March 3, 1910

of French origin with lacking more or less in loyalty. One might think that they are, forsooth, the vestals of that sacred fire, loyalty, devotion to the mother country. But when have the French Canadians ever shown disloyalty? Is it when my fellow-countrymen willingly and through pure zea] for the British cause went over to fight on the battlefields of Africa? I say pure zeal, and I have reason to say so, because in their French Canadian hearts, these soldiers had sympathy, to say the least, for that people of heroes, the Boers, who, like themselves in 1837-38, sacrificed the purest of their blood to vindicate their rights, their liberty and defend their homes and their families. _ History, in her finest pages, will have to judge these men, and I am satisfied that future generations will recall with enthusiasm and pride their dignity, their greatness and their heroic virtues. Inquire from the courageous Deputy Minister of Militia, that young French Canadian who has done honour not only to the French name, but to English citizenship, inquire from him how his fellow-countrymen behaved in the bloody battles of the Boer war. Loyalty, which you extol so forcefully, is indeed a fine and noble disposition of the soul and of the heart, but whoever grasps the meaning and purport of The word is capable of being moved by it; that is not y °ur exclusive privilege. On the contrary, you associate and confuse to such a degree! and on so many occasions, that noble sentiment with the low machinations of a mean political purpose, that you deprive it of its lustre and its beauty! We should, to begin with, be loyal to Canada by showing fairness and respect for the man whom the sovereign people of this country have placed at the head of the government, and who represents supreme authority in this parliament. You convert loyalty into a vile election machine, and when'the elections come on you will be heard proclaiming loudly your love and your devotedness to your mother country in certain provinces, while in others you will make fun of your exaggerations. Without any definite policy or principles, you will then give the country an exhibition which you seem to have a taste for, that of a divided party preaching to-day some kind of policy which to-morrow will be discarded and replaced by one exactly of opposite aims, as you have done on that question of the navy. Continue to do as you have been doing. We are the calm anu amused witnesses of your vain outpours of verbosity, we are greatly amused on this side of the House at your unsuccessful endeavours, at your differences and sudden changes' of opinion. And above all, we admire your, blind submission to' the real leader of the opposition for the time being, the hon. Mr. Mr. TURCOTTE. I Roblin, who under cover pulls the wires which command every move. Alas, what would Macdonald and Cartier say if they could only be witnesses of what is going on to-day in the ranks of their erstwhile party? They had clear and clean cut principles of policy, and with a firm hand lead the ship confided to their rare. The people of this country, with their characteristic keen and thorough insight into matters, will soon have sized up your policy and detected its narrow and shifting tendencies, in contrast to that of cur party, which is broad, resolute, openly favourable to national autonomy, and at the same time safeguarding the rights and interests of the people. I shall now bring my speech to a close, Mr. Speaker, but before doing so, I wish to thank my hon. friend from Red Deer (Mr. Clarke) for his flattering words of reference to the French Canadians in the course of the remarkable speech he delivered last week on this question. The sarcastic deputy leader of the opposition called him, in ironical and unfair fashion, a little Englander. The hon. member from Red Deer possesses a sound judgment, absolutely free from unwmrthy' prejudices, and a soul noble enough and great enough to be fair towards his fellow countrymen of different origin, and it is with the help of men such as he that a country like ours may hope to succeed in attaining the high destifiv of nations. Mean and uncompromising fanaticism is no longer tolerated. The stand 1 am taking on this question, 1 realize it fully obliges me to sacrifice ideas which I have vindicated in all sincerity for almost forty years past, and that sacrifice I make for the sake of my country and not for the sake of my party, I say so with absolute frankness. I have perfect and implicit trust in the new stand taken by my party, and since circumstances and political exigencies have induced our leaders to adopt the present policy in regard 1o the establishment of a war navy, I bow willingly to their greater experience and wisdom and will vote for the measure. In public life, as in private life, if necessary at times to sacrifice personal opinions of long standing towards forwarding the general good. (Rien tdest plus dur que le devoir en concurrence avec ce que Fon affectionne.) (Lacordaire.) (Faites votre devoir, et laissez faire aux dieux.) (Corneille.) I heard our great leader a few days ago. in a speech vibrating with eloquence and rich in great and noble thoughts, assert that, our autonomy would be safeguarded, and indeed it is safeguarded by this Bill' as far as possible under the circumstances! I have implicit confidence in the utter- ances of my chief. And why not? Have not hon. gentlemen opposite the same trust in the utterances of their leader? The Militia Bill can be compared to this, and in spite of ill feeling, I might even say the terror it inspired to the French Canadian people, it became law. Its promoter, Sir G. E. Cartier, appealed at the time to his fellow-citizens of the province of Quebec, Crowed the absolute Necessity of having an armed force and explained the tenor of that Bill, thus restoring confidence in regard to that policy of militarism. Yes, I repeat it, I have confidence in the policy of my leader. One word more, besides a few quotations which I would like to make with a view to throwing some cold water on the sacred fire of overdone loyalism which is consuming ihe heart of my hon. friends opposite. I take the liberty of quoting some distinctly British views on Canada and its value from the British viewpoint. The following is an extract from ' Canadian Emancipation,1 vol. 2, page 39: WOULD GREAT BRITAIN ATTEMPT TO DEFEND CANADA? We are told that, being a dependency of Great Britain, in case of war, we would be supported by the army and navy of the British enpire. No sane man will entertain that proposition. Some time previous to confederation, Colonel Jarvis, an imperial officer, made a report on the defence of Canada. He recommended the construction of important military works in the province of Quebec, and said: unless these works are constructed it is more than useless to continue any British force in Canada.' The works recommended have not been constructed, and England has withdrawn her forces. What are the sentiments of leading British statesmen on the question? ' Britain's annual expenditure in defence of Canada, 'said Mr. Gladstone,' is a very heavy charge, and^ it is our duty in every way to get rid of it.' Sir Chas. Adderley said: 'I believe tbe Canadians are much more likely to involve us in a war than we are to inflict one upon them, and that Great Britain cannot undertake to defend the colonies for the sake of the Canadians.' The Duke of Newcastle said: 'The cost of all war should be borne by those for whose benefit it is carried on.' John Bright asserted, in his place in parliament, that ' there is no statesman in England who will venture to bring about the shedding of one drop of blood in defence of British North America.' Mr. Aytoun said: ' He never had met with any man, not a member of the government, who considered that it was possible to defend Canada against an attack in force by the United States.'


Sir C. W.@

Dilke says: ' We defend the colonies only during peace; in war time they are ever left to shift for themselves.' Mr. Cardwell: 'it is an almost universally accepted principle of English policy that it is no longer desirable to maintain a standing army to defend our distant colonies.'

The 'London Times' says: 'We are quite aware that, in the event of war, we should not be able to render effectual aid to our Canadian Dominion, and that our fellow subjects out there would either have to fight at a terrible disadvantage, or mortify our pride by anticipating defeat and yielding to terms.

In a national point of view that would he no loss to this country.'

Before closings this speech, Mr. Speaker, I am bound to refer to some utterances of the hon. member for Victoria and Haliburton (Mr. Hughes), who, in the course of an address very agressive in tone as regards my I fellow countrymen, committed a grievous mistake by qualifying as rebels the patriots of 1837. Lord Strathcona is far from being of the same opinion, and here is what he says (I am quoting from the ' Memories of Robert Bouchette,' a book annotated by our learned and congenial librarian, Mr. A. D. Decelles, page 8):

The rebellion of 1837, directed not against England, but against colonial maladministration, was perfectly justifiable. (Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal).

These noble words fully avenge us, we of the French race in this country; they are a well deserved rebuke for the hon. .member. While listening to the insults he deliberately flung at the French Canadian people when he characterized the patriots of 1837 as cowards and traitors, I was moved by a feeling, not so much of indignation as of pity, and I said to myself: the hon. member, though a soldier, does not know of the awful horrors of a battlefield; no, he is only a parade officer utterly ignorant of the grandeur, the beauty, the nobleness and the heroism implied in the deed of the brave soldier who falls under the enemy's bullets, martyr to the love of country, victim of his convictions. In order to cover, Mr. Speaker, if possible, the sound of those words of insult and obloquy aimed at the Canadian people, I wish I could impart to my voice a power which it does not possess, and cry out: Chenier, the great Chenier, and that phalanx of brave men who have fallen under the bullets of bureaucracy, were heroes, and history will speak of them as men of courage, who have died for a great principle and for a noble cause.

In concluding, I wish to state the reason ' which induces me to vote in favour of this measure. They are, in the first place, the great confidence I have in the policy so well defined by my right hon. leader; in the second place, the political status and relationship of our country to Great Britain; and in the third place and above all,

wish for it only inasmuch as it could be obtained through the good will of Great Britain and with her full agreement; for I am free to acknowledge that to Great Britain we owe all that we are to-day, and I am proud to proclaim myself her loyal and devoted subject. .

Let us provide armaments, it is the duty of the hour, but I wish most ardently to see the day when the people will loudly call out to militarism: Stop, it is time to disarm. Long enough has our blood been spilt and our flesh been tortured to satisfy the ambitions and hatred of the governing classes and war mongers.. The general trend of opinion is even now, though unperceived, working towards that goal, and when democratic ideas will have prevailed through universal sufferage, and organized labour will act in co-operation with those who have freed themselves of the fetters of plutocracy, then shall we see peace triumph, and then also will militarism be a thing of the past.

Subtopic:   1'JlU

Edward Guss Porter

Conservative (1867-1942)

Mr. E. GUSS PORTER (West Hastings).

Mr. Speaker, I regret that my knowledge of the French language is so imperfect that I have not been able to follow with exactness the remarks of the hon. member for Nicolet (Mr. G. A. Tur-cotte), still I hope I may be allowed to pay him the compliment of saying that his speech was very musical if nothing else.

I was able to extract from his remarks sufficient to understand that he is, qualifiedly, in favour of the doctrine or principle of independence. In support of his advocacy of that principle, he was pleased to cite some authority, and with that and with his remarks I can only say that, while it is true that in Canada there are some men who advocate and believe in the doctrine of independence, I can say, thank God, that their numbers are few. It is not very encouraging to the hon. member for Nicolet to find that, *whereas when he began his remarks on this most important question-important not only to Canada but to the empire-he had a pretty full house on the government side, yet his remarks have been so interesting and have been received so favourably by the menr-bers of that side that he has succeeded, in the hour during which he has addressed this House, in pretty nearly emptying the benches. In undertaking a discussion of the Bill now before the House, known as 'A Bill respecting the Naval Service of Canada', one is met at the very outset with the difficulty that the measure is clothed in such uncertain and indefinite language and is so imperfect in its arrangement that one is at a loss, to understand just exactly what the intent and scope of the Bill is. And when one comes to compare the provisions of the Bill with the remarks upon it by hon.

Subtopic:   1'JlU

Gustave Adolphe Turcotte



members on the government side of the House, he finds the maze all the more difficult, because these speeches differ in themselves and differ very materially from the provisions set forth in the Bill. And, Sir, the fact that the position of one undertaking to discuss this Bill is difficult is not at all romarkable when we recall the fact that, when the measure was introduced by the flght hon. the Prime Minister (Sir Wilfrid Laurier), he felt compelled to admit that he knew very little about it himself. With the exception of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Militia (Sir Frederick Borden) is the only minister who has seen fit to deliver a speech in this House on the Bill. And, in regard to the speech delivered by the hon. the Minister of Militia it is noteworthy that, like the premier, he was not able to speak, as is said in sporting parlance, off his own bat, but was forced to admit that he too was speaking from details and memoranda furnished by somebody else. So, it is not to be wondered at that "one attempting to discuss this Bill finds himself in the difficulty to- which I have made reference. But, disguised as the Bill is in its language and arrangement, I think that a careful consideration of its provisions will enable one to discover sufficient of its scope and intent to determine that there is something behind the Bill more than is expressed in it. I do not suppose that I shall be able to convince hon. members on the government side that there is a sinister motive behind it or that the Bill is not what it really professes to be, because from the speeches that have been made by these hon. gentlemen I should have to class them with those who

-convinced against their will,

Are of the same opinion still.

