariff was concerned. The president of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company has pointed out the importance of the carrying trade which this country does for the United States. According to his figures goods from foreign countries shipped in transit through Canada to the United States were valued at over $65,000,000 during the fiscal year of 1931; while all Canadian imports, both empire and non-empire, shipped in transit via the United States amounted to less than $9,000,000.

It should be noted that a simple exchange of most favoured nation treatment would have automatically extended to the United States the transshipment privileges which they derived from the trade agreement. The provisions for direct shipment in connection with British preferential rates are not affected in any way.

Apart from the handicaps previously mentioned which Canada would have experienced in United States markets had she failed to secure most favoured nation treatment from that country, there was the further danger of a number of items of which Canada is the chief supplier being transferred from the free

Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement

list in the United States tariff. The most important commodity falling under this head is that of newsprint.

While newsprint still remained on the free list it was by no means certain that it would continue to do so. It has been proven that newsprint can be produced on a commercial basis from the type of pine which the southern states (Jan supply in large quantities. For some time these interested states have demanded a high protective rate on this commodity, in order to stimulate domestic production. Their demand was assuming such proportions that the government at Washington was finding it increasingly difficult not

to take action. The serious nature of this threat to the Canadian export trade will be seen once the figures of the trade are looked into.

I have here a statement showing an analysis of concessions granted to Canada, based on United States imports from Canada in the year 1929. Unless the house insists I shall not read it, but with the permission of hon. members I should like to place it on Hansard.

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CON

Richard Bedford Bennett (Leader of the Official Opposition)

Conservative (1867-1942)

Mr. BENNETT:

As I have to speak, I

should like to know what is in it.

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LIB

William Lyon Mackenzie King (Prime Minister; Secretary of State for External Affairs; President of the Privy Council)

Liberal

Mr. MACKENZIE KING:

I will have it sent at once to my right hon. friend.

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ANALYSIS OF CONCESSIONS GRANTED TO CANADA BASED ON UNITED STATES IMPORTS FROM CANADA-CALENDAK YEAR, 1929


Total imports $503,000,000 fDeduct non-commercial items. . .$ 38,000,000 Commercial items.. Deduct items of Canada is not principal supplier Canada principal supplier Free of duty (present laws) . Bound by Swedish agreement Bound by Canadian agreement.. Not bound Dutiable (present laws) . Duties reduced.. Duties bound.. . Duties unchanged. 465,000,000 78,000,000 387,000,000 253,000,000 16,000,000 221,000,000 16,000,000 135,000,000 79.000. 000 9.000,000 47.000. 000 *([DOT]Non-commercial items include- Household personal effects.. . .$ 4,229,000 Articles temporarily imported. 1,811,000 Articles returned 16,295,000 Items of which Canada is principal supplier . (Total value of items on which U.S. policy would permit negotiations.) Items directly affected Free entry assured 221,000,000 Items subject of . reductions 79,000,000 Present low rates assured 8,000,000



Items indirectly affected- (upwards of) 16,000,000 Wood pulp (certain kinds of which Canada is not principal supplier) continued free entry assured by Swedish treaty. Also a number of less important items. This list will increase as United States signs other bilateral trade treaties. "Imports from Canada of articles on -which duties were reduced were, in 1929, 94 per cent of t'he total imports of these commodities from all countries. In the following summary, the figures of Canada's exports are based on United1 States import figures, since Canadian figures of exports do not, in certain cases, correspond to the headings of the United States tariff. May I now give an outline of the principal agricultural concessions granted to Canada: Live Cattle Reduction in duty ranging from 33J per cent to 50 per cent. Most important class, weighing 700 pounds or more, reduction from three cents to two cents per pound up to 155,799 head of cattle. Almost all of this quota will be allocated to Canada. Resultant average saving in duty will amount to around $9 per head of cattle. Exports 1929, $9,900,000; in 1934 they had fallen to $4,000. Calves Of less than. 175 pounds each, duty lowered from two and one-half cents to one and one-half cents per pound. Quota 51,933. Dairy Cows Reduction in duty from three cents to one and one-half cents per pound. Quota 20,000 head per year. Cream Reductions in duty from 56& cents to 35 cents per gallon. Quota 1.500,000 gallons per year. Exports 1929, $5,000,000 of 1934, negligible. Seed Potatoes March to November reduction in duty from 75 cents to 45 cents per hundredweight



Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement Other three months reduction to 60 cents per hundredweight. Quota 750,000 bushels, which is three times current export. Turnips Reduction from 25 cents to 12^ cents per hundredweight. Exports in 1929, nearly SI ,000,000. Clover and Grass Seed Fifty per cent reduction on these items. Exports 1929, S2,000,000; 1934, very small. Maple Sugar Reduction from six cents to four cents per pound. Exports in 1929, $2,500,000; 1934, less than $500,000. Hay Reduction from $5 to $3 per ton. Horses Reduction from $30 to $20. Live Poultry and Dressed Chickens Reduction 50 per cent and 40 per cent* respectively. Cheddar Cheese Reduction 29 per cent. Exports 1929, nearly $2,000,000; 1934, $140,000. Apples, Strawberries, Cherries, Peas, Frozen or Canned Blueberries Duties reduced. Grains Ten per cent ad valorem rate bound on feed wheat and by-products of grain. May I point out that in no case where it has not been possible to get concessions from the United States is any Canadian industry in a worse position than it was before. It is really in a better position by virtue of the fact that there will be in all probability a reduction on some of the implements or instruments of production used in that industry and also a lessened cost of living, and as well an increased demand for commodities as a consequence of improved conditions resulting from increased trade. The principal concessions on fishery products granted to Canada were: Halibut Reduction from 2 to 1 cent per pound. Exports: 1929, $676,000; 1934, $261,000. Salmon (Fresh or Frozen) and Swordfish Reduction from 2 to 1J cents per pound. Exports: 1929, $659,000; 1934, $719,000.


CON

Richard Bedford Bennett (Leader of the Official Opposition)

Conservative (1867-1942)

Mr. BENNETT:

That is swordfish not

frozen?

Topic:   ANALYSIS OF CONCESSIONS GRANTED TO CANADA BASED ON UNITED STATES IMPORTS FROM CANADA-CALENDAK YEAR, 1929
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LIB

William Lyon Mackenzie King (Prime Minister; Secretary of State for External Affairs; President of the Privy Council)

Liberal

Mr. MACKENZIE KING:

Salmon, fresh or frozen, and swordfish.

Topic:   ANALYSIS OF CONCESSIONS GRANTED TO CANADA BASED ON UNITED STATES IMPORTS FROM CANADA-CALENDAK YEAR, 1929
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February 25, 1936