I would direct your attention first to section 4 of the Bill which reads as follows:

The Command in Chief of the Naval Forces is vested in the King, and shall be exercised and administered by His Majesty, or by the Governor General as his representative.

It will be observed that in the first part of this section the command in chief of the forces to be established under this Bill is declared to be in His Majesty the King. To that part of the provision I have no objection and with it I have no quarrel. The second part declares that this command shall be 'exercised and administered by His Majesty'. With that clause also, I have no quarrel. But to the concluding words, I do offer objection -that this command shall be administered by His Majesty 'or by the Governor General as his representative'. In enacting that clause it occurs to me that the


government have made a disclosure, to a partial extent at least, of what the real [DOT]object and intent of this Bill is. It would not have done to stop with the words 'be administered by His Majesty or by the Governor General', because that would have made a joint command, so to speak, it would have contradicted the very best authority and understanding of the whole British people in regard to the command of the naval forces. But they saw fit to add, 'as his representative'. In other words, it is provided that in the administration of the naval forces of this country, the Governor would be acting, as it were, under power of attorney from the King. I object, I say, to the addition of these words, for the reason that has already been very well and ably stated by the hon. member for Vancouver city (Mr. Cowan). He took occasion to show, and I I think succeeded in showing, that the clause as it is drafted and presented in this Bill, is ultra vires of this parliament, and is unconstitutional, inasmuch as it seeks to detract or take from His Majesty the King a portion of his authority in connection with the naval forces. The hon. member for Vancouver (Mr. Cowan) was pleased to cite a section of the British North America Act which proved the contention he was making, that is section 15. And let me remark here that the British North America Act is the constitution of the Dominion of Canada, and within the limits of that Act the parliament of Canada must confine itself and confine its powers. Section 15 provides:

Tlie command in chief of the land and naval militia, and of all naval and military forces, of and in Canada, is hereby declared to continue to be vested in the Queen (or King).

Then the hon. gentleman cited the British statute of 13 Charles II, which provides that the sole command of the naval forces is vested in the King; and for that reason, by virtue of these two statutes, he concluded his argument that there was no power and no authority granted to this parliament or possessed by this parliament by which they could in any manner take from or detract from the King's authority over the naval forces. I think that not only is that the case, not only is no authority granted to this parliament, but I think the hon. gentleman could have carried his argument still further, and have shown that there is an absolute prohibition to this parliament from taking any such powers as they assume to take by this Bill. Had reference been made to section 18 of the British North America Act, where the powers of this parliament are defined, it would have been found to read as follows :

The privileges, immunities, and powers to be held, enjoyed and exercised by the Senate

and by the House of Commons and by the members thereof, respectively, shall be such as are from time to time defined by Act of the parliament of Canada

Now, these are the important words:

-but so that the same shall never exceed those at the passing of this Act held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Commons House of parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and by the members thereof.

Now, Sir, having read that section, the inquiry must be continued further to determine what the powers and authorities of the House of Commons of Great Britain were over that subject at the time of the passing of the British North America Act. The statute to which my hon. friend from Vancouver referred, 13 Charles II, has been carried down from that time in the different revisions of the statute until the reign of her late Majesty, when the last revision was passed, and the exact wording of that statute, giving the sole command and direction of the naval forces of the empire to the King, was preserved, and to-day the power is the same as it was at that time. It is only a recognition by statute of what the prerogative of the King always was under the common law of England. That being the authority and power of the King at that time, the House of Commons of Great Britain had no power or authority to detract or take from that power in any way whatever. But you will see, that being the position at common law, and having recognized that common law' Dy statute, having declared by parliament that such should be the case, the only possible way in which the parliament of Great Britain could have any authority whatever over the matter would be by repealing that statute which recognized the King's prerogative, and passing a new Act of parliament which would have curtailed it or lessened it in some respect. But the parliament of Great Britain has never seen fit to do that; it remains to-day as it did at the time referred to by the hon. member for Vancouver.

But, Sir, the argument can be carried further. Admitting for the sake of argument that the parliament of Great Britain had, since the passing of the British North America Act, passed an Act of parliament giving them the right to curtail the powers of command of the King, granting that, I say that would not affect in any manner the position Canada occupies to-day upon that matter; because you will see that the statute I have already referred to, the British North America Act, declares that the pow'er of this parliament, so far as this subject is concerned, is limited to the powers that were possessed by the House of Commons of England at the time this Act was passed in 1867. So you see that even if the House of Commons of Great

Britain did pass an Act such as I have mentioned, it would not be an Act in force at the time the British North America Act was passed; and the only way in which this parliament could be possessed of the power to interfere with this command would be, either to repeal the British North America Act, or to amend that section I have referred to.

"But, Sir, that objection is not the only one to which I wish to make reference in discussing this Bill. I desire to call attention to sections 17, 18 and 19 of the Bill, sections showing what is the real intention of this Bill, although it has been attempted to disguise it. Section 17 declares :

The Governor in Council may

Mark you, not 'shall':

-may place the naval forces or any part thereof on active service during any time when it appears advisable so to do by reason of an emergency.

You will observe that in section 4 of the Act the command is declared to be in the King to be administered by him or by the Governor General. In this section 17 the power and authority of the King are left out altogether. Section 17 says- that:

The Governor in Council may place the naval forces


And so on. The King has no authority whatever in regard to that.

-at any time that it appears advisable so to do.

In connection with that clause the right lion, leader of the government, when introducing this Bill, was pleased to refer frequently to the Militia Act, and to declare that this Bill had been framed as far as possible upon the lines of that Act. But a very important omission has been made in this section of the Naval Bill, when compared with the Militia Act. The Militia Act declares that:

The militia of Canada may be put on active

service in Canada

The provision is the same as contained in this Bill so far.

-or elsewhere.

The omission in this Bill, when compared with the Militia Act, is that the naval force may be placed on active service in Canada, whereas, under the Militia Act, the militia may be placed on active service either in Canada or outside of Canada. The words actually used are:

Anywhere in Canada and also beyond Canada.

There is another mistake, or another misinterpretation, of the language used in the Militia Act. It is perfectly plain and evi-Mr. PORTER.

dent where, under the authority of that Act, the militia of Canada may be put into service, but this Bill is entirely different in regard to the navy.

The Governor in Council may place the naval forces, or any part thereof, on active service at any time.

It does not declare, as in the Militia Act, where. That is a very important omission and, I think, goes a long way to show the real object and intent of this Bill. Had these words in the Militia Act been inserted in this Bill, there would not have been any doubt about it. But, as the Bill is framed, it leaves it open to two constructions. First, it may be said by the government in one part of Canada that, according to the declaration of section 17 of this Bill, the naval force shall not be sent out of Canada. In another portion of Canada they may be able to declare that there is nothing in section 17 that limits the place or places to which the naval forces may be sent, and therefore, they may be sent on active service in Canada or anywhere else. It is left in such an uncertain position that it is possible for the government to argue in one portion of the Dominion that they may be only used in Canada, and to argue in another portion of the Dominion that they may be used anywhere the same as the militia forces. It might prove to be of very great advantage to the government, but it might likewise prove to be a very great detriment, and disadvantage to Canada and the empire. Some hon. gentlemen on this side of the House have taken occasion to remark upon the use of the word ' may ' in that section.

The Governor in Council may place

And they have seemed to question the good faith of the government in always placing the force at the disposal of the empire when they should. The only answer that has been offered to that criticism from the other side of the House is: Well, there is no danger of that. You can trust the right hon. premier and his government that they will do the right thing at- the right time. If that is so wily use the word ' may ' at all? Why not make it perfectly plain to every one? Why use a word that needs some particular construction or interpretation rather than a word that is perfectly plain, and can be understood by any one? Why not use the word ' shall ' instead of the word ' may ' ? It would appear that that word is used in that section by the government, because they have not sufficient faith in Hi.s Majesty to believe that he would only place the forces on active service, when they ought to be placed on active service, and that the government are more to be trusted to deal with that matter, than His Majesty himself. For my

part I can only say I have more confidence in His Majesty refusing to place the forces of Canada when and where they ought not to be on active service than in the government always placing the forces when and where they ought to be. I think the people of Canada would be more willing in that respect to trust His Majesty as having absolute command of the forces than to put their trust in the government of the right hon. gentleman. But, Sir, there is still another objection that I wish to take to this Bill. I have called attention to clause 18 where it is recited that

In case of an emergency the Governor in Council may place at the disposal of His Majesty, for general service in the Royal Navy, the naval service or any part thereof, any ships or vessels of the naval service, and the officers and seamen serving in such ships or vessels, or any officers or seamen belonging to the naval service.

That clause declares that they may, in case of emergency, place the forces at the disposal of His Majesty, and that must also necessarily carry with it the right to refuse. Therefore, two positions arise under that section. First, the Governor in Council may send them, and, by reservation, may refuse to place them at the disposal of His Majesty. If the Governor in Council sees fit to place the forces at the disposal of His Majesty what follows? Section 19 declares that if parliament is not then sitting or will not sit within ten days it shall be called together, and shall continue to sit, &c., as the section requires. That is all right. That provides for the case wherein the Governor in Council puts the force at the disposal of His Majesty. But, suppose the other position is taken, by the Governor in Council, and he refuses to place the force at the disposal of His Majesty?

What provision is made in this Bill for a case of that kind? Parliament will not meet, there is no power to assemble parliament and, therefore, the people of the country cannot speak through their representatives in parliament. The people cannot themselves put the force at the disposal of His Majesty. Absolutely no provision is made for a case of refusal by the Governor in Council to place the naval force established by this Bill at the disposal of His Majesty, and before the people of this country, or their representatives, could make their wishes known, or the naval force of Canada, no matter how efficient it might be, could, under such circumstances, be placed at the disposal of His Majesty, the crisis might have arrived, in fact the British empire might be ruined and destroyed before Canada could render aid. That, to my mind, is a most serious matter. The naval force is to be placed at the disposal of His Majesty only after parliament has so decided. If parliament should refuse to send the naval force to the assistance of Great Britain, there should be a provision just as strong to enable the people to pronounce upon the question as to whether that refusal was right or wrong, but we find absolutely nothing in this section in regard to it. Another equally strong objection to the Bill is that section 4 and section 18 are inconsistent. The government declare, by section 4, that in all their acts in connection with the command of the naval forces of Canada, they will be acting, and undertake to act, as the representatives ol His Majesty. The representatives of what? They must be the representatives of his authority, of his desire, of his instruction-in fact, willing at all times to carry out what the King would wish or desire, and if they are not so willing, they cannot be his representatives, they cannot act as his representatives. It is a well understood and unquestioned principle, that any person oi corporation acting as the representative of another, of a principal is bound to conform to the instructions and to the wishes of the principal by whom he is authorized. If a breach should be made by an attorney or representative so employed, what would be the natural consequence? He would merit instant dismissal. In what position do the government place themselves by assuming the powers conferred on them under this Bill? They say, in clause 4, that they are acting as the representatives of His Majesty, with all the obligations that that term carries with it; then, in section 18, they declare that in case of emergency ' they may place at the disposal of His Majesty for service,' and so on, which carries with it the right, as 1 have already aTgued, to refuse to place the navy at the service of His Majesty-and there we have the two contradictory positions. In section 4 they declare that they are acting as the representatives of the King, and so are bound to carry out his instructions, and under section 18, if His Majesty should request that the forces of Canada be placed at his disposal in any part of the empire, or engage in any contest that Great Britain might be engaged in, it is within the power of the Governor in Council, of this government, to say: No. That is what they declare: No, we shall not place the forces at your disposal. If an attorney, or a representative bound by the instruction of his principal, were to say that he would do or not do that which he was instructed to do, according to his own judgment, in direct opposition to his instructions, such action would be the grossest possible breach of faith and confidence. A man or a government committing such a breach of instructions, a breach of confidence, an attorney or representative acting in his own interests rather than in the interests of his

principal, as might well he done nnder this *section, would deserve instant dismissal.

It may be that all has been said that can be said for and against this Bill and the amendment proposed by the opposition. There has been, it is true, a great variety of expression in dealing with the principles and the policies of the two parties, but the principles and the doctrines to which the two respective parties adhere have been made perfectly plain. I shall not repeat any of those arguments. I have endeavoured to extract from the speeches delivered in this House what I deemed to be the important and essential points of difference between the two parties upon this important question. I am sorry to say that an element has been introduced into the discussion of this question which I think it would have been better to have avoided, but the offence began with the right hon. gentleman himself and it has been followed up by a number of his supporters. It could not be expected that the opposition would allow the observations made by these gentlemen to go unchallenged or unanswered, and I can only say that if the hon. gentlemen opposite have been paid off in their own coin and with interest on their investment, the government have only themselves to blame for being placed in that position. I think it is unfortunate that any question of party politics should have been introduced into the discussion of this important subject. However, it has been done and it cannot be undone.

I propose to offer to the House what I conceive to be the differences existing between the two parties upon this all-important question.

The first difference to which I would call attention is that the government, by the introduction of this Bill at the present time and the provisions contained in it, tacitly admit the existence of an emergency and of danger to the empire, and the duty of Canada to assist in meeting it; yet, the Prime Minister and others of his following declare that there is no emergency or danger, and, therefore, no necessity of providing for it, totally ignoring expert opinion, and occupying that wholly inconsistent position. Now, in answer to that the opposition take this position: They are prepared to accept the opinions of the best naval experts and of the ablest statesmen of Great Britain, and of independent men of the highest excellence, who have given the subject the most profound thought, that the emergency and real danger to the empire does exist. The opposition are willing to accede to the wishes of the people of Canada and furnish immediate and effective aid to the empire's navy in meeting such a danger. A great deal of discussion has taken place upon that branch of the question, and many references have been

Subtopic:   1'JlU

Edward Guss Porter

Conservative (1867-1942)


made to show that a real danger does threaten the empire. I wish to add just one more reference in connection with that point. In ' Everybody's Magazine ' for November, an article is published by Alexander Powell, F.R.G.S., who was specially commissioned to make an investigation in Germany as to the naval preparations that were being made in that country. I quote from the report which he made when he had finished that investigation:

Everything considered, I think that England has good cause to lie awake o' nights. Twice has the Kaiser declared that the future-of Germany lies upon the seas. Repeatedly has Germany refused to discuss her vast armaments or to give any reason for the frantic haste with which they are being increased ; the whole of her ship-building yards are engaged in an unparalleled scheme of naval construction; scores of her leading writers make no secret of her intentions ; history has shown that on previous occasions she has made unprovoked and sudden attacks on other nations, and, most significant of all, the coal-earying capacity of the ships she is building so hurriedly and which, she insists, are designed solely for the protection of her trade routes, limits their radius of action to the North Sea. There is the disquieting fact. To-day the ambitions of the Kaiser are boundless. He seeks to dominate the continent as the first step towards dominating the world. Look at it any way you will, there can be hut one end to a race which is impoverishing both nations, and that end is war. If England wins, she will have secured herself for half a century to come. If Germany triumphs, her victory will give her the position that England holds now, it will make free trade in England one of the terms of peace; it will give her a free hand in the Balkans, in Mesopotamia and in Persia; will give her the pick of England's colonies oversea, and a billion dollars indemnity with which to build a navy to overawe the world.

That is an independent opinion, and one which seems to me to be enitled to the fullest consideration. The second difference that I have noted between the policy of the two parties is this: That the government declares that Canada now requires a navy of her own for her own defence, independent of the empire, and the opposition say: That Canada, independent of the empire, is not threatened from any source now, nor is she likely to be; her coast line and fisheries are now sufficiently protected, and that protection can he greatly increased as occasion arises, without burdensome expenditure. The opposition say further, that Canada's sea-going commerce is better safeguarded by the empire's navy than it could be by an independent navy; that Canada is threatened whenever Great Britain is threatened, that Canada does not now require an independent navy, hut that our best interests lie in strengthening the empire's navy. Difference No. 3 between the policy of the government and the policy of

the opposition is this: The government assumes it has the right to lay down and to engage in a permanent naval policy lor Canada independent of its entire connection, and to make an initial expenditure varying from $15,000,000 to $18,000,000 for ships, and an annual outlay varying from $3,000,000 to $7,000,000 for maintenance-no one seems to be able to tell just exactly what either one ot the other would cost- realizing that it must be a constantly increasing expenditure annually for shipis not designed or intended to meet the emergency or strengthen the empire's defence on the sea, or capable or offering any substantial defence to Canada in the event ol attack. Now, the position of the opposition as declared by them, I find to be: That whilst the government would have the right to meet the existing emergency and danger, it has not the right- to enter upon a permanent policy of establishing an independent Canadian navy with the ever increasing expenditure and burden such a policy carries with it, without a mandate from the Canadian people; and that at all events any effort made in establishing a navy should be in conjunction and co-operation with the empire's navy. I find this furtbes distinction between the policies of the two parties: That while the policy of the government ignores the recommendations of the admiralty as to the best means to be employed by Canada for strengthening the empire's navy and maintaining the supremacy and security of the nation, the opposition policy is to recognize the great value of the advice and recommendations of the admiralty in matters of naval defence, for which experience and special training have eminently qualified them, at the same time realizing our want of such experience and training, and our common interest in the safety of the empire, and that whilst the aid offered by the amendment to the Bill exceeds the best recommendation of the admiralty as to the share to be contributed by Canada, it does not exceed the duty, the obligation, or the willingness of Canada to maintain the unity of the empire and her security against the world. I find further that by the government Bill, an armed force-and what it declares for-is created in Canada an integral part of the empire, wearing the King's uniform, armed with the King's weapons, loyal men who would be willing to fight for the King and his empire, yet the clause of the Bill to which I have referred declares that such force shall not fight for the King and the empire until Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his cabinet (that is the Governor in Council) order they shall. The opposition reply that such a declaration makes for independence and separation from the empire, that it smacks of sedition, and, if not unconstitutional, is a gross breach of confidence and abuse of power. They also pretend that such an

armed force should, in the event of war, pass automatically, if needed, under the King's command to the defence of the empire, and there should be no power to prevent that being done. That point of difference between the two parties in politics is one which, it seems to me, should be accentuated. Shall we, as Canadians, be soldiers of the King? Or shall we be soldiers of Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his government? Evidently the goal which the Prime Minister desires to reach is independence. Independence has frequently been his declared ambition, and the Bill before us carefully avoids any. provision which might serve to link Canada more closely to the empire and thus disappoint the premier's ambition, but on the contrary makes strongly in the opposite direction, although an attempt has been made to disguise its tendency. On the other hand, the policy of the opposition does not require any disguise or deception. It is clear cut. It makes straight for the solidarity and unification or federation of the empire, the security of Canada, and the sovereignty of the nation. That difference between the two policies, let me again point out. ought to be emphasized. Shall we continue to live under the old emblem of liberty, the Union Jack, shall we hoist it for ever and claim its protection, or shall we declare our independence and hoist a flag in accordance, with that policy? I venture to think that the great majority of our people will have no hesitation whatever in declaring for the old Union Jack.

The scheme of the government, if carried out, will not afford immediate or any assistance to the empire's navy or the defence of the nation, because the crisis will have long passed before such a navy as is proposed in this government measure could be placed in the fighting line, if it could ever be so placed, and consequently would not discharge any part of the acknowledged obligation of Canada to the empire. Thus it is an absolute denial of tbe affirmations contained in the resolution of this House, adopted unanimously in March last, to defend the empire in time of peril. On the other hand, thei resolution and the policy of the opposition, if adopted, will afford immediate and effective strength to the empire's navy, will meet the emergency and discharge Canada's obligation and duty to contribute to the defence of the empire and the peace of the world.

The professions of loyalty and willingness to assist in the defence of the empire, so loudly made by the government and its followers, are wholly inconsistent with and opposed to the policy laid down in this Bill. That is evidenced by the provision of this measure, whereby assistance to the mother country, if any be made, is to depend on the wiil of the government. Such provision

is but another step towards independence. Contrast that with the policy of the opposition, who supplement their declarations of loyalty by offering immediately to provide two Dreadnoughts, or the equivalent, without any reservation whatever^

There is another important distinction between the policies of the two parties. The government is inclined to offer fight-noughts which dread everything, while the opposition desire to offer Dreadnoughts which are prepared to fight anything.

The government has failed to show that the adoption of its policy will have any moral effect on Briton's enemies or the world in general such as the immediate and effective offer advocated by the opposition could not. fail to have. Such an offer would tend to lessen the possibilities of conflict and thus spare us the horrors of war.

The policy of the government largely consists in vain glorious boasting deception, useless and extravagant expenditure of public moneys, and cannot fail to provide exceptional opportunities for graft. Whereas, the policy of the opposition is one of action, prompt, generous and effective, by which many dollars will be saved for every dollar expended. The refusal of the government and its representatives to adopt or act upon any of the proposals of the several imperial conferences regarding naval defence compared with the promptness and generosity displayed by our sister dominions, Australia and New Zealand, in accepting such proposals and bearing their share of the burden, has placed Canada in a humiliating and unenviable position in the eyes of the empire and the rest of the world. The opposition feel that, considering the importance of Canada, considering her vast resources, considering her growing population and the loyalty of her people, considering the immensity of her growing commercial interests and the protection she has enjoyed under the British flag, she should be placed in the first rank of the overseas dominions instead of being put in the position of a voluntary outcast and laggard, as is done by the policy of the government.

The policy which the government submits to the House, is, by its nature, a permanent one, and yet is being entered upon without the authority of the people who have not had an opportunity of expressing their will and have not sufficient knowledge as to details as to enable them to judge as to its advisability or efficiency. This policy, once entered upon, cannot be discontinued, but must 'impose an ever increasing burden on the people, and that . without giving any sufficient assurance that it will prove adequate even for the defence of Canada. On the other hand, Mr. PORTER,

the policy of the opposition is intended to afford immediate temporary relief in an emergency and discharge the immediate obligations of Canada to the empire, it is fixed in amount, certain in details, sufficient for the purpose intended, creates no continuous or increasing burden, secures a greater measure of security for Canada by strengthening the defence of the empire than could be secured by the creation of a Canadian navy. And, being an emergency policy, does not require to be submitted to the people.

We are told by hon. gentlemen opposite that our policy is an attack upon responsible government, an encroachment upon Canadian autonomy, and would impose taxation without representation, which is subversive of Canadian ideas. But it must be evident that the offer we advocate, being a voluntary contribution, has none of the elements of taxation which, involve force, and in no sense can be called taxation without representation. And as responsible government means loyalty to the crown and respect for the will of the people and the right to control our own local affairs, while at the same time observing allegiance to the Crown, voluntary contribution to the defence of the empire to which we owe allegiance as well as the defence of Canada, is a declaration of the principles of responsible government and autonomy in their highest and noblest form. The government declares that the Canadian navy should be built now in Canada by Canadian workmen and -with Canadian material as far as possible. The opposition agree that, when the time arrives and the Canadian people declare that Canada should have an independent navy, then it should be built by Canadian workmen in Canada, with Canadian material as far as possible. But we cherish the hope that the day is far distant when Canada shall require an independent navy, but that her interest and determination will always be to maintain her position in the empire.

These appear to be the principal points of difference between the policies of the two parties in the1 House upon this question. Stripped of all political bias or party consideration, and viewed solely from the standpoint of loyal support of the empire, it occurs to me little difficulty will be experienced by the people of this country in choosing between the policies that I have endeavoured to outline in these fifteep articles. Occasion has been taken during the course of this debate to charge that Canadian interests have always suffered when those interests were dealt with by British diplomacy. That is a statement that has been made on many occasions before. It is made upon this occasion, no doubt, for the purpose of leading the House and the country to believe that in

the matter of naval defence the people of Canada can better trust the government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier than that they can trust the ablest experts of Great Britain. On one occasion in Ottawa, in 1907, the right lion, prime minister (Sir Wilfrid Laurier) said:

If we take all the treaties from the treaty of 1783 up to the treaty of 1903, we Canadians do not feel particularly cheerful over the way we have been treated by the British pleni-potentaries. We have to realize that John Bull has not always done his duty to his Canadian sons.

Also, in September of the same year, at the manufacturers' banquet, the Prime Minister spoke as follows:

We take the record of the diplomacy of Great Britain in so far as Canada is concerned, and we find it is a repetition of sacrifice of Canadian interests. We have suffered on the Atlantic, we have suffered on the Pacific, we have suffered on the lakes, we have suffered wherever there has been a question to be discussed with British diplomats. We have come to the conclusion that we would do better by attending to the business ourselves rather than have it trusted to the best men that can be found in Great Britain.

Again, in Toronto, on another occasion, the Prime Minister said:

British diplomacy, in so far as Canadian interests are concerned, has been a succession of blunders.

. This fault-finding with the British government in its dealing with Canadian .affairs is perfectly consistent with the action of the government in preparing such a. Bill as they now have before this House, and to some clauses of which I have made special reference. But, I venture to say, .there is just as little evidence to prove the assertions made by the right hon. gentleman on the occasions of which I have spoken, as there is for the position they take now in regard to this Bill, that, so fari ,as the naval force of Canada is concerned, it should be controlled by the right hon. gentleman and his colleagues, rather than as the British navy itself is controlled. I think that these references to a want of interest in Canada on the part of British diplomats, and to the interests of Canada having been sacrificed on these various occasions is entirely unwarranted and has resulted more from the desire of some gentlemen to have such a position brought about, and to increase the powers of Canada in that respect or to detract from the authority of Great Britain, than from what has actually taken place under British diplomatic treatment of Canadian affairs. I think these references are made from want of knowledge, or a refusal to acknowledge the real facts in connection with these matters. As this Bill is being viewed from almost every point of view, it perhaps

would not be amiss-reference having been made to the effect of British diplomacy in sacrificing Canadian interests, and the necessary deduction from that having been made that Canadian interests would suffer if its necessary naval defence was left in the hands of Great Britain-if I were to ask the attention of the House for a short time to a consideration of some of thesd matters, and to the comparison I have suggested. The Prime Minister, in the remarks to which I have referred, went on to say that we had lost upon the Atlantic, we had lost upon the Pacific, we had lost upon the great lakes. I propose, during the short time that I shall occupy the attention of the House, to compare the treaties that have been negotiated and concluded by Great Britain with regard to what the Prime Minister has said is our loss upon the Atlantic, our loss upon the Pacific, with certain treaties that the right hon. gentlemen and his colleagues have been able to secure during the time they have occupied the treasury benches.

The first instance to which the Prime Minister referred was the one arising under the Ashburton treaty of 1842. The opinion that was expressed in regard to that matter, and that has been perpetuated in certain quarters, is, I feel sure, the result of want of knowledge of the true facts in connection with the matter. The general contention of those w'ho make similar assertions to those made by the Prime Minister is that in this treaty Canada lost the states of Maine and New Hampshire, by reason of Webster, who negotiated the treaty on behalf of the United States, exhibiting a map to Lord Ashburton which showed the line between Canada and the United States to be very much further west than, as a matter of fact, it was, and that by showing this map to Lord Ashburton, Webster had fooled him into agreeing to the United States getting more territory than they were actually entitled to.

The 3tory goes on to the effect that Webster, the negotiator for the United States, exhibited this map to the Senate of the United States, and thereby induced the Senate, which was previously opposed altogether to the treaty, to agree to it in the form in which it was afterwards assented to. Now, if it were a fact that Webster had in this manner tricked, if I may use the expression. Lord Ashburton, and obtained an advantage in that way, dishonourable as it would be upon the part of Webster, yet it would be a most unfortunate thing for Canada, and a matter upon which perhaps Lord Ashburton might be charged with dereliction of duty, or with not having sufficiently guarded the interests of Canada. But after these long years since 1842 and down to the last year, this story has been current, and it has been given credence to by the right hon. the

Premier and many others. But only last year were the real facts in connection with the matter discovered by an officer of one of the departments of this government, Mr. White, who published an article in reference to his discovery, and giving the evidence, in the * University Magazine '-. It appears that the real facts are these: When the treaty of Paris was made, the line between Canada and the territory subsequently the United States, was definitely fixed and established. That line was fixed, according to the records, by a line known as the Oswald line, and that line was laid down and defined upon a map known as the King's map, in the possession of King George III. The map was marked with the King's own handwriting beneath, a broad red line, indicating ' This is Oswald's line ', and at the time of the passing of the treaty of Paris, and on different occasions in the House of Commons, reference was made to this King's map, and to the settlement of the line by that treaty according to what is known as Oswald's line. Now, then, at the time of the Ashburton treaty, Webster procured from the archives in- Paris a map which had been obtained from Franklin, and he produced this map. There is no evidence of any kind to show where it came from except a letter which was supposed to accompany this map, declaring that Franklin had himself made the red line that appeared upon this map. So that what Webster got was not the official map at all, nor was it a map that had been used in defining the boundary with Canada at the time of the treaty of Paris. But he used that map for the purpose of deceiving the Senate of the United States into the belief that they were getting a larger portion of territory than, according to the real line, they were entitled to. And the discovery of Mr. White proves that although at the time of the passing of this Ashburton treaty this map known as the King's map, having Oswald's line marked upon it and authenticated by the King's own handwriting, had been discovered, it turned out that under that line, what the United States got by the Ashburton treaty in regard to the boundary between the United States and New Brunswick, was exactly what the King's map, and what Oswald's line that was used in the treaty of Paris, gave to Great Britain; nothing more and nothing else to a certain point, that is, from the Atlantic ocean north to what is called the Northwest angle. But from that point the boundary line between the United States and Canada was deflected, and instead of following the Oswald line, which it would have been bound to follow had that map been produced, it was deflected to the west, so as to save to Canada, and it actually did save to Canada, a considerable portion of New Brunswick and of the province of Mr. POETEE.

Quebec; in fact the very land that today the Grand Trunk Pacific passes through was saved to Canada. There would have been no land there for Canada, only for the advantages that Canada gained by the deflection of that eastern line by this treaty. But that is not- the most important point. Had the Oswald line been followed, as the United States had a right to insist upon, and had that map been produced at the time of the Ashburton treaty, but which evidently was not produced, or at any rate was ignored, the line limiting or defining the boundary line between the United States and Canada, east and we3t, would not have been deflected from the northwest angle south and west, which enabled Canada to secure, and by which she did secure, a valuable portion of the province of Quebec which would otherwise have gone to the United States. Now, I do not want to go through all the details of that transaction, but there are two other instances where Canada saved most valuable territory by reason of this Ashburton treaty which the right hon. premier is so ready to condemn.

Now let me refer briefly to the loss which he says we made upon the Pacific coast, with reference to that portion of the state of Oregon, which now belongs to the United States, and which I presume the Prime Minister would say ought rightly to belong to Canada. That treaty was made in 1846. Now the treaty was not in respect of what is now known as the state of Oregon by any means, but the negotiations covered an extent of territory of about 400,000 square miles, including not only the state of Oregon, but what is now our very valuable province of British Columbia. Discoveries had been made upon the Pacific coast by different nations, by" Spain, by Russia, by the United States, and by France, and not one of these countries, excepting the United States, claimed to have absolute jurisdiction over that territory. The greatest claim that Great Britain ever made to that territory was that she had the right of joint occupation with the other nations that were interested in it. The United States, on the other hand, set up the contention, that, Spain having discovered that territory, and having given up her rights by treaty to the United States, the United States also having acquired the right of France by purchase, and having made discoveries by Cook and others they were entitled to the ownership of the territory. The strongest claim of all they made was that of the greatest possession, because it is a well recognized principle of international law that although discovery gives a -right it is not the highest form of title, but that possession is the thing that determines the right of any nation to the ownership of the country.

The United States at this time had not only its own right of discovery, but it had the right which it had acquired from Spain, "the right which it had acquired from France, and it also had the right of possession, because at this time, Great Britain only had in that country about 400 people, whereas the United States had nearly 8,000. That was the element that must determine which of these nations this country should belong to. Mark this important feature; Great Britain did not claim at any time to be the absolute owner of it, and the United States did. What was the position under these circumstances? The slave war was on in the United States at that time, and this territory offered the most favourable place that could possibly be discovered for the emigration of Americans, and they were filling up this territory very rapidly. Great Britain, on the other hand, was making no progress in the way of occupation. Had matters been allowed to drift along in that condition for a few years longer the result must necessarily have been that the population from the United States would overrun the greater portion of this territory, and the United States would therefore acquire it by occupation. The master stroke of British diplomacy was to see that at that time the only hope of Great Britain was to secure as much of the territory as she could absolutely rather than to occupy the position a few years later of losing it all. What did she do? Negotiations were undertaken, and these various claims were put forward. It cannot be contended that either one of two countries that enter into a controversy or discussion of this kind would make adverse claims without there being some merit in the claims of each. It cannot be said that Great Britain was all right, and that the United States was all wrong, that Great Britain was entitled to the whole of that country, because she only claimed a part of it, or that the United States was entitled to it all. So, they had to sit down, and make the best bargain they could. What was the result? Under this treaty Great Britain gave up seven degrees of territory that she only claimed the right to joint occupation of, and she acquired an absolute and indefeasible title to six degrees of territory that could never afterwards be in question. I would like to know, in view of these facts, how it could be said that in the negotiation of this treaty the interests of Canada were sacrificed. This fact must be remembered too, that at that time that territory was no part of the Dominion of Canada. That was a matter in which Great Britain alone was interested, and it does seem to me that in concluding that treaty Great Britain displayed, just as she did, in concluding the Ashburton treaty, the very highest ele-148

ments of diplomacy, and the very greatest interest in safe-guarding what afterwards turned out to be the interest of the Dominion of Canada, because she secured, through Lord Ashburton, in the east, a large tract of territory that had been denied to Great Britain by another arbitrator. In connection with that it is well to remember that before the Ashburton treaty was concluded the matter had been referred to the King of the Netherlands, and what did he do? After investigating the whole matter he gave Great Britain 900 square miles less than she got under the Ashburton treaty. The United States was not pleased with that award, and it was on an appeal from the United States that Great Britain, through the Ashburton treaty, obtained far more territory than she did under the award that was given by the King of the Netherlands. So, in regard to the treaty of Oregon, Great Britain, by her diplomacy, secured for future Canada a greater extent of territory by absolute title than she actually made claim to before the treaty was undertaken. What she lost was that part of the territory lying between the Columbia river, and the Pacific ocean that she absolutely had to admit she had not the title to, that she did not discover, that she did not occupy, except in a very desultory way, and in regard to which the claim of the United States was absolutely unanswerable. Everything that Great Britain claimed under that treaty she got, and as one writer in connection with that matter has very well put it, Great Britain got, under that treaty, all she wanted, while many of the claims of the United States were left for future consideration. They never have been considered, and never will be.

At six o'clock, House took recess.

After Recess.

House resumed at eight o'clock.

Subtopic:   1'JlU

Edward Guss Porter

Conservative (1867-1942)


Before six o'clock I had been dealing with the disparaging remarks made by the premier and others in regard to British diplomacy in connection with Canadian interests, and I had shown that by the Ashburton treaty and the Oregon treaty, Canada had really gained enormously. By the Oregon treaty we gained the absolute title over a very large and valuable province, British Columbia. Although the line between the United States and Canada west as far as the Rocky mountains had been fixed at the 49th parallel, and Great Britain had offered on different occasions to fix the line west of the Rocky mountains upon the basis of the 49th parallel, yet the United States refused to accept that offer and contended that their territory extended up to 54-40; their slogan was * fifty four forty or fight '. Great Bri-

And in the German treaty, article 2 provided :

That no other or higher duties shall be levied in the Zolverin on the exportation of any goods to the Dominion and possessions of Her Britannic Majesty, nor in the dominions and the possessions of Her Britannic Majesty in the exportation of any goods to the Zolverin than are or may be levied on the exportation of the like goods to any third country the most favoured in that respect.

Article 5 of the German treaty provides:

That in favour, privilege or reduction in the tariff of duties of importation or exportation which either of the contracting parties may concede to any third power shall be extended immediately and unconditionally to the other.

.And article 7 provides:

That the stipulations of the preceding articles 1 to 6 shall also be applied to the colonies and foreign possessions of Her Britannic Majesty. In those colonies and possessions the produce of the states of the Zolverin shall not be subject to any higher or other import duties than the produce of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland or of any other country of a like kind, nor shall the exportation from the colonies or the possessions of the Zolverin be subject to any higher or other duties than the exportation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

One would have thought that that language was so explicit there could not be any" doubt as to its meaning. One would have thought that it clearly enough provided that no preference could be given by either of these countries to any other without that same preference being extended to the other contracting party. Such a meaning had in fact for a long time been attached to those treaties, and had been recognized on various occasions by the government preceding this one, notably in the joint address passed asking for denunciation of these treaties in 1891 in order that preferential trade within the -empire might be obtained; also when the French treaty of 1894 was adopted, and again in 1895, when the Act respecting commerical treaties was passed. With these before this government, one would have thought it would have been wholly impossible for them to have misconstrued or misunderstood the full effect or meaning of those treaty provisions. But in the first year this government was in power, they placed Canada apparently in total ignorance of these restrictions, in a very peculiar position. By a resolution introduced in connection with the tariff, they attempted first to grant to Great Britain a preference that would not apply to Germany or Belgium. But when that resolution was discussed, the full intent and scope of those two treaties was pointed out. So forcibly was the matter brought to their attention at that time, that

Subtopic:   1'JlU

Edward Guss Porter

Conservative (1867-1942)



they finally brought in another resolution which I think it would be well to read:

Clause 16. When the customs tariff of any country admits the products of Canada in terms which on the whole are as favourable to Canada as the terms of the reciprocal tariff herein referred to are to the countries to which it may apply, articles which are the growth, produce or manufacture of such country when imported direct thereform, may then be entered for duty or taken out of warehouse for consumption in Canada at the reduced rate of duty provided for in the reciprocal tariff set forth in schedule D.

(a) That any question that may arise as to the countries entitled to the benefits of the reciprocal tariff shall be decided by the collector of customs subject to the authority of the Governor in Council.

(b) That the Governor in Council may extend the benefits of such reciprocal tariff to any country which may be entitled thereto by virtue of any treaty with Her Majesty.

In order to get over the difficulty that no power existed in this government to extend such a privilege as they were prepared to extend to Great Britain without extending the same privilege to Belgium and Germany, they introduced this resolution. It was again pointed out that this resolution did not remove the objection made to the original one, but was every whit as objectionable. Notwithstanding that objection, however, they went on and passed that resolution. To be as brief as possible in the history of this matter, when that resolution was passed it granted to Great Britain a preference ranging, during the course of time, from 12i to 33i per cent. As soon as that preference was granted, Germany claimed an equal preference, and Canada denied that she was entitled to it. Canada then either had to get into trouble with Great Britain, to whom she had granted the preference, or Great Britain had to get into trouble with Germany, who was entitled to the same advantages. The difficulties increased, matters kept getting worse, and until finally to help this government out, Great Britain denounced the German and Belgian treaties, so far as Canada was concerned. What then was the position? Canada was outside the treaty, and having closed the custom house door in the face of Germany at a time when she should not have done so, naturally enough the German people retaliated and imposed the heaviest duties possible upon their imports from Canada. Then, that matter pressed so heavily upon Canadian interests that this government thought they would cure it in some other way, and, to meet the adverse taxation imposed upon them by Germany, they put on what is known as the surtax. The result of that was that Canadian trade was being reduced all the

time, Canada was losing enormous sums, her interests were being more adversely affected every day. It became absolutely necessary, in order to correct the mistake they had made and to put the country on a fair basis of trade with Germany, to undo the wrong they had done. So they withdrew the surtax, and they have now entered into a temporary commercial arrangement with Germany. Now, in the face of the facts, if any hon. gentleman will say that the diplomacy exhibited by this government in the arrangement of the Japanese treaty, and in the dealings with Germany will compare favourably with the diplomacy exercised by Great Britain in the Ashburton treaty and in the Oregon treaty, I can only say that I believe he fails altogether to apprehend the action of either party in connection with these matters. The comparison, instead of being disparaging to Great Britain, shows, on the contrary, that Great Britain exercised the very greatest

I might go on and refer to many other cases-there are others. But let me give one illustration-one which contrasts the action of the two authorities in relation to one matter. In 1854, the reciprocity treaty with the United States was negotiated by Lord Elgin on behalf of Canada. The effort was a successful one to obtain what Canada desired in regard to trade relations. I need not enter into the manner in which it was obtained; that, perhaps, is pretty well known. The fact is that the reciprocity treaty was obtained by British diplomacy for the benefit of Canada. And that it was for the practical benefit of Canada is shown by the trade returns of the eleven years during which the treaty was in force. The trade grew from $20,000,000 up to $80,000,000 in that period of eleven years. That treaty was revoked. And, although these gentlemen who occupy the treasury benches had promised that one of their first acts upon attaining to power would be to negotiate another reciprocity treaty with the United States, and though they have made attempt after attempt, though, time and again, they have journeyed to Washington on this mission, they have always come back empty-handed. At last they declared that there should be no more journeys to Washington, no more attempts to obtain a reciprocity treaty with the United States -they have abandoned the whole project which they once promised to carry into effect. Here we have, in this one instance, the diplomacy of Britain succeeding and succeeding admirably in the interests of Canada, yet the efforts of these hon. gentlemen in the same direction absolutely and entirely failing. I ask if, in view of this,

one can, make a favourable comparison for Canada in diplomacy with that which has been exercised by the British government on behalf of Canada. I might also refer to the French treaty and to the Alaskan boundary. In each and every one of these cases, I venture to say, one cannot view the facts fairly without _ coming to the conclusion-however unwilling he may be as a Canadian to do so-that Great Brit-has, on all occasions, shown the greatest concern for Canada and has secured the interest of Canada to a larger extent than have those who now control our affairs.

In conclusion, I am unalterably opposed to the Bill now under consideration for the establishment of a naval defence. I think I have shown-at any rate, I have satisfied myself from my investigation-that the Bill is"not one in the interest of the Canadian people or in the interest of the empire^ as a whole. I have tried to show, and I think I have succeeded, that an attempt is being made in' this Bill to wrest from His Majesty a part of his command and control over the armed forces of this empire. I think I have shown that the government, wrongfully, improperly, have endeavoured to secure the power to deny to His Majesty the assistance and benefit, even in time of necessity, of the forces that this Bill undertakes to Taise. In fact, the right hon. Prime Minister in introducing this Bill, or subsequently, stated that there might be occasions when he would feel it his duty to-withhold the services of this navy from Great Britain. Surely, in this day and age, such a condition of affairs will not be allowed to prevail in this Canada of ours. I think I have succeeded in showing that the government in supporting this Bill, or in leading hon. gentlemen in this House to support it, have not the information or data or knowledge concerning it which should convince this House, or any one, that it can ever be of material service to the empire, or to assure this House that it will be of real service to Canada. On the contrary, they have said enough to satisfy this House and the people, I think, that the efforts they are making will cost this country an enormous amount of money-they do not even know the amount-and that this expenditure will keep on increasing until it may become such a burden that the people of Canada can ill afford to bear it. I think I have shown that the reason put forth by the right hon. Prime Minister for retaining this control and for establishing the navy in this way-that interests having been sacrificed heretofore by British diplomacy-is a fallacy, there is no foundation in fact for it. And, for these many reasons, I shall feel it my duty, not only to my constituents, but to myself and to my country as a whole, to oppose this measure. I am

a Canadian-I think I am a better Canadian because I am a British subject.

I represent a riding containing men who are as loyal as any man who ever wore a hat, men who are not only willing to pay, but are willing to tight for the maintenance of the British empire, men who are just as anxious as any one can be to retain Canada in the position she now occupies as part of the British empire, and who icherish the hope that she will always occupy the proud position she now holds as the brightest gem in the British crown.

Mr. ERNEST ROY (Dorchester) (Translation.) Mr. Speaker, at this stage of the discusion on the Bill now submitted to the consideration of the House, it is rather a difficult matter to bring forth further arguments and even to find new forms for the expression of arguments already submitted. So, I shall be content with presenting a few considerations without entering into a thorough discussion of this measure.

I intend making only a brief reference to the speech delivered by the hon. member for Hastings (Mr. Porter) who has just taken his -seat. Let me, however, congratulate him on that part of his speech in which he pointed out the main difference between the policy of the government and that of the opposition in connection with this matter. Of course, I cannot agree that he has correctly pointed out what these differences are in every respect; but that part of his speech will help, I hope, in correcting the false impression which the friends of the hon. member for Jacques Cartier, the leader of His Majesty's opposition No. 2, aTe trying to create in the province of Quebec. As a matter of fact, the friends of the latter's, hon. member for Jacques Cartier, without eliciting a single protest on his part, are creating the impression outside of parliament that it is a farce which is going on within the precincts of this House. I find that idea expressed in a resolution passed by the members of a farmers' club in one of the parishes of the county of Dorchester, and which reads as follows:

Considering that Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Prime Minister of Canada, has made an agreement with Mr. Borden leader of the Opposition with a view to putting through the Naval Bill No. 95, introduced on January 12 1910.

That idea is also given, expression to in the petitions forwarded to this House from the province of Quebec against the passing of this Bill. The hon. member for Hastings, by pointing out to the House in what respects the policy of the Liberal party and that of the Conservatives who follow the lead of the hon. member for Halifax, differ essentially from one another, will have helped to correct the false notion to which I have just called attention.


It is to be regretted, Mr. Speaker, that there should be in Canada people having so little concern for our parliamentary institutions, and such a short-sighted view of patriotism, as to spread among the Canadian people the impression that their representatives in this House, are only comedians in disguise. It is to be hoped that the hon. member for Jacques Cartier and his followers will realize that it is incumbent on them to set the public right by means of a public statement. The first duty of a member of parliament is to ensure public respect to the institution of which he forms part.

Mr. Speaker, before proceeding any further, I wish to correct as regards a misunderstanding in regard to the meaning of some remarks I made in this House last year concerning the resolution of March 29, 1909, a misunderstanding resulting from the erroneous construction put on those remarks by some hon. gentleman. The hon. gentleman for Marquette, among others, contended a short time ago that, on March 29 last, I had condemned the proposal for the building of a Canadian navy. It will be sufficient for me to quote short extracts from the ' Hansard ' of last year to set the House right in regard to the position I actually took at the time. Following on some general remarks as to the reasons which might be urged in favour of the immediate building of a Canadian navy, I spoke as follows:

(Hansard 1909, page 3550). What I have said does not imply that Canada should not adopt military measures for the defence of her coast and of her territory. . . Canada being a nation surrounded by other nations whose interests may conflict with her own, is bound to provide means of defence.

Page 3551. Let Canada organize a naval force to protect her coast line and her seaports both on the Atlantic and the Pacific; no one objects.

And I summed up my remarks in the following terms:

The House is no doubt unanimous in its opinion that Canada should get up a naval force which will enable her to make first among the nations, and thus command that respect which otherwise she would not command from those nations having hostile intentions against her.

The above extracts clearly show that last year I was in favour of the establishment of a Canadian navy, and that I then considered that undertaking an essentially patriotic one. I have not changed my mind in the meantime.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Saint Ann's, on February 24 _ last, delivered a speech which the opposition generously applauded. The hon. gentleman from Victoria (Mr. Barnard) gave expression to the admiration and enthusiasm which that

speech stirred up in the minds of his colleagues by challenging hon. members on the government side to find in their ranks any one who would dare analyse that speech not to say to attempt answering it. At the risk of being thought presumptuous. I intend taking up that challenge and answering briefly the few, though long winded arguments, set forth by the hon. member for St. Ann's. I shall do so with the same calmness of mind as when in the ordinary course of my professional practice. I appeal to a higher tribunal from the judgment of an inferior court which does not seem satisfactory.

The arguments brought forward by the hon. member for St. Ann's may be summed up as follows, and I shall take up first that which comes last in his speech. Canada, he says, without breaking the constitution is at liberty to grant to Great Britain a sum of money towards helping the mother country in maintaining her supremacy oyer the other nations of the world, or else-towards relieving her of part of the burden which she has to bear in order to keep the world at peace, by having an argument superior to that of any other nation. I recognize the soundness of that proposition. The rightful owner is entitled to transfer his property rights to whomsoever he wishes. That legal proposition cannot be gainsaid, and Canada has the right to donate the people's money to England. So the Dominion can legally do what is provided for in the latter part of the amendment submitted by the hon. leader of the opposition.

The hon. member for St. Ann's, on the other hand, admits that Canada would be justified in granting such a gift to Great Britain only in case the latter was in such a position that the money would be needed to stave off an attack on the part of Germany. He admits that, if it were not for Germany, there would be no occasion for a gift of Dreadnoughts or money. That is a question of fact, and after going into the matter, he draws the conclusion that there actually exists a German danger, and that it is desirable that Canada should make a contribution to Great Britain either in money or in Dreadnoughts.

I have also on my own account gone into that question of fact. My authority is the English people, British opinion. I find it is divided on that point. Even in England, some contend that danger exists, while others deny it. However, I am assured that those who deny the existence of any danger, are not impelled by any feeling of disloyalty, are not lacking in patriotism. I must then come to the conclusion that the people most interested in finding out, discovering, detecting any danger, deny its existence. Will Canada and particularly will this House claim that we have a better insight into the matter than the British people and

the British parliament themselves. I think it would be bad form on our part to assume that we are in a position to enlighten the British people and British parliament in matters of patriotism and political foresight.

Therefore I say that so long as the English people have not themselves clearly recognized that the danger exists, we should keep our money, and direct our efforts towards helping the mother country in another way, in the way that was recognized to be the best at the colonial conference of 1909, where all interested parties were represented. -

The hon. member for St. Ann's contends in another proposition that the passing of the Bill would result in a restriction of Canada's autonomy, inasmuch as she would divest herself of all national sentiment. He further contends that a proposal entailing such consequences should be submitted to the people previous to its being adopted by this House.

Since the debate originated, I was always expecting from hon. gentlemen- opposite some evidence that logic had been respected in the amendment submitted by their leader. Speeches ran their course and there was nothing forthcoming. Of course reference was made to the ' tin pot navy,' to the German scare, to the loyalty of the Canadian Prime Minister, to the disloyalty of French Canadians, to the lack of patriotism of the Liberals, but no satisfaction was given to the public mind, very naturally puzzled by this chaotic assemblage of disconnected ideas. The hon. member for St. Ann's, with his judicial mind, had observed that gap, and for three hours and a half applied himself to filling it.

It is no wonder that the opposition which until then had fought in a haphazard way, without any plan of campaign, with the sole idea Of fighting the government, and could not find its way out of a debate wherein they had engaged without the help of logic, it is no wonder, I say, that the opposition should have greeted with utmost pleasure the member for St. Ann's who, they thought, had found a means of solving the difficulty. They applauded him, thinking that once more out of chaos light had come. But that way out which the hon. member for St. Ann was supposed to have discovered, did not exist in reality, it was an effect of mirage, a delusion of the senses, originating from a keen thirst for logic, which the hon. gentleman has been unable to satisfy.

The Bill now under consideration, would be a restriction on our national autonomy were it to become law, says the hon. member for St. Ann's. And why? Because, he says, a war navy is always destined for attack, and he states in support of that contention an utterance of the British admir-I alty at the colonial conference of 1907.

Since, he goes on to say, a war navy is a means of attack, Canada having no right to declare war, that means would be entirely for the use of Great Britain, who alone has authority to lead an attack on a foreign nation and declare war. If that be the case, the Canadian navy will necessarily be under the control of the only power within the empire in a position to make use of it. Now, he adds, as any declaration on the part of Great Britain can only be the outcome of her foreign policy, and as Canada has nothing to do with that, it will happen that the British authorities will declare war and utilize Canada's naval force, without Canada having been consulted as to the desirability or the fairness of such a decision. Thus, Canada sacrifices in part her national conscience.

That is a fallacy couched in pretty language, but which cannot be defended on any grounds. The whole force of this argument is dependent on the truth of the contention that a war navy is necessarily a means of attack, and cannot be looked upon as a means of defence. That is the statement the falsity of which I intend to show first.

At the colonial conference of 1907 the proposal was made to provide a) single imperial navy under the immediate and exclusive control of the British admiralty. It was stated at the time that the British'navy could not be considered a means of defence, and that was true in the case of Great Britain, seeing that her supremacy in that respect cannot for the time" being be denied. Great Britain is a sovereign state having the power to declare war. She cannot let other nations whose strength is inferior provide themselves, with navies to protect them, selves one against the other; but as soon as any power tried to go further and build a navy which not only would ensure its superiority over neighbouring powers, but would put it on a par with Great Britain, that departure would be looked upon as an agression, since such an armament could be aimed only at the only power superior to it at the time. In that case, it would be a matter of elementary wisdom on the part of England not to wait until the enemv had-completed his means of attack. She should take the lead and cripple the power thus threatening the world's peace.

Canada is not a sovereign country, and while enjoying complete liberty as regards her domestic administration, she is, as regards her foreign relations, under certain restrictions due to her status of dependency. Canada is free to repulse whomsoever invades her territory; but she has not the right of declaring war against a foreign country. Her militia is for purposes of defence, but she could not of her own accord lead an attack, because whenever Canada took such a step, she would be asserting her independence.

As a result. Great Britain's relative posi-Mr. E. BOY.

tion among the nations of the world, her naval forces are destined to take the offensive, while. Canada's political status requires that all our forces should be for purposes of defence. That statement cannot be contradicted. The forces of Canada can be used for purposes of attack only in cooperation with Great Britain should the latter engage in war.

It may be inquired when Canada is likely to be attacked. I am not a prophet, but Canada might be attacked as the outcome of a declaration of war on the part of several allied powers desirous of wrenching from England her supremacy. It might also occur as a diversion by the forces of a power attempting to repel an attack on the part of Great Britain by striking at her colonies. Canada might also be the object of an attack through a desire for conquest on the part of a foreign nation suffering from overpopulation, and which, not having at home sufficient resources to draw on, might deem itself justified in laying hands on a country such as Canada, provided with the very things that power would be in need of. Would the property rights, held by Canada, her desire to reserve for her children the wealth within her borders, her repugnance to allow the introduction in the country of a civilization foreign to hers, would all that suffice to keep out those hungry foes? Certainly not.

Under all such conditions the Canadian war navy would undeniably have its usefulness. But the building of the navy will have its immediate and more certain usefulness in helping to maintain the supremacy of the British empire throughout the world, and thus ensuring for many years to come peace to Great Britain and her colonies.

When these colonies will, each and every one of them, have war navies severalty owned by them, and will see to their own protection without any expense to the mother country, any power anxious to attack Great Britain or one of its colonies, will have tp have at her command forces superior to those of Great Britain and her colonies. The expenditure which such an undertaking would necessitate and which that power would have to bear single-handed, would probably be considered too heavy. Its only recourse would then be in contracting alliance, and here it would be met with the wiles of British diplomacy, which would leave very little chance of success.

Alliances have always been the most efficient means for ensuring the world's peace. Very few countries are powerful enough to command respect by themselves, but an alliance may often result in securing the co-operation of three or four other powers, which altogether may be in a position to command respect for the rights of each and every one of them.

When England will be surrounded by colonies all provided with war navies, slie will

offer to the world the spectacle of an alliance of many nations, an alliance founded on interest and on sentiment, that is, on the most potent influences in human life. So then I say that the hon. memoer .or St. Ann's has no grounds for saying that the navy which is to 'be provided under this Bill cannot possibly be for purposes of defence, and must necessarily be for purposes of attack.

Our constitution contained in the British North America Act allows us in clause 7 of section 91, to provide means of defence on land and on sea; it grants us the power to create a land force and a war navy for the defence of Canada, That navy, of course, remains under the control of the Dominion as well as the militia.

I say that the Canadian navy will remain under the control of Canada. However, that is questioned by the wing of the opposition which has the hon. member for Jacques Cartier as its leader. That section of the opposition party, together with those in the province of Qudbec who are their exponents, contend that the control of the navy must ultimately rest with Great Britain, and that thereby our national autonomy will be restricted. Both the government and that wing of the Conservative party which follows the lead of the hon. member for Halifax (Mr. Borden), contend that the control of the Canadian navy will continue to be with the Dominion. The government and their followers take credit to themselves on that account, while the opposition taunts the government with having, under the Bill, retained that control for Canada. Of the 221 members making up the House, there are only seven or eight, under the guidance of the hon. member for Jacques Cartier, who fail to construe the law in that manner. But as every one knows, the worst cases -of blindness are those of people who refuse to open their eyes.

After thus disposing of the fallacy which the hon. member for St. Ann's has invoked in support of his contention, I am justified in saying that the Canadian navy will be a means of defence for staving off any attack directed against Canada. That navy will remain under our control. In building it, we are merely exercising a power which is granted to us by the constitution; in keeping it under our control, we are also exercising a power granted by the constitution, and the mere fact of exercising a power cannot logically restrict that power; on the contrary, it causes it to pass from the domain of theory into that of reality.

Will it he contended that by section 18, Canada relinquishes part of her autonomy? How is that section worded? It says that in a ease of emergency the Canadian government will have the power to place the Canadian navy at the disposal of the

British admiralty, which should be effected with the consent of the Canadian parliament, if it is in session; and should it be during recess, parliament will have to be summoned to meet within a fortnight of the action thus taken by the government.

The right of Canada to donate to Great Britain a sum of money in the shape of a contribution and without in any way restricting her autonomy, cannot be denied by any one. On the contrary, such action would go to show that Canada has the right to dispose of her property in the same way as any private owner. If instead of giving money to Great Britain, Canada were to give guns or rifles, she would still be acting within her powers and would not be relinquishing or restricting any of her powers. If instead of donating rifles or guns, Canada preferred loaning them, it would merely be depriving itself of certain of the privileges of ownership, usufruct, and such action would not in any way affect her powers. Then again, if instead of donating money or loaning rifles or guns, Canada, in a case of emergency, loaned to Great Britain another war machine, its navy, the same principle would apply, and Canada would not he losing anything of its autonomy. The right to give has never been restricted through its being exercised. Let me demonstrate that fact by means of a comparison. The interdict is deprived of the right of making any transaction in regard to his holdings. He is not permitted to sell, loan or give his property without being authorised to do so by some other person. Even should the interdict be a millionaire, he would not be allowed to dispose of his property any more than if he was a pauper. It is autonomy, it is liberty that is lacking. But, whoever retains his full rights and is left with a free hand in the administration of his property even, should he have only a few cents, would in giving them, be giving proof of the actual possession of his autonomy, of his liberty. To my mind, Canada would not be losing its autonomy if, in a case of emergency or which would he considered such as regards Great Britain, or herself she put the Canadian navy at the disposal of the British admiralty, any more than she lost her autonomy when she voted a grant for the sufferers in the Paris floods, or the sufferers in the earthquakes of San Francisco or Messina.

If Canada has the right, without impairing her autonomy to loan her navy to Great Britain whenever she thinks proper, she has the right to delegate that power to her trustees, the government, under definite circumstances, and the fact that in delegating that power she requires that her trustees. after fulfilling their trust, should give an account of their management does not

in any way alter the principle. It is a mere matter of policy.

I think I have shown that Canada is free +o exercise the power conferred by the constitution in regard to providing a war navy and loaning it as well to England, without losing anything of her power, liberty and autonomy.

The next question to be considered is whether it is desirable that we should exercise that power. The right of ownership implies that of safeguarding property rights; and whoever recognizes the right of ownership, must also recognize the right of the owner to defend his property and to take the necessary means to that effect. The right of defence is thereby recognized.

Nature is a great teacher m that regard. All living beings are provided with means of defence enabling them to protect their life against any attack. Man, she has endowed with intelligence and with the power to take hold of things and adapt them to his own usage, either for the preservation of life, or of property, or for purposes of defence.

Canada is a large holder; she has the right Qf utilizing her possessions, but she has also the duty, in order to maintain her property rights, to provide means for their defence against all comers. In the natural world, only those being who are destined to be food for other are unprovided with adequate means of defence, and have no thought of providing themselves with such means. In the realm of intelligent beings, the incapable, the improvident and the cowardly alone neglect providing themselves with means of defence However, ineapables, that is to say, children and sick persons, are not always exposed to suffer on that account, for 'in the human heart there has been instilled a feeling, motherly love, filial love, friendship or humanity, feelings which lead the strong to protect and defend under certain circumstances those who are weak. Even nations have shown that they were endowed with feelings of humanity, since Great Britain is known to have provided out of her own resources for the defence of ner colonies still too young to protect Ihemselves, just as the father of a family looks after, protects and defends his child so long as the latter has not reached a sufficient age, or has not acquired sufficient strength to render that protection superfluous. The child should not wait until his parents give him to understand that he is in a position to look after himself or to provide part of his sustenance; he should realize what his parents have done for him, and without hesitation look out for himself as soon as he is capable of doing so.

British colonies have enjoyed heretofore and for the last century or more, in the Mr. E. EOY.

case of Canada, a condition of perfect peace, whereby they have been enabled to make marvellous progress. And that era of peace, they owe to England, who, by making the required sacrifices towards acquiring supremacy among the nations, has lendered her colonies secure against any danger of attack. That era of peace will be maintained only inasmuch as England's power is upheld. Now that the colonies are in a position to lighten the burden of the mother country, they should do so willingly. They should do so, in the first place, by endeavouring to provide for their own wants, in the same way that the child should relieve his parents of part of the burden of becoming self-sustaining.

The measure which is now under consideration, does not provide from the start a defence service for Canada, but aims merely at completing the system already in existence, and there is nothing exceptional about it. It simply provides for a need in the ordinary course of things.

Is there a single Canadian engrossed with the welfare of his country who would have expected Canada to increase in national wealth, to treble in the space of a few years the volume of her trade, to increase her population in marvellous fashion, to make a reputation for her products in the greatest markets of the world, to reveal to all nations her resources, her great possibilities, and to develop in every way her assets, and that this same Canada would remain indifferent as regards any steps to be taken for the defence of her possessions.

Cities increase the police force and take fuller measures of safety as the value of property increases within their limits. The banker will spend more to protect his hundreds of thousands of dollars against the attacks of robbers than the common labourer will do to protect the small sums he keeps at home. Means taken for the safeguarding of wealth should bear a certain proportion to the value of that wealth. Property should be protected in due proportion to the volume of that wealth. Property should be protected in due proportion to its value for greed keeps pace with the value of the coveted objects.

We are told, Mr. Speaker, that we have not the right to complete the means of defence of the country without consulting the people. If I understand aright the theory of our constitution, Canada is governed by an executive council composed of ministers, presided over by the Governor General who represents the King. It is the duty of the government to see to the enforcement of the laws, and to provide means that will enable Canada to fulfil her destiny. It is incumbent on them to prepare the legislation under which the country will develop and its citizens be allowed

to enjoy full liberty, exercise their rights, and hold property.

That government is responsible to parliament for its stewardship; the representatives of the people are its judges. On the other hand, these representatives are responsible to the people for the carrying out of their mandate. They should be courageous enough to realize fully what duties are incumbent upon them and live up to those duties. The mandate which we as members of parliament have received from the people is not specific but general. We are here to consider the questions which are submitted to us; we should look into them and not play the part of a shyster lawyer. The advocate who is anxious to fulfil his duty advises his client, studies his case and takes the responsibility of the opinion he gives, realizing that since his client has come to him, it is because he relies on his honesty and his special knowledge of the subject. The lawyer who is indifferent to the dictates of his conscience, who may be a smart practitioner with a difficult case, rather than probe it to the bottom, will confer with his client, present the matter to him in a more or less satisfactory light, and endeavour to get from him a clue, so that should he fail later on in winning the case, he may fall back on his client and say: I have done as you diretced me to do. Such an excuse is not valid.

Mr. Speaker, I love Canada as warmly as any Canadian. My ancestry in this land of Canada can be retraced as far back as 1663, and if the grim reaper spares my home, I shall leave a numerous progeny to continue the family name on this land of Canada. I love Canada and I love the Canadian people of whatever origin. I wish for my country a happy future, _ a future of greatness which will cause its name to be inscribed in golden letters in the annals of history. I am willing to work all my life, and put at its disposal the activity, the intelligence and the enthusiasm which I have inherited for promoting its intellectual, social and material progress. I am willing to work and accumulate for ourselves and for those who will come after us great riches of all kinds; but I wish also that after thus amassing wealth we should be far-seeing enough to conserve it; and on behalf of the hon. gentlemen occupying seats in this House, if they have the power of developing the resources of Canada, without having to consult the people in regard to each and every measure submitted for that purpose; if they have the power to modify the constitution of the country as they have done so, at the time of confederation, without first consulting the people; if they have the power to ensure the greatness, happiness and prosperity of Canada, in that way, I claim for

them the right of conserving the benefits accruing from their labour without being obliged to consult the people. Not, Mr. Speaker, that I intend disparaging or showing disrespect for public opinion, or ignoring the sovereignty of the people; no, but in so doing, I would fear lest my constituents told me, and rightly so, that when they sent me here to get acquainted with the history of my country, study its resources, imbibe its ideals and aspirations, they expected that I would do my duty valiantly, conscientiously and patriotically.

I would fear lest they told me, and rightly so, that it is useless to elect representatives, if as regards every measure of some importance, the farmer must leave the plough to make a study of politics, the merchant, the manufacturer, and banker turn away from their business, from their undertakings, to unravel the intricacies of constitutional law, or carry on an investigation regarding the general business of the country from the political standpoint, so as to be in a position to direct the government as to the course it should follow. In the meantime, members of parliament would be taking a rest.

No, let us take a serious view of the question. What the Canadian electorate wish for is a body of representatives who are capable of study and reflection, of appreciating and judging things. What the people want is a body of representatives showing patriotism, good will, activity and self reliance. What the people want is the maintenance of our constitution and our parliamentary traditions. What the people want is a bodv of men capable of developing Canada, of putting in store the results of each successive advance; not dreamers who live in the clouds, not firebrands of loyalism who would fain counteract the natural course of things, who would have water flow up hill, and the child play the part of the mother. What the people want, it is a body of representatives who take lessons from the-past to prepare the future, but who are always mindful that man is master only of the present and that the true patriots are those who do things, and not those who are content with dreaming.

Subtopic:   1'JlU

Eugène Paquet

Conservative (1867-1942)

Mr. E. PAQUET (L'lslet).

(Translation). Mr. Speaker, my first thought is to congratulate my congenial and eloquent friend the member for Dorchester (Mr. Roy), on his success, on the ability and zeal with which he has acquitted himself. I shall endeavour to do my best towards answering him in the course of the few remarks I am about to make.

The Bill relative to the building of a war navy is, to my mind, the most momentous of all those that have been brought to the

attention of the government of parliament and of the Canadian people, since the day of confederation. I intend considering that social, economical and political problem from the standpoint of national interests, from the standpoint of the constitution, and lastly, from the standpoint of the rights of the electorate.

In considering that important subject, I intend taking as guide a principle inscribed in the works of the fathers of confederation: ' Canada for the Canadians, under the folds of the British flag.' I intend looking into that problem with a mind .unbiased by party interest. I was elected after stating to the electors of the county of l'lslet that, on all national issues, I would place myself above party considerations. I have not as long a parliamentary experience as most of my colleagues of the province of Quebec who occupy seats on your right, Mr. Speaker. Accordingly, at this late stage of a memorable debate, the representative of the county of l'lslet craves the indulgence and courtesy which have always been extended to him when addressing the House to defend his opinions or expound his views.

Fortunately, we are not called upon just now to deal with a question of race or religion; we are endeavouring to find out a means of settlement of a social problem which is of interest to all the provinces. I am not going to consider that question from the standpoint of race, religion or language; but entirely from the national standpoint, the Canadian standpoint, and I am glad to be in sympathy with the workingmen and a large number of English speaking farmers, who are of opinion that the government should not decide to build a war navy before consulting the people.

Previous speakers have thought proper to question the loyalty of some distinguished men of my nationality.

I am not called upon to defend these gentlemen here; but I have suffered so much from these appeals to race prejudices at the hands of my opponents that I must repudiate with all the energy that is in me those malignant attacks, directed against the Conservative and the Liberal leaders of French Canadian origin.

This Bill is of the greatest moment from a financial standpoint, and I cannot undertake to vote such large sums without first consulting my constitutents. On the same grounds, I am bound to refuse to acquiesce in the policy of the leader of the Conservative party. Without a mandate from the people, I should think I was failing in my duty and betraying the interests of my constituents in denying my cordial support to the policy advocated by the hon. member for Jacques Cartier.

Subtopic:   1'JlU

Joseph Pierre Turcotte


Mr. J. TURCOTTE (Quebec).

My hon. friend is in favour of an appeal to the peo-Mr. PAQUET.

pie, Should the people pronounce in favour of the building of a navy, would the hon. gentleman support such a measure?

Subtopic:   1'JlU

Eugène Paquet

Conservative (1867-1942)


(Translation.) Should the people, as my hon. friend suggests, pronounce in favour of the building of that navy, let me tell him that I have too much respect for the will of the people not to bow to it, once it has spoken out. I would obey the people, or else I snould respect ny own convictions to the point of bidding adieu to public life and going back to my professional labours.

Besides, in the course of the remarks I am going to make, I shall have the opportunity of replying more fully to the questions he has just asked me. However, I wish it to be well understood that I have such a respect for the will of the Canadian people that I would not hesitate to bow to their decision, and as I said, to withdraw from public life, should it be necessary.

The Bill introduced by the government on the 12th of January provides for the creation of a naval force to be composed of a permanent corps, a reserve force and a volunteer force. Let us review the variations of the naval programme of the government.

The yearly cost, from $3,000,000 rises to S7,157,000, even before we have started building our navy.

In introducing his Bill on the 12th of January, the Prime Minister laid down the naval programme and stated that Canada was going to establish a navy which might cost $15,000,000 and which was to be composed of four Bristols, six destroyers and one Boadicea.

This involves an expenditure of $3,000,000 a year for maintenance.

On the 3rd of February, Sir Wilfrid Lau-rier stated that the expenditure involved in the maintenance of this new fleet would be $4,253,000 a year.

Still another variation. On the 10th of February, Sir Frederick Borden also addresses the House The scheme is extending; a naval college is now wanted.

Here is the third plan: Four Bristols. six destroyers, one Boadicea, one Niobe or Rainbow, one naval college.

Henceforth, we are going to have 12 ships, and according to Sir Frederick Borden the estimated cost is $11,730,000, or a little less than the cost of the seven ships first mentioned. In return the cost of the upkeep, according to Sir Frederick Borden, is only $3,680,000 now, or $600,000 less than the estimated cost of maintenance of the 11 ships of Sir Wilfrid Laurier.

This ' Niobe ' which hooks on the last scheme, is a vessel thirteen years old, and out of date, which we have bought from the British Admiralty for the sum of $1,075,000.

Mr. Monk, the member for Jacques Cartier, prevailed upon Sir Frederick Borden to

place on ' Hansard ' a memorandum prepared by Admiral Kingsmill, who is in charge of our new navy, and this memorandum, which the minister tried to conceal from the House, shows the following figures, prepared by Admiral Kingsmill:-

1. Cost of ships.

(In England.)

4 Bristols at $1,885,000 each $ 7,540,000

1 Boadicea 1,750,000

6 destroyers at $400,000 2,400,000

1 Niohe 1,075,000

Everybody admits that 25 per cent must be added for the additional cost of construction in Canada, except for the Niobe, which is already built:-

4 Bristols at $2,350,000 $ 9,400,000

1 Boadicea 2,180,000

6 destroyers at $500,000 3,000,000

1 Nibe 1,075,000

Total cost $15,655,000

The interest at 3 per cent on that expenditure is $468,000 a year. The life or term of service of those ships is but ten years; one-tenth of their cost must be set aside yearly, to provide for their replacement. That sum amounts to $1,500,000.

Admiral Kingsmill, in his memorandum, gives the following approximate cost of the college, battery, barracks, dry docks, &c.:

1 naval college $150,000

Furnishing same and workshops.. .. 50,000

Two houses, captain of college and

director of studies 15,000

Barracks 200,000

Battery for heavy- and light guns.. .. 20,000

Arming same 110,000

Admiralty house for officers of barracks 70,000

Dockyards 100,000

Just think of it. Building a college for $150,000 and constructing a dry dock for $100,000. Who ever heard the like?

Let us take those figures, $715,000, and add them to the total cost of the fleet, and that gives us a total of $16,405,000 for construction and maintenance.

Subtopic:   1'JlU


The following are the details given for the yearly maintenance of our naval establishment on land: Upkeep of naval college $ 80,000 " of barracks 75,000 " of dockyards 350,000 Headquarter staffs 80,000 Reserve stores 100,000 Ordnance stores 200,000 Contingencies 150,000 Total $1,030,000


First, as to the annual cost of the training ships ' Niobe ' and ' Rainbow,' according to the estimate of Admiral Kingsmill: Cost of nucleous crew and training personal $ 282,000 Victualling and medicines, &c 60,000 Clothing gratuity 15,000 Upkeep of ' Niobe ' 150,000 " of ' Rainbow ' 115,000 Recruits: Pay, victualling and medicines 550,000 Clothing 70,000 Recruiting expenses 2,000 Total $1,244,000 Let. us now take the upkeep of the fleet, and here are the figures given by Admiral Kingsmill: 4 Bristols. Pay, allowances and victualling.. .. $ 886,000 Upkeep 530,000 1 Boadicea. Pay, allowances and victualling, &c.. 226,000 Upkeep 150,000 6 Destroyers. Pay, allowances, victualling 335,000 Upkeep 428,000 Recruits. Expenditure 200,000 Contingencies 100,000 Total $2,855,000 It is worth noting down here that there is no estimate given for coal, repairs, &c. Total cost of the navy, according to the latter plan. General recapitulation. Total cost of tlie navy, according to the latter plan $ 715,000 College, barracks, &c 715,000 Total $16,370,000 Annual cost, from the estimate of Admiral Kingsmill himself. Interest on the cost of the .fleet.. .. $ 468,000 10 per cent on the cost of the fleet, to provide for replacement, &c.. .. 1,560,000 Upkeep of college, barracks, &c .. .. 1,030,000 Maintenance of training-ships.. .. 1,244,000 Upkeep of Bristols and destroyers.. 2,855,000 Total annual cost $7,157,000 And mark that we are spending about $1,500,000 for agriculture. Is it to be wondered at that the people are clamouring for a plebiscite, in order to put a stop to such an extravagance. But wait till next year and you will see worse things than that. They talk of fifteen million dollars for the building of our navy. But those who examine closely the cost of our national public works know that a much heavier expenditure must be anticipated.

Let us now read carefully sections 5 and 6 of the Bill: Tlie minister shall have the control and management of all naval affairs, including the perchase, maintenance and repair of the ordnance, ammunition, arms, armouries, stores, munitions and habiliments of war intended for the use of the naval service. The minister shall have the control and management, including the construction, purchase, maintenance and repair of naval establishments and of ships and other vessels for the naval service. We cannot conceive to-day, how many million dollars will be spent for the purchase of the maintenance and repairs of the ordnance, ammunition, arms, armouries, munitions and 'stores, I invite all those who are responsible to the taxpayers of Canada and are accountable for the taxes imposed on them, to read carefully the following extract from the report of the conference (page 27): In any consideration of the question of providing new docking facilities the Admiralty suggested that the docks should be designed of sufficient size to accommodate the largest ships whether for war or commerce, as apart from the mercantile advantage such docks might be used in case of an emergency by armoured cruisers and battleships. Docks of this kind might be placed on the Pacific, the Atlantic and the River St. Lawrence. The providing of such docking facilities if designed of sufficient size, would involve a very large expenditure. Try to figure out the cost of the fortifications necessary to insure the protection of our naval yards and of our dry docks; just figure out the cost of pensions and of the training schools. No money is to be found now for the construction of a dry dock at Levis, to meet a long felt want of maritime commerce and accommodate sea-going ships. It is impossible to forecast the enormous expenditure which will be saddled upon this country, and it is the ratepayers, the humble workingman, and the poor farmer who will have to foot the bill. And that expenditure will go on increasing by leaps and bounds, from year to year. The South African war did cost us $2,000,000; how much then is the ratepayer going to pay, when our brothers are called upon to shed their . blood in a war carried on by England against a European power? How much are we going to spend, when our navy will be drawn into some great war for the defence of England? How much shall we spend, perhaps to drown the voice of, and defeat just claims? How much will it cost us, should that navy be destroyed? To-morrow the government will be called upon or will think that they are called upon to adopt a more strenuous attitude. Our naval expenditure will not be estimated ac-


Eugène Paquet

Conservative (1867-1942)


cording to our population, our wealth and our commerce, but from the risks we shall incur. That navy which you are going to build, those fighting ships which you propose to construct will demand life, strength and power. Before the general elections are on, the government will perhaps crown their present policy, by having Dreadnoughts built.

Open our public accounts under the heading of our Canadian militia, and you will find that that expenditure has gone on increasing by leaps and bounds, since 1890.

In 1890, our expenditure on militia was, $1,287,000; in 1896, $2,136.54; in 1909, $6,115,150.

The government is asking for a vote of $6,898,000 for the fiscal year 1910-1911. Let us speak honestly: our naval expenditure will increase in the same ratio and with the same rapidity.

Let us hearken to the words of Sir William White, who was for a long time director of the shipyards of the British government:

There is no find stand in the designing of new models of warships, and as the Dreadnought type has not received the approval of a great number of experts, it may safely be said that this class of ships will not long remain in vogue and will not be in use so long as claimed by its advocates.

Will not our history be a repetition of the history of those people thrown into the vortex of militarism formerly denounced by the right hon.. Prime Minister? When our fleet is built, we shall inevitably be carried away and led into naval ventures. We shall have to increase our public debt which will soon reach $500,000,000, and do without public works and improvements of great urgency in the interest of the progress of agriculture and industry. Let us listen to the words fallen from the lips of one of the most distinguished members on the government side. Let us impress on our minds the words uttered on March 29, 1900, by the hon. member for the Yukon:

But'if we start at present into any vast naval or military outlay, we shall so impede our growth that in the course of a very short time we shall be of much less assistance to the empire than if we permitted our country to advance and prosper as she is doing now.

Let us cast a glance at the ascensional progression of the military and naval outlay of some nations. After the wars of the French revolution and of the empire, the cost of the British army was 220,000,000 francs. The following statistics give us a slight insight into the future in store for us:


Outlay of England for her militia

in 1828 220,000,000

Outlay of England for her militia

in 1870 540,000,000

Naval outlay of England in 1828.. 150,000,000Naval outlay of England in 1870.. 240,000,000

During the last decade, the yearly outlay [DOT]of England for her navy was 820,000,000 francs.

loyalty in creating and improving our means of transportation, in building the Georgian Bay canal, in developing and pro-


Joseph Pierre Turcotte


Mr. J. TURCOTTE (Quebec).

(Translation.) Francs, you say?


Eugène Paquet

Conservative (1867-1942)

Mr. PAQUET. (Translation).

Yes, francs.


Pierre Édouard Blondin

Conservative (1867-1942)


(Translation.) Would you rather have pounds sterling instead of francs? '


Gustave Adolphe Turcotte


Mr. TURCOTTE. (Translation).

Is it

820,000,000 francs?


March 3, 1910